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INTRODUCTION
Dawn in Bata, Equatorial Guinea’s second city. At 6:00 a.m., I stood 
outside the headquarters of a large US- based oil company with a small 
group of others — a Spanish woman, a man from Louisiana, and two 
Equatoguinean men — waiting to “go offshore” by helicopter. We stood 
quietly and not quite together, separated by the early hour and by 
not knowing if we were all there for the same purpose. Eventually, an 
Equatoguinean driver pulled up in a company bus. As we boarded, 
he requested our identification passes to electronically register each 
of our exits from the compound, and then drove us to the company’s 
private wing of the airport. After an airport worker searched our bags, 
we sat in a small room to watch a safety video on the importance of 
in- flight protective equipment and what to do if our helicopter were 
to catch fire in midair. At liftoff, the helicopter rose effortlessly as the 
city of Bata spread out beneath us. Further from shore, looking back, 
the Ntem River marked the edge of the continent. After a while, sights 
and sounds faded into the calm of the open ocean seen from above 
and the gently vibrating lull of the helicopter through noise- canceling 
headphones. 
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Eventually, a bright flame appeared in the distance, attached to 
an indistinct industrial atoll — a rig. Just as the rig came into view, the 
helicopter banked left to land briefly on what looked like an aircraft 
carrier, leaving the Spanish woman on what was, in fact, a Float-
ing Production, Storage, and Offloading (FPSO) vessel. With the pro-
duction rig visible some hundreds of yards away across the water, the 
FPSO was animated by its own large flare, burning the crude’s gas-
eous by- products. Both the rig and this vast, self- propelling, ship- like 
structure floated above a field producing 100,000 barrels of crude oil 
per day. Every ten days, a tanker pulled alongside the FPSO and left 
with one million barrels of oil. From subsea hydrocarbon deposits, to 
the rig, to the FPSO, to the tanker, and finally to market, Equatorial 
Guinea’s oil production chain was clearest to me by helicopter, far off 
the country’s shores.
Capitalism is not a context; it is a project.1
This book offers an ethnographic account of the daily life of capitalism. 
It is both an account of a specific capitalist project — US oil companies work-
ing off the shores of Equatorial Guinea — and an exploration of more gen-
eral forms and processes (the offshore, contracts, infrastructures, something 
called “the” economy) that facilitate diverse capitalist projects around the 
world. Each of these forms and processes, which organize the book, chapter 
by chapter, is both a condition of possibility for contemporary capitalism 
and an ongoing entanglement with the raced and gendered histories of co-
lonialism, empire, and white supremacy out of which capitalism and liberal-
ism emerged. Indeed, the book explores the relationship between the liberal 
modernity claimed by US oil companies — contractual obligation, market 
rationality, transparency — and the racialized global inequality that radi-
cally delimits the ways in which Equatorial Guinea and other postcolonial 
African countries might engage with multinational oil companies. Just as 
racism, patriarchy, and dispossession are not exceptions to liberalism, but 
constitutive of it (James 1963; Hartman 1997; Makdisi 1998; Chakrabarty 
2000; Mills 2003, 2017; Stoler 1995, 2010; Mehta 1997, 1999; Byrd 2011; Lowe 
2015), so too, this book argues, must we shift our critical understanding of 
capitalism from one in which “markets” merely deepen or respond to post-
colonial inequality, to one in which markets are made by that inequality.2 
In Equatorial Guinea and around the world, accreted histories of racial-
ized disparity “proxy” (Ho 2016) for rational, neutral market behavior — “the 
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rules of the economy.” Global markets, the oil market chief among them, 
do not merely take advantage of these circumstances; they are constituted 
by them. 
This view from the helicopter window — through which Equatorial Guinea 
seems to recede; in which hydrocarbons seem to move effortlessly from one 
infrastructural node of the commodity chain to another; and where a space 
referred to as “offshore” seems to be a literal watery stage for placeless eco-
nomic interaction — requires a tremendous amount of work. From manual, 
managerial, domestic, and political labor; to material infrastructures and 
technologies; to the legal, ethical, and affective framing processes required 
to lubricate the passage of oil and gas to market, the apparent smoothness of 
the offshore is made and remade in the quotidian project that is hydro carbon 
capitalism in Equatorial Guinea. The view was redolent with qualities often 
thought to be intrinsic to capitalism: standardization, replicability, techni-
cal mastery, and the disembedding of economic interaction from social con-
text. In contrast, the view from fourteen months of fieldwork in and around 
Equatorial Guinea’s oil industry demonstrated nothing more than the work 
required to produce tenuous and contested approximations of those osten-
sibly intrinsic qualities. This book describes these work-intensive processes 
as I found them in Equato rial Guinea.
Yet the view from the helicopter window is not only misleading; it is also 
productive.
If anthropology (at least in the poststructural moment, if not before) 
has concerned itself with rescuing local specificity and complexity from the 
abstracting distance of views like this one, this book is equally invested in 
understanding — ethnographically, theoretically, and politically — what these 
kinds of views do in the world. These views are not merely “wrong” in any 
narrow sense. On the contrary, they are performative in that they gener-
ate durable material and semiotic effects in the world.3 Insofar as anthro-
pology and critical theory approach these abstracting views as fodder for 
deconstruction — to show contingency, complexity, heterogeneity, or locality 
“within” or “beneath” them — we fail to account for their performative work 
in the world. We seem to suggest that “mere” appearances are easily undone 
by ethnographic intimacy. On the contrary, something widely recognized 
as global capitalism persists despite that kind of deconstructive work. How? 
Ethnography can help us follow the work required to create the “as  ifs” on 
which capitalism has so long relied: abstraction, decontextualization, and 
standardization. In this book, I take these as ifs themselves as ethnographic 
objects, aspirational processes, and political projects that we can follow in 
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the field. Rather than recovering the complexity and friction effaced by the 
view from the helicopter window, then, this ethnography accounts for how 
things come to seem smooth, how the US oil and gas industry works to seem 
separate, distanced, and outside of local life in Equatorial Guinea. As I will 
go on to chronicle, many of the people with whom I worked — itinerant oil 
company management in particular — were preoccupied each day with this 
work of abstraction and distancing: how to ensure that the production and 
export of oil from Equatorial Guinea might seem detached from local lives, 
histories, and landscapes.4
To use ethnography in this way — to follow the work of standardization, 
decontextualization, and distancing — allows us to attend to capitalism as 
a project; to show how it is at once uneven, heterogeneous, and contested 
and, at the same time, proliferative, powerful, and systemic. Holding these 
analytic poles in tension, as equally empirically true in the world, asks us to 
account for their simultaneity. How is it that both can be true? As with any 
project, capitalism’s apparent coherence and momentum take work. This 
book offers an account of some of our world’s most powerful corporations — 
US oil firms — and those who work with, alongside, and against them as they 
undertake this work in Equatorial Guinea. To be clear then, this book is not, 
in any simple way, an account of local inflections or instantiations of capital-
ism. Rather, it asks after the force and fulsomeness with which capitalism, 
in fact, seems to do all the things it is supposed to do: standardize, abstract, 
distance, and decontextualize. How can we account for these phenomena 
ethnographically, showing — despite the frictions and seams — how this work 
gets done?
Because this book’s analytic trajectory follows the industry’s work toward 
apparent distance and standardization, it is not about Equatorial Guinea in 
the conventional ethnographic sense. This is why I begin with a departure 
story of sorts — the helicopter leaving Bata for the offshore — rather than with 
the expected arrival story; this is the directionality of sociopolitical life and 
work I explore in the book. The ways in which this book is and is not about 
Equatorial Guinea are also choices about a certain kind of ethnographic re-
fusal (Ortner 1995; Simpson 2014) on the one hand, and an ethnographic in-
sistence on the other. Like Simpson (2014, 105) with the Iroquois (although 
very differently positioned as a white North American anthropologist), I re-
fuse the “previous practices of discursive containment and pathology” that 
have plagued white textualizations of Equatorial Guinea. I refuse them not 
only because of their internal flaws, but also because these accounts “have 
teeth, and teeth that bite through time” (Simpson 2014, 100). My oil company 
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interlocutors used white textualizations of Equatorial Guinea, and Africa 
more broadly, to justify the violence of their industry’s daily practices — from 
contracts that contravene Equatoguinean sovereignty to economic theory 
that locates the reliably grotesque local outcomes of oil production solely 
within the “pathological African state.” The industry used anthropology, 
history, economics, and political science to efface the agency of transnational 
corporate capitalism and to distance itself still further from that by which 
it was surrounded and to which it gave shape. The teeth of knowledge pro-
duction, in the mouths of some of our world’s most powerful corporations, 
indeed bite through time. Thus, this book does not offer a general ethno-
graphic description of Equatorial Guinea (as if such a thing were possible), 
but a specific political history of the conditions of possibility that made a 
certain form of hydrocarbon capitalism possible.
This form of ethnographic refusal also contains an ethnographic insis-
tence. If knowing, and if anthropological knowing in particular, has been 
a mode of power (Asad 1979; Said 1978, 1989; Foucault 1980), then this book 
advocates knowing more about that over which we need more power. It is 
capitalism — its ideologies and institutions, people and dreams, ecologies and 
erasures — that is my ethnos. Through that commitment, I stumbled upon 
capitalism’s intimacy with liberalism, and that too became an ethnographic 
object. More precisely, I found liberalism in the field, or what Sartori (2014) 
calls vernacular liberalism: “the movement of liberal concepts beyond the 
rarified domains of self- conscious political theory . . . into wider worlds” (7). 
Specifically, I follow the ways in which oil company management and, to a 
lesser extent, Equatoguinean state actors use law, contracts, economic the-
ory, and market rationality not only as powerful tools in and of themselves, 
but also as a felicitous moral architecture through which to sanction capi-
talist practices. Liberalism here “is not a thing. It is a moving target devel-
oped in the European empire and used to secure power in the contemporary 
world. It is located nowhere but in its continual citation as the motivating 
logic and aspiration of dispersed and competing social and cultural experi-
ments” (Povinelli 2006, 13). Both liberalism and capitalism are always made 
through and with the things that anthropology has long been so good at 
capturing — specific people and histories, places and politics, landscapes and 
livelihoods. This is no less true in Equatorial Guinea, despite the fact that 
it is precisely these entanglements that the industry works so hard to sever.
Thus, this book is about Equatorial Guinea insofar as it is the historical 
specificity of that country leading up to US corporations’ discovery of oil 
and gas which made the industry’s work toward disentanglement so appar-
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ent. Equally relevant to the story is the historical specificity of the US- based 
transnational oil and gas industry in the mid- 1990s, the moment it discovered 
subsea hydrocarbons in Equatorial Guinea. Both histories — similarly steeped 
in secrecy, suppression, and violence — come to shape the project of petro- 
capitalism in the country. In the mid- 1990s, Equatorial Guinea was governed 
by an authoritarian regime on its last legs, ready to acquiesce to nearly any 
industry condition in exchange for complicity and support. At the same mo-
ment, the industry was reeling from the rise of the global environmental move-
ment, increasingly public breakthroughs in climate science, and the swell-
ing power of transnational nongovernmental organizations (ngos) (Kirsch 
2014). In addition, Shell’s ongoing catastrophe in neighboring Nigeria — 
 involving everything from the killing of Ogoni activists to the visible dispos-
session and despoliation of the Niger Delta (Adunbi 2015; Saro- Wiwa 1992; 
Watts 2004) — had made that case a model failure in the industry by the time 
investment in Equatorial Guinea began, not to be repeated at all costs. In this 
moment, respective histories of secrecy, the active suppression of informa-
tion, and global pariah status in both Equatorial Guinea and the US- based 
oil and gas industry came together in resonant frequency, amplifying the si-
lence and intimacy that has come to characterize their complicity.
Today, Equatorial Guinea is widely considered to have one of the most 
corrupt dictatorships in the world. The global oil and gas industry is simi-
larly disreputable. How, then, at this intersection, are hydrocarbons so reli-
ably transformed from subsea deposits into everything from gas to lipstick 
to futures prices? How is capitalism, in its own image, reliably reproduced at 
the intersection of an industry and a dictatorship (now the longest- standing 
in the world) that are equally notorious, illiberal, and constituted by histories 
of violence, destruction, suppression, and agnotology? In Equatorial Guinea 
and beyond, the oil and gas industry consistently escapes consequential re-
sponsibility for local outcomes, despite profound political, environmental, 
economic, and social entanglements in each and every supply site. How? This 
is the puzzle that this book seeks to address by focusing ethnographically on 
what I call the “licit life of capitalism” — contracts and subcontracts, infra-
structures, economic theory, corporate enclaves, “transparency” — and the 
forms of racialized and gendered liberalism on which it relies for its moral 
architecture. These practices have become legally sanctioned, widely repli-
cated, and even ordinary, at the same time as they are messy, contested, and, 
to many, indefensible.
Before setting out to understand the licit life of capitalism, this book’s 
ethnographic project, we must first understand that which the licit is set up to 
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manage, to distance itself from, and to frame out of the picture. To illustrate 
this, I start with a scene from the field that conveys the intimacy of absolute 
rule and transnational oil firms, before moving back briefly into Equatorial 
Guinea’s colonial and postcolonial history to give a sense of the sociopoliti-
cal world which US oil companies entered — and then altered — starting in 
the late 1990s.
On Equatorial Guinea
You get the land but you don’t provide a lot of jobs, you may be 
destroying the environment, and most of the profit goes to inter-
national capital. The companies don’t have a strong case to sell to 
local communities, so they come to not only accept highly cen-
tralized government but to crave it. A strongman president can 
make all the necessary decisions. It’s a lot easier to win support 
from the top than to build it from the bottom. As long as we want 
cheap gas, democracy can’t exist. 
— Ed Chow, longtime Chevron executive, quoted in  
Ken Silverstein, The Secret World of Oil
Elena, an Equatoguinean friend, called one afternoon to invite me to an 
outdoor dinner at a Spanish- style tapas place. Our dinner companions were 
three other people I didn’t know well — two visiting American lobbyists em-
ployed by the Equatoguinean government, whom I had met briefly on one 
of their earlier visits, and an Equatoguinean woman I’d never met who was 
introduced to me at the beginning of dinner as “an entrepreneur.” The five 
of us ambled through normal (for Equatorial Guinea) dinner conversation. 
The woman had a new iPhone, and we talked about the recent statistic that 
Equatorial Guinea had the highest per capita percentage of iPhone users in 
the world. We also discussed the construction boom and how bad the har-
mattan was expected to be this year. Soon the conversation turned toward 
my research, and the two American men and the Guinean woman5 began 
asking me a series of questions about my project: “How is it going? Who are 
you interviewing? What are you finding out? How do you get your informa-
tion?” I answered with my usual mix of candor and vagueness. “It’s going 
well. I interview locals and expats who work in the oil industry. I’m finding 
out that things are more complicated than they seem.” As the question-and-
answer session continued, Elena began to press her foot on mine under the 
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table. I wondered if she had mistaken my foot for the table base, and I gen-
tly moved my foot from under hers as I continued talking. Gradually talk 
turned to politics, and I was careful, as always, to be my best noncommit-
tal self as I listened to what the others had to say (also noncommittal, vapid 
statements) and responded with vagaries of my own. “How well adjusted I 
am to living in a paranoid dictatorship,” I thought to myself as I again moved 
my foot from under Elena’s.
We finished our beers and said our goodbyes, and I got in Elena’s car to 
head home. I was in trouble. The “entrepreneur,” it turns out, while she did 
have her own store, also worked for national intelligence, and, of course, 
Elena knew this because everyone knows everyone in Malabo. She was not 
able to tell me this before we arrived, however, not knowing who would be 
attending the dinner. As Elena yelled frantically at me in the car about how 
naïve I was to talk about my research, I tried to stutter in protest that I inten-
tionally said nothing political or dangerous, and that in terms of politics, I 
had also been vague and effectively said nothing. She said that it didn’t mat-
ter. They can take any little piece of information and twist it the wrong way. 
“A banana,” as another informant put it, “is a stone.” And worse, it was not 
only me that I was endangering, but also her. “They killed a French guy and 
framed his Guinean friend for the murder,” she said. “I would be blamed for 
your death!”
Rattled by Elena’s fear and anger at my ignorance (her foot was an inten-
tional, repeated effort to shut me up), and wondering about the actuality of 
it all — death by research, friends framed for my death — the next day I ap-
proached Isabel, my closest friend in the field who was also rising through 
the ranks of the government. I was wide- eyed, agitated, and incredulous as 
I told her my story about Elena’s anger; about being told that the intelligence 
operative was an “entrepreneur”; and about how I had answered questions 
about my research vacuously. Isabel listened calmly, nodding slowly, saying 
nothing. When I finished, looking at her expectantly, she returned my gaze 
with a quiet, knowing smile and a silence that seemed to last forever. And 
then she said, “Welcome.” Having returned to Equatorial Guinea only six 
years earlier from a life abroad, Isabel said that the same thing happened 
to her upon her return. She told me it was valuable experience for my re-
search “to experience the fear we all live in.” “If you’re not involved with 
locals,” she said, “you’ll never experience it. You have to figure out how to 
write about this.”
As Elena’s foot, Isabel’s “Welcome,” and Ed Chow’s words that begin 
this section all suggest, there is a mutually beneficial relationship between 
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absolute rule and transnational oil firms. It is a relationship characterized 
by impunity and secrecy on both sides, and by a form of collusion Anna 
Tsing (2005) has described as franchise cronyism, “in which foreign funds 
support the authoritarian rule that keeps the funds safe. . . . In exchange for 
supplying the money to support national leaders who can make the state 
secure, investors are offered the certainties of the contract, which ensures 
titles to mineral deposits, fixes taxation rates, and permits export of profit” 
(69). The licit life of capitalism — the industry’s striving for capitalism in its 
own image — is uniquely evident in Equatorial Guinea precisely because of 
the specific political histories of the place, histories that led dramatically to 
the fear in which Equatoguineans had long lived by the time US oil compa-
nies came to town.
A Brief History
While Spain had technically gained imperial rights to “Spanish Guinea” in 
1777, it was not until the late nineteenth century that Spanish sovereignty was 
fully recognized on Bioko Island (then called Fernando Pó), and it was not 
until the beginning of the twentieth century that Spanish missionaries had 
even seen the interior of Río Muni, let alone established administrative rule 
or systems of economic extraction of any kind (Ndongo- Bidyogo 1977; Nerín 
2010; Martino 2012). While Spanish administrative presence was minimal 
in the early years of colonialism, foreigners of various nationalities out to 
make money were not, at least on the main island. Bioko remained a crucial, 
dynamic economic site, characterized as a “watering hole of explorers, trad-
ers and missionaries” at the end of the nineteenth century (Fegley 1989, 13). 
Río Muni, on the other hand, receded still further from its earlier small role 
in the slave trade (Aranzadi, forthcoming). Where Bioko was an economi-
cally and politically strategic holding, with increasing Spanish presence if 
not rule, Río Muni, at least for a time, “was viewed as a magnet for the bor-
der population [from Gabon and Cameroon] because it was a place where 
censuses, native taxation, levies, and native justice [were] unknown. Accord-
ing to one French Official, it was possible for Africans to live ‘in complete 
freedom’ in Rio Muni” (Sundiata 1990, 34).6 Cameroonian author Ferdinand 
Oyono (1966) says as much in the opening of his novel Houseboy:
It was evening. The sun had gone down behind the peaks. The deep shadow 
of the forest was closing in around Akomo. Flocks of toucans cut the air with 
great wingbeats and their plaintive calls died away slowly. The last night of 
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my holiday in Spanish Guinea came stealthily down. Soon I would be leaving 
this country used by us “Frenchmen” from Gabon and Cameroon as a place 
to slip away for a break whenever things became a little strained between 
ourselves and our white compatriots. (3)
When the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, most Spanish settlers 
in Equatorial Guinea were passively associated with the anti- Franco Popu-
lar Front, but their resistance was easily overwhelmed by troops sent from 
Spain. By the end of the year Spanish Guinea was securely in Franco’s hands, 
“contributing money, raw materials and food to the long and bitter campaign 
against the republic” (Roberts 1986, 543). Franco’s victory in 1939 marked a 
dual shift in the daily life of colonial rule in Equatorial Guinea, creating more 
metropolitan interest and investment on the one hand, and more oppressive, 
violent, and sharply racist rule on the other. Remembering his schooling 
in the 1940s and 1950s, Equatoguinean journalist and Fanon scholar Do-
nato Ndongo- Bidyogo writes: “ ‘Are we Spanish?’ — the teacher would ask 
the class — ‘we are Spanish by the grace of God!!’ . . . Entering school in the 
morning you had to stand in formation, do five or ten minutes of military 
gymnastics, sing ‘Cara al Sol’ [the anthem of Franco’s Falangist party] while 
saluting. ‘I am a Falangist, I will be a Falangist until I die or overcome. Long 
live Spain!’ ” (1977, 66). While on school grounds, students were required to 
speak Spanish exclusively, regardless of their age or how long they had been 
studying the colonial language. “Those that disobeyed or could not com-
municate sufficiently were lashed, or made to kneel for hours on gravel. This 
was not cultural assimilation. This was cultural assimilation at gun point” 
(66). Colonialism under Franco was radically and unpredictably violent for 
black Equatoguinean adults as well, whose movements around the island 
and mainland, or in between, were de facto forbidden but de jure governed 
by a pass system. Equatoguineans could be beaten, jailed, and killed at any 
time without recourse. The arbitrary violence that characterized Franco’s co-
lonial fascism — authoritarian dictatorship, military rule, forced labor, radi-
cal limitations on movement, and rampant executions — would later come to 
characterize postcolonial rule in Equatorial Guinea as well.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, anticolonial sentiment and organizing 
was growing in Equatorial Guinea and across the continent. After unsuc-
cessfully trying to co- opt the majority of nationalist Equatoguineans, the 
colonial administration proposed a vote for autonomy (not independence), 
which Equatoguineans passed, thus establishing a General Assembly of co-
lonial administrators who, in turn, named a ten- member Consejo de Gobi-
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erno, or Government Council of Equatoguineans. This council included, 
among others, Francisco Macías Nguema, the former mayor of Mongomo 
(an inland continental district on the border with Gabon), and other au-
thority figures from within what Mamdani (1996) has characterized as the 
native bureaucracies of indirect rule: those Equatoguineans who had been 
enlisted by the colonial government as “traditional,” often meaning rural, 
legal, and fiscal authorities. Ndongo- Bidyogo (1977) argues that the Spanish 
were grooming the Equatoguineans named to the Government Council for 
their emergent role as the national bourgeoisie, to serve as mediators with 
Spain both politically — where their complicity guaranteed autonomy but not 
independence — and economically — wherein council members guaranteed 
Spain continued access to local riches and resources. In exchange, council 
members “were given exorbitant salaries, a Mercedes Benz, a chalet replete 
with servants paid by Spain, and control over the national budget” (105). 
Here too, the conflation of public office with private gain that began un-
der colonialism (Martino 2018b) set an important foundation for the ex-
pectations and norms of postcolonial Equatoguinean regimes to come. The 
Governing Council adopted a predictably pro- Spanish line, but Macías 
Nguema, in particular, began to separate himself ideologically, refusing to 
accept the Spanish agenda and beginning to talk about opposition to neo-
colonialism. In February 1968, only four years after the autonomous regime 
began, Equatoguinean politicians demanded independence at a constitu-
tional conference in Spain, and Franco’s regime passed a decree suspending 
the renewal of autonomous status. Equatorial Guinea held its first election 
as an independent nation- state on October 12, 1968, and Francisco Macías 
Nguema was elected president.
Trouble started almost immediately. In the month following indepen-
dence, Spain promised financial help that never came. Records from the co-
coa, coffee, and timber exports of 1968 showed that there should have been 
roughly $43 million in the bank (in 1968 dollars; roughly $300 million in 
2017), but the national accounts were empty. The Spanish had stolen the 
money. Macías’s relationship with Spain deteriorated rapidly. The Spanish 
settlers who remained began to openly provoke the newly independent gov-
ernment in an effort, Ndongo- Bidyogo (1977) argues, to precipitate a con-
frontation and “justify the intervention of the fully armed 270 members of 
the Spanish army still in the country” (154). As Equatoguineans began to 
speak up about corporal punishment, as well as racist language on planta-
tions and in Spanish- owned businesses, the Spanish ambassador responded 
by threatening to withdraw the Spanish doctors, engineers, teachers, ad-
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ministrators, and media operators who continued to run the country’s basic 
social infrastructure. 
Not three months after assuming the presidency, Macías (quite reason-
ably) began to suffer from what Ndongo- Bidyogo (1977) called the “paranoia 
and psychosis” of assassination attempts and coups. And indeed, in February 
1969, Spanish soldiers occupied the airport and media production centers, 
distributing arms to all remaining whites, who then patrolled the streets. A 
mere four months after independence, then, the Spanish organized a coup 
attempt, provoking Macías to declare a state of emergency, still referred to 
today as la emergencia. Macías asked all Spanish settlers who remained in 
the country to leave, including the missionaries who ran schools and or-
phanages, which left Equatorial Guinea largely without technical experts. 
Algerians came on technical missions as doctors and nurses, but they didn’t 
speak Spanish and struggled to serve a population in a moment of chaotic 
transition. Schools were closed; children roamed the streets in large num-
bers; food imports were disrupted; and many people left their towns for the 
cities of Malabo and Bata, hoping to find more institutional stability. Thou-
sands of Nigerians, who had long provided much of the manual labor on co-
coa plantations, also began to leave, spurred by Macías’s decree forbidding 
wage remittances to support the Biafran secession. In short, both the tech-
nocracy and the manual labor that had sustained Equatorial Guinea during 
the colonial era disappeared essentially overnight.
In the wake of the Spanish coup attempt, March 1969 marked the offi-
cial beginning of a period Guineans to this day call la triste memoria, the 
sad memory. The few doctors who remained from Algeria, Egypt, and Ni-
geria began to leave in response to orders from Macías not to cure ill peo-
ple considered “counterrevolutionaries.” Jails began to fill with “persons of 
suspicion” — people Macías perceived to be political opponents — most of 
whom died in prison. By Christmas 1969, Macías had jailed, tortured, and 
killed all politicians he perceived to be against him. All incoming mail was 
searched and censored, on penalty of death to the intended recipient should 
the censors dislike what they read. Spain responded with a press war, calling 
openly for another coup, to which Macías responded by launching a cam-
paign against all Equatoguineans who were in Spanish universities or who 
had ever studied there. “Intellectual” became a word punishable by jail or 
worse. In response, Franco’s Ministry of External Affairs switched course, 
using the Law of Official Secrets to declare all information about Equatorial 
Guinea and its relationship with Spain materia reservada — strictly confiden-
tial and not to be covered by any media. At this point, “Equatorial Guinea 
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virtually dropped out of the news. Macías closed down most of the press, 
instated severe censorship and banned all foreign journalists. Visas became 
very difficult to obtain. After 1970 there was not one reliable economic fig-
ure, government statistic or census report to be found in the country. . . . 
The Franco regime further aided and abetted Macías by maintaining strict 
silence from the beginning” (Fegley 1989, 72).
In the years that followed, Macías began to jail his own ministers; pub-
licly execute people who had served in the pre- independence government; 
and persecute, detain, and execute clergy. In 1970, he outlawed political par-
ties and created punt — el Partido Unico Nacional de Trabajadores, or the 
Unified National Workers Party. The youth wing of punt — Juventud en 
Marcha con Macías (Youth Marching with Macías) — was given free rein 
to accuse and attack others with impunity. In policies reminiscent of Fa-
langist colonial practice and in active dialogue with Maoist practice of the 
day, military drills became compulsory for the entire population, including 
children as young as five and pregnant women, and Equatoguineans were 
forbidden from traveling within or leaving their country freely. Having de-
clared himself president for life in 1972, Macías once again enclosed Guin-
eans in their homeland, “by laws so similar to those from the colonial period 
that one could hardly note a difference” (Ndongo- Bidyogo 1977, 215). With 
economic production nearly at a standstill in the wake of the first Nigerian 
exodus, Macías decreed compulsory labor from Equatoguinean citizens (un-
paid labor from all men).7 Those able to escape streamed across the borders. 
In response, Macías redoubled the compulsory labor act and jailed or killed 
people caught escaping.
Nominally socialist, Macías cultivated relations with Cuba, China, and 
the USSR throughout the 1970s, although his regime alienated each in turn. 
By 1975, doctors and medical care were officially outlawed. (Most medical 
professionals in the interceding years had been Cuban.) Amidst cholera out-
breaks, a resurgence of leprosy, and a population either fleeing or dying, 
Macías stopped the circulation of all boats to prevent further escape, thereby 
indiscriminately prohibiting all crafts used for fishing or those that fitfully 
brought medicines and food to the smaller islands of Annobón, Corisco, and 
the Elobeys. When, after a year’s time, a group finally sailed to Annobón, 
half of the inhabitants were dead; the other half were transferred to Bioko 
as enslaved labor. “Spain, which could’ve intervened in this growing isola-
tion not only as the former colonial power but more importantly as home 
to the best educated Equatoguineans, retained an ironclad silence — a long 
chain of international complicity. Even those [Equatoguineans] who wanted 
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to organize an opposition in Spain were radically stifled by the repression 
and secrecy of the Franco regime” (Ndongo- Bidyogo 1977, 270). In January 
1976, Macías refused a mass repatriation request from the remaining Nige-
rian laborers. Nigeria responded by sending war ships into the waters sur-
rounding Malabo, and Macías fled from the capital on Bioko Island to the 
interior of the continental region. From this moment on, President Macías 
never returned to Bioko Island, or to the capital city. Having burned, razed, 
and evacuated the towns of his perceived enemies, Macías was “pursuing the 
phantasms in his ill and tormented mind. . . . ‘When the opposition comes,’ 
he declared, ‘they will find nothing but ashes’ ” (Ndongo- Bidyogo 1977, 273).
By 1978, at least 20,000 people had been killed in a country with a popu-
lation of roughly 300,000. Another one- sixth of the population was forcibly 
recruited as slave labor on cacao and coffee plantations and in timber yards. 
One out of every three Equatoguineans had become a refugee (Fegley 1989). 
An estimated 60,000 fled to Gabon; 30,000 to Cameroon; and several thou-
sand to Nigeria. By 1978, roughly 6,000 Equatoguineans lived in Spain.
During my time in Equatorial Guinea between 2006 and 2008, in talking 
about la triste memoria, friends and informants agreed that Macías suffered 
from serious mental illness (many mentioned schizophrenia) that worsened 
progressively and monstrously during his decade as president (Sundiata 
1983). Very few people were willing to condemn him individually, noting 
that by the end of la emergencia, he was completely incapacitated mentally 
and refused to leave his continental compound in Nsork. For years toward 
the end of his rule, the capital city, and indeed the country, were effectively 
no longer under his command; others were carrying out the terror. By 1975, 
all sophisticated weaponry, vehicles, aircraft, and boats were held under the 
control of three or four commanders. Leading these was Lieutenant Colo-
nel Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was “virtually the ruler of [Bioko] while 
Macías isolated himself” (Fegley 1989, 162). A graduate of the Spanish mili-
tary academy at Zaragoza, Obiang was among Macías’s closest adherents. 
As Deputy Minister of Defense, he was in charge of the penitentiary system 
on Bioko Island, including both local precincts and the infamous Black-
bich (Black Beach) Prison where so many had died. In these capacities, 
Obiang “spoke and acted with the authority of the president and person-
ally saw that his punishments were carried out” (Fegley 1991, 162; Liniger- 
Goumaz 1989). And it was Obiang who, in 1979, overthrew President Macías 
in a coup. Thanks to US oil firms, Obiang remains president to this day.
After overthrowing Macías, Obiang announced that he would rule the 
country with the Consejo Militar Supremo, or Supreme Military Council 
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(smc), which would also put Macías on trial in a courtroom hastily laid out 
in Malabo’s Marfil Cinema. (Law and its infrastructures had dissolved un-
der Macías, a fact that becomes unduly important once US oil companies ar-
rive.) Charges against Macías initially included genocide, mass murder, and 
the embezzlement of public funds; however, because those running the Su-
preme Military Council, including Obiang himself, were directly implicated 
in those atrocities, the charges were quickly limited to 101 proven murders. 
When the trial eventually proceeded, the accusations were limited further 
still to the period between 1969 and 1974, “after which time most members 
of the smc were involved in the terror” (Fegley 1989, 167). Found guilty of 
101 murders, Macías was executed by a firing squad and Obiang took power.
Despite the fearsome continuities between the two regimes, Obiang’s 
coup brought immediate and meaningful changes to Equatoguineans’ daily 
lives. After roughly nine years of school closures, my friends and interlocu-
tors remembered all of a sudden being able to go to school. Churches too, 
which had been forbidden and closed, were reopened. People recalled to me 
dressing up and going to church again, with long lines for new and retroactive 
baptisms. Economically, there were immediate changes as well. One could go 
to the market and buy chicken and pork, rice and oil, bread and candy. An 
Equatoguinean friend who had been a child at the time remembered this mo-
ment as a switch from plastic sandals to the availability of sneakers. Indeed, 
foreign aid poured in with the advent of Obiang’s rule, including millions of 
dollars from the Spanish, as well as large multilateral loans. Obiang released 
thousands of prisoners and received the first resident ambassador from the 
US in 1981. Declaring his regime’s nonaligned openness to aid from the East 
and West, Obiang began the process of joining the French- aligned Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (cemac) in 1982, and the na-
tion’s currency changed officially from the ekuele to the cfa franc in 1985.
But formidable continuities lingered. The country was under military 
rule without foreseeable end; the press and political parties remained ille-
gal. Open political dissidents, including Eugenio Abeso Mondu and Pedro 
Motu, were killed in Obiang’s early years. After a decade of Obiang’s rule, 
Equatorial Guinea was drowning in multilateral debt and bereft of any po-
litical freedoms. A handful of people who were not politicians, but univer-
sity professors, doctors, and engineers — Placido Mico, Pablo Mba, Fernando 
Abaga, and Jose Luis Mvumba — began to mobilize against political killings 
and military rule with the clandestine distribution of pamphlets contain-
ing information about the current regime. Their movement built toward the 
presidential elections of 1992 when Severo Moto ran in opposition to Obiang, 
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after which Moto was arrested, incarcerated, and released. The terrain for 
oppositional mobilization was rocky at best; however, between 1992 and 1995, 
aided by loan conditionalities that required the superficial legalization of 
political parties, Convergencia para la Democracia Social (Convergence for 
Social Democracy, or cpds) gained power. Then in 1995, the Plataforma de 
Posicion Conjunta (an opposition coalition) won a majority in the municipal 
and parliamentary elections. In other words, nearly two decades after Obiang 
took power, the conjuncture of deep debts and an opposition coalition 
looked like it might finally unseat the dictatorship. And indeed, 1995 was 
a watershed year, although not in the way this election victory indicates. 
The US government had closed its embassy in the country that year, in part 
to protest human rights abuses. Nearly simultaneously, the company then- 
called Exxon discovered that the Zafiro oil field had production capacities 
three times greater than the company’s entire worldwide output of oil and 
gas at the time. “The following year, in advance of the presidential election, 
ExxonMobil’s petro- dollars bankrolled the involvement of a US lobbyist 
who helped legitimize a rigged contest in which Obiang claimed 97.8 percent 
of the vote from the same constituency that only months earlier had opted 
overwhelmingly for the opposition coalition” (Alicante 2017). Indeed, the 
Exxon- funded group, the Institute for Democratic Strategies, played a pivo-
tal role in the manufacture of Equatorial Guinea’s 1996 presidential election 
(Shaxson 2008). “And that” an opposition member of parliament put it to me 
succinctly, “was when petroleum started. Petroleum was like a life jacket for 
the regime, an oxygen balloon to help it float.” An oxygen balloon for dicta-
torship and a lead weight for democracy.
Since the discovery of commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits in Equa-
torial Guinea in the mid- 1990s, the country has received nearly $100 bil-
lion in capital deployment from US oil and gas companies alone. Among 
Africa’s most important oil producers, the long- impoverished microstate 
is now at the center of the petroleum industry’s “new Persian Gulf.” At its 
peak in 2009, Equatorial Guinea exported ninety thousand barrels of oil 
per day to the US alone (US Energy Information Administration [useia] 
2016) and is today the richest country per capita on the African continent. 
Production sharing contracts worth billions of dollars annually to compa-
nies and the state alike require protracted negotiation and complicity be-
tween US oil companies and Obiang’s authoritarian regime, which, at forty 
years strong (as of 2019), makes Obiang the longest continuously serving 
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leader in the world today. For this repressive regime, once crippled by exter-
nal debt burdens and threatened by an opposition coalition, US oil and gas 
contracts have been an unparalleled state- making project. In exchange for 
a funded regime, the Equatoguinean government must negotiate with oil 
companies to change local environmental, labor, or taxation laws that might 
affect those companies’ profit margins. Ostensibly progressive laws requiring 
35 percent local ownership of all foreign assets are abided with highly placed 
Equatoguineans serving as well- paid “associates” (socios) for foreign com-
panies. The Equatoguinean state and US oil companies unevenly share gov-
ernance and sovereignty in a complicated and profoundly unequal relation-
ship of corporate– sovereign interdependency (Cattelino 2011; Mitchell 1991).
If the political landscape has been transformed by the oil and gas indus-
try, so too has Equatorial Guinea’s physical landscape, which has transmog-
rified at a hallucinogenic pace. Offshore gas flares blaze against the nights’ 
dark skies in an uninterrupted string that seems to stretch from Nigerian 
waters all the way down. La Planta screams into view as planes land in Ma-
labo’s airport. Dazzlingly bright, the natural gas and methanol plant is a 
tangled, illuminated kingdom of small and large pipes, with some pipes big 
enough to fit a car inside, connecting metal vats and silos and containers 
and wires and more pipes and conveyor devices and cranes, all weaving in 
and out of one another. It seems the plane will scrape its metal belly on the 
highest reaches of the plant. The small capital city in the distance is dim and 
receding, or at least it was when I first started research in 2006. Yet there, 
now, contractual clauses built entire cities as if overnight (Appel 2012d). Ma-
labo II sprouted beside colonial Malabo and, dotted with Chinese and Egyp-
tian construction workers, asphalt extended filament- like in all directions 
(Mba 2011). Stadiums, palaces, skyscrapers, conference centers, hotels, and 
vast housing and apartment complexes rose from red dirt exposed beneath 
equatorial green only days before. In 2013, Equatorial Guinea saw more in-
vestment as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp) than any other 
country in the world (Harrison 2013; Appel 2018a).
This extraordinary intensity of infrastructure investment has entirely 
remade the small country’s property regime, as the president publicly expro-
priates his own substantial holdings “in the name of development,” while oil 
and gas companies rent what is still widely considered “his” land. Los de a pie 
(the masses; literally, those on foot or those who walk) are expected to equate 
their dispossession with the president’s hollow act. Gated residential and 
corporate enclaves for migrant industry personnel spring up in these spaces, 
serviced by their own sewage, septic, electricity, telecommunications, and 
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food procurement systems (Ferguson 2006, chapter 2). The infrastructures 
of both hydrocarbon production and development — from rigs to hydroelec-
tric dams, gated corporate enclaves to freshly paved roads and entirely new 
cities — become key sites in which companies and the state negotiate the ethi-
cal and political entanglements of hydrocarbon capitalism (Appel 2012d).
In 2014, petroleum revenue (from crude oil and gas condensate produc-
tion) accounted for roughly 90 percent of Equatoguinean government in-
come and over 90 percent of total exports (imf 2015). As Equatorial Guin-
ea’s reserves decline toward exhaustion and the global price of oil continues 
to fall, both of these figures are down from 2008’s numbers of 98 percent 
of government revenue and 99.3 percent of the nation’s exports (imf 2010; 
República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2010). While local employment in both the 
service sector and construction expanded marginally in Equatorial Guin-
ea’s boom times, the oil and gas industry remains the only large employer 
other than public administration, and work therein schedules Guineans’ 
daily lives, putting them in security guard or maid uniforms, or sending 
them to offshore platforms for weeks at a time. The industry has enabled 
some Equatoguineans to return from earning degrees abroad and work as 
government liaisons or accountants, while it has enabled others to engage in 
sex work and window washing. Corporate social responsibility (csr) pro-
grams subcontracted to international development firms fan across cities 
and towns, offering education reform, malaria control, the provision of hos-
pital equipment, and neighborhood drinking wells.
If US oil companies immeasurably stabilized Obiang’s regime — essen-
tially paying him to stay in power — the coming of the industry has also given 
rise to interstitial spaces that before seemed foreclosed by control, surveil-
lance, and paranoia. As Adelaida Caballero (personal communication, 2015) 
has written, some Equatoguineans (though certainly not those active in any 
kind of opposition) now joke that the dictadura has become a dictablanda.8 
At the very least, thousands of international industry personnel come and go 
every year, loosening (at least in the capital city) the sense of hermetic claus-
trophobia and isolation that had long enveloped this small country. Citizens 
of the US (and now of China, also) no longer need visas to visit the country, 
greatly facilitating the increased entry of journalists and researchers. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (see chapter 6) briefly man-
dated something close to civil society meetings, in which citizens were in-
vited to talk about governance and oil revenue. But Equatoguineans doubt 
the potential of these spaces, and with good reason. The memory of indis-
criminate violence and death is also its threat (Ávila  Laurel 2011).
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Guineans remember la triste memoria. They whisper about it. To the ex-
tent that little except mass killings or incarceration changed under Obiang, 
the sadness continues, albeit in different ways for different people. For 
wealthy, educated Guineans who have returned from lives and educations 
abroad to pursue their fortunes in this homeland of new and seemingly in-
finite possibilities, the change is radical and exciting. Familial memories of 
violence pester, however, and they too whisper about them in hushed voices 
around the dinner table. But their experience of home is, at least in part, one 
of renewal and possibility, and they often defend Equatorial Guinea against 
its critics in one moment, and shake their heads in defeat and disgust in the 
next. For the poor, most of whom did not leave, or perhaps found themselves 
in Gabon rather than in Spain or England, opportunity means jobs as se-
curity guards or maids, along with new restaurants and cars that they can’t 
afford lining the streets. They are promised public housing in the boggling 
construction as they are dispossessed of the land on which they lived (Mba 
2011; Appel 2018a).
In this time of radical change, it was not only Equatorial Guinea’s history 
that mattered. The US- based transnational oil and gas industry’s own histo-
ries of violence, subjugation, secrecy, and misinformation had also reached 
a specific moment in the mid- 1990s. From long histories of complicity with 
and support for repressive regimes (Adunbi 2015; Saro- Wiwa 1992; Yergin 
1993; Mitchell 2011; Silverstein 2014; Watts 2004; Vitalis 2007) to the endur-
ing corporate practice of organizing their transnational labor force as “di-
vided, segregated, and paid different wages according to race” (Vitalis 2007, 
22; Butler 2015), and from violent dispossession, displacement, and despolia-
tion of communities and ecosystems (Sawyer 2004; Saro- Wiwa 1992; Falola 
and Genova 2005) to the industry’s role as the Angel of the Anthropocene, 
the turn of the twentieth century was a time of unprecedented exposure 
and critique of the US- based oil and gas industry. In response, major cor-
porations began to implement a suite of practices — from more aggressive 
corporate social responsibility agendas to participation in various trans-
parency and accountability programs, including the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative.9 These practices were designed to change the grow-
ing perception that oil companies were nothing but the necessary evil of 
modernity.
While corporate social responsibility and transparency programs are 
largely outward facing, designed to secure oil and gas corporations’ increas-
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ingly tenuous social license to operate, perhaps the most profound change 
that occurred in the industry at this moment seemed like an inward-facing 
change and like a feat of engineering: the offshore. As this book will go on 
to detail, oil’s offshore is not merely a response to geologic fact — whether 
hydrocarbon deposits are located subsoil or subsea — but also an infrastruc-
tural choice intended to minimize the political risks of visible, accessible 
production. Equatorial Guinea came on- stream at just the historical mo-
ment when — largely in response to the unmitigated disaster in Nigeria — the 
industry decided that the offshore was useful not only as an organizing 
principle for industrial operations, but also as a guiding metaphor for its 
relationship to production sites more broadly. For US companies in Equato-
rial Guinea during my research, not to be like Nigeria was a mantra, short-
hand for Shell Nigeria’s infamously disastrous presence in the Niger Delta. 
In particular, the mantra gestured to the robust structures of responsibility 
that typified corporate involvement in Nigeria, with Shell providing often- 
unreliable water, light, or education in a tangled relationship with local states 
(Watts 2004; Zalik 2006, 2009; Saro- Wiwa 1992).10 The industry setup in 
Equatorial Guinea was a self- conscious and explicit response to this ongo-
ing dis aster. At least on paper, the arrangement between US oil companies 
and that which is “outside” them in Equatorial Guinea was radically attenu-
ated, with corporate social responsibility subcontracted out and companies 
separated by multiple layers of liability from that which surrounded them. 
“Offshore” was shorthand for this shift, and thus it referred not only to mid- 
ocean production platforms, but also to the guiding metaphor of apparent 
distance between corporate and national daily life.
It is important to refuse the industry account of the offshore as a technical 
breakthrough that enabled radically different forms of work, profit- making, 
or corporate relationships to place. Rather, we might better understand off-
shore infrastructure as enabling certain forms of continuity. Practices that 
had been met with increasing resistance onshore — unimpeded environmen-
tal degradation; labor suppression, including paying workers according to 
race, and providing separate and strikingly unequal housing facilities; and 
lack of meaningful training or technology transfer opportunities — can be 
newly naturalized in offshore work, ostensibly justified by the novel techno-
social configuration of the open ocean, the geophysical demands of subsea 
hydrocarbon, and the forms of infrastructure necessary to respond to those 
conditions (not to mention the invisibility of the production setup to the 
general public; Zalik 2009). With onshore communities seemingly disinter-
mediated by the offshore production process, and resistance itself presented 
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with new spatial challenges, forms of national rule, regulation, oversight, 
and state- corporate complicity become increasingly central to the produc-
tion of oil and gas in the offshore era. In other words, the US industry’s long 
history of active collusion with authoritarian regimes was particularly rele-
vant to its mid- 1990s arrival in Equatorial Guinea.
While, as this book will show, the Equatoguinean state is fractious and 
divided, and far from a homogeneous oppressive force, each and every 
Equatoguinean I came to know (whether functionary, tycoon, or a pie) was 
afraid of The State in one way or another. That fear facilitated unimpeded oil 
production without meaningful public participation. Recall again Ed Chow’s 
words from the earlier epigraph: “A strongman president can make all the 
necessary decisions. It’s a lot easier to win support from the top than to build 
it from the bottom. As long as we want cheap gas, democracy can’t exist” 
(in Silverstein 2014, 7). Press and state- independent media, the possibility of 
gathering in groups for political debate, and even the willingness to articu-
late critical ideas and opinions outside the privacy of one’s home or close as-
sociates were all but absent and often illegal in Equatorial Guinea during my 
time there. With the few exceptions of citizens openly affiliated with the op-
position, who experience regular jailing and other forms of harassment and 
abuse, “everyone is in their own corner,” as one of my friends put it (Todo el 
mundo está en su propia esquina).11
This, then, is the historical conjuncture at which Equatorial Guinea and 
the US oil and gas industry found one another. And it is this conjuncture 
that the licit life of capitalism is set up to manage. Given these histories of 
violence and suppression, how is Equatorial Guinea converted into just an-
other oil exporting place? How do oil and gas emerge as if untouched by 
these histories? How is the industry so relentlessly able to abdicate respon-
sibility for supply site entanglements? How, in short, is capitalism in its own 
image possible? These are the questions this book seeks to answer by focus-
ing ethnographically on the licit life of capitalism. Rather than use this book 
to bring critical attention to the scandals that saturate capitalism’s daily life, 
not least in the oil industry and not least in sub- Saharan Africa, I suggest 
that oil in Equatorial Guinea counterintuitively offers an ideal place in which 
to explore what we might take to be the opposite of scandal. Contracts and 
corporate enclaves, offshore rigs and economic theory are the assemblages 
of liberalism and racialized labor, expertise and technology, gender and spa-
tialized domesticity, which seem to make an industry operating on the edge 
of legitimacy and legality formally legitimate, legal, and productive of ex-
traordinary profit.12 This approach to capitalism echoes Saidiya V. Hartman’s 
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(1997) approach to the routinized violence of slavery, in which she focuses 
not on invocations of the shocking and the terrible, but on “those scenes in 
which terror can hardly be discerned” (4). This attention to the licit under-
takes an anthropology of capitalism that proceeds not from a sociology of 
error, but from the question of how what currently exists has been stabi-
lized (Roitman 2014, 78; see also de Goede 2005). Rather than a (mis)repre-
sentation to be deconstructed, capitalism here is understood as a constant 
construction project to be followed through research. Each chapter — The 
Offshore, The Enclave, The Contract, The Subcontract, The Economy, The 
Political — focuses on one site where the licit is made.
What I referred to earlier as the as ifs of capitalism that so many of my 
interlocutors were at pains to approximate — the labor- intensive processes 
of abstraction and standardization, and the practices of spatial and socio-
political distancing — are the conditions and ends of the licit. In the section 
that follows, I explore this relationship through country–company entangle-
ments, the embodied work of disentanglement, and the forms and processes 
I have come to refer to as the licit life of capitalism.
Entanglement and Disentanglement
The closer we look at the commodity chain, the more every step — 
 even transportation — can be seen as an arena of cultural pro-
duction . . . yet the commodity must emerge as if untouched by 
this friction. 
— Anna Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection
The oil and gas industry seeps into every corner of Equatorial Guinea’s daily 
life, from keeping a regime in power to the ways in which children are edu-
cated; from staggeringly vast infrastructural projects and reconfigured 
modes of property adjudication to mid- ocean employment. And yet, the in-
dustry creates and inhabits an eerie distance from its supply site. How is this 
distance made and maintained? As Tsing’s words above suggest, the tech-
nology, labor, contracts, and imaginaries that move hydrocarbons from sub-
sea to futures markets are full of the messy friction of cultural production, 
deeply and often illicitly entangled with lives and landscapes in Equatorial 
Guinea. Even so, the commodity emerges “as if untouched” by this friction. 
Again, how?13 Methodologically, this how asks us to start from what anthro-
pologists have become so good at recognizing — the complex entanglements, 
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histories, and multiplicities of daily life — and then trace the processes by 
which that complexity and contingency are often so effectively mustered into 
capitalist projects, as well as the accumulation, dispossession, and retrench-
ment of intersubjective differences that reliably accompany them (Bear et al. 
2015). This how asks us to start from the particular histories of both Equato-
rial Guinea and the transnational oil and gas industry, and then watch the 
processes through which those histories are sublated into something called 
“global capitalism.” Part of this process, of course, is to understand how the 
types of distancing and social disembedding that we’re often taught are in-
trinsic to capitalism are, in fact, made through daily bodily, affective, and 
technical practices. Capitalism’s distance was something many of my inter-
locutors aspired to and fought for.
To illustrate, early in my fieldwork, I sat down with the Canadian human 
resources (hr) manager of a major US oil and gas firm. As I pattered awk-
wardly about my emerging project, he smiled and nodded from his chair, at 
one point leaning off to the side to leaf through a desk drawer. I stumbled to 
a stop, and he passed a document across the table. It was a recently published 
article from African Studies Quarterly titled “The Political Economy of Oil 
in Equatorial Guinea” (McSherry 2006). “Everything you need to know is in 
this article,” the hr manager said to me. “If the government here doesn’t get 
its act together, this is what’s going to happen.” I was familiar with the article, 
written by a political science graduate student who, having never visited the 
country, had applied resource curse theory to Equatorial Guinea, positing 
that “oil has exacerbated already present pathologies in Equatorial Guinea’s 
political economy, paving the way for future problems of underdevelopment, 
instability, and authoritarian rule” (McSherry 2006, 24). My field notes from 
that day recount my surprise that an expatriate hr manager read African 
Studies Quarterly, my nascent anxiety about the ubiquity of resource curse 
theory (on which there is more below), and not much more. But as my re-
search stretched to fourteen months over the next two and a half years, that 
early encounter often came back to haunt me. While driving through a ru-
ral area with a British corporate social responsibility manager from another 
company, for instance, we passed innumerable small fires burning in front 
or back of people’s homes. “Another program we have,” this manager re-
marked, “is a garbage program that helps locals learn how to dispose of waste 
properly, so that these fires can stop contributing to local air pollution.” The 
haunted feeling returned. In the private compound where this man lived 
and worked, a towering gas flare burning crude’s gaseous by- products lit the 
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sky twenty- four hours per day, a practice so toxic that it is known to create 
its own microclimate.14
It was only through multiple encounters like this second one — in which 
I was told by an oil industry manager that locals needed to learn about waste 
disposal and environmental protection despite the arguably unparalleled 
global environmental wreckage that his industry has wrought — that I be-
gan to understand what haunted me about the first. Each of these moments 
shows a startling habitation of distance between those running US oil firms 
in Equatorial Guinea and the country in which they happen to find them-
selves. For the hr manager (white, Canadian, male, living temporarily in 
central Africa), the resource curse as a ubiquitous and traveling form of eco-
nomic theory enabled a particular kind of postcolonial common sense: it 
provided an authoritative, causal narrative that located the pathological ef-
fects of oil extraction squarely within “the African state,” while his own work 
for the corporation disappeared from view (Appel 2017). From this habita-
tion of distance, Chakrabarty’s (2002, 66) “particular way of seeing,” a fe-
licitous and consequential “Africa” emerges, an Africa of pathological states 
and aggrieved citizens. And, an implied other also emerges in the form of 
Figure Intro.1. Gas flare on Endurance compound.
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the benevolent corporation that proffers liberalism: market rationality in the 
face of corruption, standardization in the face of irregularity, and univer-
sal environmental standards in the face of ignorance. How are these apo-
rias made? How do those whose work is so intimately entangled with life 
in Equatorial Guinea find themselves looking out at the country as if from 
afar? The boundary- making projects that stretch from the construction of 
racialized identities to the construction of physical walls chronicled in the 
chapters of this book allow companies to bemoan poverty, pollution, and 
kleptocracy “out there,” as if they have nothing to do with them, while they 
work furiously to disentangle their operations, residential footprints, corpo-
rate practices, legal presence, shareholder value, and moral identity from life 
“outside their walls.”
At issue here is the oil industry’s intentional, aspirational disentangle-
ment from sociopolitical membership in Equatorial Guinea. Anthropology 
has long used grounded ethnographic research to show how failures to en-
gage with the specificities of place, people, politics, and history have im-
paired innumerable projects — developmental or humanitarian, activist or 
capitalist. Encountering economic theory in the field with the hr manager, 
for instance, could prompt me to dwell on the problem of misrepresentation: 
how naïve that all resource- rich nation- states could be conflated in resource 
curse analyses; how illogical to think that the same theory could be applied 
everywhere. To take this approach, however, would be to miss the produc-
tivity of economic theory in shaping the world (Callon 1998; Mac Kenzie 
et al. 2007; Miyazaki 2013; Holmes 2014; Appel 2017), and it would also 
miss the ways in which the hr manager was himself profitably at work in the 
world that these (mis)representations help to organize (Mitchell 2002). Thus, 
my analysis moves in the opposite direction. I follow the work of the oil 
companies themselves, for whom disengagement from Equatorial Guinea’s 
specificity was not a mistaken starting point (ready to be “exposed” by the 
anthropologist), but an always- unfinished project they worked daily to build. 
Within the oil and gas industry in Equatorial Guinea, the cosmology of 
profit disentangled from place was an explicit goal of many industry people 
with whom I worked, not a flaw, a mistake, or something of which they were 
ashamed. The techniques, subjectivities, and discourses through which this 
disentanglement was partially realized — whether offshore accounts for tax 
“planning,” or workers paid differently according to their nations of origin — 
were not controversies or scandals, but “best practices” buttressed by power-
ful legal regimes, moralities, and naturalized understandings of capitalism 
itself. Thus, to persist in “uncovering” local complexity beneath the smooth 
26 introduction
surface that the industry was laboring to create would be to ignore the in-
tentionality of its disengagement, its partiality and felicitous “as if” qualities, 
not to mention the spectacular accumulation and near- total abdication of li-
ability that this work produced. Capitalism in its own image, then, becomes 
a project, a constant ongoing experiment, a desire, a haunted hope. Take for 
instance oil industry guidelines from McKinsey & Company, widely consid-
ered the world’s most prestigious management consulting firm, which advise 
oil companies to “Go Modular”:
To be able to move to modular standardization, oil and gas companies need 
to make changes in two main areas. The first is project design, where they 
must adopt modular architecture and reuse standardized modules across 
multiple major oil and gas plants. The second is organizational: most oil and 
gas companies come from a tradition of building stand- alone projects de-
signed to specific geological conditions. Going forward, they must make the 
reuse of existing modules the norm in their organizations. . . . Clear guide-
lines, including a sound business case, direct which modules or submodules 
can be standardized and which must be customized. In the end, each will 
have its own standardization strategy, ranging from identical design to a set 
of discrete options to fully customized. (Hart et al. 2013)
This business advice speaks directly to the desire and aspiration I chronicle 
in this book.15 Standardization, replicability, and disembedding from so-
cial context do not inhere in something called “capitalism.” Rather, they are 
aspirational — work- intensive projects many of my interlocutors worked 
daily to build, chronicled in the chapters that follow.
The infrastructures, the contracts, and the economic theory are the stuff 
of the licit life of capitalism, the stuff that promises to create the modular 
distance toward which McKinsey & Company counsel oil and gas firms. 
The promise in each of these forms is the performative appearance of com-
pliance, legal and economic liberalism, and “transparency” in an industry 
increasingly notorious as the Angel of the Anthropocene. These technologi-
cal and legal forms are also fundamentally social forms. They rely on gender, 
race (whiteness in particular), and ideologies of liberalism for their felicity. 
The making and maintenance of the enclave or the subcontract aim to build 
intersubjective and semiotic distance and oppositions — US oil companies : 
Africa :: West : non- West :: global : local :: standard : corrupt :: licit : illicit :: 
liberal : illiberal — and centrally, I will argue, white : nonwhite. To look at 
what, precisely, the US oil industry brings with it from place to place is to 
look not only at the mobility of technical, legal, and infrastructural forms, 
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but also at the mobility of segregation, white supremacy,16 gendered domes-
ticity, and what Chatterjee (1993) has called “the rule of colonial difference,” 
wherein the industry asserts the universality of post- Enlightenment legal 
liberalism, while simultaneously constituting Equatorial Guinea as an ex-
ception to that universality (Mehta 1997, 1999). The mobility of segregated 
colonial difference (for instance, the residential enclaves spatially regulated 
by nation of origin, “skill level,” and kinship structures that I chronicle in 
chapter 2) and of technical, legal, and infrastructural forms rely on one an-
other, and they require one another for their licitness and performativity. 
In short, the forms of racial segregation that have long characterized the 
industry — the global mobility of Jim Crow across the long twentieth century 
(Vitalis 2007, see also Butler 2015), and the technical forms that the industry 
also carries from place to place (Barry 2006; Appel 2012c) — amplify one an-
other as “Western,” “global,” and “standard.”
In America’s Kingdom, political scientist Robert Vitalis (2007) presents 
a history of Saudi aramco, but more pointedly, he offers “a history of the 
long, unbroken legacy of [racial] hierarchy across the world’s mineral fron-
tiers.” As he explains in the book:
Texaco, Chevron, Exxon, and Mobil — aramco’s owners — accumulated de-
cades of experience in dozens of locales: Beaumont, Bakersfield, Coalinga, 
Maracaibo, Oilville, and Tampico. And they laid out each field and camp 
everywhere the same way, decade after decade, with the labor force divided, 
segregated, and paid different wages according to race. . . . The incontrovert-
ible fact is that it was a purposeful strategy deployed consistently and un-
altered across most of a century. (22)
I hadn’t read Vitalis’s work before leaving for the field and, consequently, 
hadn’t looked for this “unbroken legacy” of residential and workplace seg-
regation when I arrived in Equatorial Guinea. Reading America’s Kingdom 
upon my return, I was stunned by the consonance of his historical descrip-
tion of the US oil industry in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s with the contempo-
rary situation in Equatorial Guinea, where it seemed that little in the way of 
transnational corporate practice had changed. From different ethnographic 
sites — subcontracts, enclaves, daily life on offshore rigs — several chapters in 
the book chronicle how the industry’s careful segregation of gendered white-
ness from “others,” its cordoning- off, and its selective engagements via cor-
porate social responsibility or philanthropy sanctify and indeed domesticate 
the power and sovereignty that US oil companies wield internationally. Con-
versely, the felicity of what geographer Andrew Barry (2006) has called the 
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“technological zone” — a space within which differences among technical 
practices, procedures, and forms have been reduced, or common standards 
have been established — aids and abets segregation and racialized inequality. 
The ability to appeal to “standardized” contracts, or mobile offshore infra-
structures that ostensibly separate hydrocarbon production from local life, or 
economic theories like the resource curse offers white supremacy what Cheryl 
Harris (1993, 1795) describes as “the legal legitimation of expectations of power 
and control that enshrine the status quo as a neutral baseline, while masking 
the maintenance of white privilege and domination.” Segregation, paradoxi-
cally, is used to heighten standardization, repetition, and universality, and to 
buttress select postcolonial meanings attributed to whiteness, including ex-
pertise, technology, power, money, hard work, meritocracy, and philanthropy.
Systematicity and Multiplicity,  
in and beyond Capitalism
The ethnographic discovery of the work required to unevenly animate the 
licit life of capitalism — the bundled and repeating set of infrastructures, 
contracts, and forms of expertise, and the mobility of the workers required 
to realize these — brought me to the understanding of capitalism as a proj-
ect, not a context. Moving away from totalizing theories that attribute to 
capitalism a singular, intrinsic systematicity on the one hand, or an end-
lessly varied, specific, and fractured form on the other, following the work 
required to instantiate Equatorial Guinea as an oil exporting place allows us 
to account for the relationship between capitalism’s seeming coherence and 
power and the radically heterogeneous sites through which those qualities 
are made (Bear et al. 2015). Modular infrastructures, contracting, and labor 
regimes do not possess an inherent logic, rationality, or sameness. Rather, 
their intended standardization must be brought into being through the 
work required to build and maintain them, work that is technical, legal, and 
expertise- laden at the same time as it is social, affective, and crowded with 
racialized and gendered norms and roles. Capitalism, then, is “constructed” 
in Latour’s (2005) sense — in contradistinction to social constructivism — in 
that we can account for both its solid, objective reality and its contingency 
by attending ethnographically to its making processes. “Capitalism can be 
performative only because of the many means of producing stable repetition 
which are now available to it and which constitute its routine base” (Thrift 
2005, 3). From its quotidian white supremacy to its infrastructure, the global 
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hydrocarbon industry and its spectacular profit are not a structural out-
come of something called “capitalism,” but the concrete outcome of layers 
of work and history through which specific and far- reaching coherences — 
profit, licit business practices, and the abdication of responsibility — eventually 
become robust and durable, despite the contingencies of their making pro-
cesses (Çalişkan and Callon 2009).
This approach has theoretical implications for anthropology beyond the 
study of capitalism. In each chapter, I engage local and historical specificity 
on the one hand, and the scale- making work through which larger projects 
(capitalism, but also the state, whiteness, economic theory) continue to do 
their work in the world on the other (Tsing 2015). This theoretical approach 
is particularly applicable to anthropological accounts of the African state. 
In response to the widespread assertion that African states are corrupt and 
pathological, the anthropologist generally suggests, “Rather than starting 
from pathology, let me show you the local, postcolonial logics by which Af-
rican state X actually works.” This invaluable approach spans critical Af-
rican studies, from Meyer Fortes and E. Evans- Pritchard’s (1940) account 
of African political systems, through Mbembe’s (2001) account of postco-
lonial governance in Cameroon. As Fortes and Evans- Pritchard (1940) put 
it, “Political philosophy has chiefly concerned itself with how men ought to 
live and what form of government they ought to have, rather than with what 
are their political habits and institutions” (4). Mbembe (2001), half a cen-
tury later, wrote that extant scholarship on the African state “undermines 
the very possibility of understanding African economic and political facts” 
(7) and, instead, produces a situation in which “we know nearly everything 
that African states, societies, and economies are not, [but] we still know ab-
solutely nothing about what they actually are” (12). The demand from these 
thinkers is that anthropology can and should offer textured accounts of how 
African politics actually work, rather than dwelling on their distance from 
an imagined liberal state. This is indispensable work, and I do much of it 
in this book. And yet, misunderstandings of Equatoguinean or “African” 
economic and political norms, often assumptions about legal liberalism as 
the only basis on which wealth and power can be licitly amassed, are not 
simply wrong (and thus in need of an anthropologist to redress them); they 
are also incredibly productive understandings in the world. As described in 
this book, transnational contracts and economic theory, to name only two 
examples, gain inordinate power because of the perceived corruption of the 
Equatoguinean state. Again, to simply end the analysis having shown the 
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complex local logics by which the state “actually” works would fail to ac-
count for the effects of “misrepresentation” in the world.
The resource curse as a circulating form of economic theory “in the 
wild,” as Michel Callon might put it (in MacKenzie et al. 2007; see also Ap-
pel 2017), is a paradigmatic example of this problem. Emerging from eco-
nomics and political science, resource curse literature (Ebrahim- Zadeh 2003; 
Hirschman 1961; Humphreys et al. 2007; McSherry 2006; Sachs and Warner 
1995) offers an analysis of the typical oil state and its pathologies. It suggests 
that Equatorial Guinea will now become a member of a class of states that 
includes Nigeria, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan, among others, in which the 
influx of oil money fuels a distinctive form of pathological development, 
with a concomitant set of economic and political problems, including cor-
ruption, inflation, armed conflict, antidemocratic tendencies, and the mis-
distribution of oil revenue. While Mitchell (2009) correctly asserts that re-
source curse scholarship focuses too narrowly on oil as money, thus failing to 
account for the oil itself, this is a failure of analysis but not of effort. Resource 
curse theory, in fact, contends that it is the “natural” properties of hydro-
carbon that shape its political outcomes. Pathological outcomes occur re-
peatedly in oil- producing states, according to resource curse theory, in part 
because they emerge from qualities “inherent” in oil as a natural resource: 
it is extracted, not produced; its extraction requirements are technology in-
tensive, though not labor intensive; and sector activities and wealth genera-
tion are enclaved, or disconnected from domestic economic and political 
processes, because of the affordances of the resource itself. While I do not 
deny the effects of hydrocarbon’s materiality and geology, my ethnographic 
research shows that choices about labor practices, enclaving, and contract-
ing are fundamentally political projects, so far from “natural” to the resource 
that I watched the tremendous work done on their behalf on a daily basis. By 
attributing this disconnection or enclave- nature of the sector to the natural 
properties of hydrocarbon, rather than to the repeating forms of capitalist 
extraction assembled to commodify it, resource curse theory overlooks the 
tremendous amount of work oil and gas companies do to produce and main-
tain selective disentanglements from local contexts.
Scholars in anthropology and geography have also critiqued the resource 
curse, until quite recently, they also focused too narrowly on oil as money. 
(See Shever 2012; Bond 2013; Barry 2013; Appel et al. 2015; Appel 2017; and 
Weszkalnys 2015 for new directions.) In the more canonical literature, schol-
ars resisted blunt resource curse analysis in part for its commodity fetish-
ism (Watts 2004), and in part for the ways in which it imposes a universal-
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izing model on radically different places around the world (Coronil 1997; 
Okonta and Oronto 2001; Sawyer 2004; Watts 2004). Accounts that explored 
extraction in terms of the sociocultural effects of oil money show how oil 
wealth takes on mythic and spectacular qualities, at times miraculous and at 
times cursed. Unlike more permanent or “earned” wealth, oil money seems 
to burst from the ground — slippery, ephemeral, tainted, debasing (Coro-
nil 1997; Taussig 1980; Peet and Watts 2004). In both the earlier anthropo-
logical literature and in the resource curse literature of which anthropology 
is so critical, the industry recedes. All but invisible as an object of ethno-
graphic study or sustained analysis, it becomes merely a revenue- producing 
machine, a black box with predictable effects (Appel 2012c). Once the in-
dustry has disappeared from analysis, the well- documented pathologies of 
oil- exporting places then appear to reside only in state mismanagement of 
oil money, rather than at many different points within the carbon network, 
including the United States, where the politics of oil has repeatedly escaped 
democratic control (Mitchell 2009). As Mitchell (2009) writes, “Accounts of 
the oil curse diagnose it as a malady located within only one set of nodes of 
the networks through which oil flows and is converted into energy, profits, 
and political power — in the decision- making organs of individual states” 
(400). And Watts (2004) writes: “What is striking in all of this resource- 
politics scholarship is the almost total invisibility of both transnational oil 
companies (which typically work in joint ventures with the state) and the 
forms of capitalism that oil or enclave extraction engenders” (53). This book 
picks up their call.
I offer this critique of work that analyzes oil too narrowly as money not 
as mere theoretical quibble. On the contrary, I dwell on it because, as the an-
ecdote with the hr manager I recounted earlier illustrates, powerful theories 
have social lives, or as Simpson (2014, 100) put it, “teeth that bite through 
time.” The resource curse, in particular, became an ethnographic object in 
the field; specifically, it offered an authoritative and mobile academic archi-
tecture on which the disappearing company phenomenon could rest. If, as 
I have argued, the industry’s mobile offshore infrastructures and labor re-
gimes, or contracting and subcontracting setups, are intended to attenuate 
corporate liability, to create the effect of a separation between the industry 
and Equatorial Guinea, then resource curse theory has fallen for it, letting 
the industry off the hook by allowing it to recede from meaningful analysis. 
Consider British Petroleum’s (bp) description of their Baku- Tbilisi- Ceyhan 
pipeline, which, they claim, will produce “no rusting pipes or rubbish vis-
ible on the ground, while the material consequences of the pipeline would 
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flow indirectly through state budgets and community investment programs” 
(Barry 2013, 116). In other words, bp actively asserts that oil will only be vis-
ible or tangibly experienced as money in state budgets and investment pro-
grams. As long as oil only remains important, visible, or contestable in its in-
carnation as money, the industry’s work can remain invisible. Conveniently, 
in this account, it is state apparatuses that are ostensibly responsible for the 
wise investment of oil rents. Thus, insofar as resource curse theory allows in-
dustry entanglements with local socio political, economic, and environmen-
tal life to recede, “the African state” can be diagnosed, once again, as cursed.
What can we see differently when we attend to processes that take place 
long before oil is transubstantiated into money: exploration, seismic studies, 
discovery, investment, contract negotiation, labor regimes, construction of 
infrastructures and enclaves both on land and in the middle of the ocean, 
and joint ventures between national and transnational companies? All of 
these processes are entangled with the histories of colonialism, racial seg-
regation, and global forms of gender differentiation and oppression that ac-
company any large- scale project. This broader concept of the carbon net-
work, what we might think of as the construction projects of hydrocarbon 
capitalism, was eminently visible during my research in Equatorial Guinea. 
During the summer of 2006, when I first arrived for preliminary fieldwork, 
an enormous liquid natural gas plant was under construction, which would 
eventuate in a $1.4 billion facility from which the first gas cargo was exported 
in May 2007. Luba, a fishing town thirty minutes south of the capital, was 
in the ever- deferred process of becoming the region’s oil logistics center, in-
cluding land for industry infrastructure storage, fabrication, rig and ves-
sel repair, deep- water docking facilities, a fuel bunkering facility, and more. 
The hydrocarbon legislation still extant as of 2016 was enacted in November 
2006. In short, it was not only Hiltons and lavish residential complexes that 
were under construction during my time in Equatorial Guinea. It was the oil 
industry itself — its infrastructures, legal frameworks, socialities, and con-
ditions of possibility. Once we offer equal ethnographic attention to the in-
dustry, then new approaches can emerge to analyze oil exporting states and 
the porous governance and power borders between states and corporations.
Last Words: A Different Danger
The analytic process of showing something apparently singular or binary 
(capitalism, race, gender, the state, neoliberalism) to be heterogeneous — full 
of historical contingency, complexity, and multiplicity — is vital work, theo-
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retically and politically. And yet, as I have repeated in this Introduction and 
will explore throughout this book, analysis can’t rest there—Aha! Capitalism 
doesn’t work as it claims to! — lest we entertain the fantasy that in the pro-
cess of showing capitalism to be multiply and contingently constituted, we 
have somehow undone its power. At the same time, however, in tracing the 
work through which contingency and complexity are so often mustered into 
durable capitalist projects, here through ethnographic attention to the oil 
industry in Equatorial Guinea, there is a twin danger in making capitalism 
seem more coherent and hermetic than it is in reality (Banta 1993; Gibson- 
Graham 1996, 2006; see also Povinelli 2006 on liberalism). Ethnography, as 
a methodology, helps us through this apparent analytic impasse. 
Extended attention to the daily lives of those working to build and par-
ticipate in petro- capitalism in Equatorial Guinea (a great many of whom had 
participated in similar projects elsewhere in the world) offers new insights 
into capitalism as an embodied practice. First, it is haunted — by failure, by 
controversy, and by never quite being all that it claims to be. In Equatorial 
Guinea, this was the memory of Nigeria as a model failure, of company towns 
riven by strikes and worker and community organizing through nearly a 
century of global extraction, of visible and disruptable onshore infrastruc-
tures, of untiring economic theory that lingers in development plans and in 
the desk drawers of expatriate managers. These hauntings reveal capitalism 
itself as spectral. As AbdouMaliq Simone (2012) writes, “the spectral rests in . 
. . the conceit that particular kinds of things can be built anywhere regardless 
of the specificities of setting or the practicality of use.” The spectral haunts 
Equatorial Guinea because this desire to build without regard to specificity — 
capitalism in its own image of scalability, efficiency, and disembededness — 
is only that: desire, aspiration, failure. As I hope to show in the pages that 
follow, this is not an insight of critical theory. Rather, this was very much 
the starting point for many of the US and British migrant managers with 
whom I worked, who knew full well about the complexities of producing oil 
and gas in any place, and were merely trying their hardest to manage those 
complexities and to frame out those they could. Then, for the wide- ranging 
overflow that remained, they relied on everything from ostensibly standard-
ized contracts, to whiteness as property (Harris 1993), to the invocation of 
“best practices” that were neither codified nor enforced to enact the licit life 
of capitalism.
To invoke capitalism as a project, not a context, as I did at the beginning 
of this Introduction, is already to point to the contingencies of its making, 
to suggest that it is neither hermetic nor coherent. Because of oil’s newness 
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when I arrived in Equatorial Guinea, the project of hydrocarbon capitalism — 
its building and maintenance — was very much available for ethnographic 
study. As Latour (2005) has written: “When you are guided to any construc-
tion site you are experiencing the troubling and exhilarating feeling that 
things could be different, or at least that they could still fail — a feeling never 
so deep when faced with the final product, no matter how beautiful or im-
pressive it might be” (89). The oil industry is a particularly generative site in 
which to follow the work of construction, because oil too often has in com-
mon with capitalism the analytic privilege of being deemed more suitable as 
explanatory referent than ethnographic object. Like capitalism, oil is often 
conceived metonymically — oil is money; oil is geopolitics; oil is modernity — 
rather than as an ongoing project available for ethnographic inquiry (Ap-
pel et al. 2015). This shared quality folds over on itself when oil and capital-
ism are theorized as co- constitutive. Analysts of all stripes will point to oil’s 
$6 trillion annual market value to pose it as the world’s most important com-
modity or to note that, because the global oil trade is denominated in dol-
lars, its spectacular profits provide liquidity to financial markets, and, recip-
rocally, finance capital enables contemporary extraction in that enormous 
amounts of up- front capital are required to access increasingly inaccessible 
hydrocarbon deposits. Here oil and capitalism are conflated, both empiri-
cally as constitutive of one another and analytically as objects that are not 
also subjects. This conflation works to encircle and enclose our economic 
imaginations: in both oil and capitalism, and in oil capitalism, we fear that 
there is no alternative, or that alternatives are constantly deferred. Here I 
insist that both oil and capitalism are projects, not contexts; that neither oil 
nor capitalism can give a mirrored account of the other; and that both have 
immanent alternatives. 
And yet, that capitalism is a project does not mean that it can be un-
done simply. As this book has emerged from various iterations as articles 
and talks, I have constantly been asked: Where is the resistance? Where is 
the otherwise? As an activist, I am both deeply empathetic to these questions 
and skeptical of what they are asking. Bringing capitalism’s “otherwises” into 
being is a profound challenge that requires much more than simply calling it 
a project. Among other strategies, this task requires an intimate knowledge 
of capitalism itself (Thrift 2005), a strategy to which this book aims to con-
tribute across its six chapters.
Chapter 1, “The Offshore,” continues from the helicopter ride that took 
me, and aims to take the reader, from the shores of Equatorial Guinea out 
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above the ocean, to the rig, to the fpso, to the tanker that takes oil to mar-
ket. Starting from the provocation that the production chain of Equatorial 
Guinea’s oil was clearest to me by helicopter, far off the country’s shores, 
I show that the view from the helicopter is redolent with qualities often 
presumed intrinsic to capitalism: standardization, technical mastery, and 
the disembedding of economic interaction from social context (Granovet-
ter 1985; Polanyi 2001; Simmel 2011). In contrast, the view from fourteen 
months of fieldwork made clear the extraordinary amount of work required 
to produce glimmering approximations of those (ostensibly intrinsic) quali-
ties. From the helicopter ride, chapter 1 moves to working life on the rig, the 
imbrication of the financial and industrial offshores, the question of infra-
structure, and the lives of offshore oil workers through questions of race, 
labor, and risk. 
Chapter 2, “The Enclave,” brings us back onshore to look at the domes-
tic and corporate enclaves of US oil firms in Equatorial Guinea. Drawing on 
feminist theory, which has long held that marriage and kinship are political 
and economic affairs constitutive of capitalist practice (Wynter 1982, 2003; 
Enloe 1990; Federici 1998; Davis 1983; Yanagisako 2002; Stoler 1995, 2010; 
Bear et al. 2015; Hoang 2015), this chapter analyzes domesticity and daily 
corporate life together. Putting Vitalis’s (2007) work on segregation in the 
world’s mineral enclaves in conversation with Barry’s (2006) concept of tech-
nological zones, I show how the whiteness of the compounds comes to sig-
nify a certain kind of licit practice in which white : nonwhite is semiotically 
mapped onto standard : corrupt :: global : local.
In chapters 3 and 4,“The Contract” and “The Subcontract,” I turn ethno-
graphic attention to the contract form. In chapter 3, I explore the production 
sharing contracts between US oil companies and the Equatoguinean state; 
and in chapter 4, the subcontracts between companies and their workers. At 
the intersection of capitalism and legal liberalism, I am interested in the long 
life of imperial debris (Stoler 2008), and in the “shielding” work of powerful 
contracts: the effort to create legal spaces in which companies claim sover-
eignty over everything from environmental law to national taxation policies. 
Following the work of “body shops” (the industry term for labor brokers) and 
their licit discrimination based on racialized nationality, these chapters ex-
amine Pateman and Mills’s (2007) contention that “the global racial contract 
underpins the stark disparities of the contemporary world” (2).
In the book’s final two chapters, I track the work of two hegemonic ideas/
ideals in the liberal imagination — national economies and transparency. 
36 introduction
Chapter 5, “The Economy,” looks at Equatorial Guinea’s national economy 
in the wake of oil. Denaturalizing an economy as something that grows or 
shrinks, is liberalized or closed, this chapter starts from a national economic 
conference to reflect on the performativity of economics (in particular, its ra-
cialized uses in the postcolonial era), futurity and desire, and fantasies about 
the private sector. The second half of the chapter draws on ethnographic ma-
terial from the Ministry of Finance and Budgets to discuss national account-
ing, bureaucracy, and the magical realism of budgets. Finally, chapter 6, “The 
Political,” draws on my participant observation position with the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative to return to the question of political pos-
sibility, to critique liberal theologies of social and political change, and to ar-
gue that our epistemologies of capitalism — how we come to know it — affect 
how we might seek to change it. 
These six chapters move in a progression that begins with the refusal of 
the oil- as- money approach that has typified so much scholarship on oil to 
date, instead drawing attention to the transnational oil companies them-
selves and the forms of capitalism that oil engenders (Watts 2004). Thus, 
chapters 1 and 2 start with the corporate form and the making of space, 
race, and gender, processes that shape the rhythm of work and the indus-
try’s domestic spaces in Equatorial Guinea long before oil transubstantiates 
into money. Like the gendered and raced production of space, the contracts 
that I turn to in chapters 3 and 4 also long precede (and, in fact, structure 
the flows of) oil’s specie transubstantiation. It is only in the two final chap-
ters on the national economy form and epistemologies of transparency that 
I finally address oil as money, now able to analyze it as only part of a much 
more capacious and consequential capitalist project.
CHAPTER ONE
The Offshore
The helicopter touched down gingerly on the rig, and João, the rig’s safety 
coordinator, immediately whisked me to the radio room for a safety training 
mini- course on video. After administering an exam that tested my compre-
hension, João had me sign a liability waiver and then put me in my required 
personal protective equipment (ppe) of hardhat, safety glasses, gloves, ear-
plugs, coveralls, and steel toe boots. A gregarious Brazilian capoeirista and 
vegetarian in his late forties, João had been in the offshore oil and gas busi-
ness for twenty- eight years, and had been on this particular drilling rig — 
which I’ll call the fipco 330 — through a series of contracts that had taken 
him and the rig from the Irish Sea to Turkey, then Angola, the Congo, Ga-
bon, Cameroon, and Nigeria, and now to Equatorial Guinea. Built in 1973 in 
a Texas shipyard, and owned by offshore drilling contractor SeaTrekker,1 the 
fipco 330, and many of the men on board, moved around the world from 
contract to contract under the Liberian flag, a mobile technosocial assem-
blage at work today in Equatorial Guinea’s offshore waters as they were in 
Turkey’s, and as they will be in Ghana’s. Operating companies — the Exxon-
Mobils, Chevrons, and bps of the world — contract with offshore drilling 
contractors, including SeaTrekker, for the fipco and rigs like it, paying up 
to $1 million per day for offshore rig rental. With many of the workers like 
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João already on board, contracted rigs move into position to begin the gru-
eling twenty- four- hour workdays that will eventually bring hydrocarbons 
to the surface.
On this particular March day, there were 115 men working on board 
the rig. They came from twenty different nations: Australia, Brazil, Britain, 
Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Equatorial Guinea, France, India, 
Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, 
Ukraine, the United States, and Venezuela. Among the workers on board, 
only four worked directly for the operating company, which I will call Smith, 
and only twenty- five worked directly for SeaTrekker. The remaining eighty- 
six men were hired from fifteen different subcontracting companies, which 
provided everything from directional drilling experts to on- board cooks, 
radio operators to mud engineers. In total, there were seventeen different 
companies at work on the rig.
The iconic image of a “lone oil rig floating in an endless sea, [seemingly] 
detached from any sociohistorical or political- economic referent” (Sawyer 
2012, 710) asks us to picture petroleum production as a feat defined exclu-
sively by technological prowess and evermore sophisticated engineering.
Figure 1.1. Deepwater offshore, Nigerian waters, 2006. Photo by Ed Kashi/VII.  
Used by permission.
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But João and his fellow rig workers, together with the complex contract-
ing and subcontracting arrangements that organize both their transnational 
working lives and the intricacy of the corporate form itself, begin to indicate 
some of the effort required to make that iconic view from the helicopter pos-
sible. In this chapter, through an ethnographic account of the fipco 330 — as 
infrastructure, as worksite, as node in a vast corporate archipelago, and as a 
repository of capitalist desire, fantasy, racialized inequality, and tension — I 
trace the work that allows Equatorial Guinea to recede into the distance. I 
trace the work required to define this production process — subsea hydro-
carbon deposit, to rig, to Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading (fpso) 
vessel, to tanker, to market — as “offshore.”
While the rig visit that frames this chapter was merely twelve hours long, 
the broader question of “the offshore” was ubiquitous in my fieldwork, the 
great majority of which was on land.2 That Equatorial Guinea’s entire indus-
try can be described as “offshore,” despite the expansive terrestrial invest-
ments and transformations the oil and gas industry brings in its train, speaks 
to the flexibility and productivity of the category. Specifically, on the fipco 
330, in both Equatorial Guinea and in the global oil and gas industry more 
widely, there is a capacious overlap between petroleum’s industrial offshore 
and its financial offshore. Rather than imagining the financial offshore as 
“a significant spatial metaphor” in economic globalization, and the petro-
leum offshore, in contrast, as “historically embedded within socially defined 
space” (Zalik 2009, 558), ethnographic attention to the fipco shows that the 
financial and industrial offshores are imbricated zones of fantasy and tech-
niques of profit generation, both of them productive metaphors and histori-
cally embedded social phenomena.
Offshore oil operations have in common with offshore financial setups 
the idea (the desire, the design, the intention) that there are spaces where 
the production of profit can evade or minimize contestation and oversight. 
Just as offshore financial arrangements are designed to minimize regulation, 
taxation, and accessibility, oil’s offshore is not merely a response to geologic 
fact — whether hydrocarbon deposits are located subsoil or subsea — but also 
an infrastructural choice intended to minimize the political risks of visi-
ble, accessible infrastructure. Indeed, one of the themes of this chapter is 
the extent to which offshore infrastructure carries far more than the crude, 
seawater, or liquid natural gas for which it is, at least in part, designed. To 
the extent that infrastructures can participate in the materialization of cer-
tain political goals and fantasies, this chapter asks: What social and political 
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worlds are made when oil is drawn out of the earth from a depth of 35,000 
feet? What are the effects of the offshore as a capacious category? I suggest 
that it is, in part, the overlap between the industrial and financial offshores 
that makes the view from the helicopter possible, that makes it seem as if 
Equatorial Guinea has disappeared.
The first section of this chapter briefly locates the fipco in the archipe-
lagic corporate form of transnational oil and gas companies, before turning 
in the second section to the shared history of the industrial and financial 
offshores to animate the ethnographic material that follows: infrastructure, 
capitalist desire and fantasy, labor, race, and the habitation of the industrial 
and financial offshores for Equatoguinean rig workers. In each of the chap-
ter’s sections, the offshore yields questions about responsibility and sover-
eignty. In a geographic and legal space where attenuation of liability is part 
of the project, who is responsible for offshore lives and outcomes? Work-
ers’ lives? Environmental outcomes? What is the relationship between the 
Equatoguinean state and US- based oil companies offshore? How is power 
exercised and abdicated here and to what effect? How is it that practices that 
are increasingly untenable onshore — organizing and paying labor differently 
according to race — are given new licitness offshore? 
Finally, in each section I try to hold the productive simultaneity of capi-
talism in tension — contingent and obdurate; full of gaps, yet spectacularly 
performative. Thus, on the one hand, the chapter engages the familiar an-
thropological approach of using ethnographic intimacy to show how an os-
tensibly frictionless space like the offshore is, in fact, a teeming and tense 
social world. On the other hand, while insisting on the centrality of that ap-
proach, I also insist on a key shortcoming: that it can leave us without the 
tools to understand the persistence and performativity of the offshore itself. 
In Nigeria alone, more oil seeps out of scantly regulated offshore platforms 
every year than escaped in the entire Deepwater Horizon catastrophe.3 And, 
more than $140 billion per year leaves Africa for tax havens and offshore 
financial centers or via transfer pricing, which is close to four times the an-
nual amount of development aid to the continent (Bond and Sharife 2009).4 
In other words, we have to take seriously the simultaneity of the offshore’s 
teeming sociality and its felicitous performativity. The point, then, is not to 
expose the offshore as mere metaphor or misconception, but to show how 
that metaphor is made and maintained, and importantly, made real through 
its consequential effects in the world.
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The Corporate Form
The company that owns the fipco 330 is incorporated in Switzerland, with 
additional headquarters in Houston, Texas, and the Cayman Islands. The 
vessel itself is registered and sails under the Liberian flag, ostensibly operat-
ing under Liberian law. In Liberia (as well as in Panama and the Marshall 
Islands, among others), flags of convenience (focs), or “open registries,” gen-
erate significant state revenue by offering vessels protection from income 
taxes, labor demands, and other regulations, often advertised as “nonbureau-
cratic” or more “efficient” maritime administration. Today, over two- thirds 
of vessels in the shipping industry worldwide sail under open registries. Now 
ubiquitous, the practice has its origins in the oil industry. As Standard Oil 
boomed in the 1930s, Esso — Standard’s shipping subsidiary — transferred 
twenty- five ships to Panama’s fledgling registry. The colonial geographies of 
global capitalism’s “offshore” are immediately apparent here. Panama, Libe-
ria, and the Marshall Islands become more “efficient” sites of maritime ad-
ministration not because of their strategic insertion in a market of equals (as 
“comparative advantage” might suggest) but because of their subordinated 
entanglements in ongoing relations of dispossession and coloniality. In other 
words, what Stoler (2008) has called imperial debris — in this case, national 
juridical systems that are broadly permissive toward corporate interests 
offshore — is the terrain on which comparative advantage is made. 
Opening out from the fipco to the operating company that contracts 
it — itself a limited liability local subsidiary of a parent corporation we too 
simply refer to as “an oil company” — and out still further to the diffuse ge-
ographies of the parent corporation itself, we begin to get a sense of the in-
timate interconnections between financial offshore practices, including tax 
havens and transfer pricing, and industrial offshore practices that move the 
fipco, João, and his coworkers from Equatorial Guinea to the Congo. It was 
through conversations with Donald that I came to understand the centrality 
of corporate geographies to the daily life of US oil companies “in” Equato-
rial Guinea.
By the time I came to know Donald in 2007, he had been in the oil and 
gas industry for twenty- eight years. In his twenties, he moved with his wife 
Cheryl from Utah to Houston to work in the industry and raise their chil-
dren. Over years of work in Texas, Donald climbed through the management 
ranks, the kids grew up, and eventually he and Cheryl began the peripa-
tetic lifestyle of so many of the migrant managerial industry workers I came 
to know in Equatorial Guinea. Together, Cheryl and Donald had lived and 
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worked in the transnational oil industry in Russia for five years, Ireland for 
two years, Japan for one year, and Indonesia for six months. When I asked 
him, “Where’s home?” Donald replied, “Equatorial Guinea, but my tax resi-
dency is in Houston.”
Donald and Cheryl were thoughtful and kind interlocutors in the field, 
a generosity openly informed by their devout Christianity. Cheryl had only 
recently joined Donald in Malabo, and she readily admitted to feeling iso-
lated living in the company’s compound, yet uncomfortable beyond its 
walls. In order to grow more comfortable in her new surroundings (as she 
had eventually in Russia, Japan, and Ireland), Cheryl would occasionally 
accompany me in out in the city — to the market, to pay my electricity bill, 
to eat lunch. She would ask me about my life in Malabo, and I would ask 
her about life as a nomadic manager’s spouse in Equatorial Guinea and be-
yond. Donald and Cheryl invited me for meals in their home on the Endur-
ance compound, and they were perhaps the only two migrant oil personnel 
who saw the inside of my Malabo apartment. Over my fourteen months in 
Equatorial Guinea, Donald graciously hosted me for hours of interviewing 
in his office; invited me to accompany him on various facilities- related work 
excursions; and shared otherwise unattainable information, including lists 
of Equatoguinean laws relevant to the petroleum sector (compiled by the 
company’s legal team) and insight into the corporate structure of his com-
pany, which I will call Endurance. In my effort to make sense of our long 
conversations, I initially sketched a conventional organogram relating the 
parts of the Endurance Corporation hierarchically to each other.
In figure 1.2, the aesthetics of legible hierarchy and alignment suggest a 
clear relationship between corporate subsidiaries in Equatorial Guinea (at 
the bottom) and the “parent” corporation (at the top), and by extension, clear 
paths of responsibility and redress. But as I paid closer to attention to my 
interview notes with Donald and continued pressing him on the corporate 
form over fourteen months, and as I worked more closely with Equatogu-
inean rig workers (discussed later in the chapter), I began to understand the 
intended effects of this kind of corporate archipelago. Thus, it became ana-
lytically important to subvert the organogram.5 Dizzying, densely layered, 
and circuitous, figure 1.3, and the description below, more accurately depict 
the attenuation and convolution of responsibility and liability offshore.
The headquarters of Endurance Equatorial Guinea Production Limited 
(eegpl) sits on an isthmus of Bioko Island. A subsidiary of the US- based 
Endurance Corporation, eegpl is a petroleum producer that shares this 
isthmus with two other companies: one producing methanol and one liquid 
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natural gas. These three companies are managed as separate businesses, but 
the Endurance Corporation is the largest among a consortium of investors 
in all three, and it acts as the operator. Leaving Bioko Island and moving 
into Endurance’s archipelagic corporate geography, we come first to Japan, 
where we find the consortium of companies that funds the liquid natural gas 
project in Equatorial Guinea. From there we move to the Cayman Islands, 
where Endurance International Petroleum is only one of over two hundred 
registered Endurance corporate subsidiaries. From there we move through 
eight other subsidiary levels of the company until we get to Endurance Oil, 
headquartered in Houston, and Endurance Petroleum, headquartered in 
Findley, Ohio, both publicly traded, with shareholders unevenly distributed 
around the world.
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Figure 1.3. Corporate Archipelago I: Corporate Form. Op indicates operating 
company, Sub indicates subcontractor, and Cont indicates direct contractual 
relationships.
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As Donald explained it to me, “Most of these structures are set up for tax 
‘planning’ and liability.” Donald used his fingers in an exaggerated quote/ 
unquote gesture around the word “planning,” implying quite plainly that 
planning was a euphemism for legal tax evasion. “This arrangement shields 
our parent company from liability,” Donald continued. The finance manager 
of a separate company told me a similar story: “The Company consists of nu-
merous business units divided geographically. This is [the] Africa Unit. Our 
Equatorial Guinea operation is set up in the Cayman Islands for tax advan-
tages. [Other locations in the Africa unit, including] Algeria, Libya, Egypt, 
Ghana — each has separate tax laws. Africa is one business unit but the tax 
regimes are different.” And still a third manager from a third company ex-
plained: “Here in Equatorial Guinea we are a separate company, Regal En-
ergy Equatorial Guinea ltd, a Cayman Island–incorporated company, and 
a wholly owned subsidiary of Regal Energy Inc. In every country we go into, 
we set up a second account. There are advantages to keeping the revenues 
outside the US if you have operations outside the US.” The corporate geog-
raphies Donald and other managers describe here, including parent compa-
nies; multiple subsidiaries; separate headquarters, operations, and finance 
locations; and consortia investment — all separated by various levels of ju-
ridical independence — are practices of risk mitigation and liability disper-
sal. They allow corporations to enjoy tax loopholes in a variety of jurisdic-
tions; facilitate practices of transfer pricing;6 and spread the “corporeality” 
of corporate personhood into a dispersed and legally slippery archipelago 
(Maurer 2008).
Note, however, that the corporate archipelago in figure 1.3, by itself, can-
not make Equatorial Guinea’s subsea hydrocarbon deposits into either share-
holder value or gas in your tank. Instead, this arrangement relies on an over-
laid series of proliferating corporate forms called “body shops” — the industry 
term for labor brokers detailed in chapter 4 — which are paid handsomely to 
bring mostly men, mostly from the Philippines, into Equatorial Guinea, as 
well as workers like those I introduced at the beginning of this chapter from 
across the world’s oil diaspora: Ecuador and Scotland, Kazakhstan and the 
US Gulf States. Body shops are also publicly traded companies working to 
provide value to disperse shareholders. As I go on to detail in this chapter, 
the laborers they bring to Equatorial Guinea work rotating shifts on mobile 
offshore infrastructures that are themselves subcontracted from major oil 
service firms. These firms — Halliburton, Bechtel, Schlumberger — are also 
among the world’s largest and most profitable publicly traded companies. 
































































































Figure 1.4. Corporate Archipelago II: Subcontracts and Labor.
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liability, but also local investment in Equatorial Guinea, with payroll, bank-
ing, insurance, labor, transport, technical inputs, and other industry- related 
services all based elsewhere.
I want to emphasize here that Donald and I worked together on this ac-
count of his company’s corporate form. In other words, these forms of liabil-
ity dispersal are neither secret nor illicit, but open strategies for profit max-
imization, risk management, and the attenuation or spreading of liability 
for everything from offshore platform pollution to labor contestation. While 
Donald expressed ambivalence about tax “planning,” at least acknowledging 
via gesture that the practice is contested or, for some, unethical, this collab-
orative sketch of Endurance’s corporate form “in” Equatorial Guinea offers a 
clear look at the licit life of capitalism as legally sanctioned, widely replicated, 
contested, and yet, ordinary. The open, licit character of these risk- dispersal 
and profit- maximization practices is precisely what this book draws attention 
to: the legal, repeating, and flexible ways in which the oil and gas industry 
sets up in supply sites, and the grounded effects of these arrangements — stra-
tegic sovereignty, attenuation of liability, and profit relentlessly escaping both 
taxation in the United States and investment in Equatorial Guinea.
People in and close to the industry in Equatorial Guinea naturalized the 
effects of these arrangements, narrativized them and made sense of them, 
through ideas about the offshore, and offshore infrastructure in particular. 
Offshore rigs like the fipco 330 are industrial atolls in this vast corporate 
archipelago, and many of their sociotechnical qualities — mobility, technical 
complexity, transience, and the (in)visibility of their mid- ocean operations to 
onshore populations — amplify the promises of the offshore corporate form. 
To illustrate, when I wrote João to schedule the follow- up overnight visit he 
and I had discussed during my initial rig sojourn, he responded with the fol-
lowing email: “Surprise! We no longer work with smith but with another 
client named ‘Regal Energy.’ Regal Energy also has an office in Malabo as we 
are nearby Malabo now. . . . You have to rush as we will soon leave to Congo . . . 
Around the beginning of August.” Within three months, this rig had not 
only switched operating companies (and consequently, locations at sea), but 
had also received sailing orders for the Congo, with João and others in tow. 
The fitful and unpredictable temporalities, contract relationships, and geog-
raphies indicated in João’s email make even these massive infrastructures — 
some of the largest mobile infrastructures in the world — seem fleeting and 
spectral. This apparent ephemerality of massive infrastructures further adds 
to the slipperiness of the corporate form offshore. The next section attempts 
to think through the offshore theoretically as a capacious metaphor, practice, 
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and historical spatialization, before turning back to ethnographic material 
on offshore infrastructure and those who manage and labor on it.
The Offshore
There is a historical and structural relation between concepts 
of the free sea, free trade, free world economy, and those of free 
competition and free exploitation.
— Carl Schmitt and G. L. Ulmen, The Nomos of the Earth in the 
International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum
The offshore is a broad category “that consists of all sorts of sovereign spaces 
essentially defined by their relative lack of regulation and taxation compared 
to nation states” (Cameron and Palan 2004, 91). Think tax havens, export 
processing zones, or special economic zones. To be offshore, in other words, 
is to be outside of a set of relations that do not necessarily correspond to lit-
eral shores, including regulation, taxation, “inefficiencies,” and even conven-
tional conceptions of citizenship. Many offshore arrangements offer different 
rules for residents and nonresidents, a disaggregated, pay- for- the- privileges- 
you- want and the- strictures- you- don’t citizenship. Maurer (2008) summa-
rizes this quality of offshore designations as “the disaggregation or unbun-
dling of citizenship, jurisdiction, and nationality” (158). (See also Picciotto 
and Haines 1999; Ong 2006.) Offshore rigs are no exception in this regard. 
Working under flags of convenience, like the fipco’s Liberian flag, which 
facilitate the most permissive shipping and labor standards, the subcontract-
ing arrangements that proliferate in offshore oil effectively deregulate every-
thing from labor guidelines, to environmental assessment, to the provision 
of security. This is true not only in Equatorial Guinea, but in offshore oil 
arrangements around the world. Referring to the outer continental shelf of 
the US Gulf of Mexico, where oversight and regulation were “streamlined” 
to accelerate exploration in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis, legal scholar Meg 
Caldwell, geophysicist Mark Zoback, and energy engineer Roland Horne 
together refer to the Gulf as “the sacrifice zone” (Caldwell et al. 2010). Zalik 
(2009) has also written that Mexico’s offshore is “environmentally deregu-
lated” (293) insofar as restrictions on maritime movement around platforms 
render spills and other practices largely invisible (see also Reed 2009; Woolf-
son et al. 1996; Kashi and Watts 2008; Bond 2011, 2013).
In his introduction to The Offshore World, Palan (2006) suggests that de-
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spite its evocative reputation for placeless economic interaction, the financial 
offshore is in fact deeply terrestrial. “Offshore evokes images of the high seas 
and exotic locations. But often this is not the case: offshore economic activ-
ity does not take place in some barge floating in the middle of the ocean” (2). 
Rather, financial transactions originate or pass through London, New York, 
or Tokyo; offshore manufacturing, including maquiladoras or export pro-
cessing zones, are to be found in enclaves of developing countries; and tax 
havens have a geographic presence in Cyprus, Luxembourg, or the Cayman 
Islands. In each case, shores, or territorial sovereignty, is indeed central to the 
making of offshore spaces. “Offshore is sustained by the very principles of 
sovereignty that it is claimed to have undermined: export processing zones 
are territorial enclaves produced by the state; tax havens are taking advan-
tage of the right to write law and grant legal title” (Palan 2006, 102). 
Offshore, in other words, relies on sovereignty to abdicate sovereignty; 
sovereign states make political choices to revoke regulatory oversight in spe-
cific portions of their territory. But in considering offshores (and finance 
more broadly) in the Caribbean (Maurer 2008, 2010, 2013; Hudson 2017a) 
or Africa, where histories of colonialism and underdevelopment are ev-
erywhere on the surface, we have to think about sovereignty differently, as 
something closer to what Cattelino (2008) has called “sovereign interdepen-
dency.” Small island economies in the Caribbean, for instance, become tax 
havens in a process entangled with histories of imperialism, colonialism, 
and slavery, the aftermath of which makes them more attractive/vulnerable 
repositories for fleeing capital. As with flags of convenience in Panama, Li-
beria, and the Marshall Islands, the long wake of colonialism is a more apt 
description of tax haven status than is participation in a market of equals 
(Maurer 2008). So too in Equatorial Guinea, where state prerogatives to give 
US companies free rein on platforms are less about sovereign power and 
more about imperial debris, histories of colonialism, and profound inequal-
ity in the global economy.
The petroleum offshore is particularly generative for thinking about 
sovereignty because it pushes the offshore into arguably its most literal in-
stantiation. In the petroleum offshore, economic activity does take place, 
at least in part, “on some barge floating in the middle of the ocean” (Palan 
2003, 2).The fipco 330, along with the fpso and the tankers that trans-
port oil to market, are all (broadly speaking) barges floating in the middle 
of the ocean in which offshore economic activity — though not the kind 
Palan has in mind — takes place. In the oil and gas industry in particular, 
linking the industrial and financial offshores focuses our attention on the 
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centrality and proliferation of multiple offshores as intertwined techniques 
for the promises and seductions of capitalism, including the production of 
profit and the abdication of responsibility across the unequal geographies 
of the postcolonial world. Tax havens, transfer pricing, and flags of conve-
nience are central to quotidian spectacular accumulation in the oil indus-
try, as is the lack of external regulation and oversight on offshore platforms 
and throughout the hydrocarbon commodity chain. The commodity chain 
moves alongside another set of practices in which oil companies hedge the 
risks of notoriously volatile oil prices by investing in oil futures markets 
(themselves scantly regulated), which then become central not only to the 
price of gas or the outcome of pension fund investments, but also to the 
funding required for the industry’s ever- deeper- water explorations (Guyer 
2009; Sawyer 2012; Johnson 2015). In other words, petroleum’s industrial 
offshore and various financial offshores are intimately intertwined in ev-
eryday practice, a relationship with a specific juridical history in the Law 
of the Sea.
Both the financial and industrial offshores find juridical identity in an 
ongoing legal conversation around the Law of the Sea, a body of laws gov-
erning the relationships among sovereignty, land, and oceans, which has 
evolved from fourteenth-century jurists through the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea. Due to the historical need to defend territory 
against naval threats, the legal boundaries of a state had to extend beyond 
strict territorial boundaries into the surrounding seas, as did political au-
thority (Hampton and Abbott 1999). The resulting discontinuity between 
physical shores and legal sovereignty opened the door for juridical spaces 
defined in other than territorial terms — spaces still organized by state sov-
ereignty, but subject to different sets of regulations. Borrowing from Prescott 
(1975), Palan (2006) writes that “the earliest legal provisions for coastal wa-
ters involved the distribution of favors by rulers, such as exclusive rights to 
shallow fishing grounds and salt deposits in tidal marshes, exemption from 
port or harbor dues, and unhindered transit through straits” (23; emphasis 
added). The offshore in Equatorial Guinea and elsewhere is a contemporary 
site of Prescott’s “distribution of favors by rulers.” Sovereignty is both inten-
tionally and inevitably stretched thin offshore, allowing for exemptions and 
“unhindered transits” of all kinds. In Equatorial Guinea, foreign oil com-
panies do not pay import duties; they are permitted to set up proprietary 
ports of entry; and “industry standards,” rather than Equatoguinean law, 
exercise quotidian governing power over daily life on the rigs.
According to the Law of the Sea, states have domain over minerals and 
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other resources within their Exclusive Economic Zones (eezs) up to two 
hundred nautical miles off their shores (see figure 1.6). The first paragraph of 
Equatorial Guinea’s hydrocarbon law, translated from Spanish, makes direct 
reference to their eez: “The fundamental Law of the Republic of Equatorial 
Guinea consecrates and designates as the property of the people of Equato-
rial Guinea all resources found in our national territory, including the sub-
soil, continental shelf, islands, and the Exclusive Economic Zone of our seas” 
(República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2006a, 1) Because offshore oil platforms are 
still technologically limited to the continental shelf, they remain within the 
physical boundaries of the Equatoguinean state. However, the daily life of 
regulation and its absence on platforms, explored here and again in chapter 
4, introduce a series of issues around state and corporate sovereignty offshore 
where, in practice, sovereignty is distributed and (often strategically) fluid 
between the state and the innumerable contractors and subcontractors that 
we see on the fipco. The Equatoguinean state and foreign companies use 
and struggle over sovereignty strategically. It is not something that one or 
the other has or has lost in any straightforward way. By willfully signing con-
tracts that compartmentalize their territory, the Equatoguinean government 
is given the opportunity “to support unfettered capitalism while denounc-
ing it: to bemoan their loss of power and sovereignty while contributing to 
that very loss” (Palan 2006, 190). Oil companies manipulate the concept too, 
“happy to invoke national sovereignty when pressures are placed on them 
to improve their human rights or social responsibility records; and yet only 
too happy to operate in an environment in which they could get away with 
just about anything” (Kashi and Watts 2008, 46).
The archipelagic corporate form I discussed earlier facilitates the slip-
periness of corporate sovereignty offshore. This disaggregation or dispersion 
is, in effect, the legal (licit, intentional) thinning of liability, accountability, 
and responsibility, such that what seems clearly to be the singular exercise of 
corporate power — global companies in contract with governments around 
the world, maneuvering the world’s largest mobile infrastructures and reap-
ing spectacular profit — in practice fractures rapidly into a legally slippery 
tangle of subsidiaries and consortia and subcontractors.7 The next section 
tries to arrest some of that slipperiness and materialize offshore infrastruc-
ture by asking the questions: What is it? What does it do? What do manag-
ers and Equatoguinean government personnel imagine it to be doing? I pay 
special attention to the forms of desire and fantasy offshore infrastructures 
produce, and the kinds of distancing effects they enable.
(Continental shelf)
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Figure 1.6. Exclusive Economic Zone (1). Note how in this concession map, Bioko is 
visually swallowed by “the offshore.” 
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Infrastructure
Infrastructure exerts a force — not simply in the materials and 
energies it avails, but also the way it attracts people, draws them 
in, coalesces and expends their capacities. Thus, the distinction 
between infrastructure and sociality is fluid and pragmatic rather 
than definitive. People work on things to work on each other, as 
these things work on them. 
— AbdouMaliq Simone, “Infrastructure: Introductory  
Commentary by AbdouMaliq Simone”
Offshore infrastructure in Equatorial Guinea’s waters includes drilling rigs, 
platforms, and fpso vessels. Rigs are used for drilling, completion, and pro-
duction; platforms are put to use postcompletion to process oil and gas and 
prepare them for export. Essentially offshore plants, platforms are among 
the largest movable, human- made infrastructures in the world. A typical 
platform may have up to thirty wellheads, with directional drilling allowing 
subsea reservoirs to be accessed at different depths and remote positions up 
to five miles off of the platform (Conaway 1999). Once reservoirs have been 
accessed and drilled and the oil is brought to the surface, the fpsos store 
the crude until it is offloaded onto tankers for transport to market. While 
they vary in size, fpsos have tremendous technical capacities: they are able 
to process up to 80,000 barrels of oil per day, reinjecting 150,000 barrels per 
day of seawater, handling 170 million cubic feet of gas, and storing 1.6 million 
barrels of crude and condensate. 
While each platform is commissioned and built by individual operating 
companies, designed to last the lifetime of the field (after which they will un-
dergo some combination of disassembly, repurposing, and intentional sink-
ing), rigs like the fipco and fpsos are rented and are moved around the world 
from contract to contract. During my fieldwork, with oil prices at or above 
$150 per barrel, rigs were in high demand worldwide, and operating compa-
nies at work in Equatorial Guinea were waiting up to three years for a drill-
ing rig to move into position. While the fipco was built in a Texas shipyard, 
many newer rigs are built in Korea, purchased by an offshore drilling contrac-
tor like SeaTrekker, subcontracted by SeaTrekker to operating companies to 
drill offshore, and then floated from Korea to wherever the contract happens 
to be. On the fipco, I was told repeatedly how archaic the facility was, in-
cluding the redolent explanation that Africa, after all, is where rigs go to die.
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As Simone (2012) intimates in this section’s opening epigraph, the rela-
tionship between these infrastructures and the people who animate them is 
fluid and mutually productive. People work on things to work on each other. 
Here, I pay particular attention to the forms of desire and fantasy, inequal-
ity and segregation that these infrastructures facilitate, both for those who 
manage them and for those who work on them. Infrastructures, Brian Lar-
kin (2013) writes, “emerge out of and store within them forms of desire and 
fantasy and can take on fetish- like aspects that sometimes can be wholly 
autonomous from their technical function (329). . . . The sense of fascina-
tion they stimulate is an important part of their political effect” (334). In-
deed, offshore petroleum infrastructures are multivalent sociopolitical proj-
ects — not merely a response to geologic fact, but a choice about visibility, 
accessibility, and political risk. To illustrate: On both the continental and 
island landmasses of Equatorial Guinea, liquid hydrocarbons seep to the 
surface. Locals note the seeps. Migrant geologists working for US companies 
know about them as well, and yet there is no onshore exploration in Equato-
rial Guinea. Why? Because the industry’s cost- benefit analyses of prospective 
infrastructure projects consider not only the quality of crude, the distance 
to market, and the anticipated cost of extraction, but also, centrally, the per-
ceived risk. As one geologist working in Equatorial Guinea explained to me, 
“An onshore well in Algeria costs $3 million. Offshore here wells are from 
$15 to $80 million. If you do find a large onshore reservoir, it’s very economic, 
but there are associated political risks. If this country were to go through a 
civil war, our structures out in the water are safe. But look at Nigeria; noth-
ing’s to stop people from coming onto your facility, stopping production, 
blowing up the facility.” The geologist articulates a particular form of capi-
talist desire common to both the industrial and financial offshores — a space 
where “associated political risks,” whether taxation or militant resistance, 
attenuate.
Infrastructure, in other words, is envisioned, built, and operated to solve 
political problems simultaneous and even paramount to its material capaci-
ties — politics by other means (Mitchell 2011). Part of infrastructure’s affec-
tive power emanates from the enfolding of political projects into concrete, 
steel, copper wire, and asphalt. But lest we take this as an insight of criti-
cal theory, somehow a radical rejoinder to naturalized assumptions about 
infrastructure, industry managers and Equatoguinean state functionaries 




Offshore facilities promise distance from political entanglements, commu-
nity entitlements, visible pollution in inhabited areas, and militant attacks 
and bunkering focused on accessible pipelines. That much of the commodity 
chain can take place in the middle of the ocean, from exploration to process-
ing to exporting, seems to at least partially remove oil and gas companies 
from the ugliest, most visible, and most publicized negative effects of their 
industry. My discussions with migrant managers and Equatoguinean gov-
ernment appointees often substantiated these ideas of offshore disentangle-
ment. Consider the comments of Mauricio, a recently appointed Equatogu-
inean government official:
Onshore/offshore is an operation question. Socially there is more positive 
than negative to it. An oil infrastructure has a lot of environmental problems. 
When you build that onshore next to a community, there is more potential 
for problems for that community. Environmentally, the safest way to have 
an oil facility is to have it removed from social settings. It’s an advantage for 
offshore operations. Having an onshore operation involves a lot of piping, 
infrastructure, that for some people may not be beautiful architecturally. It 
may not be impressive for environmentalists and people who care for trees.
While Mauricio starts his reflection by suggesting that the difference be-
tween onshore and offshore is an operations issue — merely a spatial question 
about where the work of exploration and extraction gets done — he segues 
immediately into social and environmental visibility and impact concerns. 
He suggests that, at the community level, the visible infrastructure of on-
shore production is aesthetically disruptive (as it may not be beautiful or ar-
chitecturally impressive). But he also acknowledges that aesthetic objections 
are related to environmental objections; since “an oil infrastructure has a lot 
of environmental problems,” whether it is onshore or off, it’s best to get those 
problems away from people.
In addition to noting community- level environmental problems, this 
government appointee flags a set of supra- local issues, including regulation 
and visibility. Often when “environmentalists and those who care for trees” 
are not “impressed” by what they see (and the ability to see onshore infra-
structure is a crucial difference), there is a call for action or regulation. By 
removing the visuals of oil infrastructure and operations to the middle of the 
ocean, there is a noticeable attenuation of public and government attention, 
facilitating unimpeded production. Eugenio, one of the few Equatoguinean 
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petroleum engineers working in- country, explained the on- platform results 
of this attenuation:
Normally, in the United States for example, the more petroleum you extract, 
the harder it is to clean the water. In other sites the amount [of oil] taken 
is conditional on water quality. Here there is not this conditionality. Here 
there is no outside testing. On the platform from time to time people are told 
to prepare for an environmental assessment, but it’s always someone from 
within the company, and the results are always good.
Both Mauricio and Eugenio are overtly concerned with the environmental 
impact of offshore production, claiming either that this impact is minimized 
when infrastructure is moved away from communities or that it is only regu-
lation and assessment that are minimized. Both men, however, framed their 
understandings of the offshore with concern for local outcomes, whether 
pollution or community protection from the petro- project.
Migrant managers, on the other hand, voiced markedly different con-
cerns when discussing the advantages of offshore infrastructure. They fo-
cused not on threats to Equatoguinean environments and communities, but 
on the threats those communities posed to their operations. Here, three dif-
ferent managers (two from the US and one British) offer remarkably conso-
nant offshore aspirations:
Offshore makes it easier. Reduces investment risk. . . . You’re not exposed — 
you’re shielded from the masses, shielded from interaction. You can control 
the interaction. You can contain the asset, it’s a clean containment. If a boat 
drifts in our area, we call the Navy. There’s a lot less opportunity for negative 
interaction and distraction. In Nigeria people steal oil. We don’t have that. 
It’s clean. Less leakage, shrinkage. Controls are tight.
It’s expensive offshore, but it’s clean. No laying pipelines through jungles, 
uprooting villages. There’s nobody out there. We lay pipelines in the seabed, 
and it doesn’t bother anyone.
Offshore has made it easier. You’re on an island, if you know what I’m say-
ing. Diamond mines in Angola are an absolute nightmare. Armies get to 
you. Pirates get to you. [You have to] have massive South African war vets 
to secure the places. When you’re out there on an oil rig, you’ve got a huge 
moat around you. That has made it easier. It’s more expensive to get the oil 
out of the ground, but you don’t have to worry about onshore issues, which 
are massive expenses.
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These managers make a series of claims about the control and containment 
facilitated by the offshore — of potentially volatile sociopolitical situations 
(note the comparisons with Nigerian oil and Angolan diamond mining), of 
profit  margins (less “leakage” and “shrinkage”). The offshore setup at least 
forestalls the risks attached to visible spills and to attack by armies, by oil 
bunkerers, and by mend, who was often rumored to be planning an attack 
on neighboring Equatorial Guinea installations.8 Avoided too in the off-
shore setup are the unpleasant tasks of relocating entire villages and negoti-
ating the attendant set of community claims that come with visible onshore 
extraction — for employment, reparations, and development projects — or 
of hiring “massive South African war vets” to secure onshore installations. 
Again, the idealized industrial offshore these managers describe coincides 
with the evocative promises of the financial offshore, sites “of disinterested 
and placeless economic interaction” (Cameron and Palan 2004, 105). In 
avoiding the risks people bring, these managers envision the offshore setup 
as reducing contestation, even if it cannot be avoided completely.
It is interesting to wonder to what extent these managers’ fantasies of the 
offshore are multifaceted. They clearly hope for a controllable environment 
in which to make a profit. But do they also hope, from within an industry 
infamous for disastrous environmental and community consequences, for 
different environmental and social outcomes? Is there, in these statements, 
either an acknowledgment or a desire to resolve what one might call the 
contradictions of capitalism?9 In the field, I was stunned again and again 
by the extent to which US and British management failed to acknowledge 
the imbrication of their industry with the environmental, social, and po-
litical problems by which we were all surrounded. They loved to talk about 
these problems — how corrupt Equatorial Guinea is; how it’s so hard to see 
so much wealth next to so much poverty; how much litter there is. But, as 
with the Canadian human resources (hr) manager, or the corporate social 
responsibility (csr) manager touting environmental education, there was 
a near total disconnect between the deep imbrication of their industry and 
the daily lives they critiqued. While Venezuelan, Brazilian, and Nigerian oil 
workers in Equatorial Guinea often talked about the industry as a histori-
cally problematic endeavor in which they were choosing to participate, the 
most highly placed workers (nearly always from the US or the UK) rarely 
acknowledged the widely criticized effects of their industry.
Rather than a hoped- for reconciliation of capitalism’s contradictions, 
what I heard repeatedly from managers was more akin to haunting. The ac-
cessibility of infrastructure in other places and times across hydrocarbon 
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history haunted their descriptions of the offshore in Equatorial Guinea. Ni-
geria repeatedly oozed to the surface in my informants’ collective memo-
ries (both personal stories and anecdotal accounts of industry history), as 
did histories of uprooting villages in Latin America and laying pipelines 
through inhabited forests in Indonesia, as well as resistance to those actions. 
Indeed, from Saudi Arabia to Mexico, early oil work was typified by foreign 
companies bringing in massive onshore infrastructures, what William Reno 
(2001) has called “byoi” or “Bring Your Own Infrastructure,” for extraction, 
production, and export. Local labor at these sites, brought in initially as con-
struction workers, cooks, and technical trainees, lived in tents, cheek by jowl 
with American and European workers in the most comfortable enclaved 
conditions. Robert Vitalis (2007) and novelist Abdel Rahman Munif (1989), 
among others, have chronicled how this intimate segregation of domestic 
infrastructures led to worker organizing, strikes, and eventually national-
ization across the twentieth century. 
The emergence of offshore infrastructure changed the course of that 
trend, and Equatorial Guinea came on- stream just at the historical moment 
when, largely in response to the unmitigated disaster of Nigeria, the indus-
try decided that the offshore was useful not only as a organizing principle 
for industrial operations, but also as a guiding metaphor for its relation-
ship to production sites more broadly. In Equatorial Guinea, one repeating 
US industry mantra was not to be like Nigeria, shorthand for Shell Nigeria’s 
infamously violent presence in the Niger Delta and the robust structures of 
responsibility — with the company providing often- unreliable water, light, 
and education in a tangled relationship with local states — that typified their 
involvement. In Equatorial Guinea, the arrangement between the industry 
and that which was “outside” it was, on paper, radically attenuated, with 
corporate social responsibility subcontracted out and companies separated 
by multiple layers of liability from that which surrounded them. “Offshore” 
was shorthand for this shift.
And yet, it is important to resist the temptation to think of offshore infra-
structure as a “clean break”—in other words, a technical change that some-
how enabled radically different forms of work, profit making, or corporate 
relationships to take place. Rather, we might better understand offshore in-
frastructure as enabling certain forms of continuity. Practices that had been 
met with increasing resistance onshore — paying workers according to race, 
providing separate and strikingly unequal housing facilities, lack of mean-
ingful training or technology transfer opportunities — can be newly natural-
ized in offshore work, ostensibly justified by the novel technosocial configu-
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ration of the open ocean, the geophysical demands of subsea hydrocarbon, 
and the forms of infrastructure necessary to respond to those conditions. 
But of course, the desired distance from the haunting does not inhere in the 
infrastructure itself; instead, it has to be made and remade with tremendous 
effort. Nowhere is that effort clearer than in the daily life of rig labor.
“There’s Nobody Out There”
Offshore production may not involve the direct displacement of towns or 
villages; running pipelines through people’s backyards and drinking water 
supplies; or generally placing the considerable technology, logistics, and hu-
mans required to get hydrocarbons out of the ground in visible or disruptive 
spaces. This does not mean, however, that “there’s nobody out there,” as one 
manager claimed above. On the contrary, given the extraordinary require-
ments of constructing, moving, operating, and maintaining the largest mo-
bile infrastructures in the world, oil and gas companies put people out there 
in large numbers.
The 115 men from twenty different nations on the fipco 330 (and on rigs 
all over the world) live “rotating” lives — spending a few weeks working and 
sleeping on the rig, and then a few weeks at home in Equatorial Guinea, the 
Philippines, Scotland, or wherever home may be. In this arrangement, each 
employee has his “back to back”: when one man leaves the rig to spend his 
twenty- eight days off, another man with the same job description comes to 
take over the constant work for his twenty- eight days on.10 On the March 
day I spent on the fipco, twenty- one workers left the rig by helicopter, and 
twenty workers arrived to take their places. Referred to in the industry’s 
(English) lingua franca as a “hitch,” each of these three- to- six- week shifts 
on the rig is characterized by grueling twenty- four- hour workdays. While 
schedules require twelve hours of work, the rig does not “stop” at night, but 
rather is operational twenty- four hours per day, year round. Hence, every-
one on the rig is on call around the clock, and people routinely have to get 
up in the middle of the night to address problems. The Equatoguinean rig 
workers I came to know called each hitch a marea, the Spanish word for tide, 
but also evocative of seasickness, mareado. Workers, both international and 
Equatoguinean, described their rotating lives as surreal temporal experi-
ences. One man from Houston explained that he felt like he had two parallel 
lives, each of which stopped when he wasn’t there and started again when he 
arrived, “as if on dvd.” As they fly on and off of the fipco and rigs like it, 
most of the foreign workers barely set foot on Equatoguinean soil. Although 
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they fly into the Malabo or Bata airports, they often then fly immediately 
out to platforms via helicopter, or spend one night on private company com-
pounds before leaving for the rig the next morning. As one man put it, “I live 
here like I did in Angola: from the airport to the rig.”
The 115 men and their labor twins from twenty different nations and 
seventeen different companies, flying in and out of Equatorial Guinea to the 
fipco rig alone, is clearly a logistically and financially intensive arrange-
ment. Companies justify the considerable work and expense of recruiting 
these men — negotiating their visas, moving them between rig and home, 
paying and insuring them — by the extent to which the wide- ranging sub-
contracting of production processes diffuses liability for everything from 
employee health insurance to explosions, away from the operating com-
panies and into the loose web of overlapping subcontracts and legal rela-
tionships diagrammed above (see figures 1.3 and 1.4). While I discuss the 
quotidian details and implications of extensive (offshore and onshore) labor 
subcontracting in chapter 4, here I am interested in the daily life of rig work 
and workers, saturated with incessant comings and goings, helicopter rides, 
transnational plane flights, and personal mareado temporalities, where the 
desire and fantasy of the offshore for some becomes the lived inequality and 
exploitation of others.
Among the men on board the fipco, contracted by multiple firms and 
recruited from multiple countries, there were unambiguous working hier-
archies. The Offshore Installation Manager (oim) was at the top, with three 
supervisors under him and four “leads” under them; and then a series of 
workers organized by “levels” two through five, with five being the lowest. 
On the fipco, as well as on the other rigs I studied, white Americans, Brits, 
and Canadians held top positions almost without exception, with nation-
alities diversifying through the middle, and Equatoguinean workers at the 
bottom, with a few in level three. The two highest positions on the fipco — 
Company Man and oim — were held by a white North American and a white 
Australian, respectively. White Norwegian, English, and Canadian workers 
held all of the supervisory and technician positions, with Russian, French, 
Filipino, US, Colombian, Venezuelan, and Serbian workers in positions that 
included Operator, Field Engineer, Mud Logger, Crane Operator, Mechanic, 
and Directional Driller, among others. With few exceptions, Equatoguin-
eans occupied the bottom positions on the rig: eleven of the fourteen cater-
ing positions, Painter, Welder, Roustabout (an industry term for unskilled 
labor), Floorhand, Derrickhand, and Assistant Driller, among others. Men 
were assigned sleeping quarters on the rig according to their level, with those 
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at the top in private rooms, and those at the bottom in bunks that hold four 
or more people.
Nationality is central to this form of labor organization. Subcontract-
ing companies (discussed at length in chapter 4) calculate each worker’s pay 
and rotation schedule according to his nation of origin, using cost- of- living 
indices from international ratings agency Standard & Poor’s (s&p) Financial 
Services. According to this system of differentiation, American and UK la-
borers work a “28/28,” that is, twenty- eight days on in Equatorial Guinea and 
twenty- eight days off at home, considered the best schedule. Filipino work-
ers have the least desirable schedule: eleven weeks on and three weeks off 
(an “11/3”). Vitalis (2007) has argued that these racialized hierarchies, struc-
tured under the rubric of skill differentiation, have come to characterize oil 
operations around the world (see also McKay 2007 and chapters 2 and 4). 
Firms, including those in my research, have long argued that wage, sched-
ule, and facilities segregation is not a question of racism, but of skill level. In-
deed, increasingly specialized methods of oil extraction (offshore, oil sands, 
shale oil) require increasingly specialized labor and minimal unskilled labor. 
These requirements then map onto geographic inequalities in the produc-
tion and dissemination of technical knowledge and expertise. And yet, even 
the few locals who occupied semi- technical positions — radio or crane opera-
tor, and certainly Eugenio, the Equatoguinean petroleum engineer I quoted 
earlier — complained repeatedly that they were kept indefinitely at the level 
of “trainee”: “When they bring a [white] South African . . . I have to guide 
him but I’m the ‘trainee.’ I spend six months showing him the work, and 
once these six months are finished he becomes [my boss], and I’m still the 
‘trainee.’ ” In other words, unequal opportunities for training and education 
aside, even when two workers do the same job, they are often categorized, 
paid, and scheduled according to their nationality, a categorization that of-
ten maps too neatly onto race (a discussion I continue in chapters 2 and 4).
Dividing labor by nationality and race, of course, has been a strategy 
to keep wages low and inhibit worker solidarity and organizing far beyond 
the world’s mineral frontiers. Offshore, that strategy is given new lived em-
pirics: work comes in short, intense bursts of mere weeks at a time; workers 
never know with whom they will be working on any given rotation, or what 
language(s) coworkers will speak; and they are always under the watchful 
eye of management, quite literally, in a claustrophobic floating metal atoll. 
You cannot steal away to a bar or join one another for a home- cooked meal, 
much less hold an organizing meeting at a local church in your off- hours, 
if some of you are in the Philippines, others in Venezuela, and still others 
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in Equatorial Guinea. Equatoguineans, in theory, could meet one another 
for labor organizing over dinner, and indeed many rig workers with whom 
I worked were friends or family members who socialized in their time off. 
But, as discussed in the introduction, Equatorial Guinea is a paranoid and 
arbitrarily violent dictatorship, with a particular kind of authoritarianism 
and labor history (Campos Serrano and Micó Abogo 2006) that has proved 
highly productive for US companies.
Again, offshore infrastructure in Equatorial Guinea does not enable a 
novel configuration of racist labor practices. Rather, it enables the continu-
ity of practices that grew increasingly untenable onshore, but that go back 
over one hundred years across the world’s oil frontiers. In extraction’s off-
shore age, the kinds of social worlds produced on mobile rigs and platforms 
enable these practices of segregation to continue, facilitated by the seeming 
dis appearance of the infrastructure on which they take place. Infrastructure 
here carries far more than the crude, seawater, or liquid natural gas for which 
it is, at least in part, designed. To paraphrase Larkin (2013), while infrastruc-
ture is matter that enables the movement of other matter, it is also matter 
that enables the movement, literally the mobility (in the case of rigs), of cer-
tain forms of politics — here, inequality, racism, and the disempowerment of 
workers. This allows us to expand on Larkin’s point about affect in that it is 
not only awe and fascination with infrastructure from afar that stimulates 
political effects; but also, as infrastructure comes to intimately shape people’s 
daily lives, the rhythms of their labor, and their relationships to one another, 
it becomes central to what Mazzarella (2012) has called the professional co-
ordination of affect or affect management. Infrastructure has a synaesthetic 
effect wherein racialized difference becomes sensory and tactile — how long 
you can rest at home, and how long your hitches on the rig last; who you 
sleep with, and in how big a room; the relative heft of an s&p- calculated pay-
check reflecting the fungibility of Filipinos and Colombians, Brits and Ni-
gerians offshore. As Massumi (2002) writes, “The ability of affect to produce 
an economic effect more swiftly and surely than economics itself means that 
affect is itself a real condition . . . as infrastructural as a factory” (45).
Within these racialized hierarchies, working life on the rig is rigid and 
exacting. Risk is the specter under which workers’ arduous, wearying daily 
schedules take shape; this is risk not only in terms of accidents and safety 
precautions, but also in terms of shareholder value and company reputa-
tion. Through “typical day” narratives of rig work, I end this chapter with 
a discussion of Equatoguinean workers’ embodied experiences of rig life. I 
explore the highly ritualized safety practices that saturate their working days 
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and situate these practices historically within an industry sea change that 
took place after the Exxon Valdez and Enron debacles, drawing these expe-
riences into dialog with the productivity of risk in oil futures markets. The 
chapter closes with a broad look at risk that puts rig work, futures markets, 
and these workers’ daily onshore lives in Malabo into the same frame. This is 
the lived experience, the habitation of the industrial and financial offshores.
Typical Day
Daily work on rigs is intense, regimented, and exhausting. The low- skilled, 
labor- intensive positions of floorhand, roustabout, pumphand, derrickhand, 
motor operator, and crane operator that Equatoguinean men tend to occupy 
are closely controlled, occasionally high- pressure, and function within in-
flexible schedules. At home in Malabo, local rig workers inundated me with 
talk of strict schedules and elaborate rituals of control and safety. Two men 
from different companies and platforms explain:
We work from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., with two half- hour breaks and one 
lunch break of an hour. We work for ten hours and have two hours rest. . . . I 
have to get permission to do any type of work. There is a procedure for get-
ting permission.
They call me at five in the morning to eat breakfast. Then there is a pre- work 
meeting, to see if there are any conflicts, to see if there are any problems in 
any jobs, to discuss. [This meeting is from] 6:00 – 6:15 a.m. At 6:30 we sign 
the permits to work. You cannot work on anything without the permission 
of a supervisor. The risks have to be analyzed. At 7:15 you begin to prepare 
your tools, survey the work to be done, and begin to work. My work is com-
plicated. If I make a mistake — if [I allow] the pressure [in the system] to rise 
to 100 percent — I will shut down the whole plant. On any given day we have 
between one and three permits to work, depending on the day. After com-
pleting three permits to work, you have to go back to the Offshore Installa-
tion Manager, and then you can continue working. At 5:00 p.m., in my case, 
I stop working to fill out a report which I send to the supervisor about cor-
rections or equipment that has failed. At 5:45 or 6:00 p.m. it’s dinner, and to 
sleep. If something happens during the night, they come to call me in my 
room. After dinner I shower, and get in bed at 9:00 p.m.
I talked to men who worked on five different rigs across all three major op-
erating companies and they all had similar “typical day” narratives. Ev-
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eryone started at 6:00 a.m. after having breakfast (available starting at 5:00 
a.m.). Some had two fifteen- minute breaks before and after lunch; others 
had two thirty- minute breaks. Lunch for everyone was one hour. Every-
one stopped working at 6:00 p.m. to eat dinner. With few exceptions, each 
man made the point that he was exhausted at the end of the day and would 
fall into bed. Equatoguinean rotation schedules were either “2/2s” — two 
weeks on and two weeks off — or “28/28s,” working and living on the plat-
form for a month at a time, with the following month off and home on 
land.
Labor schedules and tasks were monitored closely, explicitly for the pur-
poses of risk avoidance and safety. (Remember that my own rig visit started 
immediately with a safety training mini- course on video, a test to ensure I 
had paid attention, and a liability waiver. And João, my guide, was the rig’s 
safety coordinator.) Petroleum production is widely acknowledged to be a 
risky industry, rife with explosion and fire hazards, limb- threatening equip-
ment, and noxious chemicals, among other perilous potentialities. The open 
ocean of the offshore and the helicopter rides required to get there concen-
trate and exacerbate these dangers.11 My own rig visit felt like a protracted 
exercise in both embodied and ornamental safety rituals — from what I was 
given to wear; to what I was told to take off; to the ways I was trained to walk, 
climb, and descend stairs; to the safety videos, manuals, and waivers I was 
required to study and sign, literally from the moment I stepped off the heli-
copter. João instructed me to take off all rings, earrings, necklaces, the hair 
band around my wrist, and anything else that could snag or catch. None of 
these items were allowed on the rig. While walking on the rig, if a railing was 
available I was instructed to hold it at all times, in particular on stairs, which, 
depending on their pitch, one had to descend facing backward.
For Equatoguinean rig workers, this exacting fixation on safety stretched 
beyond bodily adornment and comportment to the system of Permits to 
Work, mentioned by both men quoted above. Essentially a job permission 
slip, each permit details the job to be done, which tools will be included, 
whether the work is hot (welding) or cold (lifting, relocating equipment), the 
possible risks involved, and how those risks will be avoided. Tasks cannot 
proceed without a Permit to Work, secured from supervisors at the morning 
meeting. If a task arises during the course of the day for which one does not 
have a permit, a worker cannot proceed with the task until he secures a new 
permit. Permits to Work must be posted visibly at the job site on the rig, so 
that as others circulate they can discern what is going on at any given loca-
tion. Each permit must be removed and cleared with an authority when the 
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job is completed. On the fipco, if jobs were considered complicated — those 
involving multiple personnel and tasks — they required an additional think 
drill and a special permit. Also known as the think Process for incident pre-
vention, a think drill is a five- step, pre- job meeting:
1 Plan — Develop a step- by- step plan.
2 Inspect — Inspect all equipment to be used.
3 Identify — Identify all potential hazards.
4 Communicate — Communicate all relevant information.
5 Control — Control the operation.
While these details are mundane in and of themselves, they offer a sense of 
the intensely regimented, hyper- scheduled, and monitored working day on 
the rig. All of the men with whom I had in- depth interviews at home in Ma-
labo repeatedly mentioned their respective companies’ overt and constant 
Figure 1.7. Author in personal protective equipment (PPE).
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attention to safety. Talking in amazement about helicopters — a notoriously 
dangerous offshore technology — Antonio explained:
I am telling you that perhaps for you this wouldn’t be so incredible, but in 
our environment we had never seen things like this; maybe on television. We 
have never had equipment like this. It makes me say, where am I? How do 
you control so much technology? For the helicopter we watch a safety video, 
[that covers] emergency landings, what to do; if the helicopter falls how you 
can escape; where is the emergency equipment; where are the escape boats. 
[We wear] double auditory protection and life jackets. The pilot asks you if 
there has been anything that you didn’t understand. There has not been a 
single helicopter accident.
For Antonio and others, the complexity, power, and potential hazard of the 
equipment with which they worked often generated a reverence that natu-
ralized the rhythms of their working days. Antonio’s words recall Larkin’s 
(2013) insistence on infrastructure’s capacity to “generate desire and awe in 
autonomy of its technical function . . . the sense of fascination [infrastruc-
tures] stimulate is an important part of their political effect” (333). Rogelio, 
in a safety soliloquy that would make his employer proud, explained that 
“for [this company] safety is first. It is worth more to finish the day without 
an accident than to complete the work that you have been given. [We count 
the] days that we are able to go without an accident.” As Antonio and Rog-
elio make clear, this safety- saturated atmosphere was not only experientially 
definitive of working offshore, but also a welcome characteristic of rig work. 
While this gratitude in the face of serious hazard is readily understandable, 
it was an important ethnographic discovery for me, because it so directly 
contravened my own visceral response to safety measures in the Equatogu-
inean industry more generally.
In the eight months of fieldwork that preceded my visit to the fipco, 
among my strongest impressions of the oil industry in Equatorial Guinea 
was a corporate culture so safety- saturated that it bordered on the comedic. 
On one occasion, I was in a company vehicle with an British industry em-
ployee who was driving painfully slowly, and an apparatus beeped loudly any 
time he hit forty miles per hour. Cars whizzed past us. When I chided him, 
he told me that every time the apparatus beeped a report was sent to Hous-
ton headquarters. On a walk through another company’s compound with 
the wife of a migrant manager, I bent to tie my shoe, and she joked that her 
husband would need three signatures to secure permission to do what I had 
just done. Industry offices were wallpapered with safety achievements — how 
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many “incident- free” days, how many months without a “lost- time” incident. 
Acronyms abounded — keep it simple, think drills, start. In Malabo, the 
T- shirts that give safety acronyms their public lives could be seen on the 
backs of many local men, women, and children, having found reincarnation 
in the used clothing markets.
These elaborately choreographed and audited safety rituals are the out-
comes of earlier offshore fantasies run aground, the hauntings of the Exxon 
Valdez spill, the Piper Alpha disaster, and the Enron/Arthur Andersen scan-
dal, a list to which the Deepwater Horizon is now certainly to be added 
(Bond 2013). As many management informants explained to me, this series 
of disasters and their nightmarish human, environmental, public relations, 
and shareholder consequences motivated a corporate culture sea change to 
newly confront these risks, affecting everything from accounting practices 
to rituals of rig safety. Where I scoffed at beeping, speed- monitoring appa-
ratuses and ridiculous acronyms, for my migrant management informants, 
these were the procedures through which they controlled and monitored 
working environments, and the audited outcomes (incident- free days) could 
be used in shareholder reports to reassure investors that times had changed.
For Equatoguinean rig workers, the micromanagement of time and tasks 
that defined their labor environment was exhausting but welcome. Yet for 
most of them, the Enron debacle or the Exxon Valdez spill that instigated 
the safety regime for which Permits to Work are a synecdoche were snippets 
on television, if they were anything at all. An analysis of the Enron/Exxon 
Valdez outcomes complicates workers’ faith in the safety rituals they carried 
out. The shift in corporate practices in the wake of these disasters, in part, 
actually rescinded responsibility for workers and replaced it with internal, 
self- regulated safety procedures intended to keep “recorded” or “lost- time” 
incidents down, and stock prices up. As one Equatoguinean man who lost a 
finger in a rig accident found out, neither the operating company to which 
his work provided oil, nor the subcontracting company to which his salary 
provided profit, could help when he could no longer work on a rig. And, as 
two other workers reported, their oim’s act of throwing broken radial saws 
into the ocean on not one, but two, occasions, in order that the incidents 
would go unreported, prompts us to ask: For whom is the offshore arrange-
ment simpler or safer? For whom does it redistribute risk and where does 
that redistributed risk go?
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After Enron and Exxon
Alfredo was an Equatoguinean economist who had long lived abroad and 
completed his postgraduate studies in London before moving home to work 
first for the Major Corporation, and later for Regal Energy. When I asked 
him what he did as an economist at Regal, he responded: “Controls: audit, 
corporate governance, business ethics, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I de-
sign and implement processes and procedures for control and compliance.” 
When I admitted that I had no idea what “controls” meant, he offered an 
example, explaining that he had recently been working to implement a sys-
tem that would allow company vehicles to pay tolls without having to stop at 
the toll booths that separate central Malabo from the airport road on which 
company headquarters were located. When I remarked on the apparent triv-
iality of that project in relation to corporate governance and business eth-
ics, he continued that he handled anything that had to do with “control and 
safety,” from the crucial to the humdrum. “These have been the key words,” 
he emphasized, “safety since the Exxon Valdez and control since Enron/ 
Arthur Andersen; i.e., look for what the company is trying to avoid.”
Alfredo explained that before Enron, audits looked only at financial 
statements, but the Arthur Andersen scandal exposed glossy financial state-
ments as mere surfaces prepared to encourage shareholders to trust company 
finances. These statements revealed little about what was actually going on 
in the company, let alone about the processes that led to the figures therein. 
In 2002, in the wake of the Enron scandal (and others, including Tyco and 
WorldCom), the US Congress passed the Sarbanes- Oxley Act, a federal law 
intended to strengthen corporate accounting controls. In practice in Equa-
torial Guinea, Alfredo remarked: “sarbox, or sox 404, as we lovingly refer 
to it, guides what I do. [There are] procedures for absolutely everything, and 
the procedures are standardized in almost all affiliates. The company main-
tains them everywhere they go. If I was to work in an accounting department 
anywhere in the world, I would already know the procedures.” Alfredo was 
not my only informant to mention the aftermath of Enron and the seemingly 
arcane 2002 legislation. (I certainly had never heard of Sarbanes- Oxley be-
fore arriving in Central Africa.) David, the manager of a major oil services 
company, explained that after Sarbanes- Oxley, “you and I can’t do business 
on a paper napkin. . . . But before Enron that was different. When I was in 
South America we did a lot of dodgy things. It used to be that the ends justi-
fied the means. [The attitude was] go ahead and do it and we’ll fix it later.” 
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When I asked David about the potential ramifications of paper napkin busi-
ness in the post- Enron era, he responded that, “the oil industry is small, and 
that kind of behavior is not admired. It’s quite regulated. You have one scan-
dal and they blacklist people. One scandal, and can you imagine the impact 
on the nymex stock price?”
While I discuss the proceduralism and self- regulation described by both 
Alfredo and David at greater length in chapter 3, what interests me here is 
threefold. First, both the Exxon Valdez disaster and the later Enron scan-
dal ushered in new “keywords” in the oil and gas industry: safety and con-
trol. Second, these keywords have fundamentally changed practices on the 
ground — from how many signatures one needs to tie one’s shoe, to audit 
procedures following new US laws, to elaborate risk- avoidance rituals and 
their tabulation in the recording of days without a lost- time incident (Radial 
saw? What radial saw?). Third, the grounded practices to control risk — both 
financial and industrial — are primarily indexed to shareholder value, sec-
ondarily indexed to human safety, and not at all to labor rights. “One scan-
dal, and can you imagine the impact on the nymex stock price?” I want to 
dwell for a moment longer on risk where we find it here: at the intersection 
of accounting procedures and Permits to Work, or of financial and indus-
trial practice.
The packaging of risk as a commodity is among the most profitable of 
contemporary financial endeavors (LiPuma and Lee 2004; Thrift 2005; Za-
loom 2004; Poon 2009; Power 1997, 2007). Indeed, Guyer (2009) suggests 
that risk be added to land, labor, and money as a fourth category in Po-
lanyi’s famous list of commodity fictions. Although the oil and gas industry 
is, of course, traditionally reliant on the production and sale of a tangible 
industrial commodity, it is also deeply invested in what Zaloom (2004) calls 
“the productive life of risk” (365). Of the approximately two hundred mil-
lion barrels of oil traded per day on nymex, much of it is “paper oil,” or the 
buying and selling of futures contracts. Futures markets are technologies 
for distributing risk: oil companies and others who need a constant supply 
buy futures, essentially a contract on future delivery at a price agreed- upon 
now. Investment banks and US pension funds are also heavily invested in 
the oil futures markets, not because they need oil, but because the invest-
ments can be extremely profitable (Guyer 2009). Based on her involvement 
in the Chad–Cameroon pipeline project, Guyer also points out that finan-
cial instruments are inserted at multiple stages in these brick- and- mortar oil 
industry projects, from debt servicing to actuarial calculations (2009, 209; 
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see also Leonard 2016). This intercalation of industrial and financial pro-
ductivity involves multiple moments in which to trace “risk as a problem of 
practice” (Zaloom 2004, 368) or “the actual ways in which risk instruments 
intervene in the world” (Guyer 2009, 218; Johnson 2015).
On the one hand, in futures markets, risk signifies an opening; it con-
jures opportunities for increased profit in a zone of possibility and chance 
(LiPuma and Lee 2004; Miyazaki 2003; Riles 2004; Maurer 2005; Thrift 
2005; Zaloom 2004). These are risks one should take, because the yields they 
promise outstrip and are, in fact, increased by their dangers. On the other 
hand, as I will detail below, the risks addressed by Permits to Work and he-
licopter safety videos in the lives of temporarily subcontracted and semi-
skilled Equatoguinean employees evoke volatility and fear, conjuring the 
narrowing of opportunities and prospects. These are risks one should, but 
probably cannot, avoid (see also Simone 2004; Guyer 1995, 2004; Ferguson 
1999). (See Peterson 2014 for this dual nature of risk in Nigerian pharmaceu-
tical markets.) And yet, these are not simply different moments or places of 
risk, but rather comprise an ethnographic scene that shows profitable risk 
and exploitative risk to be mutually dependent. To what extent is produc-
tive, profitable, and voluntary risk enabled by, and funded by, the destruc-
tive and seemingly intractable risk shouldered by (racialized, classed, gen-
dered) others? As Karen Ho (2009) has pointed out, in the mortgage crisis 
of 2007 – 2008, Wall Street’s professional risk- takers relied on the income 
streams of middle- and working- class homeowners (see also Appel et al. 
2019; Roitman 2014; Poon 2009). For professional risk- takers, the repack-
aged mortgages were short- term securitization opportunities, whereas for 
the homeowners they were both homes and long- term investments. The pro-
fessional risk- takers required the risk of the homeowners. Dick Bryan and 
Michael Rafferty (2011, 2018) have also argued that the working and middle 
classes are central to the profitability of financial risk. Their pension funds, 
mortgages, auto loans, and health insurance payments are securitized, pack-
aged, and sold as commodities. Households, and one might even say labor, 
are the stable source of investment; so too, I want to suggest, with subcon-
tracted rig labor. To rephrase the questions I asked above — For whom does 
the offshore redistribute risk, and where does that redistributed risk go? — 
using different language: “What is risk as a transacted thing? From whom 
and to whom is risk transferred? Since mitigation can only ever be partial, 
where is the excess located in relation to a theory of ownership?” (Guyer 
2009, 215; Maurer 1998).
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Risk at Home:  
Workers’ Daily Lives in Malabo
My visceral response to the oil industry’s comically relentless safety prac-
tices was intensified by contrasting them with daily life in Malabo, a city 
which was essentially without the safety and risk- prevention provisions of 
many other urban environments. Common sights in the city included con-
struction or road improvement projects haphazardly set up in the middle of 
everything, with day laborers performing welding; swinging metal beams; 
using jackhammers and bulldozers; and creating huge ditches that dropped 
into the bowels of the old colonial undercity, without safety glasses, hard 
hats, or safety equipment of any kind, let alone a sign or brightly colored tape 
alerting pedestrians to walk elsewhere. As a foreigner, navigating scenes like 
this was definitive of living in the city, especially given the overwhelming 
quantity of hydrocarbon and construction industry- related heavy machin-
ery, equipment, and materials in constant circulation and use (Appel 2018a). 
In the claustrophobically small city, pedestrians routinely walked directly 
through these sites on their way here or there, hoping not to get sprayed by 
welding spatter or fall into a ditch. It was also common to see huge flatbed 
trucks careening though the city streets holding stacks of unsecured metal 
tubes or rebar piled high in pyramid shapes, with day laborers perched pre-
cariously (to me), yet apparently comfortably (to them), on top. One day I 
did hear that one of these trucks took a roundabout too fast, and all the tub-
ing fell off, along with the men, one of whom was killed in the accident. In a 
country where the public hospital was known as a place where people went 
to die, not to be treated for broken necks, the risk was a serious one.
Official work for the US- based oil and gas companies that form the sub-
ject of this book would never be performed under these conditions, but 
rather, under their comic opposite of the beeping and reporting- to- base 
speed- limit car monitor. Indeed, I laughed when I saw the photo in figure 1.8 
for the first time. I had intended to capture a migrant manager mansion on 
a private residential oil compound, but instead, I unintentionally captured 
perhaps the only twenty square feet in Equatorial Guinea that contained 
both a fire hydrant and a speed limit sign.
Taking the contrast of needing three signatures to tie your shoe with 
overburdened trucks careening around corners with workers perched on top 
into consideration, one can hear the rig workers all the more clearly when 
they marvel at helicopter safety videos and recite industry slogans. They are 
understandably thankful for this industry- specific, transplanted conception 
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of safety in what they know to be a highly technical and often dangerous en-
vironment. But this conception of safety that allows Equatoguineans work-
ing on rigs to potentially survive a helicopter crash cannot remove them 
from the larger insecurities and risks of their lives. In fact, these workers’ 
very removal onto offshore rigs for up to one month at a time — despite the 
acronyms of think and start — actually exacerbates the most pressing and 
dangerous insecurities they face. While management can work furiously to-
ward the disentanglement promised in the offshore setup, subcontracted lo-
cal workers cannot simplify the risks they negotiate on a daily basis as they 
try to reconcile the promises of Permits to Work with the promises of secu-
rity for their own lives and those of their family members. As one Equatogu-
inean rig worker put it forcefully to me: “How are you going to talk to me 
about safety, if you know that your child has no water or no light and no 
medical care, not to mention your wife? They don’t have anything to eat to-
day and you’re talking to me about safety!?”
During my interviews with Equatoguinean offshore workers, work- 
related risk on the platforms was not the locus of their concern. Seatbelts, 
hard hats, and safety glasses, while welcome, did not begin to address the 
Figure 1.8. Fire hydrant and speed limit sign on the Smith compound.
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main locus of risk that they faced on a daily basis. In Malabo and its sur-
rounding residential communities of Ela Nguema, Lamper, and Campo 
Yaounde, these men and their families lived with sporadic electricity, no 
running water, and inadequate healthcare. Malaria and typhoid were ram-
pant, and child mortality from afflictions as basic as diarrhea was common. 
Thus, while the risk of a helicopter falling out of the sky was indeed grave, 
as was the risk of cutting off a finger at work, when compared with the deep, 
daily insecurities of these men’s lives, those risks and the elaborate rituals set 
up to avoid them seemed as trivial as the acronyms used to remember them. 
Two workers explain:
[Working on the platform] is very risky, difficult. To have to be there for 
twenty- nine days is very difficult. It could be that something happens to my 
child and the [agency that subcontracts me] will not help me with anything. 
[I am] very worried about my family and everyone else.
In my particular case to live on the platform is difficult. My family is far 
away. . . . The most difficult is that we have sixty minutes of communication 
every week. This isn’t enough because they calculate it in a distinct way. If 
the person doesn’t pick up the phone they cut minutes. You can’t pass your 
limit. . . . Ultimately when you have a problem onshore and you leave the plat-
form, those days you don’t get paid. For example, if you’re on the platform 
for ten days and you have a problem onshore and you leave for two days, they 
cut those days. Being [on the platform] sometimes my head hurts because of 
the pressure. I think of my family, sick children. I can’t leave the platform. If 
I leave there isn’t any money. What will it have been worth?
The first worker talks about the risk of platform work, but does not have 
helicopters or fire hazards in mind. The risk is that, while away from his 
family for twenty- nine days, something could happen to his child, and not 
only would he not be there, but he worries (correctly) that the agency em-
ploying him would do nothing. The second man brings up the issue of com-
munication with home. The only way to know if everyone is okay, or more 
accurately, what is not okay on any particular day, is to call home. However, 
the company allows less than ten minutes per day of phone time, with time 
counted off for incomplete calls. Imagine negotiating in six minutes per day 
what to do if a child or uncle has malaria, if a relative has died, or if there’s 
a fire in the neighborhood, all common occurrences. Should he leave the 
platform to take care of it? He doesn’t want to leave because then he won’t 
get paid and “What will it have been worth?” As one rig worker’s wife put it: 
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“It seems bad when they leave for so long and I’m home alone suffering with 
the children. There are [six] of us in the house and my husband is the only 
one that has work.” The cost of living in Equatorial Guinea — sporadic wa-
ter, electricity, healthcare — is not factored into offshore work. As Mbembe 
(2001), Simone (2004), and Roitman (2005) have pointed out in other post-
colonial African contexts, the calculus of compensation is radically divorced 
from actual labor value. Although neither unusual nor specific to postcolo-
nial Africa, this divorce takes on a particular severity in contexts where in-
surance and social welfare have long been provided by networks of personal 
relations, as is the case in Equatorial Guinea, not by contractual obligations 
won through labor rights or citizenship entitlements.
The details of rotation schedules and phone- time allowance — seemingly 
trivial — take on serious weight for Equatoguinean laborers:
Now our shifts are two weeks on and two weeks off. Before we had to work 
and live on the rigs for four weeks with four weeks off but because of our 
families, because they are home without electricity, because we cannot com-
municate with them, we had to change that schedule. After three years, we 
complained to the company and asked to have a 2/2 rotation. At first the com-
pany didn’t accept, but eventually they did.
Many are leaving the company and [the company] knows. You are only given 
two minutes per day to talk to your wife. We begged, please give us time to 
talk to our families. But they forget that [the] French can talk to their wives 
on the internet, or the phone cards that let you talk for hours. But the rates 
here only let you talk for fourteen minutes per week. They say they under-
stand our condition, but the company really doesn’t. You are cut off from 
your family completely. With all this difficulty you prefer to be with your 
family alone.
Where foreign rig laborers could count on internet connections and interna-
tional phone cards to keep them in touch with home, international inequality 
in the spread of technology in homes (let alone electricity provision in Ma-
labo) guaranteed that for local labor, fourteen minutes per week on the phone 
with one’s family was simply insufficient. The subcontracted conditions un-
der which these men worked intentionally abdicated responsibility for the 
precarity of their onshore living conditions, a precarity best stabilized by the 
presence of people. The more able bodies in the house, the better to manage 
life’s daily challenges. With healthy men gone, even for short periods of time, 
vulnerability and worry increased exponentially (Moodie and Ndatshe 1994; 
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Meillassoux 1981). One man captured this grave misunderstanding of con-
ditions in what became a productive phrase to think with: “We are working 
like Americans but being paid like Africans.” As he explains:
The cost of living is so high here. There’s no water. There’s no electricity. You 
go to the hospital, you die there. Here this money isn’t acceptable. When you 
tell us this is a lot, we ask, for whom? We are working like Americans but be-
ing paid like Africans. . . . You can’t have it both ways. Either make us work 
like Guineans and treat us like Guineans, or make us work like Americans 
and treat us like Americans.
In this man’s narrative, to “work like an American” is to work long, hard 
hours in a safe environment; to be able to talk to your wife for free and end-
lessly over the internet that she has in her home, enabled by the electricity 
she also has; and to be compensated accordingly. To “work like an African,” 
on the contrary, is to work fewer hours and be compensated less, with the 
idea that the remaining time spent with the family putting out literal and 
figurative fires is compensation in and of itself. To “have it both ways” is to 
make these men work as if they were Americans, but to compensate them 
as Africans.
Conclusion: Offshore Futures
This chapter has traced some of the work that allows Equatorial Guinea to 
recede from view, as the hydrocarbons from its Exclusive Economic Zone 
are extracted, produced, and exported from an offshore in which oversight, 
liability, and ties to terrestrial communities are intentionally stretched thin. 
I have suggested that a broadening of the category “offshore,” to encom-
pass financial and industrial relations at the same time, helps us to under-
stand how it is that profit can be disentangled from the places in which it 
is made, at once increasing risk for some and making it more profitable for 
others. Whether through disperse corporate geographies for tax “planning,” 
in which all of the major companies in Equatorial Guinea operate through 
Cayman Island subsidiaries, or through mobile technosocial assemblages of 
colossal infrastructure with racialized labor already on board, the offshore 
becomes a space of deregulation in terms of finance, labor, and the environ-
ment. Central to this project of disentanglement is the diffusion of liability 
in the form of managing risk. Oil futures markets and Permits to Work both 
participate in this project, and risk is at once enormously profitable and an 
unbearable burden, radically unequal in its qualities and distribution.
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Writing of traders in Chicago’s Board of Trade Futures market, Zaloom 
(2004) notes that the daily practices of their working lives “encourage the 
production of subjects who can sustain themselves under high- stakes con-
ditions and thereby draw profit from economic risk” (366). Compare this to 
the situations of Antonio, Rogelio, and the other workers quoted above, who 
were at once thankful for the risk- avoidance practices in which they had been 
trained, and utterly marginalized from the spectacular profit their risks were 
reaping elsewhere. Like Zaloom’s traders, risk here has arguably produced 
subjects who can sustain themselves under high-stakes conditions, but their 
futures hardly profit from their practices. Late one Malabo afternoon, I was 
sitting in my apartment with a group of four Equatoguinean rig workers 
home from their marea. An impassioned friend they had brought along in-
terrupted one as he responded somewhat listlessly to my questions about 
their working lives, salary, and home. “My friends do not have a future. They 
can’t even build a house. . . . Neither my friends nor anyone who has worked 
in the industry has any type of guarantee for life having worked this many 
years. The cost of life here — food, school fees, hospital, medications — it’s all 
gone. They don’t have social security; they can’t buy a house, nothing. As 
older people, they will be poor.” Risk of oil bunkering or community en-
titlements is certainly minimized in the offshore arrangement. Risk’s foil — 
 liability — is also stretched thin as companies operate in tax loopholes and 
regulatory paradises. Who profits from these practices, whose risks they 
hedge and whose they exacerbate, whose futures they guarantee and whose 
they foreclose, is also clear as the open ocean, seen from above.
Ethnographic attention to the fipco 330 and the larger corporate ar-
chipelago of which it is a part offers the opportunity to follow how certain 
qualities often understood as intrinsic to capitalism — standardization, rep-
licability, indifference to local context — are built. Here, petroleum’s indus-
trial offshore not only concretizes a metaphor, but also shows how desire- 
filled fantasies of capitalism itself — as placeless, as frictionless — come into 
being in tenuous and work- intensive ways. In other words, the offshore is 
real. Its effects are real. It is not without friction; it is not the capitalist utopia 
of placeless economic interaction. It is full of specters of political risk: men 
from twenty different countries and seventeen different companies conse-
quentially divided by nationality and race; Equatoguineans underpaid and 
held indefinitely at the level of trainee; and a corporate form so multiple and 
attenuated that, paradoxically, it can seem to disintegrate altogether. But nor 
is the power of the offshore, its effects, undone by attention to this teeming 
and contentious sociality.
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In chapter 2, the ethnographic material seemingly moves from offshore 
to onshore — from rigs to the companies’ gated residential and corporate en-
claves. Yet, as a general industry descriptor, “the offshore” still encompasses 
these spaces, as companies work to distance themselves from life outside 
their walls. Racial segregation remains central to this work, and raced and 
gendered domesticity and intimacy emerges along with it.
CHAPTER TWO
The Enclave
Every Wednesday since roughly 1999, “the wives” have gathered for two hours 
of food, drink, and a card game called Continental in the well- appointed 
home of whoever agreed to hostess that week.1 These women — the wives of 
migrant oil and gas company management assigned to Equatorial Guinea — 
 socialize, plan charity projects, trade coffee beans for Crystal Light, and re-
lax over cards, casseroles, nachos, crudités, cakes, and Diet Coke. Although 
far from the only scheduled weekly activity these women shared, which in-
cluded mahjong, stitching, water aerobics, tennis, and calligraphy among 
others, cards was the most popular and the longest standing. As one woman 
who had been living in and out of Malabo since 1999 remarked, “We al-
Figure 2.1. “True to Texas” Miller Lite sign on Endurance compound.
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ways played cards on Wednesdays. And unbelievably, every time I’ve come 
back here, Continental is still held on Wednesdays. That has continued. And 
many times some women have wanted to change that and do other things, 
but it’s always come back to playing Continental.” Continental on Wednes-
day afternoons in this suburb of Texas just outside Malabo was, by the time 
I arrived in 2006, a native ritual.
Women took turns hosting Wednesday games in their homes, located in 
the private residential/industrial compounds owned and operated by US oil 
and gas companies. A trip to one of these compounds for those living out-
side their walls meant lengthy stops at gates and guardhouses, where security 
personnel checked your requisite invitation against a logbook; where you of-
fered license plate numbers, phone numbers, and other identifying informa-
tion; and where you had to leave official identification at the security office 
for the duration of your stay on the compound.
One Wednesday in September 2008, I was on my way to cards at the 
largest compound just outside Malabo with a few wives from another 
compound. (I tried to carpool to cards whenever possible because Mala-
bo’s public transportation — informal taxis — was prohibited on compound 
grounds.) As had become our Wednesday ritual, my carpool mates and I 
stood together for almost thirty minutes in the security checkpoint build-
ing while the young Equatoguinean man at the desk searched in vain for 
our identification information in a database that never seemed to be up-
dated, despite our weekly visits. As each of us gave him our full identifica-
tion information again, and he painstakingly entered it again, the waiting 
wives began to talk about home. Only days before, Hurricane Ike had badly 
damaged much of Houston and eastern Texas. These women and many oth-
ers in Equatorial Guinea had homes, family, and friends in the area who, in 
the wake of the hurricane, had been living without electricity or running 
water for several days. One woman expressed worry about her twenty- four- 
year- old daughter in Houston who had told her that there was no more gas, 
and ice was sold out at local stores, as were ice chests. She wondered aloud, 
“How will she eat?” But in the next breath she noted the incongruity, the 
strangeness, that people in Equatorial Guinea live without electricity and 
running water every day.
Indeed, people in Equatorial Guinea, including those residing in the cap-
ital city, live with endemic typhoid and malaria, and largely without run-
ning water and reliable electricity in their homes. In affluent areas, the lack 
of public infrastructure gives way to private provision, and those with the 
means to do so buy generators for electricity and/or put tanks on their roofs 
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for water. But even my next- door neighbor — the Ministry of Finance and 
Budgets — was routinely dark for days and even weeks at a time. The water 
that occasionally ran for twenty minutes each morning in my Malabo apart-
ment flowed untreated through corroded, colonial- era pipes. Education and 
healthcare systems were similarly erratic, as were food staples in local mar-
kets. With no industrialized agriculture, when the border closed with Cam-
eroon (which it often did), fresh vegetables rapidly disappeared from Ma-
labo’s markets and prices skyrocketed on the dwindling piles that remained.
Meanwhile, not four miles away from the capital’s public infrastructure 
woes, these wives and I stood at a checkpoint waiting to enter something very 
different. Once past the guard, the gates and walls of the Endurance com-
pound opened onto manicured lawns, towering ceiba trees with landscaped 
hedges and flowers, paved roads with speed limits and fire hydrants, stately 
suburban homes with suvs in garages, and a sprawling office/industrial 
complex (Appel 2012d). The sheer concentration of resources within this 
compound and others like it in Equatorial Guinea is difficult to overstate. 
The Endurance compound alone generated enough energy to power the en-
tire country’s electricity needs twenty- four hours per day, every day. Food to 
feed foreign employees was shipped in from Europe and the United States. 
The luxurious mansions in which migrant management lived were serviced 
by their own sewage and septic systems, and appointed with flat screen tele-
visions, wireless Internet, and landline phone service with Houston area 
codes. Each house had an Equatoguinean maid; the office complexes had 
Equatoguinean janitorial services; and Equatoguinean gardeners and land-
scapers (employed by a Spanish- owned company with roots in the colonial 
era) maintained each compound’s pristine grounds. These compounds also 
included pools, gyms, basketball and tennis courts, restaurants, bars, and 
at one location, a movie theater and small golf course. Malaria, endemic 
to the Equatorial Guinea just on the other side of the wall, had been all but 
eradicated within the compounds. In one particularly evocative description, 
an older Equatoguinean man who had never been inside one of these com-
pounds, but knew them through local lore, described what was behind the 
walls as una limpieza terrible; literally, “a terrible cleanliness,” but perhaps 
more accurately a fearsome cleanliness, where fearsome can mean both ter-
rifying and awesome. 
Management- level migrant oil workers and their wives living in these 
lavish “suburbs of Houston” received up to a 75 percent salary increase for 
working in what was known in the industry as a “hardship post.” Equatogu-
ineans, regardless of their class position, governmental authority, or employ-
82 chapter two
ment with the company, were prohibited from living on the compounds. 
While locals came and went as security guards, maids, gardeners, secretar-
ies, local content managers, or government liaisons, public transport was 
prohibited from entering the compounds, and all nonresident personnel had 
to wear an employee or visitor’s badge at all times while inside.
This chapter is about these compounds, domestic and corporate life 
within them, and the lived disjuncture from life outside their walls. Inspired, 
on the one hand, by the spatialization of the enclaves themselves, in which 
domestic and corporate life cohabit, and on the other by feminist anthro-
pology, which has long held that domestic arrangements of marriage and 
kinship are political and economic affairs constitutive of capitalist practice 
(Wynter 1982, 2003; Enloe 1990; Federici 1998; Yanagisako 2002; Stoler 2010; 
Bear et al. 2015; Hoang 2015), this chapter analyzes domesticity and corporate 
daily life together. In particular, I am interested in how the segregation of the 
enclaves, not only from life “outside their walls,” but perhaps more impor-
tantly, the raced and classed segregation within their walls, is evidence of the 
cultural work required to enliven the licit life of capitalism. I am interested 
in how, for instance, reproducing the nuclear family structure (if only for 
the highest managers) mobilizes white heteronormative marriage to com-
municate industry morality and even standardization, in contrast to “local” 
corruption, or how segregating foreign worker housing by “skill level” maps 
neatly onto racial and national categories, and in turn onto rotation sched-
ules and salaries.
Here, the scalability of global capitalism, so clearly seen in the offshore, 
is always a question of domesticity and gendered, racialized subjectivities; 
in this chapter, white womanhood in particular. “Race [is] a primary and 
protean category for colonial capitalism and . . . managing the domestic [is] 
crucial to it” (Stoler 2010, 13). As I argued in the introduction, in relating Vi-
talis’s (2007) work on segregation in the world’s mineral enclaves to Barry’s 
(2006) work on technological zones, the whiteness of the compounds, their 
racial segregation, actually comes to signify a certain kind of licit practice, 
in which white : nonwhite is semiotically mapped onto tenuous infrastruc-
tural and technical distinctions between West : non- West :: standard : cor-
rupt :: global : local. Segregation and intimate life, paradoxically, come to 
signify heightened standardization, repetition, and universality, drawing on 
select postcolonial meanings attributed to heteronormative whiteness, in-
cluding expertise, virtue, technology, meritocracy, and philanthropy. The 
white women with whom I waited at the gate that day — the caretakers of 
white male physical well- being, and the guardians of racialized morality and 
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privilege (Stoler 2010) — are a constitutive piece of the licit life of capitalism 
in Equatorial Guinea.
Rendering capitalism licit is, in part, about the ways we ethically par-
tition responsibility for “others,” and how those partitions are at once in-
dividually embodied and materialized in corporate, residential, and urban 
planning. This chapter focuses on the work of making tenuous separations 
and disentanglements on behalf of the licit life of capitalism. We might think 
of the material in this chapter as the domestic offshore, to tie the enclaves to 
the offshoring practices I discussed in chapter 1. Rather than simply showing 
how apparently separate experiences on either side of the enclave walls are, 
in fact, part of the same economic and ethical picture (which, of course, they 
are), I ask, instead: By what processes are “the proliferation of connections” 
between the enclaves and wider Equatoguinean life framed or bracketed into 
convincingly lived separations? (Callon 1998, 4). What work went into the 
imagining of these enclaves? What kinds of unmapping and frontier- making 
(Tsing 2005)? What kinds of white masculinity and femininity work? If ra-
cialization is always a relationship, this white gender work in relation to what 
ideas about “Africa,” Equatorial Guinea, and Blackness? To expose connec-
tions that were intentionally severed leaves intact the processes by which that 
separation came to be; it overlooks the considerable work required to pro-
duce the effect of separation itself. In the enclave, disentanglement is crafted 
in architecture, infrastructure, exceptional fiscal statuses, food consump-
tion, telephone area codes, heteronormative white domesticity, and residen-
tial labor segregation — an assemblage that allows those who might other-
wise experience the troubled intimacy of oil extraction and Equatoguinean 
life to exist in what quite reasonably feels like a separate ethical picture. Stoler 
(2010) describes this separation in a different time and place: “A cordon sani-
taire surrounded European enclaves, was wrapped around mind and body, 
around each European man and his home. White prestige became redefined 
by the conventions that would safeguard the moral, cultural, and physical 
wellbeing of its agents, with which European women were charged. Colonial 
politics locked European men and women into routinized protection of their 
physical health and social space in ways that bound gender prescriptions to 
the racial cleavages between ‘us’ and ‘them’ ” (77).
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 discusses the “lay of 
the land”: a descriptive mapping of the major enclave settlements in Equa-
torial Guinea focused on the relationships among race, labor, and the built 
environment. Section 2 is an effort to contextualize what I experienced as the 
exoticness of Equatorial Guinea’s gated enclaves through their historical con-
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tinuity with colonial settlements, company towns, and more contemporary 
forms of zonal capitalism (Winters 1996), including special economic zones, 
free zones, and maquiladoras. Section 3 traces the decision- making pro-
cesses that led oil and gas companies to build enclaves in Equatorial Guinea, 
introducing the idea of ring- fencing — “the separation of non- resident corpo-
rate persons from domestic economies and taxes and [the denial] to resident 
corporate persons the same privilege granted to foreign ones” (Maurer 2005, 
479). Section 4 explores practices of corporeal disentanglement: corporate 
and domestic ring- fencing in the enclaves as an attempted circumscription 
of health, sexuality, gender, and race (Enloe 1990; Stoler 2010; Vitalis 2007). 
Finally, through an exploration of the wives in their “golden cages” (as many 
of them described compound life), Section 5 thinks through the gendered in-
habitance and effects of multiple forms of isolation and segregation.
The Lay of the Land
Methodologically, the enclaves were the most traditionally “ethnographic” 
of my research sites. Consider Bonvillain’s (2009) textbook description of 
ethnographic research:
To conduct ethnographic research, anthropologists do “fieldwork,” that is, 
they live among the people they are studying to compile a full record of 
their activities. They learn about people’s behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes. 
They study how they make their living, obtain their food, and supply them-
selves with tools, equipment, and other products. They study how families 
and communities are organized, and how people form clubs and associa-
tions, discuss common interests, and resolve disputes. And they investigate 
the relationship between the people and their larger social institutions — the 
nations they are part of and their place in local, regional, and global econo-
mies.” (6)
The familiarly problematic anthropological conceit that a researcher can ar-
rive in an apparently static place where people live and come to know their 
behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes; how they make their living, obtain their 
food, and supply themselves with tools; the organization of their families 
and communities, clubs, and associations; and their relationships to the na-
tions and wider economies of which they are a part, is uncannily close to the 
information I present in this chapter. Compound walls seemed to circum-
scribe everything from food provision to housing, kinship to citizenship, 
giving the enclaves the feeling of anthropology’s timeless, bounded com-
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munity. And this was precisely their intended effect — that the world inside 
compound walls could seem to be completely separate from the world outside, 
despite its deep entanglements with Equatorial Guinea’s broader political, in-
frastructural, and social realities.
Each of the three largest US oil and gas companies in Equatorial Guinea — 
 Major, Endurance, and Smith — has its own residential/industrial enclave, 
and all share these broad features of apparent boundedness. All three are 
private, in that both residents and nonresidents cannot come and go at will, 
but must stop at guard gates to offer identification, declare the purpose of 
their visit, and register their presence on the compound. You cannot enter 
the compound unless you have an invitation, and no public transport from 
Malabo or Bata is allowed past the gates. Residents often have curfews, or 
“lock- downs” that respond to regional security concerns, and all three com-
pounds have a badge system where visitors and employees alike must display 
badges on their persons at all times.
The Endurance and Major compounds sit on old Malabo’s outskirts. The 
Smith compound, in Río Muni, is twenty- five minutes by car from the main 
continental city of Bata. Among the three compounds, Endurance’s is by far 
the largest due to its substantial onshore industrial footprint consisting of a 
Liquid Natural Gas (lng) plant, a methanol plant, and storage and refining 
facilities. Because the Major Corporation and the Smith Corporation do all 
of their processing, storage, and offloading offshore, and do not have lng or 
methanol plants, they have much smaller onshore footprints. All three com-
pounds contain company headquarters within the gates, offices where both 
migrants and nationals work on a daily basis, as well as residential facilities 
for migrant work forces. I spent considerable time in each of the three largest 
compounds, and the ethnographic data I use in this chapter are drawn from 
all three spaces. I do my best, however, not to conflate the enclaves, creat-
ing a “typical” space. Informants in each company would often go to great 
lengths to differentiate their corporate culture and compound from the oth-
ers. Rather than either creating a “typical” compound or dutifully following 
tales of exceptionalism, I use data primarily from the Endurance Company 
and compound, the largest of the three both spatially and in terms of per-
sonnel. The Endurance compound is also where I spent the most time, and 
where I had the most interviews and interested interlocutors.2 Before turning 
to Endurance, however, I’ll briefly describe Major and Smith.
Once inside the secured Major compound — the oldest and smallest of 
the three — you pass a small helicopter landing pad on manicured grass and 
come immediately to an office complex and employee parking lot. The of-
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fice complex is a series of large buildings housing the country manager’s of-
fice and various departments, including accounting, public and government 
relations, corporate social responsibility, human resources, procurement, 
drilling, and other offices. Past the office complexes is a second automatic 
iron gate through which you have to be buzzed again to access the residential 
area, which includes three parallel streets of two- and three- bedroom Tudor- 
style suburban townhouses. Each home has a front and back yard, with man-
icured grass, flowers, and trees tended by Equatoguinean gardeners. The 
Major compound also includes a pool, a gym, a large multipurpose room 
(for church services, parties, and other large functions), and a bar/restaurant.
The Smith compound is the only large compound on the mainland, and 
of the three is located the farthest from the main city (in this case, Bata). 
One can feel this distance in the layout and aesthetics of the camp. It is by 
far the most beautiful, surrounded by lush greenery on three sides, and on 
the fourth it faces a seemingly endless white sand beach that stretches from 
Gabon to Cameroon, with Equatorial Guinea and the Smith compound in 
the middle. Catamarans, kayaks, and other water sports equipment lin-
ger behind the fence that closes the compound off from the beach, to be 
checked out from the guard who will also take your name and the time of 
your departure if you choose to go for a beach walk. (One could easily see 
this compound turning into vacation homes for the elite, or even something 
like a ClubMed, when the industry leaves. The all- inclusive aspect is already 
there!) Like the Major compound, Smith is divided into the office area, the 
food and recreation area, and the housing area. The luxurious houses bor-
der a circular road that encloses a small golf course, and some — including 
the largest home reserved for the country manager — have ocean views (see 
figure 1.8). All resident employees are given golf carts to drive around the 
complex to reach not only their offices, but also the restaurant, pool, game 
room, and small movie theater.
Because both the Major and Smith Corporations do all their extrac-
tion, production, storage, and offloading offshore, the only personnel living 
in these compounds are the high- level migrant managers who spend most 
months of the year in Equatorial Guinea, although only for two- to three- 
year stints. In terms of layout and architecture then, the compounds are rela-
tively small, housing roughly thirty expatriate workers at a given time. The 
Equatoguineans who work in these compounds — whether as maids, garden-
ers, or security guards, or in higher positions such as government and com-
munity relations — are forbidden to live on the compounds. 
The Endurance Corporation has substantial onshore industrial facili-
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ties that entail increased onshore labor; thus, the scene that unfolds once 
past their gates is quite different from the other two. First, one need not even 
reach the security gate to see one of the two constantly burning, towering gas 
flares (see figure 1.1). Although this flare was said to burn only when the sys-
tem was “disrupted,” the flame was constantly burning during my fourteen 
months of fieldwork in Equatorial Guinea. I never saw it unlit. This flare and 
other signs of industrial production take up considerable amounts of space 
within the compound, including a large electricity plant and colossal lng in-
frastructure. Thus, rather than a ClubMed, Endurance feels far closer to Por-
teous’s (1974) description of a company town, with “the general dominance 
of the settlement by the physical expressions of economic enterprise, brought 
about by a close juxtaposition of town and plant” (411). The most significant 
difference between the Endurance compound and the other two is its hous-
ing. While all three companies have extensive subcontracts with firms that 
stock their offshore operations with employees from around the world, Ma-
jor and Smith (given their offshore setup) do not have to house these work-
ers in their compounds. Rather, they rotate on and off rigs as discussed in 
chapter 1. By contrast, the Endurance group of companies, with hundreds of 
Figure 2.2. Golf carts on the Smith compound, with management houses 
in the background.
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contracted and subcontracted employees from over thirty countries staffing 
the methanol and lng plants, has extensive housing obligations not only for 
migrant management, but also for mid- level and lower employees who also 
rotate, but in this case, to and from the onshore plant.
Once past security in the Endurance compound, the entrance to the in-
dustrial complex of offices and plant infrastructure sits straight ahead. A left 
turn at a second guardhouse brings you to another gate where you have to 
show identification to the guards, who then electronically admit you into the 
compound’s residential area. Up and over a large hill with majestic ceiba trees 
and ever- mowed grass, the residential zones partially spread out before you. 
To the left are the large suburban homes also found within the other com-
pounds, housing upper management, with the largest as always reserved for 
the country manager and his wife (see figure 2.3). During my fieldwork, it 
was white Americans, white Brits, and white South Africans who occupied 
these houses (and job positions). I knew one Brazilian woman, married to an 
Argentinean man, who lived in this level of the compound. While she con-
sidered herself to be white and was considered white by others in Brazil, she 
made it clear to me that in the compound, the US- and UK-dominant cul-
ture made her feel distinctly nonwhite. Two other women — one Filipina and 
one Thai — married to white American men, rounded out the nonwhite pres-
ence that I was aware of in either the large houses or the condominiums for 
mid- level management. The condominiums are located straight down the hill 
to the right, overlooking a small man- made lake. Referred to as the “town-
houses,” they comprise a smaller set of buildings, equally well- appointed with 
flat screen televisions, state- of- the- art stackable washer- driers, and new ap-
pliances. Most of the mid- level management living in the townhouses were 
stationed in Equatorial Guinea alone, although some men lived there with 
their wives as well. While these townhomes were absolutely luxurious and 
spanking new inside, the wives who lived in these buildings lacked expansive 
common areas, and hence did not host cards. Housing in the Endurance com-
pound was contentious. The larger houses were all occupied, so some couples 
who “deserved” larger housing were placed in the condominiums. There was 
also a feeling that the three subsidiary Endurance companies housed within 
the compound did not get equal treatment in housing. I explore embodiments 
and effects of these tensions in the final section of this chapter.
I spent considerable time with “the wives” in their weekly activities and 
thus came to know their housing facilities well. My own whiteness and (at 
that time) young womanhood produced a form of white racial sorority, fic-
tive kinship where these women looked at me and often said or seemed to 
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think, “You could be my daughter.” This raced and gendered kinship opened 
their homes to me and got me through the considerable layers of security 
with which the compound is guarded.3 For a variety of reasons, including 
my raced and gendered identity, I did not have this level of access to the ro-
tator camp (figure 2.4) or the barracks (figure 2.5). The men who lived in 
this housing were rotators; thus, when they were not working, they were 
“home” in the Philippines, Kazakhstan, or Mexico, and not in Equatorial 
Guinea. When in Equatorial Guinea their work schedules were outrageously 
demanding; therefore, it was difficult for me to find ways to socialize with 
them or encounter them outside of work. They were also forbidden from 
bringing visitors into their housing, thus the description I offer below comes 
from a series of visits guided by white management personnel with whom I 
had established a relationship.
The rotator camp is one step below the condominiums in the housing/ 
employment hierarchy. Within the camp are large apartment- building 
structures where men (exclusively) live, two to a suite, with separate bed-
rooms and bathrooms, and a shared common room. While still nice, the ac-
commodations are sparse, having more of an institutional/college dormitory 
Figure 2.3. Upper management homes on the Endurance compound.
Figure 2.4. Rotator camp.
Figure 2.5. The barracks or “Indian Camp.”
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feel. The country manager who led me on the tour of the rotator camp told 
me that the majority of workers living there were Filipino, but that it housed 
the most diverse workforce of all housing levels. Others at this occupational 
level — mid- level engineers, electricians, and plant operators — included men 
from India and Pakistan, Mexico, Venezuela and Ecuador, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan, as well as the US Gulf Coast. (Notice that despite the diver-
sity of nationalities, the men generally hail from oil- producing places.) All 
men housed in these facilities are subcontracted labor and do not work di-
rectly for the Endurance corporation. They are not permitted to bring wives 
(let alone other partners), despite the fact that some of their rotations are up 
to one year long. They have no cooking facilities and are expected to eat in 
the canteen for every meal, although many had hotpots in their common 
areas.
At the bottom of this residential hierarchy are the barracks, a series of 
modular dwellings lined up in parallel rows. Before we entered these hous-
ing units, the facilities manager explained, “I’ve never been inside these fa-
cilities. I think they’re similar to offshore: fairly tight quarters with com-
mon areas for relaxation.” With an anxiety that clearly anticipated critique, 
he told me repeatedly that they were shutting down this housing level, al-
though I saw no sign of the decommissioning. The barracks I visited had 
long, trailer- wide corridors with doors off of either side leading into shared 
bedrooms and bathrooms. They had no cooking facilities, and men in this 
level were also prohibited from bringing partners. Originally constructed to 
house the workers who built the lng plant, the vast majority of whom were 
Indian, many still referred to the barracks as “Indian Camp.” In 2008, the 
barracks residents were majority Filipino, Indian, and Pakistani. Although 
clean, the bottom two levels of housing — essentially for semi- skilled and un-
skilled and mostly nonwhite labor — were far inferior to the top tiers. When 
I asked the manager giving me the tour why the barracks were so different 
even from the rotator camp, he explained, “Western rotators are on 28/28s. 
Their requirements for housing are a little higher standard.” Not only were 
these housing options obviously inferior to the others, but they also had 
separate recreational facilities, including a small pool and their own bar. By 
comparison, the Olympic- size pool in the management residential area was 
attached to the clubhouse — a more formal dining, recreation, and bar area 
where mostly white management residents paid for meals should they so 
choose — and wives could often be found sunning poolside. Nonwhite men 
away from home for long periods of time were not fully welcome in that rec-
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reational environment. One white North American expat wife told me that 
she had recently seen some Filipinos coming to “her” gym. “They’re here 
alone for a year without a break,” she said. “Seeing them in the gym creeped 
me out.”
I ate in the workers’ canteen (as opposed to the clubhouse) on two occa-
sions, and on both there were multiple menu options advertised by nation-
ality — one day the “American” option was Sloppy Joe; the “international” 
option was Beef Hot Pot; the “Vietnamese” option was Squid Pakwis; and 
the “Indian” option was Aloo ka Bharta. Yet of course, multicultural lists of 
inclusive menu options belie a situation in which men ostensibly divided by 
skill level are given unequal housing, facilities, and recreational options, not 
to mention different pay scales, in a hierarchy that falls too neatly along na-
tional and racial lines. At the top of this hierarchy are white managers from 
the US, Western Europe, and (occasionally) South Africa, permitted to bring 
their wives and given lavish homes and salaries; Filipinos and other workers 
from the world’s oil- exporting diaspora (Kazakhstan, Mexico, Venezuela) 
are in the middle, on “rotations” that last up to a year, during which time 
they are not permitted to bring family, and share dorm- like facilities with 
fellow workers; at the bottom are Indians, Pakistanis, more Filipinos, and the 
occasional Nigerian, living in shared trailers. Again, these forms of segrega-
tion and differentiation are a clear illustration of the continuity with over a 
century of oilfield practices, the “long, unbroken legacy of racial hierarchy 
across the world’s mineral frontiers” (Vitalis 2007, 19). Note, for instance, 
that while the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa (among 
others) are multiracial societies, over two years of research in Equatorial 
Guinea, everyone from rig workers to migrant management from these 
countries were nearly homogeneously white. The only African American 
man I met in Equatorial Guinea was head of corporate social responsibility 
for one of the transnational corporations. The only Asian American man I 
met in Equatorial Guinea managed a smaller oil services company attached 
to the larger companies by subcontract. I did not meet a single Black or Co-
loured South African in Equatorial Guinea, though white South Africans 
were common. This is to say that the forms of racialized hierarchy — and 
white supremacy in particular — that unevenly organize life in these coun-
tries traveled to Equatorial Guinea with the US- based oil and gas industry. 
While Vitalis (2007) points to the continuity of these corporate practices, 
one significant piece had changed: Equatoguineans were not allowed to live 
within the compound.
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Some of my Equatoguinean interlocutors, who had lived abroad for 
most of their lives, received postgraduate degrees, and recently returned to 
work in the oil industry, had requested to live in the compounds. They ar-
gued that their extended families were still abroad, and that they would be 
uncomfortable in Malabo and not able to work as efficiently as their foreign 
coworkers without the quality of life to which they were now accustomed, 
including reliable electricity, potable running water, and adequate housing. 
They were all denied. When I asked migrant management why Equatoguin-
eans were forbidden to live in the compounds, they responded that allowing 
Equatoguinean residents would force them to “change the rules.” Migrant 
managers were open about the fact that the “rules” of the compound al-
lowed them to control not only the comings and goings of their employees 
with curfews and lockdowns, but also to control the comings and goings 
of outsiders. If Equatoguineans lived in the compound, then they would 
want their families and friends to visit, and perhaps spend the night, all of 
which was currently prohibited. Fundamentally, the compounds were set 
up to separate, to disentangle, to partition, and to control. Separations, in-
cluding the prohibition of Equatoguinean residents, contributed to the lived 
sense that the enclaves were somehow completely detached from the world 
outside their walls.
Through fourteen months in Equatorial Guinea, I was consistently as-
tounded by the strangeness of the industry’s gated enclaves, by what felt like 
their horrifically archaic raced and gendered divisions of labor, space, and 
domestic life. I am obviously at home with running water and cable televi-
sion, and neither golf carts, Texans, nor gross inequality is new to me. Yet 
there was something about the sheer concentration of these technosocial ar-
rangements tucked within enclave walls that made me feel ever the anthro-
pologist, constantly wondering what the “locals” would think of next. But 
my ongoing astonishment was merely historical ignorance. The oil industry, 
and extractive industries more broadly, have long histories of compound life 
to which I now turn in order to situate what I have described within longer 
histories of settler colonialism, company towns, and zonal capitalism.
History and Precedents
In his 1931 memoir, an American oil worker living in Venezuela noted, “If 
ever a white man could live happily with his wife and children in a hot cli-
mate, that was in Mene Grande,” a US oil camp in the Maracaibo Basin 
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(Coronil 1997). Citing this passage, Coronil writes, “As veritable enclaves 
with private roads, schools, stores, and medical supplies, these camps consti-
tuted a State apart from the Venezuelan State” (109). And a 1946 article from 
Chevron’s monthly magazine opens with a phonetic introduction: “Sah- oo- 
dee Ah- ray- bee- ah, where part of America has been set down amidst rock 
and sand” (Vitalis 2007, 35). Of Dhahran in 1945, the wife of an American 
colonel brokering a deal with Saudi aramco wrote home: “The oil town . . . 
is just like a bit of the USA — modern air- conditioned houses, swimming 
pool, movie theater, etc. Six American wives have already arrived and more 
are on their way” (Vitalis 2007, 80). Since the 1930s, firms have built “the ba-
sic infrastructure that we associate with modern municipalities — housing, 
streets, power, water, security, and so on — in order to bring their commodity 
to market” (Vitalis 2007, 266). Transnational extractive industries have long 
operated in what William Reno (2001) has called a “byoi” or “Bring Your 
Own Infrastructure” environment.
Paul — a white Zimbabwean brought to Equatorial Guinea to finish, 
commission, and run the Smith enclave — narrated these long histories in 
Africa, in particular:
Within [our company], people say that this compound is one of a kind and 
that there’s no other complex like this. But they’re wrong. There are lots of 
these in Africa. Mining has been a huge industry in Africa — diamond, gold, 
emerald, platinum, and every single mine has a complex like this — larger 
and more elaborate . . . private game reserves, eighteen- hole golf courses. 
Shell Nigeria, their whole outlook is different. They have schools with teach-
ers and headmasters and summer trips, wives and children with dad. [Their] 
complexes have supermarkets.
Indeed, the partitioned use of space has an extensive history across Africa’s 
resource- rich landscape. Here, through brief thought pieces on colonial set-
tlements, company towns, and more contemporary forms of zonal capital-
ism, I think through the enclaves’ adjacent forms — histories and precedents 
of the strategic use of domestic and industrial space. Each spatial form I 
consider is both strategically and partially integrated into the economies, 
infrastructures, and populations of their respective locations, and each is 
intentionally dis- integrated as well. Each form is highly racialized and gen-
dered insofar as those aspects of personhood are central to the organization 
of labor, living conditions, and freedom of movement.
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Colonial Settlements
Plantations are self- contained worlds. Workers, managers, and 
the crops they cultivate live together side by side, but regulated by 
strict hierarchies, the more blatant because they are carved into 
the landscape. Male managers and their wives live in comfortable 
houses with gardens and kitchens maintained by local employees 
and have access to their own clubs with well- stocked bars and re-
freshing swimming pools. 
— Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist  
Sense of International Politics
Enloe’s description of South American plantation life could, in many ways, 
be today’s oil and gas enclaves in Equatorial Guinea, with oil production re-
placing crop cultivation (see also McKittrick 2013). The enclaves’ geographies 
in Equatorial Guinea often trace a direct relationship to the colonial cocoa 
economy. For instance, to be dropped outside the Endurance compound by 
taxi, you simply ask the driver to take you to la planta. As a cognate with the 
English word “plant,” asking to go to la planta is, in part, asking to be taken 
to the factory. But in Spanish, la planta is also an abbreviated reference to la 
plantación, or the plantation, and the picturesque spit of land on which the 
massive Endurance compound now sits was, during the colonial era, a large 
cocoa plantation.
Commercially, colonial (and imperial) extraction brought with it many 
of the key features still seen in oil enclaves today: private companies with 
private security, intimately connected to their states of origin; infrastruc-
ture set up exclusively for export; and contractual regimes with local power 
holders guaranteeing special ports and customs areas, or specifying juridical 
procedures in disputes. As with petroleum, the historical trades in enslaved 
humans and palm oil were governed by parastatal contractual relationships 
(Lovejoy and Falola 2003; Mann 2007, 2013). The slave trade, in particular, 
was so capital intensive that it could only be run by chartered corporations — 
which operated by means of chartered monopoly, subsidies, and special 
rights (including the right to wage war) conferred by the British Monarchy.4 
Labor setups in colonial and imperial production varied dependent on, 
among other factors, the requirements of the raw material in question. In 
the case of labor- intensive crops or extractive processes, such as sugar, rub-
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ber, and mining, large labor pools were required; often, large town- like com-
plexes were set up to house workers at all levels, from manual, indentured, or 
enslaved labor through overseers and plantation managers (Ferguson 1999; 
Stoler 1989b. See also McKittrick 2013, 2016 for contemporary rereading.)
In Equatorial Guinea, after the slave trade grew dangerous at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, trade turned from humans to ivory and 
palm oil, both needed to lubricate the machines of the industrial revolution.5 
With the end of slavery, a merchant class of English- speaking West Afri-
cans from Sierra Leone came to Equatorial Guinea, the first of many waves 
of people who would come to be called Fernandinos (Liniger- Goumaz 1989, 
2000; Creus 1997). Later, Liberians and Nigerians joined them, and together 
they made up an entrepreneurial and social group, communicating in Pid-
gin English and shunned by the local Bubis. Undoubtedly motivated by the 
rapid accumulation taking place, Spain gradually began to reassert nominal 
imperial control of various kinds. The first Spanish governor arrived in 1858, 
followed by missionaries (Liniger- Goumaz 1989, 2000). Cocoa was intro-
duced for the first time at the end of the nineteenth century, some argue by a 
Liberian Fernandino, and Bioko (in particular) began a transformation into 
a latifundiary monoculture (Creus 1997; Liniger- Goumaz 1989). Unlike the 
export of palm oil or ivory, which required only a comprador class to broker 
deals with ship merchants, the farming of cocoa was both time and capital 
intensive. The work to be done and the profits to be had ensured that more 
European colonists and African Fernandinos began to settle on Bioko island. 
The Spanish set up small- scale cacao plantations with houses for local work-
ers, mostly those the Spanish labeled civilizados, who had been converted to 
Catholicism and worked and lived with their families on the plantation. Be-
cause the local population of Bioko Island was so small, the Spanish brought 
in Nigerians to supplement the labor force, who then grew to become the 
demographic majority of colonial labor on Equatorial Guinea’s cacao plan-
tations. Nigerians too received houses, although much smaller and of much 
poorer quality, where they lived as migrant laborers without their families. 
These graduated domestic arrangements — from white colonial managers 
and their wives in comfortable housing with luxurious amenities, to mid- level 
foreign labor in smaller housing, to manual labor in camp- like situations — 
persist in Equatorial Guinea’s enclave arrangements today.
The Uncle Ben’s Rice, Crystal Light, and Bull’s Eye barbeque sauce that 
crowded pantry shelves in management housing seem easily analogous to 
“the inappropriate dress, food, and other markers of European culture that 
Anthony Burgess and George Orwell caricatured in their novels: the jun-
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gle planter sweating through a five- course dinner in formal attire” (Stoler 
1989, 149). Yet, there is also something fundamentally different about mi-
grant management lifestyles in Equatorial Guinea’s compounds. Burgess’s 
and Orwell’s caricature comes across in the sweat, exposing the five- course 
meal and formal attire as maladapted, insisted upon only as markers of race, 
class, and other forms of distinction. Among migrant management in con-
temporary Equatorial Guinea, there is little sweat, literally or figuratively. 
Down to the telephone area codes, the air- conditioned transport of subur-
ban Houston life into these small enclaves can feel so complete that, until one 
goes outside, it is difficult to caricature flat screen televisions, running water, 
or mansions with manicured lawns and maids as absurd. 
Stoler (1989) writes that “colonial cultures were never direct translations 
of European societies planted in the colonies, but unique cultural configu-
rations, homespun creations in which European food, dress, housing and 
morality were given new political meanings in the particular social order of 
colonial rule” (136). Much of this insight certainly applies to these enclaves, 
but “homespun” they are not. The intensification of technologies of trans-
port, communication, and infrastructure since the colonial era guarantees 
that these enclaves are appointed in ways perhaps less homespun even than 
these people’s homes in Texas or elsewhere. The furniture is standardized 
as are the state- of- the art appliances. The compound even has its own volt-
age setting to accommodate American electrical current. Perhaps the most 
significant difference from Stoler’s accounts, however, is that in Equatorial 
Guinea there is no colonial governing apparatus, just the exigencies of the 
industry. This distinction alone brings us much closer to the model of a 
company town.
The Company Town
A consideration of company towns highlights other continuities between 
Equatorial Guinea’s gated compounds and different historical forms of cor-
porate and domestic enclaving across the world’s mineral frontiers. The 
company town is defined by employees of a single company or group of 
companies as inhabitants; ownership of the real estate and the houses by 
those same companies; deliberate residential zoning by nationality/ethnicity 
and socioeconomic class, including “a small number of luxury dwellings 
for the attraction and retention of key personnel”; and an elevated level of 
employee control stemming from the company acting as both landlord and 
employer (Porteous 1974). As I explore below, only the Endurance compound 
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in Equatorial Guinea might fruitfully be thought of as a company town. The 
obligation to house a large number of workers from all over the world makes 
Endurance unique in Equatorial Guinea, but far more like most other major 
extractive industry complexes around the world. Specifically, as narrated 
above, the compound is laid out according to what Porteous (1974) has called 
“deliberate residential zoning from the outset” (41). 
The occupational hierarchy of the plant traditionally has been imposed upon 
the town by fiat in residential segregation terms. Common elements include 
(1) deliberate ethnic and socioeconomic segregation in housing location; (2) 
creation of a graded series of house styles which are allocated to employees 
not according to need (i.e. family size) but according to class; and (3) creation 
of separate institutions for each class. (411)
Porteous’s schema is based on his work at three major Anaconda Copper 
Company towns in Chile’s Atacama Desert, established in 1916 and enduring 
in a certain form until they were nationalized in 1971. A century after Ana-
conda’s establishment of these towns, the same deliberate residential zoning 
processes are visible in Equatorial Guinea’s oil compounds.
Segregated residential zoning is not peculiar to company towns. Most 
cities and towns in the US and elsewhere are racially segregated, and in turn 
have drastically different housing styles — from mansions to public housing — 
 “not according to need but according to class,” and, we must add, race. How-
ever, the processes that produce the daily segregation in which many of us 
live — long histories of redlining and gentrification (better referred to as “ra-
cial banishment” [see Roy et al. 2016]), immigration, white flight, industrial 
collapse, and zoning legislation — are often slow and cumulative. While their 
effects are systemic and visible, the processes themselves are often implicit 
enough to be naturalized. The segregation in company towns, on the other 
hand, is premeditated and deliberate. Far from emerging slowly over time, 
graduated residential options are put in all at once, and workers are assigned 
to each according to their job and the temporality of their labor, which co-
incide neatly (although not perfectly) with race, class, nationality, and the 
attendant inequalities of the global nation- state system.
Like settler colonialism, the company town model is not historically 
static. On the contrary, its long and violent history of labor unrest and rebel-
lion, in particular, has meant that companies continually rethink how best 
to set up their domestic- industrial space. This ongoing rethinking has led 
to significant differences between the classic company town model — with 
schools, post offices, and churches, for instance — and what we find today in 
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Equatorial Guinea. Take Ferguson’s (2006) description of company towns on 
the colonial Zambian copperbelt, which he deliberately contrasts with more 
contemporary forms in what he calls the “Angola model” of oil development:
On the Zambian copperbelt, investment in copper mining brought the con-
struction of vast “company towns” for some 100,000 workers. . . . The min-
ing towns, classic examples of colonial- era corporate paternalism, eventually 
came to include not only company- provided housing, schools, and hospitals, 
but even social workers, recreational amenities such as movie theaters and 
sports clubs and domestic education programs. (197)
Paul, the Zimbabwean in charge of the Smith camp quoted earlier in this 
chapter, commented that older oil compounds in Nigeria have “schools with 
teachers and headmasters and summer trips, wives and children with dad. 
[Their] complexes have supermarkets.” Porteous’s description of Atacama 
towns, Ferguson’s of Zambia, and Paul’s of earlier Nigerian oil camps all be-
tray the dynamism of modes of extraction, management of labor, and, with 
them, company town design. Towns that grew up around both the Atacama 
mines and the Zambian copperbelt depended first on the idea that the com-
pany would be in the region for a long time and second on the need to em-
ploy and house thousands of local workers. On the one hand, the temporality 
of oil in relatively low- producing supply sites like Equatorial Guinea is such 
that long- term investment in institutions doesn’t make sense from an oil 
company’s perspective. But on the other hand, as Paul’s comparison with Ni-
geria shows, there is also the iterability of the transnational oil industry; that 
is, US oil companies have learned from the failures of institution- building 
in Nigeria (Watts 2004; Zalik 2004, 2009; Adunbi 2015), and they are in-
vesting differently in places like Angola and Equatorial Guinea (Ferguson 
2006). In Equatorial Guinea, again, the locals who work in the industry are 
prohibited from living in the enclaves, and the migrant workers who live in 
the enclaves, regardless of level, are prohibited from bringing their children. 
These, among other regulations, leave a small and transient population as 
enclave inhabitants, no more connected to living in Equatorial Guinea than 
they were to their postings in Angola, Indonesia, or Russia before that.
Company towns are perhaps most (in)famous for the tension between 
proffering comfortable living conditions in extractive settings on the one 
hand, while intimately controlling labor and domestic life on the other. 
Starting with the town of Pullman, Illinois, in the late nineteenth century, 
company towns have long been based on “progressive concepts of manage-
ment and labor relations administered by trained professionals. In order to 
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deter unionization and reduce labor turnover, the ‘new’ company town at-
tempted to attract workers by providing significantly better working and liv-
ing conditions” (Crawford 1995, 3). In other words, invoking the recurring 
theme of self- regulation, company towns rely on a specific relationship be-
tween capital and labor, in which workers’ living conditions become a matter 
not of potential industrial conflict, but of company regulation, as Porteous 
(1974) explains:
Company housing has proved an effective means of worker control where an 
entire company town is constructed. If the industrialist is landlord as well as 
employer, his relationship with his employees extends beyond the plant and 
into the workers’ homes. Employers may thus exert considerable influence 
over the social and political, as well as the economic life of company towns, 
sometimes with dire results. . . . Union organization may be prevented, reli-
gious bigotry fostered, and social class structures fossilized; dissenters and 
“radicals” may be dismissed from their jobs, and consequently from their 
homes and thus from the company town itself. Such excesses, including a lu-
rid history of strike suppression in the cola and copper towns of the Ameri-
can west, in Chile, and elsewhere, have been the basis for the notoriously 
poor public image of the company town. (410)
Extraction and production in Equatorial Guinea are happening at a conjunc-
tural moment when, in both industry history and Equatoguinean history, 
active or intentional union deterrence is superfluous. The structure of labor 
evidenced in both the offshore and in these enclaves — subcontracting to in-
numerable companies through “body shops” that draw men from Venezuela 
to Turkmenistan, Pakistan to the Philippines, rotating in and out on hitches 
of various lengths — now practically ensures that unionization isn’t an op-
tion.6 Moreover, de jure, unions are illegal in Equatorial Guinea (Campos 
Serrano and Micó Abogo 2006). In other words, since Pullman, Atacama, 
and even Nigeria’s earlier oil boom, much has changed in the setup and tem-
porality of labor, and in how migrant oil workers relate to their “homes.” 
And yet, the ability of companies to intimately shape the lives of employ-
ees in company towns has not changed. In Equatorial Guinea’s enclaves, 
resi dents have curfews, and nonresident circulation is closely monitored; 
residents cannot paint their homes or tend their own yards; and only a privi-
leged few are allowed to bring their heteronormative spouse to the country.
While colonial settlements and company towns draw attention to the 
long histories of cohabitation of industrial production and domesticity still 
to be found today in Equatorial Guinea’s oil enclaves, those precedents don’t 
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capture the privileged fiscal and juridical statuses of these ring- fenced areas. 
There is a final category that Winters (1996) calls “zonal capitalism” through 
which to consider the enclaves, to grasp the full extent of their exceptional 
juridical and fiscal status in relation to the nation-state in which they can 
be found.
Zonal Capitalism
Zonal capitalism [is] a special economic zone in a subnational 
area — sometimes walled but always clearly bounded — in which 
an intensified effort has been made to create a climate favorable 
to business. Government policies within and for the zone tend to 
diverge markedly from those applying generally to the national 
jurisdiction.
— Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility  
and the Indonesian State
Special economic zones come in various forms: Export Processing Zones 
(epzs), Free Zones, maquiladoras, and Special Autonomous Zones, among 
others. Intimately related to the broadly conceived offshore discussed in 
chapter 1, within these spaces companies are often “freed” from national laws 
regarding taxation, labor rights, and environmental regulation. The means 
of production also are freed from state involvement; for example, companies 
are permitted the duty- free import of equipment, materials, machinery, sup-
plies, and components, using global procurement chains that stretch around 
the world (Sklair 1993; MacLachlan and Aguilar 1998; Cameron and Palan 
2004). With reference to the ways in which corporate sovereignty supersedes 
national sovereignty within these spaces, Palan (2006) has called this use of 
space “sovereign bifurcation,” and Ong (2006) “postdevelopmentalism,” to 
refer to “a more dispersed strategy that does not treat the national territory 
as a uniform public space [but instead favors] the fragmentation of national 
space into various noncontiguous zones” (Ong 2006, 77).
For both Winters (1996) and Ong, zonal capitalism and postdevelopmen-
talism are state strategies to attract nomadic capital. Taking Indonesia and 
China as their respective sites, their theorizations rely on an idea of the state 
as strong and tactical, intentionally ring- fencing parts of their territory in 
which they can rescind labor laws and attenuate taxation regimes in an effort 
to draw foreign investment. In Equatorial Guinea, on the other hand, prof-
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itable hydrocarbon discoveries can hardly be said to have been state strat-
egies. As Ferguson (2006) and Reno (2001) have pointed out, despite the 
axiom that African states, in particular, must demonstrate a certain busi-
ness climate — such as good governance and transparency — to attract For-
eign Direct Investment (fdi), Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Su-
dan, among others, show that the geologic presence of hydrocarbon deposits 
alone is sufficient to attract abundant fdi, even in the midst of civil wars, 
ethnic cleansings, widespread civilian unrest, and deep kleptocracy. In these 
contexts, the enclave is hardly a state strategy, but rather an oil company 
strategy through which the industry attempts to “shield” its practices from 
what may lie outside its walls. In this way, enclaves in Equatorial Guinea may 
have less in common with noncontiguous zones in China, and more in com-
mon with the relationship between small Caribbean economies and offshore 
finance (Maurer 2005, 2008; Navarro 2010; Hudson 2017a), where historical 
hierarchies of rank and the state’s marginalization are, in fact, what guide 
the enclaving process. As with small Caribbean tax havens, the impunity 
that oil companies enjoy inside Equatorial Guinea’s enclaves has less to do 
with the state’s position at the cutting edge of capitalism, and more with its 
earlier abjection therefrom.
Finally, Ong (2006) has pointed out that “these zones [are a] confluence 
of economic freedom and political repression” (113). Despite other differ-
ences, Equatorial Guinea and China certainly share this effect of variegated 
sovereignty. Although Equatoguinean life outside the enclave walls — with 
armed soldiers dotting the streets, tanks parked visibly in strategic loca-
tions, and military helicopters often buzzing overhead — feels more milita-
rized than the enclaves themselves, the potential for armed response within 
the enclaves is palpable, if latent. The compounds were frequently “locked 
down” in response to perceived geopolitical unrest, whether local, in Nigeria 
or Cameroon, or along various borders. In addition to these forms of overt 
control of circulation and the policing of boundaries, the political repression 
in these spaces suffused the texture of daily life in more mundane ways, as 
I have described above — from regulations on what you can and cannot do 
to your house, to the clear backpacks issued to Equatoguinean workers; and 
from strict guidelines about visitors, children, and partners, to the differen-
tial treatment of citizens and noncitizens in terms of rights and privileges 
within these spaces. “Preexisting ethnoracializing schemes (installed under 
colonial rule) are reinforced and crosscut by new ways of governing that dif-
ferentially value populations according to market calculations” (Ong 2006, 
79). The relationships among national and racial hierarchies, profit, domes-
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ticity, and the built environment come together in novel ways in Equatorial 
Guinea’s oil enclaves. They contain, at once, centuries of continuity with set-
tler colonial patterns, the iterative antipolitics planning of company towns, 
and newer forms of noncontiguous political life in which nation-states re-
fract into policed communities of variegated, racialized sovereignties and 
profit potentials.
Equatorial Guinea’s enclaves are novel in another way, in that, despite 
narratives of progressive corporate learning and late capitalist flexibility 
(from full employees to subcontractors, from company towns to special 
economic/domestic zones), securitized compounds are not inevitable. In-
deed, in major extraction sites around the world, many large US oil com-
panies house workers at all levels “in the community.” In the next section, I 
explore why major US oil companies chose the compound model in Equa-
torial Guinea, making an argument for the “actuarial” enclave. This is an 
infrastructural form haunted by past uprisings and built to avoid a set of 
potentialities — illness, graft, political unrest — which, if they were to mate-
rialize, would ultimately be more expensive than the enclave built at great 
expense to avoid them. This is cost- benefit analysis as ghost story, capitalism 
as a calculative palimpsest of white fear and the making of a frontier.
Actuarial Enclaves:  
Frontier- Making and Ring- Fencing
Wendy and I sat on the screened back patio of her home on the Endurance 
compound. With her large suburban- style house perched on the very edge of 
Punta Europa, the spacious patio offered an expansive view over the ocean 
inlet that separated the Endurance compound from Malabo. The city was 
low and visible through the heated haze just across the water, as if a mirage. 
Wendy had been coming in and out of Equatorial Guinea with her husband 
since 1999, by far the longest of any of the migrant wives I came to know. 
She reminisced that her husband had come to Equatorial Guinea originally 
in 1998 on a “reci,” or reconnaissance mission for his oil company. She came 
with him in 1999 on a “look- see,” to determine if the place was a viable living 
and working option for them after other lengthy migrant stints (as Brits) in 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Texas, and Los Angeles. As she explained:
We came out to where we were going to live, just to take a look at the project. 
The project was here. It was actually on this spot, because they had a gas flare. 
They had a gas discovery and . . . that flare has been there since 1990, since the 
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discovery. The original flare was massive. It actually lit up the sky. There were 
very little lights around here. Nothing existed. This was jungle, total jungle. 
So we just saw the whole thing develop. This, where we are now, where we’re 
sitting now, on the peninsula, was jungle, and we chose this spot. [My hus-
band] went on a “reci,” you know, he actually did a reconnaissance mission. 
He actually walked through the jungle to see whether it would be suitable to 
start building houses, and where they would build the plant.
Part of the lore of company towns has long been the idea of remoteness, 
captured in Wendy’s description: “Nothing existed. This was jungle, total 
jungle.” Porteous (1974) writes that “most commonly, the company town 
comes into being through the overwhelming physical fact of isolation. The 
pioneering entrepreneur, endeavoring to develop a resource in a region re-
mote from established population centers, is likely to find a dearth of specu-
lative builders, local governments capable of providing housing, or workers 
with the capital or skills necessary for dwelling construction. The company 
town is thus typical of remote resource frontier regions” (410). In Wendy’s 
narrative, we hear not only about geographic isolation, but also of Porteous’s 
“pioneering entrepreneur,” her husband who “actually walked through the 
jungle” to determine where they might start building houses. Enloe (1990) 
has also written about this masculinized and most often white character in 
military bases and plantation economies around the world, where a “rough 
and rugged cohort of men [transform] the primeval forest into a civilized and 
profitable plantation belt” (140). Their bravery and ruggedness are crucial in 
this narrative, where “privilege and profit are [justified via] character and not 
on race or class” (141). (See also Stoler 2010.) But as is so often the case, the 
physical isolation or remoteness that Wendy conjures is not what it seems.
Not only is the Endurance compound separated from the capital city 
by a mere handful of kilometers, but the land itself, Punta Europa (Europe 
Point), is an exquisitely beautiful and perfectly situated isthmus that had 
been a Spanish- owned cacao plantation in the colonial era. Along with most 
of Equatorial Guinea’s plantations, it fell into disuse after Macías expelled 
the Spanish. Although its Spanish owner attempted to reclaim it under the 
bienes abandonados (abandoned property) act at the beginning of Obiang’s 
rule, he was unable to do so, and Obiang then claimed the property as his 
own.7 The first contract for oil- related infrastructure development on Punta 
Europa — the contract that produced the gas flare “that lit up the sky” — was 
between Endurance’s predecessor company and Obiang, to whom they paid 
rent as a private property owner. During the second phase of Endurance’s 
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major expansion, when the company forced the displacement of small com-
munities living on the isthmus, Obiang made a large and public display that 
the state was “expropriating him too,” as he officially sold his property to the 
government (of which he was, and is, the president). Rather than a company 
town established in a remote area, at its beginnings the Punta Europa com-
pound was more accurately Tsing’s (2005) “zone of unmapping. . . . Frontiers 
aren’t just discovered at the edge; they are projects in making geographical 
and temporal experience” (29). In Punta Europa, there were already long 
histories of ownership, cultivation, and dispossession underfoot, although 
Wendy narrates her family’s early experiences as reconnaissance missions 
in empty jungle. At the same time, however, it is difficult to suggest that she 
might have done otherwise.
The overgrown cacao plantations that dot Bioko Island quite reason-
ably look like “jungle” to those unfamiliar with the landscape, with second- 
growth tropical flora creating dense shade. Only those with a practiced eye, 
like the Equatoguineans who walked me through second- growth elsewhere, 
might know that the cocoa pods deepening from yellow to orange, or the eas-
ily walkable routes through the trees with no machete needed, indicate histo-
ries of cultivation and inhabitance over the last century. Obiang’s ownership 
of the land, on the other hand, was a widely known fact, albeit one that made 
most migrant industry managers somewhat uncomfortable — that their pres-
ence was enriching a dictator in the most direct and intimate ways — while 
most Equatoguineans rolled their eyes in bored resignation, accustomed to 
the complicity.
While Wendy and other early migrant arrivals waited for the compound 
to be built, they lived in Malabo, as she describes here:
We settled into Caracolas [an affluent residential community]. The housing 
accommodation was basic, [but] very, very nice. It was all Spanish so it was 
beautiful and it had the facilities, but it needed updating. Everything was re-
ally quite old. It had to be rewired and the water was really bad. We had lots 
of remodeling to do. We settled into the house there, and most of my life was 
in town. There was a very large cultural community. I played tennis with the 
French. We used to go out to beaches. We used to do a lot of things, but in a 
multicultural group — Spanish, French, Belgian; we had people from Brazil.
Indeed, Equatoguineans remembered that when oil first arrived, “Americans 
were all over the city. Now you hardly see them.” Wendy was clearly nostalgic 
for this time — the freedom of movement and the national (although note, 
not racial) diversity of the migrant community with whom she socialized. 
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As Wendy’s brief time in Caracolas illustrates, the construction of these en-
claves was not inevitable, at least according to my migrant informants, many 
of whom were closely involved in the decision- making processes that led to 
this spatial arrangement. As the country manager for Regal Energy noted, 
“In Ecuador and Vietnam [migrant employees] live in the community. In 
China they congregate you in expat housing. Tunisia we lived in the com-
munity. Israel we lived in the community. Here it’s unique, this [enclave] 
school.” Others I spoke with had lived “in the community” in places as dis-
parate as Gabon, Indonesia, Ireland, and Japan; however, “in the commu-
nity” is a slippery designation. While migrant employees in Gabon or Indo-
nesia weren’t as isolated from local life or public infrastructure as they are 
in Equatorial Guinea, in all places they were offered “western-style” housing 
with separate water and electricity sources, if necessary, in gated and secu-
ritized compounds.
When I talked with people involved in the decision- making that led to 
compound construction in Equatorial Guinea, they consistently responded 
with a narrative pair: on the one hand, the difficulty and expense of the en-
deavor; on the other, a sense of having no alternative. As a finance manager 
I spoke with explained:
There were two schools of thought when we first came here: one wanted to 
live in the community and force the issue. Others said no, we need to build 
a place where people are willing to come and work. I don’t know which way 
is right. [It’s] a business decision: it makes more sense to live in the com-
munity. It’s cheaper if you can live in the community and shop in the places 
where local people shop. It makes financial sense from a business standpoint. 
So the pressure in that regard is internal. You’ve gotta get your project done; 
you’ve gotta get the personnel; you’ve got the realities on the ground to deal 
with. If we find some very nice housing for expats in Paraiso [another afflu-
ent neighborhood in Malabo], from the outside it looks really nice. But the 
wiring is really messed up and the residents get shocked. The well has chlo-
roform because it was built too close. . . . It’s not to the standard that we’re 
accustomed to.
The man quoted above claimed that “it makes more sense to live in the com-
munity” because it’s less expensive to rent already- built housing and shop 
where local people shop. The pressure to enclave then is not simple economic 
pressure, but what he referred to as “internal” pressure. Enclaving, in his 
estimation and that of all other managers with whom I spoke, facilitated a 
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more focused work environment, attracted people who might not otherwise 
be willing to work in Equatorial Guinea, and prevented contact with “re-
alities on the ground,” which included everything from chloroform in the 
drinking water, to unpredictable electricity, to volatile regional politics that 
had the industry constantly uneasy about “Nigerian” unrest.
Ferguson (2006) has argued that this enclaved model, in which food and 
other industry needs are imported, has the benefit of “low overhead”; its 
efficiency is almost frictionless or deterritorialized insofar as it avoids lo-
cal involvement altogether. On the contrary, as the finance manager above 
intimates, the complex processes necessary to materialize the disentangle-
ments of this model are far more expensive and logistically involved than the 
alternatives. But the idea is that this strategy avoids a set of potentialities — 
illness, graft, involvement in political unrest — which, if they were to mate-
rialize, would be more expensive to contain than the enclave built at great 
expense to avoid them. Enclaves are, in this way, actuarial: calculating po-
tential future risks and attempting to insure against them in the present. As 
one manager put it, “We have people out there working on wells that cost 
$30, $40, $50 million. If they have an upset stomach and they’re not think-
ing about work, a $30 million problem turns into $100 million. So we try to 
ensure that everything works, the maid service, everything, because the re-
percussions, the knock- on effect, is magnified.” For enclave administrators, 
the enclaves are about keeping the focus on the project at hand: drilling for 
oil. For them, the predictability, health, and control that the “self- contained” 
compounds offer allow workers to keep their minds on $30 million problems 
instead of upset stomachs or the frustration of a late local delivery.
Provisioning enclaves to ensure these outcomes is to work incessantly 
and at great expense toward building separations. Of the Smith facility, Paul 
explained:
Opening a facility like this takes twelve months. [We had] teething problems: 
generators black out, the incinerator wouldn’t work. Potable water wasn’t re-
ally potable. We had to modify filtration systems, massive problems with ac. 
The camp was designed by an American company in Houston and this isn’t 
Houston, this is Africa. It has its own relative humidity, its own dew point. 
But now this camp is completely self- contained. Electricity, water, sewage, 
[we] handle our own garbage, incinerate it all here. The bulk of our food 
comes from Houston. We ship it all in because it’s cheaper and the quality is 
good, and it eliminated the need to deal with a highly inefficient local econ-
omy. We spend $150 million a year [in the local economy], but in a manner 
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that doesn’t negatively impact efficiency offshore. [Our] social development 
program [is] 100 percent local content.
After a long year in which a Danish construction company, along with Span-
ish, Portuguese, Icelandic, and Greenlandic journeymen, plus eight hundred 
temporarily employed Bata residents, built the camp according to a Houston- 
based design, it is now, according to Paul, “completely self- contained.” The 
provision of electricity, water, sewage, garbage disposal, and even food is 
systematized to serve those within the walls, and, in his telling, independent 
from those systems outside the walls. That this provision of resources relies 
on infrastructure outside the compound walls — roads, seaports, airports — 
does not, in Paul’s telling, detract from the compound’s self- sufficiency. The 
effect, instead, is to “eliminate the need to deal with a highly inefficient lo-
cal economy.” Facilitated by this idea of separation, the only relationship 
Paul sees with the outside world is the $150 million per year spent “in the 
local economy” on corporate social responsibility programs. Corporate so-
cial responsibility becomes the detached way in which oil companies can 
intervene, from the other side of the wall, redoubling the effect that they are 
somehow separate, but willing to “help” those on the “outside” (Shever 2012; 
Rajak 2011; Welker 2014).
Paul’s idea that it is cheaper to import food from Houston (and Europe 
in some cases) is, at face value, shocking and seemingly untenable. Donald’s 
wife Cheryl explained to me the logistics of their “food drops”:
Fruits and vegetables and milk are flown in from Europe so that we’re guar-
anteed that we get nutritious food and are able to eat well. Twice a year, fro-
zen meats are brought in and put in a container. I can place an order for meat 
items that I might need. I do that once every two months based on how much 
I get so that I can cook and make my menus. I do go into town. I have not 
bought any of their fresh produce or milk. But I will purchase cereals and 
olive oils and tinned things, and the American or European products that 
I’m familiar with. Their interest on the compound is making sure that we 
are given food items that are cleaned and unspoiled so that we omit a lot of 
illness. That’s another reason for the compound: continuous work without 
ill health issues.
The procurement procedures Cheryl described were in place for all three 
compounds, although practiced differently in each. In the Major compound, 
for instance, residents did not receive regular shipments of fresh produce, 
but ate mostly canned vegetables or local (Cameroonian) vegetables pur-
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chased by the intrepid few in town. This was a a source of tension and jeal-
ousy between the Endurance wives and the Major wives, the latter of whom 
were resentful of the Endurance wives’ produce deliveries. Wives in the two 
compounds often traded various pantry items for imported produce items, 
a trade they oddly had to keep secret, as it was — in some arcane version of 
anti corruption practices — considered against company policy. Wives from 
the Major compound often used the tidbit that they didn’t receive fresh veg-
etable shipments as proof that they weren’t as spoiled as the Endurance wives 
and that they were “roughing it” slightly more.
The rationale for importing food was one of the questions I routinely 
asked my informants, not only those in procurement or management posi-
tions within oil companies, but also relevant Equatoguinean authorities and 
farmers as well, including one farmer whom I often accompanied on food 
drops to the compounds. Their answers displayed a remarkable consonance 
around the undesirability of importing food, but the impossibility of sourc-
ing it locally. In an early conversation with Donald, I speculated that perhaps 
food import had to do with the industry being offshore. “It doesn’t have any-
thing to do with onshore or offshore industry” he responded:
People want to know why we’re not supporting gardens and farms, why we 
import food. [Agriculture is] not our business. We could set up a group that 
helped people to plant, but that takes energy from the organization to do 
things that aren’t core. If we could get milk and juice and fresh vegetables lo-
cally we would. In Russia, the only thing we brought in from the outside were 
highly technical pieces of equipment that we couldn’t buy locally.
Equatorial Guinea does not have industrialized agriculture, let alone a meat 
or dairy industry. Boats come daily from Kribi, Cameroon, into Malabo’s 
port to stock the markets with produce staples, including tomatoes, onions, 
and peanuts. While companies have secured a handful of “local content” 
contracts with small farmers to bring in local produce, the quantity and 
regularity of the deliveries does not meet the US- standard needs of resi-
dent employees. Thus, as Donald explains it, in order to source local food, 
the industry would have to get involved in subsidizing and fomenting local 
agriculture — “setting up a group that helped people plant” — and they’re not 
interested in doing that. Another manager, clearly aggravated by my ques-
tion, responded: “There is this song and dance about local content. Where 
are the people that can do the services we need? We don’t take food into 
Ecuador and Vietnam, or any other place we’ve ever worked. You purchase 
it locally. We bring it in here because it’s not available.” Local farmers read-
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ily admitted their inability to fulfill the scale of food needs the US industry 
presented, and lamented the absence of systematized agricultural support 
from the government. Equatoguinean state officials I spoke with agreed that 
importing food was the companies’ only option. As one of them explained:
If your country can produce those things, they will be bought from the local 
economy. Equatorial Guinea does not produce things consumed in eg. In Ni-
geria you buy everything [in Nigeria] to put food on the platform. When we 
get self- sufficient here in food and foodstuff, we will not need to go to Came-
roon to buy tomatoes or potatoes. It’s not because the platform is offshore. 
If the industry were onshore, you would still get it from Cameroon. That’s 
what you eat here.
And yet of course, while Equatoguineans eat Cameroonian produce, oil 
industry personnel, by and large, do not. While importing from Cameroon 
would be cheaper, it would also entangle companies in ongoing border ten-
sions and disputes, which routinely cut off supplies of fresh vegetables from 
Cameroon for days and, less frequently, weeks at a time. The use of duty-free 
imports and private ports ensures that materials shipped from the United 
States or Europe experience less friction, or at the very least, that the friction 
they might encounter can more easily be framed as technical supply  chain 
disruptions, rather than entanglements in central African politics. It is to 
these corporate ring- fencing mechanisms of privileged tax and transport 
statuses, among others, that I now turn.
Corporate Ring- Fencing
It was 9:50 a.m. on a Malabo Monday morning. I had been sitting in the of-
fice of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Mines, Industry, and Energy 
(mmie) for fifty minutes, waiting for a 9:00 a.m. meeting to begin. In front of 
me, one secretary mouse- clicked at a computer game absentmindedly while 
another read the bible. In a room to the right, a third secretary clicked away 
at her mouse at the same rate, perhaps playing the same game. Their desks 
were empty, save the computers; three desks without a visible piece of pa-
per, file folder, or pen. These women seemed to have nothing to do, at least 
according to my own understanding of office work. The Secretary General 
seemed to have no formal schedule (as I’m sure he didn’t remember telling 
me to meet him at 9:00 a.m.), and these women certainly didn’t seem to be 
keeping one for him. As people came in and out of the office, one of the sec-
retaries would simply say that the Secretary General had not arrived. Beyond 
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that, it was unclear what work, if any, these women were entrusted with. 
Here I was in the all- important Ministry of Mines, and the action at 10:00 
a.m. on a Monday morning was three secretaries chatting in Fang and click-
ing away at computer games. The building itself, a ragged ten- story apart-
ment building constructed by a Lebanese company, was essentially empty. 
As you climbed the stairs floor by floor, outdated concession maps dotted 
the walls here and there; but in general, it felt like a big, dark building (elec-
tricity was often out) with empty offices and the occasional piece of office 
furniture, often still wrapped in plastic. Although the ministry was soon to 
move into a brand- new glass skyscraper in Malabo II, the emptiness was not 
because the action had already moved. That’s how the mmie had been since 
I had first seen it two years before. In fact, the plastic plaques on the walls of 
each floor, listing whose offices were where, were an improvement over the 
water- stained paper printouts pinned on each landing when I first arrived 
in 2006.
The confusing emptiness of the mmie offices was in sharp contrast to the 
more familiar office environs within the compounds of US oil companies: 
large buildings with open floor plans, crowded with cubicles and swivel of-
fice chairs; walls covered with graphs, charts, and posters, as well as com-
pany slogans and achievements; enormous white board calendars and sched-
ules filled in with uncannily legible handwriting; office desks and shelving 
crowded with stacks of paper, books, labeled binders, file cabinets, comput-
ers, printers, and fax machines; the thrum of phones and photocopying; and 
the hustle and bustle to and fro between personalized work spaces, with pho-
tos of families, inspirational quotes, and sports team memorabilia.
And yet, in addition to the Presidency, the Ministry of Mines was consid-
ered to be Equatorial Guinea’s most powerful and effective Ministry. Locals 
and foreigners alike often extolled its highly trained personnel and bureau-
cratic presence in industry processes, often in contrast to GEPetrol (the rela-
tively new national oil company), whose mission was still ill- defined to the 
point of mystery. I share the contrasting office- life descriptions here to draw 
attention both to how different the working life of the industry feels on either 
side of the wall and to the kinds of work rhythms enabled by infrastructures 
like reliable electricity and running water, which could be found only within 
the US company compounds.
The infrastructures that enable constant electricity, wireless internet, 
running water, and Houston area codes are clearly not only for the domestic 
comfort of migrant employees and their spouses, but also enable the move-
ment of oil and gas to market in more legibly business- oriented ways. Con-
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sidered in their commercial capacity, these enclaves enclose separate busi-
ness practices, ranging from the use of satellites that allow Houston phone 
numbers in offices; to differential laws, regulations, and taxation regimes; 
to variegated citizenship rights and responsibilities; and finally to the infra-
structure itself — private, duty- free ports, electricity grids, and telecommu-
nications systems. Justifications for these separate business practices stretch 
beyond arguments for efficiency and profit maximization. The companies 
also point to the ostensible ring fence within which they operate as spatial 
and procedural proof that they are separate from the “corruption” outside 
their walls. “In effect, a border is expected to be established between the oil 
industry, which now seeks to demonstrate that it is governed according to 
global standards, and the local economy and society, which lie outside these 
borders” (Barry 2006, 246). Corporate processes “within” the enclave cloak 
themselves in discursive and procedural regimes of the global, the standard, 
the compliant, and the objective, to be differentiated from the arbitrary, the 
personalistic, and the incomprehensibly local beyond their walls.
Political scientist William Reno (2001) has gone so far as to say that “the 
private enclave exploitation of resources is a salutary imposition of market 
discipline and standards of efficiency on corrupt economies. Foreign firms, 
especially larger ones, offer short- term prospects of filling in for missing 
state capacity” (4). To the contrary, I would suggest that the enclave is pre-
cisely a performance of market discipline and standards of efficiency, crafted 
through spatial, technical, and embodied differentiations that serve as 
semiotic proxies (Ho 2016) for “the market” and its ostensible standardiza-
tions. Like any felicitous performance, these practices create sociomaterial 
effects in the world; in this case, oil and gas from Equatorial Guinea reach-
ing global markets with remarkable reliability. At the same time, however, 
the relationship between the enclave’s segregated infrastructure and these 
effects is not causal, as the industry (or Reno) would suggest, but instead 
mediated by those thick, sticky entanglements with local life that the enclave 
claims to avoid. The enclave then is a procedural stage for market terms — 
efficiency, standardization, depersonalization — while the actual processes 
that get oil to market have everything to do with socialities, compromises, 
and often political force. One can hear this layering in a Smith’s country 
manager’s explanation of the exceptional status his company enjoyed in 
Equatorial Guinea:
There’s so much revenue generated. Corruption and inefficiency exist in 
spades in West Africa. The fact that we generate so much revenue, we have 
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direct contacts in [the Ministry of Mines, Industry and Energy] and tremen-
dous influence. If there are difficulties — [given our] $700,000 per day [rig] 
rental — negative impact by customs, immigration, [we are] able to make a 
few phone calls and it gets cleared away.
This man intimates that zonal capitalism is made through deep and per-
sonalistic entanglements with that from which it claims to be separate. “We 
make a few phone calls and it gets cleared away.” We use our global, compliant 
standards to call our highly placed connections at the Ministry of Mines and 
ask them to please call the lowly customs official who is holding our needed 
technology at the port and tell him to snap out of it. This is how we differenti-
ate ourselves from the “corruption that exists in spades in West Africa.” Thus, 
while Barry (2006) is right that “the formation of technological zones has be-
come critical to the constitution of a distinction between global/Western po-
litical and economic forms, and their non- Western others” (250), the work of 
making that distinction cannot be characterized by separation alone. It must 
also include the onomatopoetic Spanish word that locals used most often to 
explain the relationship between the oil industry and local power structures: 
compinchados, or accomplices. As one Equatoguinean lawyer put it:
Obiang gives the companies free rein, and in turn they protect his regime. 
[The companies] operate on the margins of local law, but it doesn’t affect 
them. This theme of having their own telecommunications system, it guar-
antees that the government cannot interfere. This is on the margins of cur-
rent legality and of the country’s interests. They are commercial relations in 
which the industry closes its eyes to what is obviously illegal according to in-
ternational law in order to do business with the regime. . . . The government 
has tacitly renounced control of the activities of these companies. As they 
renounce control, company activities damage the interests of the population. 
In environmental protection there is not a single control. The damage that 
they do — to the coast, the pollution — it reaches our beaches and the govern-
ment doesn’t have a single mechanism, there isn’t the political will. . . . The 
fishermen feel abandoned, and the government does nothing.
This man narrates the deep ties and complicities between oil companies and 
those in power — from the state’s granting of corporate sovereignty within 
the enclaves, to the companies turning a willful blind eye to blatant illegali-
ties. And yet, the effects to which Barry and Reno point are pervasive — the 
performation of a border between the industry and the economy and society 
thought to be “outside” it (Barry 2006), and an idea of the imposition of mar-
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ket discipline (Reno 2001). The needed technology rapidly clears customs 
at the port, and the company can claim that they have sidestepped the cor-
rupt outside yet again. Despite the sticky entanglements through which it is 
made, this infrastructural separation allows the consequential inhabitance 
of a partition, wherein companies are “imposing market discipline” from be-
hind the walls, paragons of legal and economic liberalism. The separation is 
a spatial and procedural stage on which companies enact removal from and 
superiority to the legal, environmental, political, and financial situations in 
which they are causally and irrevocably implicated.
Another aspect of the ring- fence model — or the story told about it — is 
the extent to which these companies are “tightly integrated with the head 
offices of multinational corporations and metropolitan centers but sharply 
walled off from their own national societies” (Ferguson 2006, 203). While it 
is difficult to argue that Equatorial Guinea is the “national society” for any 
of the companies in question, their tight integration with head offices in 
Houston is unquestionable. Their phone systems, internet, and email are all 
connected and operated via satellite between Houston and New York. Every 
lobby and many offices of US firms in Equatorial Guinea have two clocks 
adjacent on the wall — one set to Houston time and the other to Malabo 
time. Daily working life for most employees who work in the offices is also 
Houston- centered. As one migrant it manager explained, “A lot of the peo-
ple in this building don’t deal outside these walls. The nationals [Guineans] 
are 50/50. In many cases they just deal with Houston. Our logistics people — 
drivers, movement of materials — they deal a fair bit with the outside.”
It is not only Houston that becomes a central reference. Rather, Equato-
rial Guinea becomes a node in a much wider oil- producing diaspora con-
nected by supply  chain logistics, mobile infrastructures, procurement pro-
cedures, and shared technologies (Barry 2006). In discussing his job, Smith’s 
information technology manager explained that he delivered technology to 
“every company office — Indonesia, Africa, Russia — sixteen different coun-
tries.” Smith’s finance manager told me a similar story about her job. Having 
worked previously in Dubai and Jakarta, she explained:
Smith’s reporting procedures are standardized worldwide. It’s not very dif-
ferent. There are set rules and policies we have to follow. Government report-
ing is slightly different place to place, but what I do — company accounts — are 
the same. And the more locations there are, the more things are the same in 
every single location. The company is really trying to standardize. So eg, in 
terms of reporting, is the same as any other location.
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Houston- centric working life, including globally standardized it systems 
and company financial reporting, indeed serve to ring- fence corporations. 
But again, I would suggest that the level on which this ring- fencing works is 
procedural, gaining its effects through the performativity of ritual — a per-
formation (Mol 2002). In other words, that Smith’s reporting procedures are 
standardized worldwide is itself the consequential and performative fact. 
That the contents of those reports, and even the methods through which 
they are completed, may vary widely does not dim the effect or felicity of 
apparent standardization, integral to the disentanglement of the ring- fence 
model.
The performance and invocation of standardized, “global” procedures 
work to smooth the lived, messy entanglements that characterize even the 
most mundane details of ring- fenced work. “We do get [preferential treat-
ment] on our major stuff. [But] there are always other issues — registration of 
cars, residency permits, licenses — that you struggle through,” as one country 
manager explained.
We spend $850,000 per year on licenses and residency permits. One of the 
big issues starting to hamper our work [is the] process for visa attainment: 
requiring police checks for guys from the UK. [The Equatoguinean state now 
asks for] a certified letter from the local constable. You can’t have outstand-
ing warrants or a history of crime. [So now the] whole process takes longer, 
but even after the process you have people’s visas denied with no explanation. 
So we just finished a two- week turnaround where we shut down the plant 
and wanted to bring in specialists. One specialty company that we wanted to 
bring in, none were given visas.
While nearly $1 million spent on registrations, permits, and working visas 
was a drop in the bucket to both the oil companies and the Equatoguinean 
government as a yearly expenditure or receipt, seemingly banal bureaucratic 
forms like car registrations, residency permits, and licenses are in fact ana-
lytically rich. Particular sticking points — visas in this case — reveal much 
about what worked smoothly in the enclaves, what didn’t, and why. The visa 
issue this informant identified as emerging in 2008 is not simple red tape. 
Instead, in the wake of a failed 2004 coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea that 
implicated Mark Thatcher, among other geopolitical luminaries (Roberts 
2006), the Equatoguinean government grew increasingly wary of who they 
let into the country. While Spaniards, as the ex- colonial power, had long 
struggled to acquire visas, most other European foreigners did not. However, 
the coup and its aftermath laid bare for the Equatoguinean state the long 
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history of personnel exchange between international militaries, mercenar-
ies, private security companies, and the extractive industries. A brief pro-
fessional biography of Simon Mann, accused of being the coup plot leader, 
illustrates the point.
White South African Simon Mann had served in the Gulf War before he 
returned to work in the oil industry in Canada. In 1993, when the National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (unita) fighters closed oil in-
stallations in Angola, President dos Santos brought in Executive Outcomes, a 
private military security firm in South Africa (now defunct), who contracted 
Mann and others to fight. This circulation between private military contract-
ing companies — soldiers for hire in wars both declared and undeclared — 
 and the extractive industries is common. To sharpen the point, the de-
fense Mann and others offered of their apparent coup attempt in Equatorial 
Guinea was to say that they were, in fact, flying to the Democratic Republic 
of Congo to provide security at a diamond mine (Roberts 2006). Thus, with 
Mann’s extradition, trial, and jail time in Equatorial Guinea, and even be-
fore, the Equatoguinean government became increasingly savvy about the 
intimate ties between the extractive industries and the defense/security in-
dustries. Many of the foreign men I met in the field shared these biographies, 
including Paul (the white Zimbabwean discussed above), who was arrested 
and interrogated in the wake of the coup, and the head of security for Re-
gal Energy, who was recently back from Iraq where he had served as J. Paul 
Bremer’s bodyguard.8 Once Simon Mann was released from prison in Eqa-
utorial Guinea, Obiang contracted him as a defense and intelligence expert.
Another company logistics manager, quoted below, ran into similar, 
seemingly trivial entanglements that show the extent to which supply chains 
are, in fact, chains of or proxies for exchange translations along the rails of 
geopolitics (Tsing 2015).
We have loi [letter of invitation] issues. They’re trying to get a technician 
here from Genoa, Italy, to work on the machine, but we don’t get our lois 
nearly as fast as Chinese or Arabs. They present the red envelope. We are pro-
hibited from doing that. [Our employees] know if they do that, they won’t get 
reimbursed, because they’re going officially. So the lois drag out. Literally 
one week later Endurance gets the loi; [the expert] will be here tomorrow. 
During this whole period I estimate the lost revenues in the $15 million gross 
range for the government’s take alone. I can guarantee you that Endurance 
has pulled out all stops, putting pressure on their people, but things don’t 
move like that here.
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In this man’s story, we see significant revenue loss from seemingly banal visa 
and loi issues that stem from the geopolitics of mercenaries, coups, and oil. 
This informant also brings up “the red envelope.” He claims that the Chinese 
and the Arabs (referring to Arab Contractors, an Egyptian parastatal) bribe 
officials to get letters of invitation and other bureaucratic red tape taken care 
of more quickly. As we saw in chapter 1, US- based migrant informants who 
worked for large American companies claimed repeatedly that in the wake of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (fcpa), the Enron scandal, and Sarbanes- 
Oxley legislation, they simply could not offer bribes in that way, even if it 
previously had been standard practice in the industry. Nevertheless, ma-
jor transnational Chinese and Egyptian companies — mostly in Equatorial 
Guinea for construction- , road- , and port- building projects — were widely 
known to operate under a different set of circumstances and guidelines.
Chinese and Egyptian companies — and indeed, French and Spanish 
ones — were also heavily invested in Equatorial Guinea’s booming hydro-
carbon economy. While in- depth ethnographic knowledge of these compa-
nies’ practices was outside the scope of my research, word on the street and 
in the ministries — among Equatoguineans — was that these companies did 
business in different ways than the Americans, at least in terms of quotid-
ian interactions. I do not doubt, for example, that many Chinese or Egyptian 
companies often paid a fee for an expedited letter of invitation. An Egyptian 
friend living in Equatorial Guinea and working for a major construction firm 
confirmed for me the regularity of these practices in his company. Nor do I 
doubt that at this level of trivial proceduralism, American companies tended 
not to present red envelopes. In this difference, I would like to suggest, it 
is not a coincidence that American companies were enclaved, while these 
other companies were not. The performative separation of the enclave and 
the refusal to give a red envelope for trivial matters were enactments of pro-
cedural disentanglement intended to frame out the profound implications of 
US firms in Equatoguinean life. Akin to needing three signatures to tie one’s 
shoe, or to the regulations that prohibited wives from trading pantry items 
and produce, the scale and depth of US company entanglements in local life 
renders pitiful the refusal to pay a $5,000 bribe.
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine how the enclaves’ most pro-
found effects arguably emerge not from procedures of zonal capitalism tradi-
tionally conceived, but instead from the embodied experiences of seclusion, 
racialized social separation, and control that enclaves produce on both sides 
of the wall. Starting from the feminist argument that the domestic arrange-
ments are not private matters, but political and economic affairs that act 
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to sharpen or mute specific practices in the search for profit (Wynter 1982, 
2003; Enloe 1990; Federici 1998; Yanagisako 2002; Stoler 2002; Bear et al. 
2015; Hoang 2015), I offer a brief discussion of lived separation before closing 
the chapter with an exploration of the ways in which “the wives’ ” presence 
shaped company involvement with, separation from, and boundary- making 
between their compounds and the outside.
On Lived Separation
Back in the Ministry of Mines. At 10:20 a.m., a Chinese businessman walked 
in with his Equatoguinean liaison. The Guinean spoke in Fang to the sec-
retary, saying that they had an appointment. He then spoke in fluent Man-
darin, I assume telling the Chinese man that the Secretary General wasn’t 
yet in the office. They sat down next to me to wait, and we started talking. 
The Equatoguinean man had studied in China for five years, and he read, 
wrote, and spoke fluent Mandarin. The Chinese businessman gave me his 
card from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (cnooc), and I gave 
him mine, from Stanford University. Speaking English and Spanish, he ex-
plained the Equatoguinean oil industry as high risk but high reward, espe-
cially given that prices were so high. We talked about Stanford, and how he 
would like to study psychology and philosophy. We talked about the Olym-
pic opening ceremonies that had just taken place in Beijing. As we chatted, 
we both overheard the secretary telling another visitor that the Secretary 
General would travel to Nigeria that day at 11 or 12; maybe he wouldn’t come 
into the office at all. But at 10:41, we got word that he was on his way.
After meeting briefly with the cnooc representative and his Guinean 
liaison, the Secretary General welcomed me into his office. Among other 
questions, I asked, “What does the average Equatoguinean know about the 
oil industry?” And “What does the rotator from Texas know about Equato-
rial Guinea?” I quote his response at some length:
This question, it could be a theme of professional debate. Unfortunately, I am 
not a sociologist. We have lamented precisely this situation many times. At 
the cultural level we (Equatoguineans) are hospitable, peaceful people who 
know how to integrate among ourselves and with others. It’s possible that this 
Guinean character trait — the ability to integrate — has not been able to be no-
ticed from the cultural point of view, perhaps because we have such a small 
population. We can look at the typical example — the Major Corporation — in 
the same city but fortified, and no one leaves. Despite the fact that many jog 
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in the streets, they don’t stop. . . . I would say that a form of business discipline 
has been imposed, one that requires specific behaviors for those who come to 
work in the petroleum industry in Equatorial Guinea: singular dedication to 
work. I refer to the exclusive attention to the [work- related] tasks necessary 
to achieve success in a relatively unknown environment. Nevertheless, there 
is no doubt that this discipline imposed by the norms of the company col-
lides with the social values of man, the sociability of man. [This discipline is] 
creating a space of isolation, of exemption. The people exempt themselves . . . 
and why not? Those who come learn from those who are already here. There 
has to be much more human interaction to avoid differences, a consolidation 
of interpersonal exchange. These people need to open themselves. It could 
improve the relationships.
The Secretary General’s explanation of the enclaved spaces was compellingly 
resonant with those given by expatriate company managers. The managers 
suggested that the enclaves — with imported food and stable infrastructure — 
were necessary to ensure that the work got done, that $10 million wells weren’t 
made into $30 million problems by upset stomachs. The Secretary General 
states it more plainly: the foreign men who work in Equatorial Guinea have 
been told to come and work, not to stop and chat with Guineans while jog-
ging. He suggests that companies have decided that this exclusive dedication 
to work is what will ensure “success in a relatively unknown environment.” 
This success comes at a price, however, as dedication to work forecloses other 
forms of sociality, and the foreigners isolate themselves from the peaceful, 
accommodating Guineans.
Responding to a similar question, Mauricio — an Equatoguinean func-
tionary in the Ministry of Finance who had also worked for the Major Cor-
poration for years before transitioning into government — echoed the Secre-
tary General’s ideas of isolation and partition, stating of the migrant workers 
that they don’t “pick up social views” very well:
They don’t live in Malabo. They live in Houston. In [the Major Corporation] 
we even used to have rules in terms of when you go out and when you come 
back home [to the compound]. You can’t keep company in compound, guys 
or girls . . . You’re not going to pick up good social views, realistic social views, 
from the Major Compound or the Endurance Compound. They’re never out-
side of that compound unless they’re on the bus to the airport.
While the amount of time that expatriate employees spent outside of their 
compounds for personal/recreational purposes varied, there was definitely 
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a common refrain among US and European single male rotators I talked to: 
“I rarely if ever go out in public. From the rig to the office. I’ve rotated into 
Equatorial Guinea for six years and I’ve probably spent thirty nights in Ma-
labo. I’ve maybe gone out for dinner twelve times. I’ve not taken advantage 
of opportunities to mingle with the culture. One of my [Guinean employees] 
says he’s disappointed I’ve never come to his house for dinner.” Or another:
I live here like I did in Angola. From the airport to the rig. In Angola there 
was a civil war. Some people like going into town. I want to eat my dinner 
here and go to sleep. In two years in Bata, I’ve been out to dinner one time. In 
Aberdeen [we were] part of the culture. In China, it’s not a camp situation. I 
spent time in the city. But I didn’t go out a lot. But that’s just me. There have 
been those that partake of the nightlife in Bata, which is discouraged. [There 
was] one guy who couldn’t ever make it back to camp the same night, and 
they moved him offshore.
In this man’s account, to “partake of the nightlife” is a euphemism for en-
gaging with sex workers. This man talks about a “type” of man he defines 
himself against, a man who — whether in China, Equatorial Guinea, or 
Angola — likes to “go out a lot.” Certainly, there are many men in the oil 
industry in Equatorial Guinea who meet Guinean women and offer them 
money, meals in restaurants, and sometimes even more stable arrangements 
of housing and a living allowance in exchange for companionship and sex. 
In an effort to constrain this behavior, the large compounds at issue in this 
chapter all have curfews, ostensibly for security and to ensure a well- rested 
worker in the morning; but certainly this is also a way to control alcohol 
consumption and sex, two of the main attractions outside compound walls. 
Who can and cannot bring wives to the compounds becomes more salient 
here. The apparent morality and dignity of white upper management is 
propped up by their domestic arrangement that either keeps them home at 
night or encourages them to socialize with other married white couples in 
luxurious housing. As Povinelli (2006) writes: “The intimate couple is a key 
transfer point between, on the one hand, liberal imaginaries of contractual 
economics, politics, and sociality, and, the other, liberal forms of power in 
the contemporary world. Love, as an intimate event, secures the self- evident 
good of social institutions, social distributions of life and death, and social 
responsibilities for these institutions and distributions. If you want to locate 
the hegemonic home of liberal logics and aspirations, look to love in settler 
colonies” (17). By contrast, nonmanagement migrant workers — the vast ma-
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jority of whom are men and not white — away from home, alone, for up to a 
year at a time, are more likely to leave their claustrophobic compound hous-
ing after work. (Remember from the earlier descriptions that they have no 
kitchens or living room areas, and live in dorm- style or trailer- wide facili-
ties.) Given that many of these workers are also from the global South, Equa-
torial Guinea “beyond the walls” is far less exotic or threatening to them, 
and many enjoy the opportunity to frequent bars and nightclubs beyond the 
gaze of their bosses, whether or not they engage with sex workers or long- 
term companions. Notice too that for men who can’t make it back to camp 
before the curfew, an offshore posting is a punishment, further racializing 
questions of work and sexual morality.
The enclave and its outside are intensely gendered spaces in which sexu-
ality and kinship — who was frequenting sex workers; who could or could not 
have wives with them — became entangled in labor control and hierarchies 
of privilege. The wives, however, inhabited these regulations and hierarchies 
differently, and segregation both outside and inside the walls took on differ-
ent meanings and potentialities for them than it did for their husbands and 
other male workers.
The Wives
The wives of migrant managers were my easiest informal entry into the in-
dustry early in my fieldwork. Many pitied me: “You live in the city? Don’t you 
want to take a shower?” They invited me to cards on Wednesdays, mahjong 
on Tuesdays, and stitching on Thursdays. They also invited me to present 
a seminar on “Women in Africa,” and later to offer a workshop on under-
standing opera as part of their ongoing series of “master classes” presented 
by women for women living in the compound. I received invitations as a 
friend, translator, or mere tagalong to their charity drives and to outings in 
the city or around the island. They invited me to potlucks to say goodbye to 
various women — one leaving for a new post with her husband in Kazakh-
stan, another retiring with her husband to a lake house in Wisconsin, and 
another heading back to Texas. When I left the field, they threw me a pot-
luck of my own.
I played Continental with them every Wednesday afternoon. Chat over 
the game would turn to predictable questions. “What did you do before?” At 
my table of card players on one afternoon, there was one woman who had 
been a tennis pro, one who had been a banker, and another who had a degree 
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in recreation and had led a ywca. Another woman’s father had died when 
she was young, and she was left to take care of her mother. She explained 
softly that she didn’t get the chance to earn a college degree, and she was 
clearly self- conscious about losing at cards. Other women I came to know 
had degrees in law enforcement and police administration, library science, 
nursing, education, sociology and psychology, and fashion and interior de-
sign. Others had a high school education. Many were gifted artists; one was 
a jeweler. All of them were in Equatorial Guinea to support their husbands 
in what was widely acknowledged to be an egregiously work- intensive envi-
ronment. Reminiscing about her own career, Scarlett explained, “Oh, I’ve 
worked in retail; as a secretary; been a mom; wife and professional volun-
teer. I never got to pursue my dreams. In my late thirties and early forties, I 
grieved the loss of that. I’ve had a wonderful life. We’ve been corporate no-
mads.” Sarah, who had worked as a nurse, explained, “I can get a job any-
where. [My husband] does appreciate that I could be at home working, with 
an identity more or less. I gave that up, and he never takes it for granted.”
We would eat Doritos and m&ms, salads and sandwiches, meringue 
and chocolate cake. If one wife ran low on something, she would trade with 
another, Crystal Light for coffee beans. As various wives prepared to leave 
Equatorial Guinea permanently, each would sell off the contents of her pan-
try: Stove Top stuffing, Campbell’s soup, Grape- Nuts, marshmallows, gra-
ham crackers, Uncle Ben’s rice, hot chocolate mix, canned beans and beets, 
and chili. I bought a box full of groceries at one sale, and the wife who was 
leaving quoted me a price in US dollars as “the same amount that I paid,” to 
assure me she was not making a profit. Because all three companies forbid 
expatriate workers from bringing children to Equatorial Guinea (for reasons 
that ranged from malaria, to lack of adequate schooling, to “security con-
cerns”), the women I met were mostly in their fifties and early sixties, dearly 
missing children in their twenties and beyond at home. They were from 
New York City; Savannah, Georgia; Ipswich and London, England; Ogden, 
Utah; Conroe and Georgetown and Houston, Texas; rural Louisiana; and the 
Midwest. There was one Thai woman married to an American, one Brazil-
ian married to an Argentine, and one white South African woman who had 
moved to Equatorial Guinea from Bonnie Island, Nigeria, where she had 
been posted with her husband in the industry and opened a chicken chain. 
Nearly all of them had lived in Texas with the industry, and among them 
they had also been posted in Angola, Argentina, Ecuador, England, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and throughout the 
American Gulf Coast.
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They were accustomed to expatriate life and its particular rhythms, its 
comings and goings.9 The woman leaving for Kazakhstan went for a “look- 
see,” to find out what she would need there and what types of clothes she 
should bring. We spoke after she returned to Equatorial Guinea to pack up 
her house for good and, referring to an earlier conversation we’d had, she 
said, “You know, it’s just like we were talking about. There’s a whole subcul-
ture there ready to show me where to change money, wives calling me ready 
to pick me up.” Despite all the moving, the constant new faces and places, 
there was a patchy transnational continuity to migrant management life. 
The “wives” in any given place had most often lived in many other places 
and were accustomed not only to the transience of this existence, but also 
to its peculiar durabilities and continuities, including already- established 
communities of migrant wives. Chief among these peculiar durabilities are 
postcolonial meanings attached to whiteness, and the political potency of the 
heteronormative and deeply gendered nuclear family structure. “The Expat 
Wives’ Prayer” (figure 2.6) is a poignant and troubling artifact of these con-
tinuities, given to me by one of the migrant women with whom I worked 
in Equatorial Guinea. The poem is a satirical reinterpretation of the Lord’s 
Prayer that circulates broadly in expatriate communities the world over, on 
the internet, and in Equatorial Guinea, although the woman who gave me 
this copy was clearly ashamed to do so. 
The poem is saturated with gendered, raced, and classed relationships, 
implicitly laid across the global north and south. White property — excess 
baggage, houses, treasures, duty free; relations of white dominance and non-
white subordination — cooks, maids, drivers, gardeners; and a collective 
whiteness seeking “divine guidance in our way of doing things” (empha-
sis, tellingly, in original) are all arrayed against “the natives” who the Lord 
is called upon to help “love us . . . for what we are, and not for what we ap-
pear to be worth.” In thinking through this poem, first I want to recognize 
white supremacy by Ansley’s (1989) definition: “a political, economic, and 
cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and ma-
terial resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority are 
widespread, and relations of white dominance and nonwhite subordination 
are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings” 
(1024). Second, I want to recognize the centrality of racialized sexuality and 
propriety to the place of white womanhood in the long history of global 
capitalist projects (Hoang 2015; Stoler 2010): “Keep our husbands from com-
paring us to foreign women. Save them from making fools of themselves in 
nightclubs and please, Lord, do not forgive them their trespasses for they 
Figure 2.6. The Expat Wives’ Prayer.
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know exactly what they do.” The “natives” are in one moment the expat wives’ 
cooks and maids, and in the next, “foreign women” against whom they com-
pare unfavorably, and with whom their husbands should not be forgiven for 
having extramarital sex. 
In the penultimate line of the poem, the author capitalizes “Expat Wives” 
for the first time, as she hopes for friends at the end of her nomadic life with 
whom to share her many memories, photos, and stories “so our lives as Ex-
pat Wives will not have been in vain.” This line suggests that wedded do-
mesticity itself — providing emotional and housework support to a husband 
through his corporate journeys — is not enough to redeem the hardships and 
sacrifices of this kind of life for women. In the sadness of this line, in the 
sentiment of lives lived in vain, one can hear Scarlett again: “I never got to 
pursue my dreams. In my late thirties and early forties I grieved the loss of 
that.” In other words, the de facto white supremacy and the class mobility 
that can come with these postings — women, many with a high school edu-
cation, living in luxurious houses with maids and gardeners on a 75 percent 
uplift salary — create a profoundly ambivalent lived experience, full of con-
tradiction, guilt, and grief. Fear, physical and emotional vulnerability, and 
conflicted relationships to material possessions and “native” peoples braid 
with the poem’s invocations of quotidian white supremacy. These affective 
ambivalences saturated women’s daily lives in the compound, as the end of 
this chapter will detail, and they betray how these women wrestle with the 
availability of preexisting systems of raced and gendered inequality to capi-
talist projects.
The intimately unequal domesticities of race, class, and gender expressed 
in the poem, and the repetition of domestic segregation in oil compounds 
around the world, show us how the US- based transnational oil and gas in-
dustry draws on preexisting systems of raced and gendered inequality, not 
simply on norms and technologies of liberal capitalism. Or, rather, raced and 
gendered inequality are norms and technologies of liberal capitalism. From 
subcontracting and body shops that pay workers according to their nation 
of origin, to the flags of convenience that allow offshore rigs to sail under 
the Liberian flag, to the acceptability of residential segregation, many of the 
quotidian practices that constitute the licit life of capitalism depend on the 
reliability of already existing inequalities. “No firm has to personally invent 
patriarchy, colonialism, war, racism, or imprisonment, yet each of these is 
privileged in supply chain labor mobilization” (Tsing 2009, 151). Consider 
Nigel Thrift’s (2005) assertion that “capitalism can be performative only be-
cause of the many means of producing stable repetition which are now avail-
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able to it and constitute its routine base” (3). While Thrift is nodding toward 
infrastructure here, the stability of race and gender iniquities — in all their 
lived ambivalence — is also more and less consistently available to capitalist 
projects and, thus, constitute their routine base (Robinson 1983; Yanagisako 
2002; Hoang 2015; Hudson 2017a). However, the affective experience of those 
iniquities — even for those whose intersectional identities place them at the 
apex of race and class, if not gender, hierarchies — is deeply troubled. Among 
the wives, “living in vain” came up often.10
In every interview and questionnaire, I asked the women what they 
would change about their lives in Equatorial Guinea. Nearly without excep-
tion, they wished to know more about the country, understand more, learn 
to speak Spanish. “I would like to have the opportunity to get to know Guin-
ean people. It’s as if you come here, you pass through the place, and you don’t 
learn anything. It’s like living in vain. Rather than losing this time, I would 
like to have more Guinean friends, more exchange.” As was the case in the 
poem, here again wedded domesticity is not enough to redeem the sacrifices 
of gendered migrant life. Where the poem’s narrator yearned for friends with 
whom to share photographs and stories once her world travel ended, the ma-
jority of the migrant wives I interviewed and came to know well in Equato-
rial Guinea yearned for a more fulfilling life outside the compound, outside 
the walled boundaries of conjugal conscription.
Philanthropic projects of various types offered the most readily avail-
able and acceptable method to access this outside. Indeed, the phrase “men 
are out for prostitutes and bars, women are out for charity” was a widely cir-
culated platitude in the compounds. While no wife had been in Equatorial 
Guinea longer than three years at a stretch, there were charity projects that 
had been going constantly since 2000. New wives coming in picked up where 
others had left off. As Chris left for Kazakhstan, she could rest assured that 
her art and English classes, her program with Jet Air and the local Catholic 
nuns, and her milk program would continue. And when she arrived in the 
North Sea, she would pick up the projects of others. While their husbands 
were up to their eyeballs in work, and enjoyed an open bar, deluxe gym fa-
cilities, and American cable tv in every home at the end of the day to un-
wind, the women were bored for the most part and filled their time with all 
kinds of activities both within and outside the compound. They were often 
more involved in and knowledgeable about life outside the walls than many 
of their husbands.
Many of the women living in the Major and Endurance compounds were 
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involved in charitable, philanthropic, and educational projects, which were 
officially separate from the corporate social responsibility programs of the 
companies, the largest of which were subcontracted to multinational devel-
opment contractors. Through a sympathetic airline employee at London’s 
Gatwick Airport, the wives brought in large containers of materials — school 
supplies, toiletries, toys, clothes — and distributed them in Bioko’s small, 
mostly Bubi villages of Moeri, Basacato, Riaba, and Baney, often working 
through nuns in churches and schools. They hosted game days for local chil-
dren, and also taught art, English, and stitching classes, occasionally hosted 
in their homes on the compound, although more often at local schools. They 
helped to run a summer school for teenagers in Ela Nguema that focused on 
hotel management, cooking, and welding classes. They also hosted fund-
raisers and donated the proceeds to local school building projects or for the 
purchase of a generator.
Yet, for all this activity, nearly without exception, from the most fervent 
participants in charitable work to those who chose only to give money oc-
casionally, if at all, the women had profoundly ambivalent feelings about 
their presence in and relationship to Equatoguinean communities. As one 
woman told me:
I will donate things, but I don’t want to be center stage. To be perfectly hon-
est, I feel like it’s a dog and pony show where you go and pass out one pen-
cil. The pencil- passing embarrasses the hell out of me. I’d rather help them 
paint a house instead of coming all dressed up like I just had a shower and 
hand out stuff. I don’t know where that comes from. I don’t want to feel like 
the great white savior. For me, I’d rather be in the background. I don’t think 
you can save the world. I think you work one person at a time. And I hate 
when the camera comes out. Oh lord! To be perfectly honest, sometimes 
I’m embarrassed. We have so much. I’d rather go into a school on a regular 
basis and help. Give something of myself, maybe? I’ve volunteered in one 
of the schools in Nyu Bili. I volunteered in the [company’s] computer lab 
with trainees teaching computer- based math and science programs. I re-
ally enjoyed that.
Madalena, the Brazilian woman living in the Endurance compound, had 
equally ambivalent feelings that she openly narrated in terms of colonialism 
and race, which set her descriptions apart. When first coming to Equatorial 
Guinea she had volunteered in a local clinic as a nurse, but she left due to the 
resentment she felt from the Equatoguinean nurses, which she attributed to 
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their “racist” attitudes toward white people and to a perceived threat that she 
would take over their jobs. After quitting in frustration, she preferred to stay 
at home in the compound. As she described it: 
The [charity] projects? No. I’ll donate money, but orphanages? No. I’ll do-
nate, but not go. “Here come the white people who take our petroleum money 
and come to give us pencils!” It’s like colonialism — they take all the land 
and then give a gun or a calculator. I feel shame that I don’t participate, but 
I would rather be in my house. What I like about living here is the comfort 
and economic things. I didn’t come here to do volunteer work. We came to 
make money.
When I asked Madalena if she enjoyed leaving the compound at all, she re-
plied: “Oh, I love it! We go to friends’ houses. But to do as the Americans 
do, to go here and there buying crafts? I don’t like that. I think they see it as 
exotic, to leave the compound and all. I don’t go because it stinks.” As she 
waved her hand in front of her face, she lowered her voice and leaned in, in-
dicating that she was worried her Equatoguinean maid would hear her (as 
we were conducting the interview in a mix of Spanish and Portuguese). “The 
times that I have gone into town, I felt ill because of the heat and the smell 
of trash. I like crafts, but because of dust and trash I’ll spend the whole day 
ill. And, because of social class distinctions in Brazil, this isn’t exotic to me. 
Poverty doesn’t choke me up. But what does choke me up is that the people 
here seem hostile. ‘What are you doing here, whitey?’ And they have the right 
to feel this way, because of the Spanish.”
Again, we come to the affective ambivalences of these women’s lives. 
They hoped that “more exchange” with Equatoguinean people would give 
meaning to their migrant existence, perhaps even afford more Guinean 
friends. But in practice, charity work outside the compounds produced a 
confused grappling with the contradictions of Equatorial Guinea’s petro- 
project, which brought vast wealth to a few (including them) and dispos-
session, environmental degradation, and retrenched political repression to 
many. While these are not the terms in which the wives articulated their 
struggles, their embarrassment about pencil passing and invocations of the 
“white savior,” and, clearly, Madalena’s historical analysis of the continuities 
with colonialism, all show that they grappled in their own embodied ways 
with the contradictions of postcolonial racial capitalism. That philanthropy 
and volunteer work, in particular, generated so much confusion is revela-
tory. Enclaved life spatialized politics and interaction, so that philanthropy 
became, on the one hand, among the only accepted and permitted means of 
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“reaching across the wall.” But, on the other hand, it also became a series of 
ruptural experiences in which radical inequality, race, and colonial histories 
blipped into uncomfortable, embodied presence.
In my conversations and interviews with wives, and in questionnaires I 
distributed and they completed on their own, their yearning for more con-
nection with “the outside” — Equatorial Guinea and Equatoguineans — was 
not a yearning to do more charity projects. Rather, their stated yearning was 
most often to learn Spanish, to make Guinean friends, and by extension, to 
be able to circulate more freely outside the compound. Women living in the 
Endurance compound were forbidden from driving company or private cars 
outside the enclave, and women associated with all three major companies 
were forbidden from taking public transportation, including taxis, which 
greatly limited their range of motion and meant that when they did leave the 
compounds, they often did so in large groups on company buses.11 As one 
woman explained to me:
We can’t have cars — we have to be on buses as a spectacle. Everyone’s staring. 
It looks weird. We go in as a pile of people, and it’s embarrassing. You can’t 
be a good ambassador for your country. . . . I don’t know if a lot of the women 
are self- conscious, but I know I am. They’re loud. . . . You’re completely as-
sociated with whoever you’re with, but you don’t sometimes approve of the 
way they’re acting. It’s a tour group, and you’re grouped in.
Women’s movements were tightly controlled, and when they were able to 
move beyond compound walls, it was often as a conspicuous and, to many, 
embarrassing white group. Without language skills, or a physical presence 
beyond the walls that was able to transcend spectacle, the women’s desires 
for more personal forms of connection remained thwarted. But note too, in 
this woman’s account of her embarrassment at the spectacle of a bus full of 
white women, the tensions she experiences are tensions between the women 
on the bus. It is other women who embarrass her (they’re loud), and it is dif-
ferential privileges between women affiliated with different companies (we 
can’t have cars) that frustrate her.
For migrant wives living in Equatorial Guinea, homosociality within the 
compounds, within the apparently homogenous whiteness of management 
wives, was deeply crosscut by multiple forms of difference, inequality, and 
prejudice.12 These included, but were not limited to, nationality (Americans 
are loud, Brits are uptight); class and social capital (who had education, who 
was rural); differences between company policies and hierarchies within 
the companies themselves (who was married to whom, whose husband was 
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whose husband’s boss). In other words, on the whole, the women gener-
ally felt that there was nowhere comfortable to turn. Wedded domesticity in 
Equatorial Guinea was insufficient; reaching outside the compound via char-
ity projects was fraught; and their relationships to one another were riven 
with tension and judgment. In this feeling of having nowhere to affectively 
rest, the compounds’ luxurious infrastructure and the wildly inflated sala-
ries paid to their husbands would often become, somewhat ironically, the 
least problematic psychic space. Remember the sentiments expressed by Ma-
dalena who, although she had originally volunteered as a nurse, renounced 
that start completely: “What I like about living here is the comfort and eco-
nomic things. I didn’t come here to do volunteer work. We came to make 
money.” But this too was an ambivalent position.
For migrant wives in Equatorial Guinea, this ambivalence expressed it-
self as love of luxurious infrastructure and comfort on the one hand, and 
resentment and feeling caged by that same infrastructure on the other. They 
were thankful for the security and comfort the compound provided. Many 
explained that had there not been a compound, they would have been un-
willing to come to Equatorial Guinea. Many wives also readily admitted that 
the comfort of the compounds bled into luxury; for example: “We’re totally 
spoiled. Fabulous food, it’s a life of leisure. We’re taken care of with house-
keepers and gardeners. It’s a quality of life similar to the US, except that you 
socialize more because there’s nothing else to do.” For many women, this 
luxury extended to what they were able to do as they found ways to fill their 
time. One woman offered a particularly whimsical assortment of personal 
activities that kept her busy on the compound: “keeping fit, oil painting, 
printmaking, playing flute and small pipes, walking the dog, knitting and 
sewing, learning French, reading French novels, writing, different cultures, 
people watching, day dreaming, keeping in touch with friends and family, 
acupuncture, socializing.” And yet, these feelings of security and comfort, 
luxury, and expansive free time were also bound up with guilt and the feel-
ing of being judged, as one woman expressed:
I love the greenery all around us. I love the fantastic houses and facilities. 
More than anything, I love the quiet. I feel protected. You feel like you’re in 
the United States, and that’s what the enclaves are for, so that the expatri-
ates can feel like they’re at home. But then when I talk to expats who live in 
Malabo, they say, “Of course you like living here! You live in Disney World!” 
They are jealous. It’s as if we have to feel guilty for living well. You have to 
excuse yourself for living well here.
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And another:
When I moved in, the woman who lived in this house before me said, “This is 
the best prison you’ll ever live in.” It’s almost embarrassingly nice. When you 
go into town and you see the abject poverty and then you come back here. . . . 
I mean I don’t want to live in a dump, but it doesn’t have to be over the top.
In our conversations and interviews, and in responses to survey questions, 
the wives repeatedly described their experiences in the compounds using 
metaphors of prisons, fishbowls, and microscopes. Interestingly, however, 
they attributed their confinement and agitation not primarily to a threat-
ening outside, but to the internal social divisions that I described above — 
 between Americans and Brits; between those with and without college edu-
cations; and between those whose husbands occupied different levels of the 
corporate hierarchy. As Suzanne explained, “It’s simple. Interacting with lo-
cal people is rewarding. Interacting with other wives is frustrating.” Or as 
another wife put it perceptibly to me, “Everyone feels as if she is on the out-
side.” Below I offer a sampling of these sentiments, culled from what could 
have been an entire book about isolation and social distinction among 
women living in the compounds:
It can be a lonely place. Everyone’s in their homes, and you don’t want to 
disturb them. You feel eyes are watching you. When you go out, you feel 
others are watching you. When you’re sitting by the pool, you feel people 
are watching you. “Oh, I saw you walking yesterday. I saw you playing ten-
nis. Who were you playing with?” I’m guilty of this as well. I’ll say, ”I really 
would’ve liked to play tennis. Why didn’t you call me?” A lot of ladies feel 
left out. I feel left out.
You’re under a microscope. It’s an artificial life. If I lived back in Houston, 
I would not see the wives on a daily basis or on a frequent basis. Seeing the 
same people all the time is a little . . . I like ’em but that wouldn’t be the way 
it would be if we were in the real world.
There is a prominent difference in our compound between Brits and Ameri-
cans. People go toward who they feel comfortable with, more so now than 
before because there are many Americans and fewer Brits. It gets very loud, 
so noisy. We Brits are less vocal. We’re quieter as a nation; we don’t express 
ourselves.
There is a cultural difference. The rift is about the ones who have not had 
college education. For me to mix with those ladies, they’re not sure of me. 
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People are paranoid, on the verge of hysteria. We’re not one big happy fam-
ily essentially. Human nature, health issues, menopause, all those things are 
within the equation.
Finally, regarding another common complaint about internal divisions in 
the compounds, a woman explained that “there are women whose husbands 
are managers and they feel more important. I have lived this in many coun-
tries.” And, from the other side of that sentiment, a production manager’s 
wife (the highest possible in- country position) talked to me about her pecu-
liar position as “the pastor’s wife”:
I enjoy the infrastructure: water, electricity, telephone, internet, air condi-
tioning. I never have to be lonely. But when you want privacy, it can be suffo-
cating. There are women in the compound who like to know what everyone is 
doing. And there is some prestige attached to being the production manager’s 
wife. People manipulate that relationship. So I don’t like the lack of privacy, 
or people making assumptions, or having my behavior monitored. There’s 
pressure to be the pastor’s wife.
The wives also shared ways in which their migrant experiences in Equa-
torial Guinea and elsewhere had changed them. In particular, many artic-
ulated various moments of personal and intersubjective insight, whether 
about “culture” broadly conceived, race, or personal ignorance; for example: 
“The best thing that happens is the widening of my eyes, the re- seeing. It’s 
the softening toward other people and other cultures.” And another stated, 
“I was never ‘American’ until I got to Gabon. I was also never ‘white.’ ” Still 
another woman explained her opinions on the “awful things” Chinese oil 
companies were doing to the local environment. “They’re educated, don’t get 
me wrong,” she said. “But I don’t think they care about the people and the 
environment like we [Americans] do.” After that blunt judgment of an entire 
nation, she paused, and then chuckled, clearly at herself. “Maybe that’s my 
arrogance coming out. Now you’ll see how ignorant I was: When I moved 
to [my first overseas posting in] England, I thought I was moving to a third 
world country. Growing up in the US, I wasn’t that interested in learning 
about the world.” This reckoning with personal ignorance, and with the her-
metic geographies of quotidian American exceptionalism, was also a com-
mon theme. Here is Cheryl, Donald’s wife, for whom a posting in Equatorial 
Guinea came after long postings in Russia and Japan:
I told myself years ago I would never live in Africa. I would never come here 
because of the bugs and the diseases and all that. Never. eg would pop up 
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every now and then in our previous years. I would think, “Oh forever more, 
no.” I am never going there. When [my husband] came home I said no, I am 
not going there. Knowing that there was a Western- style compound, once 
I started thinking about it and had to make a real decision and think and 
choose, it was, OK, I can do that. And then it was, I’ll have nothing to do. I’ll 
be on a compound. But I got over that too. But then I thought I’ll collect all 
my projects and come. I planned to keep myself happy, and I’ll figure it out 
once I get there. I’ve come to Africa having never wanted to come here. Africa 
is malaria. Africa is bugs. Africa is those things that get in your clothes and 
eat into your skin, and National Geographic pictures, and things you read 
when you were a child. I just never wanted to go there. But I had the same 
reaction when he said Russia. Immediately, when he said Russia, I said no. 
I can’t go there. We’ll have to stand in bread lines. It’s what you’ve learned 
previously that’s not true in real life.
And finally, during negotiations with a woman to see if she would let me read 
a collection of detailed letters she had written home to family and friends in 
England, she acquiesced on one condition: “Provided that you understand 
that my views are not fixed and will change over time, and that I am striving 
to understand relationships and cultures here and how that reflects my own 
culture and beliefs.” Whether or not this was a caveat strategically intended 
to please the anthropologist, it is important to me to take this provision se-
riously. In sharing their guilt, ambivalence, and frustrations with me, the 
women presented themselves as whole persons — neither corporate nor do-
mestic automatons — feeling their way through the deep compromises and 
multiple hypocrisies that racial and gendered capitalism entails.
The women in their “golden cages” perched atop Equatorial Guinea’s 
historic cacao plantations felt lonely, confined, and stuck in various forms of 
social tension and distance, not only with the Equatoguineans beyond the 
walls, but even more so between one another. Designed to partition, sepa-
rate, and disentangle the oil industry from the place in which it happened to 
be operating, the enclaves also seemed to intensify the social partitions that 
divided these women one from the other by class, nationality, and education, 
leaving them resigned neither to humanitarian concerns nor lifelong friend-
ships, but, as Madalena put it, to making money and getting out.
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Conclusion
Solon T. Kimball was an anthropologist at Columbia Teacher’s College. In 
1955, the Arab American Oil Company (now Saudi aramco) invited him to 
participate in a summer institute for teachers in Saudi Arabia, after which, 
unbidden by the company, he wrote a paper on his impressions entitled “Sec-
tion of Anthropology: American Culture in Saudi Arabia” (Kimball 1956). 
Quoting from Kimball’s paper, Vitalis (2007) retells his story of 1950s Saudi 
Arabia in interlaced infrastructural, emotional, and racial terms eerily simi-
lar to those I have explored in this chapter:
Many of the men and women [Kimball] met appeared troubled. “Although . . . 
the phrase, ‘we’ve never had it so good,’ is used often, nevertheless there are 
deep currents of disquiet and frustration, and perhaps even more serious per-
sonal consequences.” . . . “Even the lowliest” American worker had his or her 
sense of superiority reinforced through the spatial and racial organization of 
the camps. “The American position of pre- eminence is reflected in symbol 
and fact. It is also a position that imposes a high degree of cultural isolation . . . 
and contributes to an omnipresent sense of precariousness.” When [Kim-
ball] probed, even those who emphasized aramco’s contribution to Saudi 
development and the Americans’ “sense of mission were prone to lapses of 
pessimism.” Many if not most would say, “I’m here for the same reason as 
everyone else — the money.” (254)
The migrant wives with whom I spent much of my time were sunk in this 
deep ambivalence, hopeful in one moment that for Equatoguineans, oil 
would be the salutary imposition of market rationality and benevolent de-
velopment, yet defensive in the next moment: “Let’s face it, we’re not do- 
gooders. We’re here to get oil out of the ground. I didn’t come here to do 
volunteer work. We came to make money.” Frustrated by the complexity of 
other desires, the spectacular profit to be had by collecting a 75 percent up-
lift salary, with all expenses paid, in the hardship post of Equatorial Guinea 
ironically became the least problematic justification for compound life. And, 
indeed, if one could characterize migrant management work in Equatorial 
Guinea by a unifying trope, it might be class mobility. One woman con-
fided that she and her husband had $5 million cash in hand to buy an ex-
pansive ranch property in Texas; another worked diligently via Skype in her 
free time, monitoring the building of her dream farmhouse in the French 
countryside.
I have proposed in this chapter that the enclave is a framing device, a site 
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of intentional disentanglement. At face value, this separation works toward 
two purposes. First, the enclaves provide residential comfort for migrant em-
ployees, shielding them from the discomforts of unpotable water, sporadic 
electricity, and typhoid and malaria that suffuse life outside their walls. Sec-
ond, insofar as the enclaves enclose not only residential life, but also daily 
office life, they are a spatial representation of the extent to which the oil in-
dustry claims to ring- fence corporate practices away from an external busi-
ness environment widely regarded by the industry as unpredictable, person-
alistic, and corrupt. Despite the apparently comprehensive partition between 
each enclave and its outside, the separation is partial, strategic, and perfor-
mative, with many people doing a tremendous amount of work to maintain 
its boundaries, and others yearning for more meaningful contact across the 
apparent divide. Yet the effect of this work of separation is eerily successful: 
it allows companies — as individual employees living in Equatorial Guinea 
and as juridically disperse institutions with shareholders and Houston cen-
tral offices — to inhabit a space of uneven disentanglement. They bemoan 
what goes on outside their gates as if they have nothing to do with it, when 
in fact their industry constitutes 98 percent of Equatorial Guinea’s national 
economy with all the sticky entanglements that entails.
What is perhaps most striking about the compounds, however, is not 
their apparent partition from life outside the walls, but the ethnic, racial, 
class, gender, and kin partitions within them. As I have tried to show, these 
are not separate projects; they are intimately related. As I wrote in the book’s 
introduction, the mobility of segregated domestic life within the compounds, 
and the mobility of the technical, legal, and infrastructural forms, like the 
rig through which oil moves to market, rely on and require one another 
for their licitness and their performativity. The industry’s careful segrega-
tion of gendered and heteronormative married whiteness from “others,” its 
cordoning- off, and its selective engagements via corporate social responsibil-
ity or philanthropy, sanctifies, and indeed domesticates, the power and sov-
ereignty that US oil companies wield in Equatorial Guinea and elsewhere. 
Conversely, the felicity of the “technological zone” aids and abets the forms 
of segregation and racialized inequality present in both the compounds and 
in offshore life. The ability to appeal to standardized accounting practices 
the world over, or to enclaved corporate practices more generally that osten-
sibly separate hydrocarbon production from “local life,” offer white suprem-
acy what Cheryl Harris (1993) describes as “the legal legitimation of expecta-
tions of power and control that enshrine the status quo as a neutral baseline, 
while masking the maintenance of white privilege and domination” (1715).
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And yet, as my work with the expatriate women in the compounds insis-
tently showed, they live white supremacy ambivalently, redeemed only, and 
partially, through exorbitant pay. This is the simultaneity, or arguably the 
causal relationship, of transnational scapes of white supremacy to the isola-
tion and emotional precariousness that Kimball’s work also documented. 
The horrors of philanthropy — of passing the pencil — and the guilt of show-
ering are moments of rupture. That rupture is partially bandaged by uplift 
salaries; but, in that moment of rupture, of shame and anguish and isolation 
for these white women, I’m reminded of Stefano Harney and Fred Moten 
(Harney and Moten 2013) addressing (on my reading) white people in white/
black coalitions: “The problematic of coalition” they write, “is that coalition 
isn’t something that emerges so that you can come help me, a maneuver that 
always gets traced back to your own interests. The coalition emerges out of 
your recognition that it’s fucked up for you, in the same way that we’ve al-
ready recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. I just need 
you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, 
you stupid motherfucker, you know?” (140). (See also Fanon 1991; Césaire 
1962; Nandy 1988; Stoler 2010.) The isolation, shame, and guilt produced in 
and around compound life are fleeting feelings and moments in which these 
women realized that it is fucked up for them too; in essence, that the on-
going work of white supremacy, colonialism, and resource extraction can-
not be undone by philanthropy, but only by the realization and subsequent 
enactment of the fact that it’s killing us white people, however much more 
softly, too.
Through ethnographic accounts of offshore rigs and onshore enclaves, chap-
ters 1 and 2 have shown the centrality of racial capitalism (Robinson 1983) 
to the daily life of oil production. In chapters 3 and 4, the transnational his-
tories and availability of racial differentiation, and imperial debris more 
broadly, remains a central theme in ethnographic attention to what is per-
haps capitalism’s central legal form — the contract.
CHAPTER THREE
The Contract
The difficulty of writing about sexual and racial power today . . . is that it exists in 
a context of formal equality, codified civil freedoms, and antidiscrimination legis-
lation. People are thus encouraged to see any problems as a matter of discrete rem-
nants of older discrimination or the outcome of unfortunate, backward individual 
attitudes. We tried to show how contract in the specific form of contracts about prop-
erty in the person constitute relations of subordination, even when entry into the con-
tracts is voluntary, and how the global racial contract underpins the stark disparities 
of the contemporary world. 
— Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, Contract and Domination
There are at least two kinds of “not- noticing” during fieldwork. There are 
the things you don’t notice because you rarely come across them, and there 
are the things you don’t notice because you come across them so frequently. 
In the latter case, certain conversations, interactions, and experiences are 
so common as to become a kind of background thrum. You know it’s there 
because it saturates your daily life, and, yet, you have to not notice, lest its 
ubiquity leak into the foreground of your project. In my fieldwork, contracts 
offer a good example of the first category in the not- noticing pair. Despite 
the fact that the oil and gas industry is intimately structured by contracts, 
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they were not an obvious ethnographic object. I rarely came across the docu-
ments themselves, let alone representations, interpretations, or discussions 
of them. This is predictable enough in that contracts are confidential — 
especially at the state/company level — which can both preclude detailed 
study (Hardin 2001) and beckon it.
On the other hand, the background thrummed with a pair of discourses 
so ubiquitous that I had to stop noticing them for my own sanity: relent-
less “rule- of- law” and corruption talk paired with what I came to call the 
incantation: water, schools, electricity, healthcare — waterschoolselectricity-
healthcare. In the case of rule- of- law and corruption talk, every day in the 
field was flooded with complaints, knowing glances, jokes, well- intentioned 
concerns, and hushed conversations about corruption and the lack of rule 
of law in Equatorial Guinea. (See Smith 2007 for this phenomenon in Ni-
geria.) Migrants who worked in the oil industry talked relentlessly about 
eg’s “culture of corruption,” the pains they took to avoid it, and the formal 
procedures they had in place to work around it, ensuring that their oil got 
to market “cleanly.” Equatoguineans employed in the industry asked why 
money was deducted from their paychecks for healthcare if, when they went 
to Loéri Mba (the national clinic), it was always closed, or there was no sub-
sidized medicine available. They asked why they were never indemnified af-
ter a contract termination, or even paid the overtime wages they understood 
to be their due.1
In the case of the incantation — waterschoolselectricityhealthcare — every-
one, from my Equatoguinean friends and interlocutors, to my mother, to 
migrant oil workers, was constantly chanting some version of “This country 
is so rich, and yet clean running water, electricity, healthcare, and educa-
tion are practically nonexistent! The suffering and poverty in the midst of 
such vast wealth is unconscionable.” Rule- of- law talk was constantly paired 
with this incantation through the suggestion that it was the lawlessness and 
corruption of the state and/or the oil companies (depending on whom you 
talked to) that eventuated in Equatorial Guinea’s ongoing lack of basic so-
cial services in the shadow of such vast wealth. Where, everyone wanted to 
know, was this elusive “rule of law”? Who or what determines the paths that 
oil money takes, and whether it ends in offshore bank accounts or in a na-
tional healthcare system? Who or what shapes the overlaid human processes 
and consequences of the oil industry in Equatorial Guinea? In this chapter, 
I begin to trace the ways in which the production sharing contract (psc) is, 
and is not, the answer to these questions.
The Contract 139
Back in Donald’s office. Our conversations often centered on the specifici-
ties of doing business in Equatorial Guinea — the challenges and strategies; 
how it was similar to or different from the oil and gas business in Russia or 
Indonesia. During one of these discussions, I asked Donald how his previous 
experiences came to be useful in Equatorial Guinea: “Do you bring anything 
with you from place to place? How do you bring what you’ve learned into 
such radically different environments?” Donald responded that his “history 
of working internationally for many years,” and the industry’s history of 
working internationally, helped in every new place:
Through work in remote, less-sophisticated countries, there’s been a lot 
of learning. Before we start working in a country, we enter into a contract. 
Those contracts aren’t simple one- page documents. They cover a lot of cate-
gories to shield us from the problems and inefficiencies. These contracts are 
set up to protect us from the vagaries of the environment. That’s what gives 
us the comfort to come here.
For Donald, production sharing contracts are an itinerant, iterative form 
in which companies collate and codify the lessons they have learned across 
time and space. In Donald’s estimation, these contracts, which often exceed 
one thousand pages in length, have the power to “protect” or “shield” compa-
nies from “local problems and inefficiencies,” to give comfort to companies 
working in countries both geographically and politically remote from their 
Houston headquarters. Contracts, we might say, are legal enclaves. As with 
the making of offshore and enclaved spaces discussed in previous chapters, 
Donald suggests that contracts also aid in creating the separation or bound-
ary between companies and wherever their extraction site might be today. 
This chapter follows Donald’s provocations about the power of the contract 
form. Do contracts somehow protect, shield, or give comfort? If so, to whom 
and from what? How? And to what effect? As in other chapters, here I look at 
the work contracts do and how they do it. Rather than simply deconstructing 
contracts’ obvious fictions, I show the empirical, ethnographically traceable 
effects these fictions have in the world. Like the offshore or the enclave, I ex-
plore pscs both in all their ethnographic specificity and as a provocation to 
think about the contract as a more general form and process that facilitates 
diverse capitalist projects around the world.
After a brief introduction to the psc and contracts more broadly in social 
theory, I combine a close reading of a sample production sharing contract 
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(República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2006b) from Equatorial Guinea’s Minis-
try of Mines, Industry, and Energy (mmie) with other fieldwork material 
to explore three interrelated themes. First, I look at the structural effect of 
making “the state” and “the company” into juridical individuals with uni-
tary wills as parties to a contract — one of legal liberalism’s animating fic-
tions. The contract works, in part, to stabilize multiplicity, that is, to not only 
unify the radical heterogeneity of the corporate form in Equatorial Guinea 
(recall the dizzying figures 1.3 and 1.4), but also to convert a fractured and 
once- precarious state apparatus into a singular power. Indeed, for Obiang’s 
repressive regime — once crippled by debt and threatened by an opposition 
coalition — production sharing contracts have been an unparalleled state- 
making project, the “oxygen balloon” for a sinking regime. Second, I address 
how, as juridical individuals in the contract form, the Equatoguinean state 
and the given company are ostensibly “equally free” to sign this legal instru-
ment, yet both their incommensurability (one a state, one a company) and 
their inequality are consequential to the effects of contracts in the world. I 
am interested here in the conjuring power of legal liberalism, and the par-
ticular kinds of commensurations and equalizations it makes possible. How 
do “freedom” and “equality” operate in production sharing contracts and to 
what effects? Third, I turn from a discussion of ostensible equality to one way 
in which the contract claims to recognize difference, namely when it is used 
to “make up for” a host of qualities that investors deem Equatorial Guinea 
to lack (as signified by Donald’s characterization of the country as “remote 
and less sophisticated”). While US-based transnational oil companies con-
veniently deem the Equatoguinean state sovereign enough to sign contracts, 
those same companies consider the state’s substantive sovereignty for the 
purposes of capitalism — as daily protector of the rule of law or guarantor 
of property rights — to be inadequate. Using a discussion of rule of law on 
the ground in Equatorial Guinea, I show how companies attempt to use the 
contract to provide a proxy system of law in a state deemed unable to back up 
contractual obligations (the “protection” Donald was talking about). With 
an ethnographic focus on fiscal stability clauses and the productive confu-
sions at the intersection of local law and transnational companies, I address 
issues of postcolonial sovereignty and power. Who rules in Contract Land?
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(Production Sharing) Contracts,  
Capitalism, and Anthropology
Production sharing contracts are the primary contracts between the Equato-
guinean state and major oil and gas companies. This contract form is also 
broadly used in oil and gas production sites across the global South. Nego-
tiated and signed at the beginning of a company’s relationship with a given 
sovereign state, each psc details the production and dispersal parameters 
for billions of barrels of oil and billions of dollars in profit for companies 
and countries over the life of the concession, generally thirty to fifty years. 
The production sharing contract or production sharing agreement (psc or 
psa) was first used in the oil and gas industry in the 1960s, with the ancestral 
document considered to be a psc signed in Indonesia in 1966. Before the psc, 
license- concession contractual models were standard: a colonial extraction 
regime in which the state, in its administrative and authoritative capacity, 
granted private companies not only use, but also ownership, of the subsoil 
for extraction purposes.2 
Formally, pscs differ from concessions in three primary ways. First, they 
are contractual as opposed to concessional; the state becomes an “equal” 
commercial party to a legal agreement (at the same time as it is expected to 
maintain its authoritative and regulatory prerogatives). Second, pscs explic-
itly recognize that resource ownership rests with citizens, represented by 
the state, as opposed to with private extractive parties.3 Third, the “sharing” 
in production sharing contract refers to the way in which risk and profit are 
distributed between state and company. In effect, states hire companies as 
contractors; the company brings all necessary investment, expertise, and 
technology to the project, and also bears all financial risk. If, after explora-
tion, no oil is discovered, all “sunk” costs are the company’s to bear. If the 
venture is successful, however, and production begins, the company recoups 
their initial investment and operating costs through “cost oil.” Once they 
have recovered their initial investment, “profit oil” is split between the state 
and the company at rates determined in each contract (see Radon 2007 and 
Johnston 2007 in Humphreys et al. 2007).
Contracts are a material, legal, and symbolic presence everywhere at the 
formal center of capitalist relations, leading political economist Ronen Pa-
lan (2006) to claim that “the distinguishing feature of a modern capitalist 
economy is that it rests on contracts” (85). The contract form — in which 
public and private, law and profit, are inextricably bound — easily belies neo-
liberal fantasies of market independence from states, regulation, or judicial 
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systems. Formally, the validity of any contract is backed by the power of a 
sovereign state, and hence capitalist society is, in theory, dependent on (rule 
of) law. “The contractual nature of market relationships,” writes Palan, “re-
minds us that the capitalist market is essentially ‘an endless chain of legal 
relations’ ” (85). Westphalian sovereignty then not only divides the world into 
geographic jurisdictions of authority and responsibility, but “also serves as 
the foundation of the national and international law of contract. . . . Con-
tractual relationships, now spanning the entire globe, are rooted in a system 
of sovereign states” (Palan 2006, 86). In a world of deep postcolonial and co-
lonial inequalities and their resultant interdependencies, one can anticipate 
the problematic fictions of such a system right away.
Some anthropologists may bristle at Palan’s description of the global 
contractual economy, objecting that it reifies the contract form (not to men-
tion sovereignty or capitalism’s reliance on law), presupposing effects while 
neglecting the diverse social and political relations in which contracts are 
constantly negotiated, utilized, contested, and ignored. Indeed, many since 
Durk heim (1997) have drawn attention to the noncontractual universe of 
social obligation and cooperation present in every contract. I am sympa-
thetic to these substantivist or neosubstantivist approaches and engage them 
throughout this chapter and book; but I hope to push them beyond an argu-
ment that what is framed as economic is, in fact, social (cf. Granovetter and 
Swedberg 2001). Today, the analytic task seems to be to move from “social 
explanation” to the enduring power of the form: how to account for the sub-
stantial effects of tools like contracts in the world (Latour 2005; Callon 1998; 
Çalışkan and Callon 2009). For instance, while the equality posited between 
states in the Westphalian system may be mythic — Equatorial Guinea and 
the United States are far from equal — that posited equality is deeply conse-
quential. Contractual relationships like those established in pscs depend on 
Westphalian sovereignty for their licitness, for their felicitous performance. 
At the same time, as this chapter will go on to detail, certain contractual 
parties are able to profit from the obvious inequalities that the Westphalian 
model ignores. In other words, normative models themselves — Westpha-
lian ideas of sovereignty; neoclassical or legal liberal understandings of the 
contract form — are not “wrong” as much as they are partially constitutive 
of what anthropologists and others have often thought of as the social.4 We 
know, contra Henry Sumner Maine (1861), that the contract does not in-
trinsically produce isolated, individuated homines oeconomici. What we still 
need to know is how to account for the effects of contracts that this chapter 
goes on to illustrate: How does the contract render blatant neocolonialism 
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licit or legal? How does it frame multiplicities into legally recognized and 
politically consequential singularities, and contested political regimes into 
petro- powerhouses? Attention to the contract enables us to account for the 
power of formalizations without imagining that they have an essential na-
ture (Bear et al. 2015). We can point to contracts’ reliance on and manipula-
tion of postcolonial inequality and sovereignty without imagining that these 
“social explanations” or “historical contexts” somehow undo their power. 
On the contrary, they are constitutive of it. Historical contexts of radical in-
equality and imperial debris (Stoler 2008) are the arbitrage opportunities in 
which inordinately corporate- friendly contracts are made.
Finally, contracts offer a mighty analytic threshold into the social life 
of not only capitalism, but also liberalism as a global form. Along with the 
rule of law and representation, the contract is part of the deep structure of 
both political liberalism (social contract theory, Hobbes, Rousseau) and, 
significantly for my purposes here, economic liberalism (Adam Smith). 
The contract forms I trace in this chapter and the next, specifically the ways 
in which they organize inequality, offer a productive glimpse into Mehta’s 
(1997) empirical puzzle, wherein “something about the inclusionary pre-
tensions of liberal theory and the exclusionary effects of liberal practices 
needs to be explained” (59). We begin to see this apparent contradiction 
come to life in Donald’s description: Equatorial Guinea is “remote,” “less 
sophisticated,” full of “problems and inefficiencies.” Where liberalism’s the-
oretical vision is one of universality, these descriptors betray Donald’s im-
pression that Equatorial Guinea is not yet liberal (rule of law, sanctity of 
private property, representation); thus, the contract becomes liberalism’s 
aggressive avatar, “covering categories to shield us from problems and in-
efficiencies.” This is far from liberalism as theoretical universal, and is in-
stead exemplary of the period of liberal history that Mehta (1997) traces 
since roughly the seventeenth century, which is “unmistakably marked 
by the systematic and sustained political exclusion of various groups and 
‘types’ of people” (59). Via an anthropological reading of Locke, Mehta 
shows that rather than finding a universal conception of human beings as 
all equally endowed with rights and privileges, one sees a developmental 
teleology — a constant and aggressive differentiation between those whose 
endowments are always-already realized and those whose endowments must 
still be honed to be properly recognized as a liberal subject. Thus, liberalism 
indexes “a specific set of cultural norms [that] refer to a constellation of so-
cial practices riddled with a hierarchical and exclusionary density” (Mehta 
1997, 70). As Wendy Brown (2009) explains, liberalism’s promises have never 
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been fully realized, but “have always been compromised by a variety of eco-
nomic and social powers from white supremacy to capitalism. And liberal 
democracies in the First World have always required other peoples to pay . . . 
that is, there has always been a colonially and imperially inflected gap be-
tween what has been valued in the core and what has been required from the 
periphery” (51 – 52). Among other effects, contracts render licit, liberal even, 
that imperially inflected gap.
Oil contracts at the scale considered here — between a sovereign state and 
a given multinational company — offer a unique ethnographic intersection 
of political and economic liberalism. They become both a social contract 
and an economic contract. Following this line of thinking, I frame both this 
chapter and the one that follows on subcontracts with the work of Carole 
Pateman and Charles Mills (2007) on the contract and racialized/gendered 
domination. While Mills’s work (1997, 2017) contemplates the social contract, 
broadly conceived as predicated not on inclusion and equality, but on Euro-
pean imperialism and racialized relationships of domination and exclusion, 
his work with Pateman (Pateman and Mills 2007) brings us closer to the 
material at hand here — actually existing commercial contracts. “Contract,” 
Pateman and Mills argue, “is the major mechanism through which . . . un-
free institutions [the modern state and structures of power] are perpetuated 
and presented as free institutions” (20). The “freedom” to sign contracts then 
is an illusory freedom, an always- already compromised freedom that is at 
the heart of liberalism.5 Ethnographic attention to oil contracts between US- 
based transnational companies and the Equatoguinean state show liberal-
ism’s animating contradictions in action.
The Making of Contractual Parties:  
The State Effect and the Company Effect
Three parties sign each production sharing contract in Equatorial Guinea: 
the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Equatorial Guinea’s relevant National 
Company (GEPetrol in oil contracts, Sonagas in gas contracts), and the 
Company — the local subsidiary of the transnational oil and gas company 
in question (see the very bottom left of the conventional organogram — 
 figure 1.2 — in chapter 1). The making of “the state” and “the company” into 
juridical individuals with unitary wills is one of the productive fictions of 
the psc form. Where much contemporary anthropology has sought to dis-
assemble and disaggregate the fetishized surface of such fictions — showing 
the State (in this case), but also Capitalism, Development, Race, and Gen-
The Contract 145
der to be multiple, contested, and contingent — we have focused less on the 
practices by which those multiplicities, contestations, and contingencies are 
mustered into durable and consequential singularities. The production shar-
ing contract is one such practice.
Timothy Mitchell (1991), in “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Ap-
proaches and Their Critics,” suggests that we should approach the state as 
a structural effect, “that is to say, it should be examined not as an actual 
structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make 
such structures appear to exist” (94). A single “state” signature on produc-
tion sharing contracts is one such practice that lends obduracy and appar-
ent unity to the state, one of the “modern techniques that make the state 
appear to be a separate entity that somehow stands outside society” (91). 
I want to extend Mitchell’s analysis of the state as structural effect to the 
corporation as well. Like the state, and perhaps even more so, corporations 
are made through heterogeneous and geographically far- flung sociomate-
rial practices — shareholders, headquarters, stock prices, employees, produc-
tion processes, transport, offshore accounts, raw material — that do not co-
here within a clear external boundary. Yet, despite this multiplicity, we often 
imagine the corporation, like the state, to be singular and bounded. Stretch-
ing Mitchell’s analysis, I suggest that corporate unity too be understood as 
“the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices” like the contract “that make 
such structures appear to exist.”
On the first page of the “Model Production Sharing Contract,” the first 
party to the contract is listed as:
the republic of equatorial guinea (hereinafter referred to as the State), 
represented for the purposes of this Contract by the Ministry of Mines, In-
dustry, and Energy, represented for the purposes of its execution by His Ex-
cellency Mister _____________; the Minister. (República de Guinea Ecua-
torial 2006b, 1)
Thereafter, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is simply referred to as “the 
State.” This contractual party fuses the citizens (who ostensibly “own” the 
resource), disparate legislators, officials, ministries, and the nation into a 
single figure, a juridical individual with a unitary will. This unification of 
those who sign the contract into “the State” is a form of nation- fetishism 
that legally masks the specific “parties” who, in fact, sign these contracts. 
In a country whose economy is 97 percent petroleum based, where, in other 
words, the differentiated and fractured state apparatus is wholly reliant on 
hydrocarbons, the contract form (who is privy to it and who signs it) gains 
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inordinate power. To illustrate, a parliamentarian (technically, a member of 
“the State” signatory party) explains the secretive and sectarian history of 
oil legislation and contracting:
In the early years, when American companies started production, the con-
tract negotiations were done in a very private way (de una forma muy reser-
vada), almost confidential. There were personal meetings set up by the Amer-
ican Ambassador, Chester Norris. It was as if they were dealing with private 
property, to such an extent that no one knows what was in the first contracts. 
What are the most important clauses? No one knew. No one even knew about 
the state’s [percentage take] on each barrel of oil. And this has remained 
opaque until now. . . . In 1999, the president began to publicly denounce the 
contracts that his government had signed, [saying that] they were a disaster 
(una ruina) for the country. He said this publicly, that it was a shame. Since 
then, there has been one effort or another to improve [the state’s] participa-
tion 3 or 5 percent. I don’t know if today it reaches 35 percent. The petroleum 
business continues to be opaque.
According to this parliamentarian, the specific “parties” who actually nego-
tiated and signed early contracts met in secret, in personal meetings set up 
by the American Ambassador. Although, by definition, the psc (and eg’s 
hydrocarbons legislation) designates all products of the subsoil as belonging 
to the citizens, “it was as if they were dealing with private property.” When, 
years later, it became clear to the president — who was undoubtedly involved 
in the first contracts — that the oil companies had taken him for a ride, even 
he could distance himself from “the State” that had signed, claiming that 
early contracts had been “una ruina.” Here, the contract facilitates contradic-
tory claims. On the one hand, it unifies specific interests into a “state,” which 
leaves even parliamentarians unclear as to what “the State” has signed. On 
the other hand, the contract allows room for those specific interests to re-
nounce it as not of their making, to blame other parts of “the State” for sign-
ing ruinous contracts. The contract provides an authoritative frame within 
which the specific signatories can both locate and negate responsibility. But 
to what effect?
Recalling the days just before Chester Norris and the early oil contracts 
with American companies, an opposition politician waxed improbably nos-
talgic about what had been a time of economic and political crisis in Equa-
torial Guinea: “In the ’90s,” he explained, “the regime was drowning [and] 
the opposition was strong and growing. The country suffered a significant 
economic crisis with external debt among the highest in Africa. The coun-
The Contract 147
try operated fundamentally on international cooperation, conditioned by 
the pressures and conditionality clauses [in the loans]. And that’s when pe-
troleum started. Petroleum was like a life jacket for the regime, an oxygen 
balloon to help it float.” His nostalgia for a drowning regime is ironic; few 
pine for the days of deep debt and structural adjustment. But to the extent 
that the immiseration of the period destabilized a regime already in power 
for over twenty years by the early 1990s, for many it was a time of political fo-
ment and hope. And yet, despite active opposition movements and glimmers 
of conditionality- driven democratization, when “the State” signed the first 
contract with a US firm, the potential energy of the moment was quashed, 
and an eerily singular, and singularly powerful, “state” arose that endures 
to this day.
Coronil (1997) narrates a similar story of Venezuela at the turn of the 
twentieth century. In 1908, Juan Vicente Gómez had overthrown the ruling 
general and sought to restore order to the ensuing economic and political 
chaos partially through inviting foreign capital to invest. Oil companies re-
sponded, and with Gómez at the helm, “the State” signed a number of con-
tracts with these oil companies. Coronil suggests that before the arrival of 
oil, “the state was so weak and precarious as a national institution that its 
stability and legitimacy were constantly at risk. Without a national army or 
an effective bureaucracy, in an indebted country that lacked a national road 
network or an effective system of communication, the state appeared as an 
unfulfilled project” (76). This could almost be a description of the Equatogu-
inean situation in the 1990s. Certainly, the state was as weak and precari-
ous as it had ever been since Obiang took power in 1978. Like the Venezuela 
Coronil describes, Equatorial Guinea was highly indebted and lacked an ef-
fective bureaucracy or national road network. What legitimacy and strength 
the state had achieved emanated from a combination of fear and patrimonial 
sentiment, which many Equatoguineans, including the opposition politi-
cian quoted above, believed was eroding in unprecedented ways by the early 
1990s. As with Venezuela, however, the opportunity to sign oil contracts 
provided unprecedented state- making effects in Equatorial Guinea, allow-
ing a sinking regime to rise, as the opposition politician put it, as if attached 
to an oxygen balloon. 
Tsing (2005) also writes about this structural effect of the contract in 
Indonesia, humorously referring to the contract as the cow, or Contract of 
Work:
cows have been magical tools of the national elite. Although merely paper 
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and ink, they conjured a regular income for the Indonesian nation state. 
Their terms must be secure and attractive by international standards, or they 
will not draw capital. But if they meet these standards, they can conjure the 
funds that allow the nation- state to produce itself as what one might call a 
“miracle nation”: a nation in which foreign funds support the authoritarian 
rule that keeps the funds safe. I have called this “franchise cronyism.” In ex-
change for supplying the money to support national leaders who can make the 
state secure, investors are offered the certainties of the contract, which ensures 
titles to mineral deposits, fixes taxation rates, and permits export of profit. 
(69, emphasis added)
Tsing’s franchise cronyism — foreign investment supporting authoritarian 
regimes rendered licit through contract — draws our attention to another 
aspect of the state/corporate effect of contracts, that of boundary making 
and separation. While the state and the company sign as separate parties, 
the contract in fact intercalates them in consequential ways, blurring any 
boundary between them. The parliamentarian and opposition politician’s 
stories of private meetings between companies and state personnel, and oil 
money as an oxygen balloon for a sinking regime, illustrate both the per-
meability of state- society- corporate boundaries in practice and the political 
significance of maintaining those boundaries in theory (Mitchell 1991). Few 
US oil company shareholders could tell you where Equatorial Guinea is on 
a map, let alone which president they are effectively voting for there. The 
same opposition politician quoted above noted that at certain times, com-
pany representatives have been prohibited from talking to the opposition, 
not by law, but by the exigencies of the personal relationships on which con-
tracts are based. “In a trip to the United States I tried to meet with company 
representatives but they escaped. They said, ‘no, no, no, no!’ An American 
company — which knows what liberty is, the usefulness of information — 
refused to speak with me. They realize that they accept these terms to pre-
serve good relationships.” In other words, where contractual parties appear 
as separate and individual, not only is each party far more multiple and con-
tested on the ground, but they are also co- constitutive of one another in con-
sequential ways. Here, US- based oil companies fund a repressive regime and 
refuse to speak with the political opposition. Liberty be damned.
“The Company” undergoes a similarly miraculous process of unifica-
tion and separation in contract land.6 Claiming a unified juridical identity 
as the third party in the contract, each version of “The Company” as it exists 
in Equatorial Guinea is, in fact, a subsidiary of a subsidiary of a subsidiary of 
The Contract 149
its parent company. Recall figure 1.2, diagramming the corporate geography 
of Endurance. The companies are located in one place, Equatorial Guinea, 
as a limited liability operating company; in another place, Houston, as cor-
porate headquarters; and in still another place, Dubai, Cyprus, or the Cay-
man Islands, for financial purposes. Moreover, even The Company’s most lo-
cal contract- signing incarnation as an Equatorial Guinea–based subsidiary is 
itself a consortium — a group of companies who invest together to spread the 
costs and risk, and share profit. Like the state effect, in which disparate and in-
deed conflicting parties are unified in the contract form, so too with the corpo-
rate effect of the psc, in which this archipelago of attenuated liability is felici-
tously unified, helping us trace the movement between figure 3.1 and figure 3.2. 
As shown in chapter 1, where I diagrammed Endurance’s corporate struc-
ture with Donald’s help, the open, licit character of these state- and corporate- 
effect practices is important here. It is the legality of these arrangements — 
including dispersed corporate geographies unified as a responsible party in 
the contract form — that allows both the Equatoguinean contract signers and 
those who sign for oil companies to relinquish responsibility for local out-
comes when necessary.7 In the moments where any number of parties might 
be held accountable for failing to regulate money laundering or environmen-
tal and labor relations, let alone keeping a dictator in power, the disentan-
gling authority of the contract form steps in. To illustrate, consider the story 
































































































Figures 3.1 and 3.2. From corporate archipelago to corporate unity.
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of subsea hydrocarbon deposits off Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea opened 
its first embassy accounts with Washington, DC – based Riggs Bank.8 “Over 
the next eight years, the bank opened nearly fifty additional accounts and a 
dozen certificates of deposit not only for the government of EG but also for a 
host of EG senior government officials and their family members. By 2003, the 
EG account had become the bank’s largest single relationship, with balances 
and outstanding loans that together approached $700 million” (Coleman and 
Levin 2004, 38). In 2004, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Money 
Laundering and Foreign Corruption released the results of their investigation 
into this relationship (as well as the bank’s relationship with Augusto Pino-
chet). They concluded that everyone from the Riggs Bank employee directly 
responsible for the accounts, to his wife, to the Examiner in Charge from the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency (occ), to Federal Reserve regulators, to 
US oil company management, to President Obiang himself were guilty of anti- 
money- laundering infractions (Coleman and Levin 2004). Riggs shut down in 
the wake of the scandal, merging in 2005 with pnc Financial Services.
In the wake of the Riggs debacle, the Equatoguinean government repeat-
edly invoked the contract form in its own defense: to explain offshore bank 
accounts, direct payments from oil companies to government officials, and 
money in personal accounts that perhaps should have been in the national 
treasury. “All payments made by the companies to the State of Equatorial 
Guinea are contractual, and therefore legal, payments” (República de Guinea 
Ecuatorial 2005, 12; emphasis added here and below):
It is important to point out that the funds which the state of Equatorial 
Guinea deposited in Riggs Bank were not in any way the product of money 
laundering or foreign corruption, but rather revenues earned by companies 
involved in the country’s oil sector, in fulfillment of their contractual obliga-
tions to the state. (3)
All the payments made by the businesses are contractual payments, . . . to talk 
of hidden payments is to ignore the existence of contracts which the compa-
nies have signed both with the State itself and with the Equatorial Guinean 
service companies. . . . We confidently declare that we are perfectly able to 
demonstrate that all the payments made by the companies were contractual 
payments. (15)9
In their headlong rush to use the contract form to demonstrate the licitness 
of the transactions and accumulations exposed in the Riggs case, the authors 
of the Riggs Report also divulged the kinds of contractual details that begin 
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to flesh out the form’s more quotidian entanglements in Equatorial Guinea’s 
daily life. The Riggs Report cites a contractual clause in which the company 
is required to deposit a one- time payment of $50,000 into a Riggs account 
to “assist the state in the establishment of an Embassy in Washington D.C.” 
(2005, 13). Thereafter, monthly payments to that account in the amount of 
$7,000 were to be made until the arrangement was canceled or the Embassy 
shut down. Also in this clause was the stipulation that the company will pay 
the state “up to $20,000 U.S. to fund the production of videos in order to as-
sist the Ministry of Mines in marketing its mineral resources” (14).
The depth of the entanglements is striking; contract signatures not only 
buoy flagging regimes, but also pay to establish embassies abroad and pro-
duce videos to market national resources. These outcomes of the contract 
form easily belie separate, unified “parties.” And yet, the licitness of con-
tracts, the liberal and legal evidentiary regime in which they rest, allows the 
form to disentangle companies and states from these very relations, to move 
them from power to technique, from politics to procedure. The specificity 
of these entanglements also reveals the radical inequality between the two 
contractual parties.
Two Parties Equal before the Law:  
Commensuration, Difference,  
and Inequality
Abstract assumptions about fair contracts, equal partnerships, and mutual 
profit have the familiar ring of liberal sentimentality — the desire to see equal-
ity in the face of obvious inequality. There is also, perhaps, the ring of faith in 
the conjuring power of liberalism itself, that is, the idea that two parties made 
equal before the law might then somehow also be more equal in substantive 
practice. And yet, in the contract form as a legal liberal instrument (simi-
lar to human rights as a liberal moral instrument), commensuration — all 
are equally free to sign contracts; all are equally entitled to human rights — 
does not equality make. To the contrary, these processes of commensura-
tion (especially when they are as lucrative as a production sharing contract) 
often exacerbate and cement existing inequalities.10 Again, this is contract 
as the aggressive avatar of liberalism, the contract as a form of licit violence 
where Equatoguineans have “not yet” developed their ostensibly universal 
liberal endowments.
As Donald intimated above, pscs are a fundamental part of the modular 
bundle operating companies bring with them from site to site. An Equatogu-
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inean judge who participated in contract negotiations confirmed this: “When 
they come, they already have contracts.” Bringing precedents from previous 
contracts as they negotiate new ones, companies implicitly or explicitly equate 
Equatorial Guinea to Nigeria to Ecuador, at least insofar as the contract is 
meant to structure the same outcome — usable, profitable hydrocarbons — 
from site to site. And yet, what stands out about the contractual clauses on 
the establishment of embassies abroad and the bankrolling of promotional 
videos is their peculiarity, their idiosyncratic responsiveness to the needs of 
Equatorial Guinea at the specific moment the contract was signed. Within a 
standardized frame, these clauses index Equatorial Guinea’s difference from 
other sites where pscs might be in force, and index inequality (no American 
embassy; limited local media) as a certain kind of difference. Both agnostic 
toward and yet necessarily responsive to the differences among exporting 
sites, the making of licit and felicitous contracts requires different entangle-
ments for different local conditions, “to produce functionally comparable 
results in disparate domains” (Ong and Collier 2005, 11). In the next section, 
I explore these dynamics of commensuration and differentiation, as well as 
the tensions between “equal parties” to the contract and the crystallization 
of their historical inequality. First, in thinking through what is “standard” in 
production sharing contracts, I look at how formal sameness produces dif-
ference when refracted across inequality. Second, I turn to the consequences 
of liberal sentimentality.
On Modularity:  
Repetition and Difference in the Contract Form
Production sharing contracts around the world “give precise detail and le-
gal specificity to the obligations of a state and the company or consortium of 
companies involved in an extractive project” (Maples and Rosenblum 2009, 
15). While the content varies, all pscs have a similar form or “boilerplate,” 
with core sections covering definitions of key terms; the grant of formal le-
gal title; rights, duties, and obligations; termination; confidentiality clauses; 
and dispute resolution, among other standard sections (Maples and Rosen-
blum 2009; Humphreys et al. 2007). In addition to this repetition of basic 
form, the sample Equatoguinean production sharing contract to which I 
had access was peppered with acronyms and proper nouns, including cif, 
fob, Platts, and libor. Each references methods for global standardiza-
tion in the hydrocarbon commodity chain, from shipping regulations to oil 
prices to interest rates. Many of the acronyms come from the International 
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Commercial Terms (Incoterms®) document, published by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (icc) and closely corresponding to the un Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Self- described as the 
“rules at the core of world trade” and the “standard trade definitions that are 
most commonly used in international contracts,” Incoterms® is a terminol-
ogy standardization toolkit that finds its expression in English, considered 
the legally binding version (icc 2010). In addition to Incoterms®, Equatorial 
Guinea’s sample psc mandates the use of the libor rate, the interest rate of-
fered in the London InterBank Market as published in the Financial Times of 
London, unless it fails to publish the rate for five consecutive days, in which 
case the Wall Street Journal is consulted (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 
2006b, 5). For oil price negotiations, the contract specifies the use of Platts 
Marketwire, “the leading global provider of energy and metals information, 
and the world’s foremost source of price assessments in the physical energy 
markets” (Platts 2010).
Incoterms®, libor rate, and Platts Marketwire each seem at once trivial 
and natural. Of course there are standardized shipping terms, interest rates, 
and commodity prices, but are they even important? Anthropological work 
has long shown that no matter what Incoterms® has to say about shipping, 
for instance, individual people, ports, vessels, and histories will find their 
own ways of getting the job done (Çalişkan 2010, Dua 2019, Bishara 2017). 
These standardizations are, however, also power indices (Lampland and Star 
2008). They index financial geographies — London and New York; specific 
tribunal locations for the settling of disputes (Riles 2011; Potts 2016, 2018); 
institutions such as the icc, the un, and nymex; the English language and 
the American dollar. And, needless to say, these apparently mundane rules 
are not always mundane, but can reveal themselves as cauldrons of social-
ity, inequality and collusion, as the libor rate scandal did between 2012 and 
2015 (McBride 2016).
In each contract, these standard sections and mundane proceduralisms 
commingle with far more consequential clauses that vary from extraction 
site to extraction site; for example, temporalities in production and payment 
processes; taxation guidelines, including tax deductions, exemptions, and 
reductions for the company; and the legal jurisdiction in which the contract 
is extant and where legal proceedings would take place should conflicts arise. 
In addition, pscs include environmental guidelines and protection mea-
sures, and land use guidelines and rights to private and public land, includ-
ing clauses on the displacement of local communities. In negotiating this 
more controversial content, the outcomes of which vary with the strength of 
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local regulatory regimes, replication in the contract form — standard sections 
and terms — seems to offer a certain licitness. When, for instance, a Liberian 
newspaper published a report critical of Mittal Steel’s contract with the gov-
ernment, the company responded that its agreement “mirrored essentially 
like it’s done elsewhere” (Maples and Rosenblum 2009, 52). “Essentially like 
it’s done elsewhere” draws our attention to the surface licitness and intended 
seduction of standardization.
Consider the phrases “good oil field practices” and “generally accepted 
practice of the international petroleum industry,” for example, which each 
repeat on nearly every page of the 2006 sample psc (República de Guinea 
Ecuatorial 2006b). The contract says that the Company will carry out opera-
tions in Equatorial Guinea according to “good oil field practices” (1); maxi-
mum production rate will be determined “in accordance with good oil field 
practices” (7); and perhaps most ominously, “The Contractor shall take all 
prudent and necessary steps in accordance with generally accepted practices 
of the international petroleum industry . . . to prevent pollution and protect 
the environment and living resources” (22). These quotes, and others like 
them throughout the contract, imply that there are standardized practices 
in the international petroleum industry enacted identically worldwide, and 
that these standard practices serve as guidelines or even regulations of some 
kind. As Reed (2009) clarifies, however, “Transnational oil corporations of-
ten declare compliance with global industry standards, but there is no man-
datory set of worldwide regulations, and attempts at harmonization provoke 
a figurative race to the bottom” (66; emphasis added).
There are no mandatory global industry standards. Phrases like “good 
oil field practices” and “standard practices of the international petroleum 
industry” gesture, instead, to self- regulation and the prerogative of corpora-
tions to bring their own rules wherever they go. In practice, these phrases do 
not denote replication in oil fields from Norway to Equatorial Guinea. In-
stead, they render licit dramatic international differences, predicated on the 
specificities of each extraction site. Environmental regulations; labor regu-
lations; accounting practices; and capacities and incentives of states to moni-
tor, supervise, scrutinize, or audit oil field practices vary radically from state 
to state. “Standard oil field practices” vary accordingly. Ethnographically, 
then, “good oil field practices” means that there are countries in which the 
petroleum industry can get away with almost anything — the more under-
developed and newer to the extraction process, the better — and countries 
where they can get away with less. During my fieldwork, Equatorial Guinea, 
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perhaps needless to say, was definitively in the former category. Consider a 
longer version of Eugenio’s story, which I introduced in chapter 1.
Originally from Equatorial Guinea, Eugenio had gone to school abroad 
to study petrochemical engineering and returned home to work in the in-
dustry. He was employed by a chemical processing company, which I’ll call 
cpco. This company had the monopoly on chemical processing in offshore 
production in Equatorial Guinea. Globally, they are considered the top com-
pany in this line of oil service work. The Major Corporation subcontracted 
cpco to test the water off their platforms and to clean petroleum by- products 
from the water used in the drilling process, so that “clean” water could be 
returned to the ocean. During his petrochemical master’s program, Eugenio 
learned that according to what one might call “standard oil field practices” 
for cpco’s work, the more petroleum extracted from beneath a given plat-
form, the harder it is to clean the surrounding water. Hence, the amount 
of oil extracted is to be conditional on surrounding water quality, tested 
daily for pH levels. Once the water reaches a certain level of contamina-
tion, extraction must be slowed or stopped altogether. In Equatorial Guinea, 
however, where cpco is not regulated by any outside body, there was no 
enforced conditionality between pollution levels and extraction rates. Ac-
cording to interviews with men working on offshore platforms, including 
Eugenio, workers were told sporadically to prepare for environmental as-
sessment, but someone from within the company always carried out these 
assessments, and the results were always positive. As Eugenio starkly put it: 
“In the history of oil exploitation in Equatorial Guinea, there has not been a 
single environmental inspection by competent authorities. At the very least, I 
can confirm this fact during the three years I worked with cpco.” Equatorial 
Guinea’s lack of regulatory oversight — its difference from Mexico or Norway 
or Malaysia — allows pollution off its platforms to go completely unchecked. 
In these moments, standardizations become more ominous because of their 
radically different execution across space.
Liberal Sentimentality, Equality,  
and the Making of Contractual Difference
The laws of contract and international commercial relations generally sup-
pose two corporate entities doing business with each other, both seeking 
profits and answering to shareholders. This makes sense unless one of the 
parties is not a corporate entity, but rather a government answerable to citi-
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zens (itself, of course, a liberal supposition). Even as they conduct business, 
governments have duties, obligations, and interests that go well beyond profit 
maximization (Maples and Rosenblum 2009, 11).
After peaking at $18.5 billion in 2008, Equatorial Guinea’s gross domestic 
product (gdp) hovered at $10.18 billion in 2016. By way of comparison, Gam-
bia — a country of a similar size, although without oil — had a gdp of $964.6 
million in the same year. The Major Corporation’s revenue for the same year 
was over $200 billion, placing it among the world’s largest economic entities, 
ahead of Belgium and Norway, just smaller than Sweden (and significantly 
smaller than Walmart). Major’s 83,000 worldwide employees exceed the en-
tire population of Equatorial Guinea’s capital city. The Major Corporation 
and others at work in Equatorial Guinea have at their disposal vast teams of 
experts in everything from chemical and mechanical engineering to con-
tract law, deepwater geology to cutting-edge financial investment. They also 
have global telecommunications and information technology networks, and 
expansive public relations and corporate social responsibility departments. 
During my main fieldwork in Equatorial Guinea, the country had one uni-
versity that was without electricity, let alone computers. These inequalities 
come to life in the contract form (Radon 2007; Zalik 2009). 
Consider another version of oil’s origin story in Equatorial Guinea. Just 
after Obiang came into power, Spanish oil company Hispanoil (now Rep-
sol) began to explore. According to government documents, the World Bank 
came on a technical assistance mission to the oil sector at the same time, 
introducing the psc model to the country in 1981 and offering the oil com-
panies “very wide and advantageous margins, so as to make worthwhile the 
exploration” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2005, 12). While the tales cir-
culating about the outcome of Hispanoil’s exploration varied, a particularly 
popular version was that Hispanoil indeed discovered deposits with com-
mercial potential; but then they stipulated as a condition of their production 
that Equatorial Guinea’s Minister of Finance and Minister of Mines be re-
placed with Spaniards. When the local government rejected this offer, His-
panoil wrote reports claiming to have found nothing. One year later, after 
drilling two successful exploratory wells, wildcat American company Wal-
ter International put the first gas and condensate field into production, and 
with it the first psc, with an appallingly low 3 – 5 percent profit share to the 
state. As Mauricio, the Equatoguinean man who had worked for the Major 
Corporation and then moved over to the government, explained: “We didn’t 
have another option. Take it or leave it. You’ll die of hunger with food in 
the ground.” Soon, larger US companies came in, buying out Walter Inter-
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national and signing up “to the excellent special advantages offered by the 
Model Contract suggested by the World Bank . . . in order to attract foreign 
capital investment in the country” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2005, 12).
Reminiscent of Tsing’s cows described earlier in this chapter, Mauricio 
continued:
In order to attract foreign investment, we had to really make things easy. We 
didn’t have a history of oil. We wanted exploration. Very few people were 
willing to take the risk. It takes a lot of investment to find oil, and if you 
don’t find it, it’s down the drain. All countries around us had oil. What is the 
incentive for a company to jump from Nigeria? Contract terms. You have to 
really lay down at a certain level terms that attract investment. Equatorial 
Guinea did that. Once the oil was found, slowly the government had to build 
up to the level that is appropriate for the industry. . . . It’s just equalizing the 
playing field for an area now considered a producing country. Even so, Equa-
torial Guinea continues to provide a better business environment than our 
counterparts. . . . Hannah, have you been to Nigeria?
More attractive contractual terms provide the incentive for companies to ex-
plore. And indeed, government documents claim that of all the pscs in West 
Africa, Equatorial Guinea’s conditions remained the most favorable to the 
companies well into the 2000s. As of 2005, a document claimed that the “rate 
of profit tax levied in the sub- region is of the order of 50%, while in Equato-
rial Guinea it is 25%. The State share in the sub- region is over 50%, while in 
Equatorial Guinea it is still below 20% in the fields currently under exploi-
tation” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2005, 13). The same report goes on 
to claim that Equatorial Guinea offers “the most flexible fiscal environment 
in the world” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2005, 16, emphasis added). 
Viewed from another perspective, Mauricio wryly noted of this flexibility 
that “one day they will add to the contracts that the foreign business owners 
are permitted to hit Africans. They have freedom to do anything. They can 
transfer all the money they make without any problem. These things have 
to change.”
In the daily life of contracts then, from the earliest moments of their 
negotiation, long and ongoing histories of inequality are never “written 
out.” Contracts are first negotiated according to, and will later capitalize 
on and further institutionalize, those inequalities. I have repeatedly drawn 
the analogy to Maurer (2008) and Hudson’s (2017) work on the processes by 
which small island economies in the Caribbean become tax havens, osten-
sibly via their participation in a market of equals. More accurately, Maurer 
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suggests, their particular insertion into this market relies on histories of 
imperialism, colonialism, and slavery, the aftermath of which makes them 
more attractive repositories for fleeing capital (see also Hudson 2017a; Rod-
ney 1972). I quote Maurer (2008) here, but replace “offshore finance” with 
oil, and “small island economies” with African economies:
[Oil] has become the lifeblood of many [African] economies, where legacies 
of slavery and colonialism are not imagined to remain in the distant past but 
rather always in evidence in the conduct of international affairs and every-
day encounters in tourist or financial settings. Here . . . reputation is about 
hierarchies of rank, not about equivalence or a market of equals. . . . Coming 
to grips with [oil exploitation in Africa] may mean coming to re- appreciate, 
analytically and politically, the politics [and histories] of those hierarchies 
of rank. (172)
That Equatorial Guinea continues to provide “a better option than our coun-
terparts,” as stated by the Equatoguinean official quoted above, suggests just 
such a hierarchy of rank. Weak regulation, tax laws, and low state percent-
age takes of profit become something to promote: “the most flexible fiscal 
environment in the world.” This is imperial debris proxying for market terms, 
becoming the shape the market takes. Indeed, at the end of 2012, Equato-
rial Guinea’s US- based lobbyists purchased a full- page ad in the New York 
Times that read: “The new commercial hub of central Africa is a paradise 
for investors.” 
The discovery of oil and gas opened new opportunities for Equatorial 
Guinea and turned it into a “pillar of stability in the region,” as the text in 
figure 3.3. states. (“Pillar of stability” here refers, somewhat ironically, to the 
fact that Obiang is still in power, gesturing to the state- making effects of the 
contract form.) Imperial debris (Stoler 2008) and hierarchies of rank suffuse 
the contract form and its effects in the world. And yet, Equatorial Guinea’s 
early 3 – 5 percent share of the profits from their resources is couched in the 
procedures, standards, and aspirations of legal liberalism — fair contracts 
“the same everywhere” and mutual profit. Imperial debris here is constitu-
tive of legal liberalism, not a deviation from it.
In the next section, I revisit a particularly tenacious metric in these hier-
archies of rank: corruption and rule of law. At the intersection of the “local 
logic” by which Equatorial Guinea’s judicial system works, or doesn’t, and 
transnational corporations with billions of dollars at stake, I focus on the 
power of “corruption” to organize consequential contractual outcomes. How 
do hierarchies make the contract form, and to what effect?
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Who Rules Contract Land?  
Local Law, Transnational Companies, 
and Stabilization Clauses
Ferguson (2006) has written that the spectacular wealth pouring into Equa-
torial Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, or Angola contradicts the neoliberal develop-
ment nostrum that corruption diminishes foreign direct investment (fdi). 
In this section, I explore how the contradiction between neoliberal develop-
ment nostrums and actual fdi is not without consequences in Equatorial 
Guinea. What happens when spectacular amounts of fdi come into a place 
Figure 3.3. Full- page 
advertisement in the  
New York Times:  
“A New Paradise for 
Investors.”
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widely understood by the people doing the investing to be without the rule of 
law? What instruments and processes “protect” (to use Donald’s formula-
tion) foreign investment in places whose states companies deem incapable of 
or untrustworthy in the implementation of that protection? The sovereignty 
of the contract form — given moral and conceptual space by ideas of absence 
and lack — emerges as one answer. “Since most developing nations do not yet 
have established practices and stability in the rule of law and its application, 
oil companies seek to create a stable working environment through contrac-
tual means. . . . The less reliable the legal system, the more issues need to be 
addressed in the [psc], as this contract effectively becomes a self- contained 
law” (Radon in Humphreys et al. 2007, 95, 100).
To reframe an argument about corruption and “the African state” that I 
laid out in the introduction, consider Transparency International, the World 
Bank, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, which widely 
rank Equatorial Guinea among the most corrupt and kleptocratic dicta-
torships in the world. In 2010, Equatorial Guinea occupied the 168th spot 
among 178 countries in Transparency International’s influential Corruption 
Perceptions Index. In 2011, Freedom House put the country in its “worst of 
the worst” category, along with North Korea and Turkmenistan; in 2014, 
Equatorial Guinea did not even receive a ranking from Transparency Inter-
national, as the organization deemed the country “too opaque to rank” (EG 
Justice 2014).11 Anthropologically, this becomes interesting because “corrup-
tion” and “weak rule of law” are characterizations based on historically and 
geographically specific ideologies of power and governance (Elyachar 2005; 
Gupta 1995; Grovegui 1996; Mbembe 2001; Roitman 2005; Smith 2007). Thus, 
“corruption” or “weak rule of law” are not explanations in themselves, but 
characterizations to be explained. First, they are characterizations unified 
by lack: Equatorial Guinea lacks rule of law, transparency, and good gov-
ernance. Consequently, as Mbembe (2001) explains, they tell us not what 
Equatorial Guinea is, but what it is not. “The upshot is that while we now 
feel we know nearly everything that African states, societies, and economies 
are not, we still know absolutely nothing about what they actually are” (12). 
One classical anthropological move here, and the one Mbembe encourages, 
is to produce work on what African states actually are —not what they lack, 
but what they have and how they work, and by what logics, philosophies, 
and histories. I agree that this work is crucial. Indeed, I do some of it in the 
next section on local law. However, at the same time it is also crucial to note 
the effects of these fungible categories — corruption, lack of rule of law — in 
circulation. While we anthropologists are busy showing the oversimplifica-
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tions and commensuration- conjuring power of the World Bank or Trans-
parency International, their metrics are having effects in the world. Notably, 
the daily making and remaking of Equatorial Guinea as a place that lacks 
rule of law provides the expansive pscs with their conditions of possibility. 
These metrics create market conditions. The lacks and absences posed by 
this relentless thrum clear the way for inordinately powerful contracts that 
one would not find in Mexico, Malaysia, or Angola. First, then, I turn to an 
ethnographic account of rule of law on the ground in Equatorial Guinea, 
before shifting to the precise contractual tools — fiscal stability or stabiliza-
tion clauses — through which oil companies seek to create “stable working 
environments” in Equatorial Guinea and beyond.
Lithium Batteries and Legal Ambiguity
In 2008, a major oil services firm was expecting a shipment of lithium batter-
ies into Malabo’s port. Instead of a notification from the port authority that 
the batteries had arrived, the company instead received a letter from a highly 
ranked customs official accusing them of bringing missiles into Equatorial 
Guinea. (“The tubes do look like projectiles,” a manager of the firm’s local 
subsidiary offered.) The letter notified the company that their property had 
been confiscated and was being held in a bunker in Fishtown, one of Ma-
labo’s peripheral neighborhoods. Explaining that there was a $500,000 fine 
attached to the import of this material, the letter concluded with a request 
from the customs official to set up a meeting in order to clear up the problem. 
Two company representatives (including the manager with whom I was in 
contact) attended a meeting with the official, during which he accused them 
of “wanting to poison our people, our country,” and went on to explain that 
if they wanted their property back for less than $500,000, he had an environ-
mental company that could pack the missiles/batteries and export them on 
the company’s behalf. Following the meeting, the company representatives 
called their regional office in Douala, Cameroon, and the company’s legal 
team dispatched a lawyer to Equatorial Guinea to look for a law relevant to 
the import of lithium batteries. The only law they found was vague, and the 
lawyer was unable to determine if the battery import was indeed in violation 
of the law or not. The situation ended when the oil services company agreed 
to pay $500,000 to get their lithium batteries out of the Fishtown bunker.
That local law exists in theory is widely acknowledged, and (as was the 
case with this oil services firm) foreign companies generally contract- out 
the practice of engaging it to local subsidiaries of international consulting 
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and law firms, including Miranda & Associates, Ernst & Young, Pricewater-
houseCoopers, and Deloitte, among others. As this story illustrates, how-
ever, in daily practice there is a tremendous amount of ambiguity and mud-
dling through among both migrant company management and local officials 
about Equatoguinean law — Does it exist? Does anyone follow it? Do they 
have to follow it? Where the answers to these questions are unclear — Is there 
a law relevant to the import of lithium batteries in Equatorial Guinea? Where 
did the $500,000 figure come from? — companies often find themselves in 
legally murky dealings with Equatoguinean officials. When circumstances 
demand a decision more quickly than the timeframe within which legal-
ity might be established, Equatoguineans and foreign workers often act by 
mobilizing moral or “cultural” reasoning. Confronted daily with compet-
ing and partially overlapping regimes of “compliance,” migrant oil person-
nel and the Equatoguineans who encounter them in various ways stitch to-
gether multiple legal codes, moral judgments, and ideas about “the other” 
into what amounts to self- fashioned frameworks for action, only “compli-
ant” in the most superficial sense. The Smith Corporation’s country man-
ager described this improvisational decision- making process to me as “the 
rules of the game”:
It starts with the law in this country. What is the law? [This question is] as-
sociated with land title, the ownership of assets including oil and properties, 
the judicial system and dispute resolution processes. In West Africa there is 
the illusion of [resolution via] connections to power and intimidation rather 
than the merits of the case. The fcpa [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] pro-
cesses, that helps us here. It helps us reinforce that although local officials 
may want a special deal or money under the table, there’s compelling legal 
constraints on the company and individuals that make me not do that. For us 
it’s very helpful. Criminal, civil, environmental law — we have to understand 
those rules and regulations. But even if the law exists, it’s hard to see support-
ing regulations. Oil and gas companies operate according to international 
law, or their own internal “what makes sense.”
This manager describes simultaneous sources and scales of authority that 
unevenly inform his work: Equatoguinean law, on the one hand, and the 
perceived lack of enforcement on the other; “West African illusions” about 
personal connections and intimidation in dispute resolution; the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act;12 international law; and what he called oil and gas 
companies’ internal “what makes sense.” Note that while these “rules of the 
game” start with Equatoguinean law, they end on a sense- making terrain 
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internal to oil and gas companies. Quite literally in one sentence this man 
moves from the most “standard” and “global” to the most internal and par-
ticularistic: “Oil and gas companies operate according to international law, 
or their own internal ‘what makes sense.’ ” As with the “good oil field prac-
tices” discussed earlier, this manager is intimately aware of competing reg-
ulatory landscapes, many of which are at the end of their tether in Equa-
torial Guinea, where there is little official oversight of any kind, whether 
national or international. Companies most often reconcile these unevenly 
overlaid sources of authority through internal processes, made licit by rhe-
torical recourse to external authority (like international law or the fcpa), 
when necessary.
Certainly, oil and gas companies’ internal ideas of “what makes sense” are 
 just as “illusory” as what this manager called “West African” sense- making 
via connections to power and intimidation. Both are context- specific, reli-
ant on localized moral cosmologies, hierarchies of authority, and notions of 
value. What often makes sense to oil industry actors is to find a way to keep 
extraction, production, and export running smoothly, in an effort to meet 
targets and keep profit, and ultimately stock price, up. What often makes 
sense to powerful Equatoguineans is figuring out how to insert themselves 
and their interests into these processes, so that all of this obvious profit 
doesn’t pass them by. While equally context- specific and intelligible, these 
two forms of sense- making are not equal. The internal “what makes sense” 
to oil and gas companies is contractually buttressed not only by sweeping 
international legislation like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or “inter-
national law” more generally, but also by the bureaucratic micropractices 
of audit, record keeping, and signature, which, as we saw in chapter 1, have 
taken new form in the post- Enron era. In Equatorial Guinea’s post- Enron 
moment, the internal “what makes sense” by which oil and gas company 
personnel seemed to abide was made licit by these mundane microprac-
tices. Proliferating signatures, exhaustive documentation, and budgets 
trans parent to audit seemed to be the practices that rendered compliant 
what was, in fact, messy and compromised daily decision making that led, 
for instance, to paying a $500,000 fine. The messy and compromised daily 
decision making of Equatoguinean officials, however, does not have an evi-
dentiary regime for lithium batteries that is comparably licit beyond the 
country’s borders.
The combination of mundane bureaucratic procedure, powerful fram-
ing devices like the fcpa and Sarbanes- Oxley, and orientalizing ideas about 
“African” ways of doing things offers oil company personnel a tremendous 
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amount of interpretive space in quotidian decision- making practices about 
whether or not to pay for those lithium batteries. “Corruption,” in other 
words, is hardly avoided in daily practice, and yet the ensuing entangle-
ments are compliant within extant post- Enron regimes of proof. The profit-
able perception that local law cannot be followed produces two consequences 
that seem contradictory, but actually reinforce one other: first, a tremendous 
amount of freedom to negotiate the licit/illicit on the ground, while at the 
same time making way for a powerful contract that gives companies inordi-
nate power over local law. Before turning back to the contract itself, I dwell 
for a moment longer on local law, this time from the perspective of someone 
far more intimate with it.
Tarzan and the Archive Cemetery
Concrete walls and wooden louvers welcomed me into the familiar, cool 
dimness of a colonial- era government building, in this case, Malabo’s aging 
Supreme Court. Angled just so, the louvers let in enough light to see with-
out electricity, but not so much as to allow the sun to heat the long hallways 
and small offices. My footsteps echoed up the stairs as if I were alone in the 
building, and indeed it felt empty inside, an experience I had come to expect 
of most state buildings excepting the bustling police station. I had come to 
meet with a judge with whom I’d had passing, circumstantial conversations 
over many months (over dinner with mutual friends, for example), but had 
not yet spoken to alone or in an interview setting. As I wandered down the 
long hallway looking for his name on various doors, the first and only per-
son I passed was an old man walking in the other direction, yellowing files 
in hand. I found the door with the judge’s name ajar, poked my head in, and 
a secretary explained that he was not in, instructing me to take a seat back 
down the hall. The old man and I sat together in the foyer, looking out at the 
city between the louvers, me silently practicing what I was going to say, until 
the boisterous judge arrived. He welcomed me and gestured that I should fol-
low him, and I ran to keep up with him down the hall as he shouted greetings 
to people I didn’t see. I began in my usual way, reminding him that I was an 
American anthropology student interested in the oil industry. As often hap-
pened, this statement immediately yielded far more about “anthropology” 
as a traveling signifier than about the industry itself. After an interesting, if 
unsolicited, lecture on “black African” concepts of kinship (“in Fang there 
is no word for uncle”) and group versus individual rights that were to him at 
the heart of the problems with postcolonial African law, I asked him about 
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the implications for oil and gas investment in particular. “Ha!” he laughed. 
“Someone has to create a finishing school for Spaniards and Europeans!” 
He continued:
The investors who come to Equatorial Guinea think that they are going to en-
counter Tarzan. Tarzan lives in the forest, where there is no law. So, because 
they don’t have the proper information, investors go directly to the treetops. 
Then they get into problems and call me to try to help them find a solution. If 
I try to help them, they will talk about me as if I’m doing a side business. [The 
same foreign investors who get into trouble and ask me for help] are the first 
people to write internationally that there is no independence of the judiciary. 
Banana republic, this is the mentality that they have. These investors install 
themselves here illegally, without respecting a single law, and when things go 
badly, they say, “judicial insecurity.”
The judge’s critical assessment of fdi in practice offers an on- the- ground 
account of the circuitous logic and processes by which ideas about lawless-
ness circulate productively and reproductively in Equatorial Guinea’s hy-
drocarbon industry. Foreign investors come in with a priori assumptions of 
lawlessness, which they then act on by installing their investments without 
regard for extant law. If there are legal consequences to their actions (they are 
kicked out of the country, or the state garnishes revenue), only then do they 
look to this judge for help. If he chooses to help them on their terms — a con-
sultancy arrangement in which they need his expertise in local law — they 
often turn around to their communities of origin and use his intervention 
on their behalf as proof of judicial corruption and dysfunction. The judge’s 
critique is useful to show how facile oppositions — us : them :: rule of law : 
corruption — fail to account for the co- constitutive and reproductive mobi-
lizations of these categories in practice. Like the expatriate managers above 
who resort to self- regulation and murky practices in the name of “rule of 
law,” the judge explains how foreign investors both circulate and reproduce 
their own ideas of judicial insecurity. After this beginning, however, the 
judge continued in a different direction. “But neither does reality here belie 
what the investors think,” he said. “Local law is a real problem in Equato-
rial Guinea.”
At the time of independence from Spain, the constitution of 1968 stipu-
lated that Spanish law would apply until Equatorial Guinea began to create 
its own laws.13 But the coup attempt the following year led Macías to an-
nul the constitution. By 1973, Spanish law no longer existed in Equatorial 
Guinea. According to the judge, from 1973 to 1979 there was no law. Spanish 
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law had been annulled. Macías issued decrees but never legislated, producing 
what the judge called “a legal vacuum” that lasted until 1980. After Obiang’s 
1979 coup, he reinstated Spanish law and began to legislate regularly, but the 
judge lamented: “Now there is confusion. People don’t know what law is ap-
plicable here. When I go into court, we don’t have archives or documenta-
tion. We have only been trying to get these together since 2004. This is es-
sentially since yesterday. The principal problem is that no one knew what law 
was extant in Equatorial Guinea. Then along comes oil. What law applies?”
The implications of Equatorial Guinea’s historic relationship to codified 
information changed with the coming of oil. Codified law, for instance, be-
came newly important or useful. How information is or is not recorded, ar-
chived, or documented began to matter in novel ways. The new hydrocarbon 
industry became a situation in which, as the judge put it, “It’s easier to find 
petroleum than it is to find information.” He explained:
The archives are a cemetery of records. So what happens? Bad lawyers in-
troduce a different recourse; sometimes they invent laws. How far do they 
go? They’ll say, “Law number such- and- such,” and this law doesn’t exist. In-
formation is a real problem. In one case, I had to go look for a law in the 
archives. But I couldn’t go into the archives in my tie. I came back in boots 
and a T- shirt with my nose covered, and I still got sick afterward. As I went 
through, I found laws that I didn’t have. The archives are a general problem 
in the whole administration.
Postcolonial legal disarray, coupled with incipient projects to archive law and 
establish precedents, overlap uncomfortably with a transnational industry 
heavily and powerfully reliant on specific kinds of information and meth-
ods of codification and archive. The consequential intersection of Equato-
rial Guinea’s postcolonial legal history with the transnational oil industry 
calls to mind Stoler’s (2008) “political life of imperial debris, the longevity 
of structures of dominance, and the uneven pace with which people can ex-
tricate themselves from the colonial order of things” (193). Certain forms of 
imperial debris — here, Equatorial Guinea’s legal system — add immeasurably 
to the longevity and strength of structures of dominance. That dominance 
finds expression through specific moments and mediators —here, contract in 
general, and below, fiscal stability clauses more specifically. If, to paraphrase 
the judge, along comes oil and no one knows which law applies, companies are 
only too happy to bring their own law in the contract form.
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Fiscal Stability Clauses
I often thought that Donald would grow tired of me, or at the very least, of-
fended that I wanted to discuss what I understood to be some of the more 
controversial aspects of the oil and gas industry abroad. To my surprise, 
quite the opposite occurred as our research relationship stretched over four-
teen months. Despite my perception that my inquiries sought answers about 
increasingly controversial subject matter, Donald seemed ever more sup-
portive as I posed questions requesting greater detail and specificity. Karen 
Ho (2009) makes a similar observation about her work on Wall Street. She 
was concerned that bank employees would not want to talk about downsiz-
ing, mass layoffs, or the expendability of employees, topics she understood 
as politically sensitive and potentially damaging to the image of the com-
panies with which she worked. On the contrary, she found people talked 
about these strategies openly, and even those who had been negatively af-
fected by them often narrated their personal experiences of layoffs and un-
employment in terms of efficiency and shareholder value. In talking to Don-
ald about contracts, corporate power, and fiscal stability clauses, I had much 
the same experience. Where I was concerned that my interest in fiscal sta-
bility clauses, in particular, would somehow expose a little- discussed and 
ignominious corporate practice, Donald spoke openly about the contractual 
tools. Like the licitness of disperse corporate geographies for tax “planning,” 
here contractual clauses that override local law are a surprisingly unprob-
lematic technique for those who use them.
Hotly debated in the late 1990s in international investment circles, and 
reanimated in recent years by the Trans- Pacific Partnership (see Stiglitz 
2014), stabilization and fiscal stability clauses are related to the practice of 
“regulatory takings,” or the right of corporations to sue states for regula-
tions that affect their profit margins. In Equatorial Guinea and elsewhere, 
these contractual clauses attempt to guarantee two types of “stability” on 
the companies’ behalf. First, they stipulate that the legal and fiscal regimes 
in place in the supply site at the time the contract is signed — environmental 
law, labor law, tax codes — will not change over the life of the contract. Sec-
ond, these clauses stipulate that if those fiscal and legal regimes do change, 
and if those changes reduce companies’ profit margins, the state is contrac-
tually obligated to indemnify the corporation. “If, for example, a new en-
vironmental law — even if it is of general applicability to all companies and 
is adopted to bring the country into compliance with international treaty 
obligations — would increase the cost of oil development or operations, 
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then the oil companies would automatically be exempt from complying 
with such a law. Or, a government would have to compensate a company 
for the cost of compliance” (Radon in Humphreys et al. 2007, 96). While 
public policy in a variety of countries can trump the practice of regulatory 
takings — one cannot find these clauses in contracts with Canada or Nor-
way — this is certainly not the case in Equatorial Guinea. With pscs in par-
ticular, stabilization, fiscal stability, or indemnity clauses are arguably the 
most egregious contractual methods companies use to profit from inequal-
ity. “Through stability clauses oil companies limit the normal prerogatives 
of any legislature and government, such as their right to enact and issue pro-
tective environmental, labor, and other regulatory laws. These clauses are 
immune even to judicial challenge by the host country’s domestic courts. . . . 
Stability clauses are too often contractual colonialism, the modern world’s 
legal answer to a discredited system” (Radon in Humphreys et al. 2007, 
95 – 96). Stability clauses are the ultimate “shield” to which Donald referred, 
through which companies claim to protect or disentangle themselves from 
local state lawlessness, arbitrariness, or avarice. It is through fiscal stabil-
ity and stabilization clauses that companies claim to import or guarantee a 
“rule- of- law- based” environment.
Continuing to think with the judge’s comments above, if stability clauses 
stipulate that the legal and fiscal regimes in place at the time the contract 
is signed will not change over the life of the contract, imagine Equatorial 
Guinea’s legal and fiscal situation in the early 1990s, when the state signed 
the first pscs. As a technocrat at the Ministry of Mines explained to me: 
“There was no legislation that dealt with the hydrocarbon industry in Equa-
torial Guinea. We didn’t know anything about it. You could not draft an oil 
contract based on local law because there were no relevant local laws.” Given 
this historical situation, what exactly is “stabilized” in the contract form? 
Most basically, oil companies and their profits become central to legislative 
and regulatory processes that are newly urgent, given the massive influx of 
cash, construction, pollutants, and humans that an oil boom always entails, 
stabilizing a peculiar and perverse relationship in which state actors have to 
haggle with oil companies to change laws.
What do fiscal stability clauses look like in Equatorial Guinea, and what 
are their effects? How do they work on the ground? Donald explained:
Our fiscal stability clauses [say that] the laws that govern this contract are 
those that are currently in place. The tax will not be more than 35 percent. If 
there’s a change in law that requires the company to pay more, the govern-
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ment will step in and pay that. The clauses are mainly fiscal: taxes, import 
duties, the ability to control who you contract with and how you do the con-
tracting. Here [in Equatorial Guinea] and elsewhere, the government will 
ask you to do business with specific companies. But our contract says we can 
contract with whoever we want as long as it’s legal and ethical.
As he continued to elaborate the content of these clauses, Donald explained 
acts by the Equatoguinean state, including new laws or regulations, higher 
taxes, or requests to do business with specific contractors, as “encroach-
ment” and “step by step nationalization.” In response to these acts, the com-
pany could put up the “shield” of the stability clauses as a temporary solu-
tion while they figured out what to do. For example, in 2008 the Ministry 
of Health and Social Welfare issued a decree stating that all oil companies 
needed to start paying social security tax for migrant employees, equivalent 
to 26 percent of their salaries. Before this decree, the companies paid social 
security tax for their Equatoguinean employees and a 35 percent income tax 
on their own salaries. While companies with newer contracts had specific 
clauses shielding them from paying social security taxes on migrant employ-
ees, Donald’s company did not, and they had to find what he called “general 
language” in the contract to help them avoid paying this new tax. “That’s 
the fiscal stability part,” he explained. Because this was a fiscal issue, the 
company was able to counter with the power of their stabilization clauses. In 
other circumstances, however, this was not the case. For instance, GEPetrol 
(the national oil company) formed a local insurance subsidiary in 2008, and 
companies were then required to obtain insurance through them. As Don-
ald explained it, Equatorial Guinea “had learned from their neighbors.” In 
Angola, oil and gas companies are required to buy insurance from local in-
surance companies. Because Angolan insurance companies are often with-
out the collateral to underwrite the massive insurance costs required in the 
industry, they contract through international underwriters, effectively dou-
bling the cost of insurance for transnational oil and gas companies. As with 
the tax issue above, Donald explained that companies with newer contracts 
in Equatorial Guinea have clauses that specify that they can get insurance 
from whomever they want. “They have shields. But ours doesn’t have that 
specific language. Then the question is, is this a fiscal issue? It’s not taxes. 
So then you try to work with ministers and officials, to tell them it doesn’t 
make sense to get the same thing at twice the cost. For local business devel-
opment we’re willing to pay a little more, but we’re not willing to pay twice 
the amount. This is encroachment.”
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Broadly speaking, stability clauses are at the center of what becomes a 
protracted, constantly negotiated relationship between companies and their 
representatives, and state representatives (generally from the Ministry of 
Mines) and their consultants. “Contracts,” as one informant put it, “are like 
marriages. Just because there are difficulties, or even if one party breaks their 
vows, the marriage is not necessarily over. The relationship is too important 
and you’re too much involved in one another’s lives to end it just like that.” 
Indeed, contracts worth billions of dollars annually, based on enormous out-
lays of capital and technology and subsea hydrocarbon that cannot simply 
be relocated, will not be annulled (to continue the analogy) just because the 
government wants to change an import duty or insurance policy. Instead, 
the party representatives will meet and negotiate, albeit on the radically un-
equal ground described above. Contracts yoke both sides into a protracted 
relationship of negotiation that seems to have its own teleology, in which 
Equatoguinean contract signers fight to regain the sovereignty and potential 
profit they signed away in the exploitative early contracts.
Conclusion
Contracts- as- marriage returns us to Durkheim ([1893] 1997), who famously 
declared that “everything in the contract is not contractual” (211). He con-
tinued, “Contracts give rise to obligations which have not been contracted 
for [and] ‘make obligatory not only what there is expressed in them, but also 
all consequences which equity, usage, or the law imputes from the nature of 
the obligation’ ” (212). And the parties to a contract “are not only in contact 
for the short time during which things pass from one hand to another; but 
more extensive relations necessarily result from them, in the course of which 
it is important that their solidarity not be troubled” (217). With the luxury of 
more than a century of interceding social theory, this chapter’s too- simple 
response to Durkheim is, of course. Of course, everything in the contract is 
not contractual, and a production sharing contract whose duration is the life 
of the concession, sometimes nearly fifty years, generates as much overflow 
as it does felicitous framing of risk and responsibility (Callon 1998).
I want to conclude, however, with a rejoinder to Durkheim and to neo-
substantivist approaches more generally: that everything in the contract is 
not contractual is not a radical insight of critical theory. On the contrary, this 
was the assumption from which oil companies started. Working in central 
Africa or Indonesia or Kazakhstan is complex, overdetermined by intimate 
and complicated ties among corporations and local people and institutions 
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and environments. That was Donald’s point. Distance from local complex-
ity, replicability, and standardization are goals of Donald’s work. More ac-
curately, they are desires, aspirations. He and his company started from the 
assumption of Equatorial Guinea’s complexity and unknowability, and the 
contract became an admittedly imperfect effort through which to aspire to 
capitalism in its own image, to specify and standardize profit distribution or 
taxation rates, to peg interest rates to libor or oil prices to Platts Marketwire. 
The one- thousand- page production sharing contracts, in other words, exist 
precisely because oil companies understand the wide- ranging social and po-
litical entanglements of their work, and they are constantly trying, mostly in 
vain, to control that overflow, to contain it, to anticipate it, and to write con-
tractual clauses broad enough to account for its unaccountability. I insist on 
this point because I think there is a danger in offering a “social explanation” 
without (a) understanding that as shared terrain and (b) understanding that 
the work of the contract may be social through and through, but this insight 
does not by itself destabilize its formal effects in the world — for accumula-
tion, for sovereignty, for the retrenchment of inequality, for the endurance 
of apparent singularities like the corporation or the state.
The banal provocation of this chapter, then, is that contracts work. They 
are one of the procedural cornerstones of this project we know as global 
capitalism. The work of contracts — their ongoing negotiation, their docu-
mentation of the desire and aspiration to approximate qualities thought to 
inhere in capitalism itself, as a stage for legal liberalism — is productive. The 
contract is a charismatic and felicitous form, and we fail to account for it at 
our analytic peril. We see, for instance, how the felicity of the contract form 
can yoke it to other charismatic processes like development or state- making. 
Moreover, contracts are good to think with because they show how capital-
ism is dependent on and constituted by its “externalities” — here, a repressive 
political regime and corporations eager to take advantage of the patchy legal 
landscape they find there. Finally, contracts help to draw our attention to 
capitalism’s licit life; that is, the contract as ubiquitous practice that is legally 
sanctioned, widely replicated, and ordinary, at the same time as it makes 
markets out of inequality, domination, and imperial debris.
We stay with contracts in the following chapter, shifting to the subcon-
tracts that intimately structure the lives of rig workers and oil service work-
ers. Continuing to think with Pateman and Mills (2007) on questions of the 
contract and racialized domination as constitutive of contemporary capi-
talism, chapter 4 also examines subcontracting as a practice in and against 
teleologies of late capitalism.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Subcontract
By the time I came to know Eduardo in 2008, he had been a Voxa employee 
for three years. Voxa is an Equatoguinean- owned subcontracting firm whose 
business it is to provide local laborers to international oil and oil services 
companies, a labor- brokering niche widely referred to in the global oil in-
dustry and beyond as a “body shop.”1 Foreign firms with operations in Equa-
torial Guinea pay Voxa per worker hired; Voxa takes a cut of each payment, 
and then pays their employees what remains. Among other contractual stip-
ulations, the body shop guarantees the cleanliness, sobriety, and punctuality 
of the workers they provide.
Eduardo’s first job with Voxa was on an offshore rig in drilling and lab 
analysis. After one “hitch,” or marea, the contract between the company that 
owned the rig, SeaTrekker, and the operating company renting the rig, the 
Major Corporation, expired, and the rig moved out of Equatoguinean wa-
ters. After a mere two weeks on the job, Eduardo was out of work. His fellow 
subcontracted workers on the rig — Filipino, Scottish, and Venezuelan men, 
among others — stayed with the rig as it moved on to Angola or Nigeria or 
Ghana, because their subcontracts were with Laurel, an international oil ser-
vices body shop whose contracts remain extant irrespective of national bor-
ders. Guineans, including Eduardo, were left behind, as their subcontracts 
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were a fleeting product of “local content” requirements written into produc-
tion sharing contracts (pscs). Local content requirements are contractual 
clauses that require international firms to employ a certain number of local 
workers, clauses that lose their power once the relevant contract (in this case, 
a rig rental) moves beyond national borders.
After Eduardo’s first job sailed, Voxa sent him to work for the Breffield 
Corporation in the construction of TurboGas, a gas- to- electricity power 
plant on the Endurance compound. Eduardo worked there for four months, 
up to the completion of the TurboGas construction project and the end 
of Breffield’s contract with Endurance. From there, Voxa sent Eduardo to 
Hume Tools, another oil services firm, this time to work as a security guard 
for four months, after which that contract with Voxa expired as well. After 
the Hume job, Voxa sent Eduardo and other employees home, because there 
was not any available work. When I met him, Eduardo had again been con-
tracted by Voxa and had been working for two months as a security guard 
outside a gated ShaeferCorp residence, another global oil services company 
with small private compounds in Equatorial Guinea. On the job a mere two 
months when we met, not only had Eduardo already been switched from 
one SchaeferCorp house to another, but he had also been told that he now 
no longer even worked for Voxa, whose contracts had been taken over by 
another local body shop. “This month,” Eduardo explained with a wry grin, 
“we are with Silvano.”
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which subcontracts and subcon-
tracted workers saturate every level of the hydrocarbon commodification 
process (Maples and Rosenblum 2009). Once a psc is signed, the prolifera-
tion of subcontractors in the given concession stretches from tool compa-
nies to catering companies; rig companies to road builders; transoceanic 
tankers to sea water sprayers; audit, tax consulting, and financial advisory 
services, to shipping and supply chain management companies. Subcon-
tracts literally people the oil industry in its production sites in a way that 
pscs do not. The actual commodity chain of a barrel of oil or 6,000 cubic 
feet of natural gas, which the general public understands to be a Shell or 
British Petroleum (bp) product, is, in fact, produced by hundreds of com-
panies and thousands of employees, only a tiny fraction of whom are di-
rectly contracted by the operating companies or their subsidiaries. Consider 
again the fipco 330 from chapter 1 — employing 115 men from twenty dif-
ferent nations, only four of whom worked directly for the Smith Corpora-
tion, and only twenty- five of whom worked directly for SeaTrekker, the rig 
company. The remaining eighty- six men were hired from fifteen different 
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subcontracting companies, bringing the total number of companies at work 
on one rig to seventeen.
Ethnographic attention to subcontracting highlights the processes that 
bring workers to rigs and determine how long they stay there, how much 
they are paid, and even the comfort of their living quarters while at sea. 
Insofar as these conditions vary along predictable lines of racialized global 
inequality, subcontracting arrangements, like the pscs that provide their 
conditions of possibility, still have us dwelling with imperial debris and hi-
erarchies of rank, but now as lived in individual lives. As I explore in this 
chapter, for Equatoguinean rig workers like Eduardo, hierarchies of rank 
manifest in low- level industry jobs hoped for, gained, and lost; in children’s 
school fees paid or not; in profound disgust and disappointment at the com-
plicity of absolute rule and corporate freedom in Equatorial Guinea. For Fili-
pino rig workers, hierarchies of rank manifest in their perceived “obedience” 
and “docility” as workers (Parreñas 2015; McKay 2007, 2014; Appel 2018b); 
their ostensible fungibility with US workers (one- tenth the value, Standard 
& Poor’s tells us); their long rotation hitches; and their historical relation-
ship with African American navy soldiers and US imperialism. For North 
American and Western European managers, hierarchies of rank are made 
manifest in uplift salaries; new vacation homes that await them upon their 
return from Equatorial Guinea; and radical upward class mobility. Given 
these distinctions, this chapter focuses on subcontracts as another ethno-
graphic threshold through which to understand racialized inequalities as 
constitutive of capitalist markets, rather than merely exacerbated by them, 
or the “context” in which they operate.
Transnational labor markets of the kind I explore in this chapter — in 
which the relative value of workers is calculated by ratings agencies like 
Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s — are an exceptional example of Tsing’s (2009) 
assertion that “no firm has to personally invent patriarchy, colonialism, war, 
racism, or imprisonment, yet each of these is privileged in supply chain la-
bor mobilization” (151). Following Karen Ho (2016) and the work of the Gen-
erating Capitalism Group (Bear et al. 2015), and in dialogue with the Black 
Radical Tradition, my argument here and throughout the book is that global 
capitalism is made of, in, and through inequality (including racial frater-
nities and exclusions) and imperial debris.2 This means, for instance, that 
the relationship between corporate freedom and absolute rule in Equatorial 
Guinea is not incidental to, but constitutive of, the daily life of hydrocarbon 
capitalism. The contract form, and the subcontract in particular, comes to 
play a meaningful part here. Just as the Equatoguinean government mobi-
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lized production sharing contracts as proof of licit financial transactions in 
response to the Riggs Bank debacle, so too with subcontracts, through which 
companies mobilize the contract’s “neutral” and “impersonal” qualities to 
legitimate exploitative and racist labor practices.
My research revealed two particularly egregious forms of inequality and 
discrimination in and around US oil firms in Equatorial Guinea, and I at-
tempt to chronicle both in this chapter. The first was the racialized “skills 
hierarchy” that structured life (and pay) for mobile, transnational workers 
in the industry, which we saw a glimpse of in chapters 1 and 2. This first 
form of discrimination was characterized by the mobility of strikingly un-
concealed Jim Crow segregation among workers — in living facilities both 
offshore and on, in pay, and in rotation schedules. I specify Jim Crow here, 
following Vitalis (2007; see also Butler 2015), because these arrangements 
moved with and were reproduced by US companies. The second form of 
egregious inequality was the particular ways in which Equatoguinean work-
ers were (and were not) included in the industry. In all but exceptional cases, 
when Equatoguinean workers were hired at all, it was for the most transitory 
and ill- paid positions, as Eduardo’s story chronicles. Worse still, these posi-
tions were structured by sub- subcontracting arrangements, in which locally 
owned subcontracting companies like Voxa often forced would- be employ-
ees to pay for the mere chance of a job. Local workers in these arrangements 
widely critiqued the Equatoguinean state for keeping their wages from for-
eign companies down and their labor grievances unmet. This second form of 
discrimination, then, involved the apparent complicity of foreign firms and 
the Equatoguinean government in keeping Equatoguineans’ relationship to 
the industry precarious and unequal. While these two forms of discrimina-
tion are linked through the figure of the subcontract, and hence I always 
imagined writing about them together in this chapter, there are other ways 
in which I kept them analytically distinct. Initially I understood the first 
form to be about histories of race peculiar to the US, made mobile in the 
transnational oil and gas industry, whereas I understood the second to be 
about histories of colonialism and its aftermath in forms of global inequality, 
where multinational companies and rapacious postcolonial statecraft meet.
Drawing on Jemima Pierre’s (2013) work, this chapter moves away from 
that analytic distinction. My impulse to keep these forms of discrimina-
tion apart was based on what Pierre describes as a problematic disciplinary 
split, wherein “African diaspora studies generally concerns itself with ar-
ticulations of race and Blackness but not directly with Africa, [and] African 
studies generally concerns itself with Africa but not directly with race and 
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Blackness” (xii). But if, as Pierre demands, we start from the longue durée 
of European empire making, we see that “conquest, the commerce in Afri-
cans, slavery . . . and the colonization of the Western hemisphere, the Af-
rican continent, and Asia are . . . an interlocking set of practices that have 
cemented the commonality of our modern experience.” “What is signifi-
cant here” she writes, “is the racial dimension of this international system 
of power and the attendant global White supremacy through which it is en-
acted and experienced” (3). In sum, we can and should understand the mo-
bility of Jim Crow and the particular kinds of exploitation visited on black 
Equatoguinean workers as historically related in “the nervous system of the 
liberal diaspora” (Povinelli 2006, 225). This is a global system in which white 
supremacy — again, “a political, economic, and cultural system in which 
whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious 
and unconscious ideas of white superiority are widespread, and relations of 
white dominance and nonwhite subordination are daily reenacted across a 
broad array of institutions and social settings” (Ansley 1989, 1024) — remains 
the norm. Tellingly, in Pierre’s invocation of “global white supremacy” she 
cites Charles Mills, whose own work has chronicled the relationship between 
contract and racial domination (1997, 2003; with Pateman 2007). Having dis-
cussed the work of Pateman and Mills (2007) in chapter 3, it is their specific 
attention to contracts about property in the person that is directly relevant 
here — a contractual form that “constitute[s] relations of subordination, even 
when entry into the contract is voluntary” (3). Subcontracting becomes an-
other entry point into their argument that “the global racial contract un-
derpins the stark disparities of the contemporary world” (3). Contracts and 
subcontracts offer a stunning empirical site for understanding how race 
and other forms of postcolonial inequality are constitutive of both capitalism 
and the liberal political and legal theory from which capitalism draws much 
of its moral and historical justification.
In the sections that follow, after defining subcontracting, I work through 
the familiar teleologies of late capitalism by which both my migrant indus-
try interlocutors and critical theory (albeit, in slightly different ways) often 
make sense of subcontracting. I note the ways in which these teleologies 
miss empirical questions of inequality and instead rely on ideas of capital-
ism in its own image — efficiency, shareholder value, progress. After show-
ing how subcontracting arrangements long antecede (and seed) late capital-
ism, both in the oil industry and in Equatorial Guinea, I turn ethnographic 
attention first to Laurel Incorporated, a transnational body shop, and then 
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to local body shops and the relationship between corporate freedom and 
absolute rule.
On Subcontracting
A subcontract is a legal agreement between a party to an original contract 
(in this case, the subsidiary- many- times- over that signs pscs as “the com-
pany”) and a third party, which is contracted to provide all or a specific part 
of the obligations (work, materials) specified in the original contract. Stan-
dard interpretations of the business incentives for subcontracting include 
cost reduction (sweatshop labor being a classic example here, such as h&m 
subcontracting manufacturing to Cambodian children) or risk mitigation. 
Risk mitigation brings us back to the discussion in chapter 1 of the thinning 
of liability across an extensive web of contracts. Think of the finger pointing 
among bp, Halliburton, and TransOcean in the wake of the Deepwater Ho-
rizon conflagration, in which each company was able to claim that their spe-
cialized fragment of the production process was not causal to the explosion 
and then point the finger at someone else’s fragment. This dispersed liabil-
ity (“risk mitigation”) is an intended effect of subcontracting arrangements.
The wider anthropological and critical theory literatures, and indeed 
my management informants, often contextualize subcontracting within the 
now- familiar epochal story of “late capitalism,” “post- Fordism,” “flexible ac-
cumulation,” or supply chain capitalism (Harvey 1990; Jameson 1992; Coma-
roff and Comaroff 2001; Thrift 2005; Ong 1999; see Tsing 2000a, 2009 and 
Bear et al. 2015 for critiques). From both celebratory and critical perspectives, 
subcontracting here is narrated as part of a suite of (late) capitalist practices — 
just- in- time production, global supply chains, outsourcing — that emerged at 
a specific time. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, dates the term 
“outsourcing” to 1981. When narrated teleologically, we are asked to under-
stand these practices both as relatively new and as inevitable. But discus-
sions with migrant oil company management in Equatorial Guinea and the 
country’s own labor history reveal different temporalities and possibilities. 
What drops out of these epochal histories of late capitalism as management 
and even critical theory tell them? And even as ethnography allows us to see 
those elisions, what effects have they had, qua elisions, in the world? What 
does it mean, for instance, that Wall Street narratives of shareholder value 
aren’t narrated alongside histories of colonial cacao plantations in central 
Africa (Hudson 2017a; McKittrick 2013; Robinson 1983, Williams 1944)?
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Interview material from migrant managers and historical records from 
Equatorial Guinea allow us to work through these questions. While some of 
these narratives repeat predictable and already- known histories of late capi-
talism, they also contain moments of rupture. I want to start here, with pre-
dictability and rupture together interrupting subcontracting’s epochal his-
tory, so that ethnographic surprises later in the chapter — for instance, why 
Filipino men make up one in every three workers at sea — can be seen not as 
anecdotal flourishes on an already- known teleological story, but as central 
to the ongoing project of global capitalism.
Predictably, my management informants narrated the subcontracted la-
bor regime in which workers (although not them) are employed on a ro-
tating, as- needed basis as an ever- intensifying arrangement guided by effi-
ciency, industry- wide standardization, and the maximization of shareholder 
value. “Subcontracting is the way the business has evolved,” one manager 
put it:
It has to do with Wall Street and profitability. [It is] not cost- effective for one 
company to do everything. We don’t need everything all the time. We don’t 
need all these drillers when we are finished drilling. They’re paid a good wage 
while they’re here, and then when they finish they go home. Same thing for 
the Indians [doing] the construction. They follow [Breffield] around and do 
plants. They don’t stay in the countries. They have engineers and civil teams 
who go in and do what they do over a two- to four- year period and then they 
go on to the next project somewhere else.
Or another:
If you look at the oil industry almost thirty years ago when I started, employ-
ees of the companies performed most of the work. . . . Endurance produces 
the same volume of products as we did when I was first hired, but our work-
force is probably 20 percent. If I’m in West Texas out in the sagebrush, you’ve 
got a field, and you’ve got wells every half mile or so. You build roads, power 
lines; you drill the wells; [there are] people out collecting oil. In the olden 
days, twenty- five or thirty years ago, company employees performed all that 
work. They dug dirt and got trucks for roads; you dug holes and strung your 
power lines. Over time, a lot of that has been outsourced to service compa-
nies, to subcontractors. It’s more efficient. You don’t have to maintain a huge 
inventory. You have a separate subcontractor that has an inventory for roads, 
another for tools, etc. [This setup] reduces the workforce so you don’t always 
have to have road builders. The workforce decreased and service companies 
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and subcontractors increased. But we’ve gotten to the point of outsourcing 
accounting, it, and it’s maybe not the best situation. I personally think that 
we’ve taken it too far.
Wall Street, cost- effectiveness, the segmented character of the produc-
tion process, discrete forms of technology and expertise required at differ-
ent moments, and minimal inventories and workforces all come together in 
these managers’ descriptions. Workers on rigs or in road- building compa-
nies move around the world, following industry- wide demand. “We don’t 
need all those drillers when we are finished drilling,” but the assumption 
is that someone else, somewhere, does. Whether the need is plant builders 
in Ecuador, rigs off the coast of Angola, or shipping in the North Sea, oper-
ating companies enter into subcontracting arrangements with oil services 
firms who deploy mobile personnel, expertise, technology, and infrastruc-
ture (Barry 2006). As discussed in chapter 1, these arrangements intensified 
in the industry with the advent of offshore production. Even in famously na-
tionalist oil industries like those of Norway and Mexico, you find in offshore 
settings “a radical contracting- out of the production process” (Woolfson et 
al. 1996, 322).
If only a handful of companies float rigs around the world or provide 
deepwater drilling support, then those companies have technology and per-
sonnel in or near all major extraction sites around the world, organized by 
repeating contractual terms with many of the same major operating compa-
nies. Technologies, people, and contractual terms circulate, and the intended 
outcome is to “maximize standardization and repeatability in design, pro-
curement, and construction, to introduce fit- for- purpose functionality into 
codes, specification, contracting and procurement documentation” (Woolf-
son et al. 1996, 311 – 312). Although this arrangement is flexible, varied, and re-
liant on unique entanglements at each site, its attraction for operating com-
panies is in the repetition, the reliability, and the boilerplate functionality of 
the same people and technology moving around the world, most of whom 
they never contract with nor contact directly. When things go wrong, as they 
often do, part of the reliability here is both the licitness of the subcontracting 
form and the thinning of liability that comes with it; with so many compa-
nies involved, responsibility (or risk, depending on your perspective) is radi-
cally decentralized. Notice too that the empirics of this circulation or repeti-
tion do not create replication, or even deep standardization, on the ground 
in supply sites. On the contrary, they enable companies to import experts, 
technologies, and processes while having minimal engagement with local 
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systems. The ability of companies and technologies to “operate worldwide” 
through extensive subcontracting systems takes geographic or political dif-
ferences among extraction sites as a given, to be anticipated and managed 
through global subcontractors, whose processes are legalized, standardized, 
and often already in place. In this way, companies can appear ever- distant 
from local political, environmental, or labor concerns. So far, so familiar.
The migrant managers’ accounts of this shift toward subcontracting in 
the industry foreground efficiency, just- in- time production, and an emer-
gent relationship between Wall Street and American corporate profitabil-
ity in the 1980s — often referred to as the shareholder value revolution — in 
which downsizing and mass layoffs first became commonplace (Fligstein 
and Shin 2007; Ho 2009; Khurana 2007). Both managers quoted above seem 
to buttress this periodization, implying a distinct epochality in the indus-
try’s use of subcontracting. The first manager comments that the business 
has “evolved” this way, relating that evolution to Wall Street. The second 
tells an evocative story of West Texas in which each company did everything 
for itself until a march toward specialization and outsourcing, which “may 
have gone too far.” However, leaving the analysis here would lead us to miss 
other temporalities, other rhythms. First, the history of subcontracting in 
the transnational oil industry long predates the shareholder value revolution. 
Second, the teleology of “late capitalism” allowed industry personnel to ex-
plain as “inevitable” exploitative labor practices that, in fact, long predated 
any specific shift, and then to tautologically justify those practices in the 
name of inevitability. For instance, the workers that the first manager refers 
to as “these drillers,” or later “the Indians,” gestures to the fact that the seg-
mented character of the production process takes pre existing forms of post-
colonial inequality as means of production for “efficiency” or “shareholder 
value.” “The Indians” contracted around the world for plant construction 
are “engineers and civil teams” — often formally educated and highly skilled, 
yet miserably paid and housed en masse because they are “Third Country 
Nationals” or tcns. Third and finally, the epochality of late capitalism ef-
faces labor histories in Equatorial Guinea and on the African continent more 
broadly, where various forms of subcontracting and labor mobility have been 
common at least since the colonial era, and have long linked colonial extrac-
tion with capitalist accumulation. I explore these interfering temporalities 
and rhythms below.
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On Epochality and Subcontracting’s 
Multiple Histories
The international contracting- out of the oil production process started in 
the industry in the 1920s and 1930s, anticipating by half a century the global 
commodity chain organization that came to typify other transnational in-
dustries in the 1980s or 1990s. Bechtel, for example, “had been building pipe-
lines for Chevron since the 1920s, and by the 1930s had spun off one of the 
world’s first full services firms for the industry” (Vitalis 2007, 67). Bowker 
(1994) writes of Schlumberger’s work in the USSR, Venezuela, and Burma 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Vitalis (2007) also notes that “most of the first ge-
ologists, drilling crews, and camp bosses who worked in Saudi Arabia . . . 
learned their trade as wildcatters and contract employees elsewhere, nota-
bly, in the South American fields of Colombia, . . . and Venezuela” (54 – 55). If 
production in Saudi Arabia started in earnest in the 1950s, then these con-
tract employees got their starts in Colombia and Venezuela in the 1930s and 
1940s. From at least the 1930s onward, then, major oil services firms, as well 
as geologists, drilling crews, and camp bosses, sold their labor and expertise 
through subcontract to operating companies around the world.
In this history of subcontracting that long predates 1980s Wall Street, we 
can see the relationship between subcontracting and increasingly special-
ized forms of expertise — Bechtel’s in the construction of oil infrastructures 
and Schlumberger’s in geologic exploration and survey. But we cannot allow 
explanations of the technology or expertise- intensive character of hydro-
carbon extraction to naturalize the forms of labor discrimination that have 
come to typify the industry. The industry uses the “natural” properties of 
the commodity — its geologic depth and pressure, its inaccessibility — and 
the specialized skillsets those qualities require to justify not only discrimina-
tory labor hierarchies, but also the attendant practices of providing certain 
benefits (housing, insurance) to certain workers (often the white, directly 
contracted ones) and not to others (often the nonwhite, subcontracted ones). 
Subcontracting, in other words, has always been a contested terrain where 
inequality, expertise, and power meet. Consider a comment dating from the 
1950s from Abdallah Tariki — the first Saudi to obtain an advanced degree in 
oil geology in the US, who then served as Director General of the Saudi Oil 
Ministry — on aramco’s use of subcontracted labor:
aramco found that applying the Law of Work and Workers to all the work-
ers they needed in their operations would cost them a lot, so they introduced 
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the concept of contractors and vehicle owners. . . . And the mission of those 
new contractors was to collect willing workers, and the company would bring 
materials and engineers to train the contractor and his workers to do the 
work required of them. In this way the company was not responsible for ar-
ranging accommodation or health insurance or the care of the workers and 
their families. (Quoted in Vitalis 2007, 135)
In other words, the discriminatory subcontracting practices that I will ex-
plore at length in this chapter were already solidly in place in the indus-
try by the 1950s. Yet, there was undoubtedly an intensification of subcon-
tracting practices from the early 1990s, a timeframe to which both of my 
management interlocutors above refer. With oil prices at record lows, and 
with production costs escalating as easily accessible onshore supplies both 
began to shrink and were met with increasing resistance, companies were 
desperate to stay profitable and to find the surplus value to invest in new off-
shore extraction technologies. And yet, even considering this intensification 
of subcontracting, technological expertise, and global procurement chains 
over the last twenty years, labor and supply chain processes today still vary 
radically among supply sites, belying ideas of inevitability and industry-wide 
standardization. Consider Donald’s description of his work in Russia in the 
early 2000s:
When I was in Russia, there was quite a bit of pressure to bring in global pro-
cesses, global procurement, and after very long discussions we ended up do-
ing everything 100 percent locally. [Everything was] available, half the cost, 
quality was adequate, and you avoided import logistical issues. That’s just not 
the case [in Equatorial Guinea]. It’s a small industry, relatively new, doesn’t 
have manufacturing capability. In Russia [they] manufacture their own rigs, 
drill bits, everything. Ireland and Equatorial Guinea are similar because they 
have small industries and most of the service contractors are foreign compa-
nies that come in and set up local branches. [But it’s] more cost- effective to 
bring things in locally.
In just a few brief sentences, Donald confirms that massive subcontract-
ing is not inevitable; it is not neatly epochal; and it is not necessarily cost- 
effective or efficient. On the contrary, if the country can produce what the 
industry needs, it can be cheaper for the industry to source everything 
locally. Specific industrial and political histories in each place — in Rus-
sia, communist industrialization and competitive Cold War technological 
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development — come to play a formative role in the ways the US- based oil 
and gas industry can, or cannot, operate in a given extraction site.
The oil industry is not alone in having a much longer history of subcon-
tracting than epochal claims about late capitalism might suggest. Subcon-
tracting has long genealogies in the extractive industries of southern Af-
rica, in particular, where investors preferred migrant mine labor brokered 
through recruiting bureaus to avoid local entanglements (Van Onselen 1986; 
Moodie and Ndatshe 1994). Equatorial Guinea’s colonial cacao economy also 
was sustained by a labor system that looks much like the rotating, as- needed 
labor of today’s itinerant oil industry workers (Martino 2012; 2017; 2018b). 
Starting in 1906, the Spanish administration passed a series of labor regula-
tions intended to control hiring processes, primarily through the creation 
of a mediator organization known as the Colonial Conservatorship. Like 
the body shops that administrate Eduardo’s labor and the labor of those on 
the fipco (discussed at length below), the Conservatorship was to act as an 
administrative intermediary between employers and local and foreign work-
ers (Campos Serrano and Micó Abogo 2006). The Conservatorship signed 
agreements for massive labor imports from Liberia in 1914 that were canceled 
five years later. After the 1930s, labor recruitment turned to Nigeria and Ni-
gerians, whose contracts were to last two years “with the aim of not gener-
ating a new group of deep- rooted population” (Campos Serrano and Micó 
Abogo 2006, 31; Ejituwu 1995). As we will see below, this rationale is eerily 
similar to that of the oil industry, in which rotators are expected to engage 
exclusively with their work, regardless of where it is taking place. The impli-
cations of temporary, imported workers for labor organizing and workers’ 
rights are clear: those without roots or rights where they work are less likely 
to organize.
With the “efficiency” that subcontracting promises now situated within 
historical time, and in relation to colonial and imperial relationships in par-
ticular, I turn to Laurel Incorporated and the daily life of the foreign subcon-
tractor market in Equatorial Guinea today.
Laurel Incorporated
Laurel Incorporated is a Scottish company with main offices in Houston, 
which, for tax and litigation purposes, is registered and operates out of Cy-
prus.3 From their office in Equatorial Guinea, Laurel Incorporated matched 
transnational laboring bodies with labor needs of the local oil and gas indus-
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try. Paolo, a finance manager for Laurel, originally from Ecuador, explained, 
“Here we provide manpower, which is called in the worst kind of way ‘body 
shops.’ I don’t feel proud of that.” He continued:
We recruit, look for people. We bring the person here via air transport. We 
secure visas, Letters of Invitation, Equatorial Guinea [work] papers. We 
pay employee expenses, give them cash advances which are deducted from 
their salary. . . . People work for the client, and we simply keep track of the 
work days, travel days, pay them, [and] process payroll. They’re covered with 
insurance against all sorts of fatality or work- related accident. . . . But the 
employees are not covered when they get home. They only have health in-
surance as long as they are working in EG. When they get home, it’s their 
responsibility. 
Reminiscent of the Colonial Conservatorship that brought Liberians and 
Sierra Leoneans into Equatorial Guinea’s cacao economy, Laurel recruits and 
administers labor from around the world for operating companies and oil 
services companies via subcontract. Once workers are hired, Laurel coor-
dinates their logistics, from plane tickets to paperwork, and provides inter-
mittent health insurance. Companies pay Laurel for workers’ costs plus an 
additional 18 percent; after taking their cut, Laurel then pays the employees. 
Those who find work through Laurel can be fired without notice, and they 
are likewise “free” to quit at any time. Reflecting on how often people quit 
and how often they were fired, Paolo commented that “you play with people 
like chess pieces. The lie is that you work for stability, benefits, social secu-
rity, but here nothing. They just pay you what you earn that day. The busi-
ness doesn’t take anything from your check, you don’t take anything [from 
them], and they pay you a little higher rate, but not enough to make up the 
difference.” The temporalities of this payment setup are worth reiterating: 
the men are paid and insured only when they are working. Because they work 
on rotating schedules, this means that they are paid and insured for two 
months while on the rig, for example, and then go home for two months 
without pay or insurance.
Taken together, people as chess pieces, intermittent pay and insurance 
with no guarantee of work stability, and vaguely connected webs of op-
erators and subcontractors mean an attenuation or distancing between the 
worker and the employer. Indeed, this effect of distancing seems to be the 
key intention of what Paolo referred to as “the contract instrument.” As he 
explained:
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It’s way easier to have control and expect results with the contract instrument 
in the middle. It’s a client relation. [It’s] much better to have contractors. You 
can demand results and track performance. In a contract, there’s a structure; 
everything turns out to be converted into money. If you have a bad perfor-
mance, I will pay you less. [This structure] incentivizes the company to give 
better service and the operators to get better service. To get things done [it 
is] better to give instructions, send out regulations, give orders. It is better 
to give to the subcontractor the figure of contractual clauses in the middle. 
Either this works out or it’s over, and it will involve law and lawyers that no 
one wants. (Emphasis added)
Paolo suggests that having “the contract instrument in the middle,” by which 
he means a subcontract, specifically, transforms the employer/employee re-
lationship into a client relationship. He says that this contract instrument 
makes it easier for the company to have control and expect results by chang-
ing their relationship with labor from employer : employee to client : service 
provider. With the subcontract instrument in the middle, the operating com-
pany moves from employer (with all the attached rights and duties) to client, 
with all the attached privileges and entitlements. The employee becomes a 
service provider, upon whom it is incumbent to provide good service or risk 
diminished pay or termination. Note, however, that Paolo’s understanding of 
the contract instrument is almost anthropological, insofar as he suggests not 
that these qualities of distancing and attenuation inhere in the contract form, 
but rather that contractual clauses become figures — symbols that invoke the 
threat of law and lawyers, expendability, the monetization of everything — and 
it is that symbolism, then, that guides the actions of the subcontractors.
Among the approximately one thousand workers Laurel Incorporated 
managed during my time in Equatorial Guinea, company documents show 
that roughly 40 percent were Filipino, 20 percent were British, 15 percent 
were Indian and Pakistani, 10 percent were from the US, and another 10 per-
cent were South American (Paolo explained: “The majority of them are Ven-
ezuelan, because they have oil skills, they’re good labor, and they’re cheap; 
and also because Chavez fired 18,000 employees three years ago who tried 
to unionize.”) The remaining 5 percent were a mix of Lebanese, Italian, and 
French. Nationality is central to this form of labor organization. As each 
worker is brokered through a body shop, his pay and rotation schedule are cal-
culated according to his nation of origin. In Laurel’s case (and as described in 
chapter 1), American and British laborers work a “28/28” — twenty- eight days 
on in Equatorial Guinea, and twenty- eight days off at home — considered 
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the best schedule. Filipino workers have the least desirable schedule: eleven 
weeks on and three weeks off (an “11/3”), recently switched from a 14/3. South 
Americans work 8/3s.
When I asked Paolo why schedules varied by nationality, he replied: 
“They say that it’s the market. . . . Companies take advantage of inequal-
ity in the economies of the world. Some people say that it is discrimination 
and it is, up to a certain point. But it is also working with the rules of the 
economy. . . . You bring in ten Filipinos for one American guy. Same human 
being working the same ten hours, with equal or better knowledge, and your 
business is running.”
In paying and scheduling employees differently according to nationality, 
the industry is responding to a specific kind of difference — global inequality 
between nations — rendered profitable. In assembling a mobile transnational 
workforce, companies take difference into consideration, work with it, and 
profit from it, while ensuring they are absolved from responsibility for pro-
moting or reproducing it. “You are paid according to passport,” explained 
Paolo. Even he, as a finance manager, was paid as an Ecuadorian national. “I 
am an administrative manager very high up in the company, but I’m paid as 
a ‘third country national,’ even though I don’t have a house in Ecuador, and 
I want to live in Australia.” Despite his management position, his tertiary 
degree in finance, and the fact that he had no home in Ecuador and was in 
the process of migrating to Australia as his permanent residence, Paolo was 
paid according to his passport, guaranteeing a lower wage. Conversely, many 
US passport holders who worked as subcontractors in the industry actually 
lived in the Philippines or Central America. As US oilmen, they had met 
their wives while on previous assignments in Venezuela or Indonesia, and 
now rotated to those sites between hitches. But their passport guaranteed 
that they were still paid the US wage, details that belie any industry attempt 
to explain wage and scheduling inequalities through skills hierarchies.
The preponderance of Filipino labor in Equatorial Guinea’s oil and gas 
industry is particularly illustrative of how histories of colonialism and ra-
cialized imaginaries constitute global markets. One out of three workers at 
sea today is Filipino (McKay 2014). In explaining this phenomenon to me, a 
migrant country manager offered his own naturalization:
Worldwide in shipping there’s a lot of Filipinos. Why? They’re English- 
speaking. [They have a] willingness to work, good attitudes. [They are] good 
workers, friendly. If you go to Saudi, Kuwait, uae, they have millions. That 
whole society is built on the back of imported labor, from Pakistan, Bangla-
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desh, India. That’s what these countries export. For our lng facilities they 
went to the source of inexpensive but English-speaking, highly educated 
workforce. Over the years it’s become a tradition [with Filipino labor], and it’s 
almost generational. Their grandparents, aunts, and uncles were all involved 
in this sort of industry. In the early years it was exploitation: low wages, poor 
living conditions, but you found people willing to do it. What we find now 
is that the wages for these third- world people are creeping up worldwide.
In this man’s explanation, Filipinos are English- speaking, highly educated, 
willing to work, and friendly. Moreover, it is “traditional” in their extended 
families to work at sea. How did this “tradition” of maritime work and this 
widespread characterization of Filipinos as docile workers come to be? These 
naturalized and racialized explanations of the preponderance of Filipinos in 
a US- dominated industry in Equatorial Guinea have a specific history. The 
US Navy was resegregated after World War I, and Filipinos took the place of 
African American seamen, receiving English- language nautical training in 
American colonial institutions in the Philippines. At the time, three years in 
the Navy qualified Filipino men for American citizenship, and over 100,000 
per year applied for menial steward jobs. With their demographically domi-
nant but hierarchically subordinate position in global shipping well estab-
lished by the time the Philippines gained independence from the US in 1946, 
the newly independent state began to market its population as good subordi-
nates, from men in shipping to women in nursing and domestic work (Par-
reñas 2008). The state marketed its citizens as possessing “inherent” traits of 
docility and loyalty, as the Philippine Seafarer Promotion Council claimed 
in its motto, “in loyal service to God, Country, and Company” (McKay 2007, 
2014). The global labor market, in other words, is made through the colo-
nial relationship of the Philippines to the shipping and military industries 
(McKay 2007), or Chavez’s firing of unionized workers. Supply and demand 
are made by Jim Crow segregation of the US Navy, which created a labor de-
mand that was ultimately met through the coercive promise of citizenship- 
for- exploitation to Filipino colonial subjects. 
 In the oil industry broadly speaking, there are unmistakable continu-
ities between subcontracted labor organized, scheduled, and paid by pass-
port, and earlier versions of the racial wage, both of which are intended to 
keep costs and worker organizing down, and profit up. And yet, I want to 
think beyond functionalist explanations of deterring unionization or even 
maximizing profit, toward this convergence that Paolo articulates of dis-
crimination and what he calls the “rules of the economy” — of fungible Filipi-
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nos and global oil prices. To do so, I start with an expanded version of Paolo’s 
explanation of the practice of hiring by nationality:
Part of the business here is that manpower is provided by nationality. [Com-
panies including ours] take advantage of inequality in the economies of the 
world. Some people say that it is discrimination, and it is, up to a certain 
point. But it is also working with the rules of economy. You have first, second, 
and third world. Of course, if you’re a US citizen going to South America, 
you have more spending power. Your money is more solid than local money. 
A barrel of oil is sold in dollars, also quoted in pounds. If you have the possi-
bility to bring people from other parts of the world and hire them by paying 
them what would be considered an acceptable wage for their position back 
in their home country, you really at the end don’t have a problem: you’re sat-
isfying their needs — having a good wage — and the company is making mil-
lions of dollars. Endurance pays our company so much money in commis-
sion fees, but they are making all of the money because they are not paying 
people benefit plans, as they would pay an Endurance employee. Whatever 
money they spend, they get five times more money because of having differ-
ent nationalities. You bring in ten Filipinos for one American guy. Same hu-
man being working the same ten hours, with equal or better knowledge, and 
your business is running. All the machinery is running. You’re pumping oil 
and gas, and you’re selling it abroad. Oil price is standardized all around the 
world, so there is the gap. People are expendable.
Paolo notes that “some people say it is discrimination, and it is, up to a cer-
tain point.” For Paolo, the certain point past which these hiring processes are 
not discriminatory is to be found in “the rules of the economy.” Vitalis (2007) 
also notes that, when pressed on labor discrimination, the firms he studied 
insisted that “markets, not hierarchy, dictated that some workers received 
their pay in dollars, others in riyals” (23). The fungibility of ten Filipinos for 
one American off the shores of Equatorial Guinea, we are told, is a matter of 
markets, not hierarchy. But markets are made of hierarchies.
In Paolo’s description, “the rules of the economy” are about the simul-
taneity of inequality and fungibility — ten Filipinos for one American; the 
spending power of US dollars in a South American economy; barrels of oil 
sold in dollars and quoted in pounds, hard currency denominations that in-
dex the geographies of power in which the oil industry operates. “Oil price 
is standardized around the world, so there is the gap. People are expendable.” 
Where labor value varies radically across the furiously maintained borders 
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of nations, genders, and races, the price of oil — while unstable over time — is 
largely stable across space. The libor rate or Platts Marketwire, discussed in 
chapter 3, determines the contractually sanctioned interest rates or price per 
barrel for oil, and yet there is no analogous procedure for labor. Or perhaps 
more accurately, there is an analogously licit and “market- based” procedure 
for determining labor value, with a radically different outcome. 
Laurel uses a ratings system devised by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
(s&p) to determine wages by nationality, from Americans and Brits at the 
top to “tcns,” or Third Country Nationals, at the bottom. On the one hand, 
then, an idea of the market absolves charges of discrimination or racism, 
while on the other hand, the very methods, tools, and metrics that make 
“the market” rely on and reproduce already existing categories of inequality, 
as in s&p’s use of first, second, and third worlds. Following Cho (2008), Ho 
(2016), and others, this pushes us past both the social embeddedness theory 
of markets (in which “the social” can offer an explanation for that which 
was previously assumed to be “economic”) and the social studies of finance 
theories of markets (in which devices, expertise, and economics in particular 
make markets). The point is neither that the global labor market is respon-
sive to postcolonial inequality, nor that devices and theories imagined to 
describe markets in fact create them, but rather that the market is made by 
inequalities. Accreted histories of racialized inequality — including African 
Americans being kicked out of the US Navy and replaced by Filipino colo-
nial subjects, or Paolo being underpaid for his skillset as a financial manager 
because of his passport — “proxy,” in Karen Ho’s terms, for rational, neutral 
market behavior, or “the rules of the economy.” The market is not taking ad-
vantage of these circumstances; it is constituted by them. The contract form, 
here as subcontract, is a legalizing frame that offers stability and licitness to 
that constitutive process.
On Local Body Shops
As rigs off the coast of Equatorial Guinea today leave for the Congo or Ghana 
tomorrow, the Filipinos, Brits, Indians, and others contracted by Laurel stay 
with the rig, rotating home as if, in many ways, nothing has changed. But 
the Equatoguineans, Nigerians, Gabonese, or Angoleños do not often find 
themselves moving around with the rig once it has left their waters, as their 
employment positions are most often the result of “local content” contract 
requirements, an additional subcontract removed from any type of job secu-
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rity. As the first significant production company in Equatorial Guinea, the 
Major Corporation brought subcontracting norms and practices with it in 
the 1990s. Shortly thereafter, Equatorial Guinea’s Ministry of Mines set up 
an Agency for the Promotion of Employment (apegesa) based on the body 
shop model. Filtering Equatoguineans who wanted to work in the indus-
try according to family relationships and political affinities, apegesa and 
other early employment agencies routinely took 40 – 70 percent of workers’ 
pay, often charging Equatoguineans interested in working in the industry a 
fee for the privilege of accessing their services, before they even had a job. A 
local lawyer explained that “companies of this type proliferated, all of them 
[related to] the president. The first belonged to the Minister of Mines. The 
ministers were the ones who started them all. Catering companies, service 
companies, all were in the hands of children and nephews of the president 
and his ministers.”
Tight control of local industry employment and the profits to be gained 
therefrom remained typical throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. However, 
as the industry boomed and foreign companies came in greater numbers, the 
hiring processes and even the local body shops themselves slipped beyond 
such centralized control. One Equatoguinean interlocutor who left the in-
dustry to go back to cacao farming described this change through his own 
experience: “I worked for Major in 1998, but I had problems because I wasn’t 
in the party.4 I am apolitical; I am professional. Joining the party to get a job 
isn’t convenient for me. At the beginning jobs were more controlled in this 
way, but now there are more jobs, more companies, more demand than sup-
ply for qualified local workers. And the government is richer now, so there is 
less need to have their people in the industry.” 
Certainly, part of what motivated this change was the government’s in-
creasingly substantive and lucrative ties to the industry, rendering whatever 
profit or intelligence could be had from control of local workers insignificant 
by comparison. In addition, some operating companies began to organize 
direct recruiting, bypassing local body shops and offering “aptitude tests” 
and competitions, often recruiting Equatorial Guinea’s “best and brightest” 
for jobs that turned out to be little more than menial labor. Finally, the Law 
on Employment Promotion established that all Equatoguineans who wanted 
work in the industry should register at the Ministry of Labor, where they 
would be given access to free employment- promotion services. Despite the 
creation of this law, however, the lawyer quoted above noted that “the pri-
vate [subcontracting] firms still dominate, making money from the money 
of workers. They rob the workers. I have the records of groups of people try-
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ing to reclaim the money that was robbed; not only salaries, but also other 
unknown taxes.”
Indeed, local body shops are hyperexploitative to varying degrees, and 
securing a job still almost always requires either money to the body shop 
up front or a personal connection of some kind. Consider the stories of Sara 
and Gloria, two domestic workers who were employed through a local sub-
contracting firm to clean houses on the small compound of an oil services 
company. They were in the compounds every day, where they cleaned win-
dows, swept the sidewalks, mopped, and, as Gloria put it, “looked for dirt.” 
The constantly running air conditioners brought dust into the houses in an 
uninterrupted stream, which they persistently fought, in between washing 
and ironing the residents’ clothes, occasionally going to the market, and even 
cooking for the compound’s inhabitants if they were asked. Sara got the posi-
tion through her sister, who had the cleaning job before her; her sister left to-
ward the end of her pregnancy, passing the job on to Sara. In explaining this 
story to me, Sara insisted that had her sister not been able to pass her the job, 
had she been “on the outside,” as she worded it, she would’ve had to pay the 
equivalent of US$200 to $400 to access the job. “Supervisors negotiate on the 
side,” Sara explained. “There is one supervisor for the whole agency and pay-
ing her obliges her to give you work. Every month you give her money until 
you get your job.” When I asked if these payments were explicit body shop 
policy or mutually understood if unofficial norms, she replied: “This whole 
industry is about unofficial norms. Our bosses [at the oil services company] 
know. Each one is filling his pocket. There are official norms but nobody ful-
fills them. It is a norm to have the right to rest, to take medical leave, but they 
cut your pay, and your salary is left at nothing. So you are here, sick, working.”
Gloria had a similar story to Sara’s. She got the job through her brother- 
in- law, who worked for the local body shop. Her husband told his brother 
that Gloria was looking for work, and they hired her when a spot opened. 
She too insisted that it was only because of her family relationship that she 
didn’t have to pay, and indeed that her brother- in- law accepted money from 
others as a matter of routine, most of which he gave to the same supervisor 
Sara spoke of (both claiming that this particular supervisor had a consid-
erable amount of power). Even when subcontracting arrangements ended, 
which they frequently and unpredictably did as we saw in Eduardo’s case, 
as Gloria explained, “you have to give her something, bribe her so that she 
will call you [if there’s more work]. If you make an agreement with her that 
you are going to give her money and at the end of the month you don’t pay, 
she won’t call you.”
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Sara and Gloria each had a job that many Equatoguinean women would 
covet, due to its more or less steady paycheck and the occasional perk of sur-
reptitiously doing your family’s laundry in the washing machines at work, 
as opposed to by hand in the river or using the spigot behind your house. 
While they each recognized the benefits of their jobs, the women also felt 
disgusted and exploited by the subcontracting setup. Gloria explained that 
she was paid 200.000 cfa every month (roughly US$400), but that was after 
the subcontracting company took the first 50 percent of her original salary, 
paid to the body shop by the oil services firm for which she worked. Once 
that half had been taken, the government took half of what remained to pay 
for “the highways, the sidewalks, social security, and taxes.” The money that 
she has left, she says, “gets you as far as your family situation permits.” As 
the mother of two children, her monthly bills included 40.000 cfa for rent, 
11.000 for electricity, 3.000 for a landline, and 2.000 for her mobile phone. 
Considering these bills plus the cost of food, Sara exclaimed, “To reach the 
end of the month, witchcraft has to be done! The children need transport 
to and from school, school fees, shoes, and you yourself have to buy clothes 
and braid your hair. With this salary you can work your whole life and have 
nothing.” “Imagine!” she demanded, musing about where the body shop’s 50 
percent of her salary went before she even saw it. “I don’t know how many of 
us work for Voxa. They don’t only have SchaeferCorp, they have [contracts 
with] Hume Tools, Regal Energy, Expor, eglng. [They have] people who 
work in offices, as drivers, as logistics. We would like to know how much 
Voxa earns off our work. We want to know!”
The intricacies related to salaries between contractors and subcontrac-
tors — who made how much off of whose back — was a widely contentious 
issue for nearly all my Guinean interlocutors who worked in the industry, 
from those like Sara and Gloria who worked as house cleaners, to Eduardo 
and others who worked as security guards or semi- skilled labor on rigs, to 
Roberto and Rogelio who had earned advanced degrees abroad and come 
home to work in petroleum engineering and accounting, respectively. While 
Roberto and Rogelio had access to direct contractual relationships with op-
erating companies, Rogelio explained that he had many highly educated 
Guinean friends who refused to come back, despite aggressive recruiting by 
oil companies. “They will always be strapped to a certain income,” he ex-
plained. “They will always be Guineano.” Equatoguineans with the initial 
capital needed to start their own businesses preferred that option to work-
ing for “Guinean” salaries in an American industry. “If you can offer more 
qualifications or more skills, it’s demoralizing to work for them.”
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Subcontracted workers most often explained frustrations similar to Glo-
ria’s, that the body shop was making an undisclosed amount of money off of 
their labor, seemingly without having to lift a finger, and the government was 
removing “taxes” from their checks, but not providing services in exchange. 
Ramón, however, had a more specific story to tell. A temporary position as 
an administrative assistant in payroll for the Major Corporation gave him 
access to certain empirics of the subcontracting setup:
The objective is that the parent company doesn’t want to be responsible for all 
the labor costs; for example, transport, food, the problem of accidents. Any-
thing of this sort, the company gives a bill to the [subcontracting] agency. 
According to law, contracting agencies cannot take more than 30 percent of 
their employees’ salaries. So if Major pays one million cfa, the agency cannot 
take more than 300.000. But what happens is the exact opposite. What hap-
pens is that the agency pays me 300.000, and they can’t justify it. There’s no 
demand for them to justify it. Both the parent company and the agency have 
the idea that we know nothing, that we don’t have the education to investigate 
this. But I know because I have worked in the parent company’s administra-
tion. I have handled bills, and I know lots of things. There have been mo-
ments where I’ve seen an expatriate who does the same work as a Guinean, 
and he makes 10 million cfa each month. The same Guinean makes 500.000. 
The law talks about salary parity. If the expatriate does the same work, the 
Guinean cannot receive less than 50 percent of what the expat receives. If the 
expat makes 1 million, the Guinean should not make less than 500.000. But 
in practice it is incomparable.
In addition to noting how the subcontracting relationship allows “parent 
companies” or operating companies to disseminate liability for worker re-
production, Ramón points to the ways in which local body shops easily evade 
extant- but- unknown and unenforced law (see chapter 3). Despite the labor 
law which decrees that body shops cannot take more than 30 percent from 
each salary, leaving 70 percent (pre- tax) for the employee, Ramón insists that 
in practice some local body shops reverse the percentages, taking 70 percent 
of workers’ salaries. Moreover, Ramón points to another law in which “sal-
ary parity” entitles Guineans to no less than 50 percent of a migrant’s salary 
for comparable work. Already inequitable on its own terms, Ramón insists 
that this law is rarely followed either, and that salaries for equal work are 
“incomparable.” I asked if he could give me a specific example of this situ-
ation, and he described a Guinean friend who had been trained in Auto-
CAD, technical software for computer- assisted, three- dimensional design 
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and modeling used in the industry. Ramón explained that Major previously 
contracted an American engineering firm to do this specialized work, but 
once his friend had mastered the program, he took over the design and plan-
ning for the tubes. “The American company charged a fortune,” Ramón ex-
plained, “about £20,000 per month. [The Guinean man’s] salary doesn’t even 
reach two million cfa [the equivalent of £2,600 pounds or roughly 1/10th] 
per month.”
Despite these radical salary inequalities for comparable work, £2,600 per 
month is an exceptionally high salary in Equatorial Guinea. Even the salaries 
of the semi- skilled, subcontracted rig laborers with whom I spoke, which 
averaged 700.000 cfa (US$1,400) per month, were exceedingly high relative 
to the paucity of other options outside civil service, where official pay was 
notoriously low. Security guard salaries were often a small fraction of that, 
on par with Sara and Gloria’s wages at roughly 200.000 cfa, or US$400, per 
month. However, because of the relative size and reliability of these salaries 
compared with other options, Guinean’s complaints to their migrant bosses 
of unequal pay for equal work, or unexpected and unremunerated contract 
termination, were most often met with familiar refrains: “Locals who work 
for us make a lot more than they would have otherwise.” Or “Why do you com-
plain? You have it so good compared to most people here. There are so many 
others who would jump at the chance to take your job.” “If you complain,” said 
Antonio, “they call you ‘troublemaker’ or ‘problematic.’ If you want the job 
take it. If you don’t want the job, you’re free to quit. That’s the philosophy. [I 
do this job] just to maintain my family. The company knows that you don’t 
have another option.” 
Paolo’s reasoning above, that paying a Filipino worker one- tenth of an 
American worker’s salary abides by “the laws of the economy,” aligns with 
migrant managers’ refrains of “Why do you complain? You have it so much 
better than most.” Inequality is tautologically justified by the inequality that 
preceded it; “ethical variability” (Petryna 2005) is naturalized as both mar-
ket variability and human variability, which sees different standards of living 
for different people as natural, or always- already there (Benson 2008). We 
might also return here to the double meaning of freedom discussed in chap-
ter 3. The “freedom” to quit, like the “freedom” to contract, is an illusory 
freedom. Without access to capital or the basic necessities of life, the choice 
is between being exploited and being hungry. In Pateman and Mills’s (2007) 
words again, “Contract is the major mechanism through which these unfree 
institutions [the modern state and structures of power] are . . . presented as 
free institutions” (20).
The Subcontract 195
The realities of a $1,400 per month salary (let alone $400) in Equatorial 
Guinea are somewhat grim, especially when one imagines that this is Equa-
torial Guinea’s aspiring urban “middle class.” With their regular paychecks 
(if ephemeral subcontracts), Sara, Gloria, Ramón, and Eduardo all aspire 
to own a home, put their children through school, support wide extended 
families both in the city and in rural areas, access regular medical care, and 
more. The rig worker’s words from chapter 1 come back to haunt this ques-
tion of salary: “We are working like Americans but being paid like Africans.”
Consider Antonio, who was sent to Canada by an operating company for 
training. While there, Antonio and a cohort of others were given a salary of 
$1,800 per month to pay for room and board, clothing, and other personal 
needs. He said:
If you translate 900.000 cfa to dollars [$1,800/month], an American will 
say, “Why do you complain?” But I have five children, and I have to maintain 
them. It’s like saying, “Which do you prefer? Abandon your family to study? 
Or abandon your studies for your family?” I ate bread with sugar in Canada 
to send $200 or $300 for my children. I was saying to my wife, “Bear it, it 
will get better.” When my child was sick, I said, “Don’t tell me; let me keep 
studying. I can’t handle it and I don’t have the money.” When you talk to the 
company about your situation, they say that you signed something that said 
you agreed to this amount.
Antonio’s last sentence captures the bitterness of subcontracting: “When you 
talk to the company [to ask for help], they say that you signed something that 
said you agreed to this amount.” The contract comes to be the figure in the 
middle, as Paolo invoked it, through which legal codes facilitate “the iso-
lation and partitioning of responsibility” (Benson 2008, 209). In Benson’s 
formulation, the legitimizing force of the law, here in the figure of the sub-
contract, “is experienced as a double negative” (209). Salaries for intensive 
work on which people cannot support their families are not not regulated; 
rather, they are sanctioned by the subcontract. They are licit. That the bosses’ 
unsympathetic responses are, in fact, protected by the contract form “com-
pounds the sense that depravity is sanctioned, even deserved” (209). Per-
sonal appeals for help from subordinate to superordinate — the conventional 
way of accessing resources for many people in Equatorial Guinea and else-
where (Ferguson 2013) — and their potential for moments of mutual respon-
sibility and understanding are short- circuited by the contract form.
The legalization of disregard for Equatoguinean industry employees’ 
cost of living is brought into sharper relief when put next to migrant man-
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ager salaries and costs of living in Equatorial Guinea. Gloria listed the petro- 
inflated prices of rent, electricity, phone, and food, not to mention payments 
to the body shop manager, all of which came out of her monthly salary, leav-
ing her in need of “witchcraft” at the end of the month to make ends meet. 
Migrant managers, on the other hand, pay none of these expenses for their 
luxurious facilities in Equatorial Guinea. Their gated compounds, electric-
ity, satellite- based phone service, suvs, and food costs are all paid by their 
respective companies. None of those costs come out of their salaries. As Glo-
ria put it:
The money the company spends weekly for food in this compound is equal to 
three and a half months of our salary. And they spend nothing of their own 
salary! They don’t even bank it here! The company pays for their house and 
their electricity and their car and their gas, even the water they drink! Credit 
on their cell phones! We make so little, and we have to pay for everything. 
The expatriates are making a killing here. And us? I have been working for 
six years, and I have nothing. They work here for six years and become a 
multi millionaire in their country.
Indeed, for agreeing to work in a “hardship post,” migrant manager salaries 
were often raised by as much as 75 percent, with cost of living nearly 100 per-
cent subsidized. Banking all of these exorbitant salaries abroad, nearly all of 
my migrant management interlocutors found in Equatorial Guinea a ticket 
to radical class mobility. As I wrote in chapter 2, migrant management cou-
ples shared with me their plans for investing in a retirement ranch in Texas, 
a romantic farmhouse in France, and a surf retreat in Costa Rica. Recall one 
US woman who described shopping for a retirement home with her husband 
with “$5 million cash in hand.”
This juxtaposition of “uplift” salaries (a deeply ironic term, given its his-
tory in African American struggle) for white American and Western Euro-
pean management with the sub- subcontracting salaries and conditions for 
black Equatoguinean workers brings us back to Pierre’s (2013) assertion with 
which I opened the chapter. Where we have the option to see the practices of 
Laurel Incorporated as the mobility of Jim Crow white supremacy, and those 
of local body shops as rapacious, postcolonial corporate- and state- craft, we 
can and should understand them together in “the racial dimension of this 
international system of power and the attendant global White supremacy 
through which it is enacted and experienced” (3). These stories of Eduardo 
and Paolo, Voxa and Laurel Incorporated, Sara and Gloria, Filipinos and the 
US Navy, and uplift salaries for white people are linked in what Pierre (2013) 
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refers to as the longue durée of European empire making. In the last section 
of this chapter, I turn to the imbrication of the Equatoguinean state and the 
multinational oil companies in the licit organizing not only of exploitation, 
but also of abdication of responsibility.
On Responsibility and the Obstacle  
of Absolute Rule
Frustrated that the “social security tax” removed from his paycheck every 
month didn’t seem to be showing up in any inceso (social security) account, 
José sought to trace the question of responsibility through his contractual re-
lationships. In the maze of operating companies, contracts, subcontractors, 
and body shops, the possibilities and avenues for redress — already tenuous 
in Equatorial Guinea — get further muddled. José traced the circuitous prob-
lem from the subcontracting agency, to the social security administration, to 
the contractor and around again:
The agency [body shop] is taking advantage of the workers. For example, 
inceso takes money from your check, but you go to inceso and none of 
the money they’ve taken is there. But they say the problem is with Voxa. So 
right now I want to see the director. Every day they tell me, “come tomor-
row.” They begin to give you the runaround. At the end, you get tired and you 
leave it [lo dejas]. Concretely, we don’t know how much SeaTrekker pays us. 
We’ve gone to them to ask, but they say they can’t reveal it, that it’s a secret of 
the contract. Now this I don’t understand. Each of us would like to be con-
tracted directly. I don’t know the agency system, but it clearly doesn’t work, 
the pay, everything. We should complain to Voxa, but we don’t go because 
it’s an agency of SeaTrekker, so we go directly to them.
The figure of the contract emerges again here, as José tries to determine how 
much SeaTrekker pays Voxa. “It’s a secret of the contract,” he is told. Also 
secret in this web is who, ultimately, is responsible if José’s social security 
taxes do not appear in his account, tied also to his ability to access subsi-
dized medical care and medication. José’s frustrated routes trace contrac-
tual relationships designed to abdicate responsibility for him: from inceso 
that sends him to Voxa, from Voxa that sends him to SeaTrekker, from Sea-
Trekker that tells him what he wants to know is secret.
While workers held production companies and subcontractors primar-
ily responsible for their secretive and convoluted salary situations, they also 
(with fear in their voices and looking anxiously around my apartment to see 
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if someone, somewhere had installed a bugging device) frequently cited the 
government’s role in allowing the companies to get away with it. As Ramón 
put it, “You go along with it because you don’t have anywhere to talk about 
it.” He continued:
We have a saying here: No one can come to cut plantains behind your house if 
they weren’t permitted by someone in the family. This means that everything 
needs the permission of the owner. The company knows the living condi-
tions here, but if they encounter the father of the family — those with power 
here — they will tell them, “You don’t have to pay our people.”
Ramón’s parable is a thinly veiled allusion to the president and those in 
power. If they allow companies to pay incomparable salaries, or body shops 
to take up to 70 percent of workers’ salaries, where can I seek redress? Or, as 
Gloria explained: 
The government and the expatriates share responsibility. Both of them lack 
humanity. Even though the expatriates are making so much money, you ask 
for a raise and they tell us we already make a lot. We have appealed to them 
so many times to see if they can help us resolve our issues, but nothing comes 
of it. They know our situation, and they do nothing. You realize that they are 
in cahoots with those in the regime to cheat the poor people.
Of labor organizing in the face of industry exploitation in Saudi Arabia 
in the 1950s, Vitalis (2007) writes: “Conditions for the nascent Saudi labor 
movement and the relative handful of officials who sought to move Saudi 
Arabia in a more inclusive and redistributive direction were, to understate 
the obstacle of absolute rule, inauspicious, and the firm there had a freer 
hand to deflect, ignore, and counter demands for fairness and human capi-
tal development” (24). In Equatorial Guinea, as in Saudi Arabia, there is an 
intimate relationship between absolute rule, labor organizing, and corpo-
rate freedom to contract labor on the companies’ own terms. The president 
and his regime use their absolute rule to sign production sharing contracts 
that enable near- absolute freedom for the oil companies, producing the 
treaty- like capacities of pscs and the subcontracts they proliferate. It is fair 
to say that all branches of the government under Obiang’s absolute rule have 
failed industry workers in collusion with US oil and gas companies: from 
government- related body shops that pay exploitative wages; to the failure to 
enforce already inequitable salary parity laws or laws dictating what percent-
age of wages can be garnished by body shops; to taxes on already low sub-
contracted salaries that are said to go to social security or “training funds,” 
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when no medicine is available at the public hospital and training funds seem 
to go directly to the ruling party; to the absolute failure of the judicial system 
to address workers’ complaints against subcontractors. 
Many workers even claimed that the government had mandated a legal 
maximum salary for Guineans working in the industry of 900.000 cfa per 
month, prohibiting companies or subcontractors from paying more than 
this, regardless of training or skill levels. After hearing this from a handful 
of interlocutors, I finally asked Ramón why the government would create a 
legal maximum. He responded: 
Here there’s so much money, but citizens don’t have it. Salaries in the public 
sector are low, too low. So the only way you can have money is to engage di-
rectly or indirectly in corrupt practices. If the salaries are too high in the [oil] 
companies, this will create discord because most people in the administra-
tion don’t have the opportunity to take money either. Why does the govern-
ment step on/put pressure on [pisar] oil companies so that they don’t pay us? 
Simply so as not to create discord, inequality between the administration and 
the companies. But it’s something that’s not written. 
I was unable to verify from either the operating companies or govern-
ment personnel if there was, indeed, a de jure or de facto salary cap. But the 
mere plausibility of this explanation, and the fact that workers I came to 
know widely understood it to be true, attests to citizens’ relationships to and 
understandings of their government — its willingness to depress oil industry 
salaries in an effort not only to retain the attraction and power of govern-
ment work, but also to slow the growth of a middle- class independent from 
the ruling party. Given the handsome profits to be had by oil companies 
from subcontracted (uninsured, precarious) labor, we see again here that 
the relationship between corporate freedom and absolute rule in Equatorial 
Guinea is not incidental to, but constitutive of, the daily life of hydrocarbon 
capitalism. Where companies would like to frame “government corruption” 
or the “inability to enforce regulations” as conditions external to their op-
erations (as “local” or as state versus company), on the contrary, they are at 
the very core of these companies’ daily affordances in Equatorial Guinea.
Because conversations about government complicity (or critique of any 
kind) were effectively illegal in Equatorial Guinea, in practice not to be had 
outside of one’s most intimate circles, I came to know Guinean industry 
workers only through other workers. One would come for an interview only 
because someone he knew had vouched for me, and then he would come 
back and bring a friend. The next day the friend would bring another friend, 
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and soon I had an extended network of industry workers I came to know 
over fourteen months. Routinely, however, they came in groups of three or 
four to my apartment, often two people I knew already initiating another 
friend into the odd ritual of talking to an anthropologist. At one point, a con-
versation in which Ramón, José, and Antonio were narrating endless labor 
exploitation nightmares and bemoaning government complicity seemed to 
trail off into discomfort, all of us looking at our hands, not knowing what 
to say to ourselves or to one another about the ugliness of what we were 
talking about, so rarely heard out loud. In our earliest meetings, I had been 
clear with workers that I could offer no guaranteed help beyond listening to 
them, recording their stories, and thinking with them about our unevenly 
shared situation. In that quiet, I was revisiting my pitiful caveats, sickened 
that the only thing I could think to do was to offer more juice when Antonio 
said, “Hannah, I know you can’t help. But can you tell me, is this normal? 
Does this happen in other places?” I said that I wasn’t sure, that I thought it 
probably did, and that labor exploitation in various forms was common ev-
erywhere, including where I come from. But then I continued that in other 
places, people often feel they have recourse: they go to the media; they file a 
lawsuit; maybe they belong to unions or other solidarity organizations; maybe 
the church can help. They are not so afraid of telling their stories. Elsewhere, 
I thought but did not say out loud, the convergence of corporate and gov-
ernmental absolute rule did not seem so hermetic. The workers continued 
to look at their hands, obviously unhelped and perhaps sick of hearing, of 
knowing, that “elsewhere” things were different.
The relevant “elsewheres” for Equatorial Guinea, particularly in relation 
to the industry, were often Nigeria and Angola, regularly invoked in compar-
ative frames by locals and migrants alike. Angola was widely recognized for 
its strong national oil company (Sonangol) and enforcement of training and 
nationalization plans for workers. Even Nigeria, considered a “model failure” 
in certain respects, was considered better than here for the substantial role 
that the Nigerian government and workers played in the industry. Rogelio, 
who had worked in accounting for multiple firms, explained that “in Nigeria 
and Angola, the driving force comes from the state [who says], ‘We own this 
industry.’ Whereas here the idea is, ‘We own this resource.’ Owning the in-
dustry requires the orientation of putting things and people in place to make 
it work.” One operating company sent Rogelio to Texas for six months of 
training, and while he was there he met Angolans who had been sent by the 
same company for five years of training. The discrepancy, he explained, was 
not related to the company, but was between the governments. The Angolan 
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government has a nationalization plan in place through which migrants can 
work in Angola; however, they can’t stay for more than two or three years, 
after which a local has to replace them. A migrant logistics manager for the 
Smith Corporation had just come from years in Angola, where he worked 
closely on their nationalization plan. In Equatorial Guinea, he said, “there’s 
no requirement to assure that service companies have something in place for 
locals. In Angola, there was the requirement to show a plan to advance the 
local population. Here, those opportunities have passed us by.”
Futures
I like the work. Everything that we’re doing is what I wanted. 
I love working in the field and not in the office. I love to learn, 
and I always want to learn more. [But] they’re impeding me from 
learning what I want to learn. I feel frustrated. They tell us that 
we’re learning really fast, as if that’s a bad thing. I would like to 
be a mechanical engineer, but now they’re saying that they won’t 
offer that training. Now you are stuck at the level you’re at. This 
is completely frustrating, the most painful. You start a job with 
your objectives perfectly clear, but then they tell you it’s impos-
sible, and you’ve lost eight years of your life believing something. 
This is the most painful. They promised us. . . . They just don’t 
want educated local people. There is no explanation. . . . Major 
came and they told us if you want to be an engineer, you can do 
it, according to your abilities. But then, poof, it’s all gone. 
— Antonio
Frustrated by exploitative and racist subcontracting arrangements, low 
salaries, and a high cost of living; expatriates “making a killing” in a fully 
subsidized lifestyle; and no viable options for redress, many subcontracted 
Equatoguinean workers expressed a final, lost hope in the broken promises 
of training, education, or marketable skills that their time in the industry 
might give them. If the industry couldn’t remunerate them fairly, perhaps 
at least when oil dried up, they would be fluent in English or have skills in 
AutoCAD, Excel, or engineering. But in the absence of government enforce-
ment, early company promises — “if you want to be an engineer, you can do it, 
according to your abilities” — have disappeared. “Once we were in a meeting 
and the [American boss] said to us, ‘I’ve contracted you to be capable of two 
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things: if they call you on the radio, you need to understand [what they’re 
saying], open and close the valves, and that’s it.’ The boss said that to us 
plainly. From there, well, to now . . . When I started in 1999, the idea [was to 
educate us], to give us the competence levels that expats had.” One company 
agreed to finance the construction and organization of a technical training 
center, but then pulled out or asked to renegotiate when it became clear that 
the government expected them not only to finance it, but to build it, staff it, 
and run it themselves.
Perhaps that technical training center will be built one day. Perhaps, 
as many governments have before it, Equatorial Guinea’s government will 
come to see “the most flexible fiscal environment in the world” moniker not 
as an asset, but as a euphemism for exploitative contractual terms, rampant 
environmental degradation, labor abuses, and corporate sovereignty at the 
expense of national interests. Perhaps, as many governments have before it, 
Equatorial Guinea’s will change hands. Or perhaps the training center will 
end up where others have, in Equatorial Guinea’s relevant elsewheres. “As if 
to mock the sad fact that [Nigeria’s first oil town] is now a sort of fossil, rot-
ting detritus cast off by the oil industry, a gaudy plaque dating from a presi-
dential visit in 2001 sits next to Well No. 1. It is a foundation stone for Oloibiri 
Oil and Gas Research Institute. . . . But the ground has not been broken, and 
never will” (Kashi and Watts 2008, 37).
Futures always seem at once urgent and fated in the oil industry. The 
workers I spoke with knew that their opportunities to make money or re-
ceive education from the industry were finite and dwindling rapidly with 
each passing year. While many had effectively given up their own dreams of 
achievement in the industry, what remained in the more wistful moments 
was always the future without oil (Limbert 2010) — for their children, their 
homes, maybe even a life in agriculture. As one worker expressed: 
When [petroleum production] ends it will be worse. Because of this I am 
building [a house]. Even if you have worked, if you are without a house you 
have nothing. That’s why I’m always building. You have to build so that your 
children have something. There is also information that other countries have 
suffered. I would like to work in agriculture, but right now agriculture can’t 
feed my family. . . . But if agriculture is ever industrialized in Guinea, that’s 
where I’m going, even with little money, that’s where I’m going. 
The persistence of the management refrain that those with ephemeral 
and underpaid subcontracts shouldn’t complain brutally overlooks this fu-
ture. It is a future in which the only sure thing is that oil will be gone. To 
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accept these working conditions despite the fact that they can’t prepare you 
for that future, despite the fact that they don’t contribute to the vision of the 
country you have for your children, is to foment bitterness of our contempo-
rary world’s most violent kind:
My fight is that my child has a good life. It doesn’t matter to me if I have 
work or not. That’s what I said to an American who asked me, “Why do you 
care what’s going on? You have work!” I said back to him, “You didn’t make 
America what it was. Your ancestors did. I want that for my country.” This 
type of hate makes terrorists.
Conclusion
From the fungibility of Filipinos to future Equatoguinean terrorists, the sub-
contract is a frighteningly productive form. One could certainly argue sim-
ply that both the companies and the government want to make money, and 
workers — as always — are left by the wayside. Certainly that story would be 
true. But I have tried to attend in this chapter, and in the previous one, to 
the ways in which contracts offer licitness, legality, and legitimacy to those 
outcomes. Both production sharing contracts and subcontracts offer ethno-
graphic entry points into imperial debris and hierarchies of rank. Again, in 
the words of Pateman and Mills (2007), we see that “the global racial con-
tract underpins the stark disparities of the contemporary world” (3). More 
specifically, I have argued that both pscs and subcontracts, and the long life 
of imperial debris in which they are forged, are productive ethnographic 
thresholds through which to think about racialized inequality as constitu-
tive of capitalist markets, rather than merely exacerbated by them or the 
“context” in which they operate. If we consider subcontracts only within the 
teleological stories of late capitalism through which they are so often nar-
rated, we miss not only the multiple rhythms and temporalities of global 
petro- capitalism — what happens in Russia is radically different than what 
happens in Equatorial Guinea — but also the way that global inequality prox-
ies for ideas of capitalism in its own image: efficiency, shareholder value, and 
“the rules of the economy.”




The first months of 2008 were dark in Malabo. The capital city went for days 
without electricity, stretching at one point to two weeks. Those who could 
afford it used private generators in the days sin luz (literally, without light) 
to keep businesses running, keep homes cool, or allow electric light, mu-
sic, or television. The city filled with the clattering roar of generator motors 
fighting their flimsy steel containers, along with the stench of diesel exhaust. 
My neighbors — a Lebanese- owned restaurant and nightclub complex — had 
a powerful generator, the noise and fumes from which sometimes filled my 
small apartment so completely that staying inside became unbearable. Un-
able to sleep on one such generator- filled night, I opened my door to look for 
air, and to share water and complaints with Moussa, the Senegalese watch-
man who spent every night on the sidewalk outside the Lebanese complex. 
We chatted about the blackout. He said that Senegal provides electricity for 
many of its neighbors — for Guinea Bissau and as far away as the Ivory Coast. 
We laughed and said that Senegal should consider providing electricity to 
Equatorial Guinea as well. But, for all of Senegal’s apparent success in the 
realm of electricity provision, Moussa spent every night sleeping on card-
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board laid over broken concrete on Malabo’s sidewalk, inhaling generator 
fumes, covered head to toe in clothing and plastic sheeting to fend off the 
malarial mosquitoes in the eighty- plus- degree heat. Even without electric-
ity, and sleeping on the sidewalk, he seemed to think that Equatorial Guinea 
provided better prospects than his native Senegal.
In the first decade of the new millennium, Equatorial Guinea was among 
the world’s fastest- growing economies. It is now the wealthiest country per 
capita in Africa (ahead of the Seychelles and Mauritius), and in 2013 saw 
more investment as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp) than any 
other country in the world. It is eminently reasonable to assume, as Moussa 
did, that even sleeping on the sidewalk where the streets are paved with gold 
might get you a little closer to it.
On my block in the old colonial center of Malabo, what one might call 
economic life in a petro- boom was vibrant, if quotidian. In the Lebanese 
complex on the corner, the large restaurant with a menu priced for foreign-
ers and the wealthy most often seemed empty, but the nightclub was popu-
lar with a young local crowd on weekends, and their corner soft-serve ma-
chine with strawberry or vanilla for the equivalent of fifty cents did steady 
business throughout the week. On the opposite corner was a Senegalese- 
owned restaurant popular with locals for the afternoon meal, outside of 
which a Beninois cobbler sat on the sidewalk, expertly fixing shoes for next 
to nothing. Behind him, a small door led into a darkened room, where an-
other young man from Benin sat at a desk adding credit to people’s mobile 
phones, changing money, and apparently selling some of the jewelry and 
home décor items displayed around him, although I never witnessed those 
transactions. Down the block, a local man who owned a small grocery store 
sold dry and canned goods, sodas and beer, candy, pastries, and basic clean-
ing supplies. The steps in front of his business served as a gathering place 
for the neighborhood’s older men, who would stand talking in groups of 
two and three as afternoon cooled to twilight. Next door, Maria — an Anna-
bonés woman — sold bananas, avocados, coca, soursop, tomatoes, and atanga 
according to the season from a low wooden table set up on the sidewalk in 
front of her house. A handful of neighborhood children would congregate 
and play on this corner, sometimes selling for Maria, and other times en-
couraging passersby to purchase a handful of peanuts from Maria’s table so 
that they might eat them. 
There was a lawyer’s office on the other side of my apartment, and the 
lawyer therein had a reputation for his willingness to take on clients and 
cases opposed to the regime. A kind, old, and often drunk Fang man served 
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as watchman for this office, although the post was clearly a ceremonial one. 
He and I would often exchange pleasantries in Fang, after which he would 
switch to Spanish and promise to bring me plantains from his farm outside 
the city. In the apartment above mine lived a local businessman and his im-
possibly elegant wife, recently returned to Equatorial Guinea from lives in 
London and Nigeria. She decorated their spotless apartment with imported 
ikea furniture, while he worked to create a local merchants’ association and 
run a computer store. Down the block in the other direction, there was a 
shoe store that sold cheap imports from Spain at incredibly high prices, al-
though they were open to bargaining, and across the street was a small hair 
salon where I would get my hair washed when I had missed the twenty min-
utes of running water at 6:00 a.m. or was too lazy to dump buckets of cold 
water over my head.
Around the corner, the Ministry of Finance and Budgets was also rou-
tinely without electricity, despite the multiple generators (presumably bro-
ken) visible in its courtyards. With the street- facing door to the Ministry’s 
archives constantly ajar, precariously stacked files and papers escaped into 
the street, caught by harmattan winds or soaked in the rainy season’s mud. 
Further down the block sat Martinez Hermanos, a Spanish- owned, Indian- 
staffed supermarket that started as an import- export business in the colonial 
1940s. In both its Bata and Malabo locations, Martinez had that hyper- air- 
conditioned, too brightly lit supermarket feel that might be found almost 
anywhere. But the display cases full of cellular phones selling for the equiva-
lent of US$1,000, in contrast with the frozen imported meat that had clearly 
been under deep freeze for months, perhaps distinguished it as being in 
Equatorial Guinea. While Martinez’s clientele were mostly wealthy, the city’s 
majority shopped in smaller stores scattered throughout the city’s neighbor-
hoods and in the open- air markets of Los Ángeles and Semu. Even those 
who frequented the supermarket for imported packaged goods most often 
bought fruits, vegetables, meat, and fish at these other markets, where the 
staples came not from Spain, but Cameroon. Smaller French- owned shops 
always carried delicious, fresh- baked goods, but nearly everyone subsisted 
on government- subsidized bread — small, nearly hollow baguettes that sold 
for five cents each. Lines in front of these bakeries — run by Lebanese mer-
chants who were widely rumored to have a monopoly on the import of oil 
and flour — were routinely fifteen to twenty people deep. Patrons would buy 
anywhere from one to thirty loaves at a time, while harried Equatoguinean 
employees would count out change with lightning speed. Outside of the su-
permarket and other establishments frequented by the wealthy, male youth 
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between the ages of about ten and twenty would offer to carry your grocer-
ies, wash your car windows, or help with any other task either of you might 
dream up. Just behind Martinez Hermanos, you could look over a low wall 
down toward Malabo’s port, into which large wooden boats overflowing with 
Cameroonian produce would motor on a daily basis to unload their goods.
While prices on staples like tomatoes and plantains fluctuated with bor-
der politics — Is the border closed with Cameroon? For how long? — and 
prices at high- end restaurants and stores were staggeringly high atop petro- 
inflation, day- to- day currency transactions were relatively stable. As a mem-
ber of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (cemac) 
region, Equatorial Guinea (along with Cameroon, the Central African Re-
public, Chad, the Republic of Congo, and Gabon) uses the Central African 
franc (cfa), itself pegged to the Euro and issued by the Bank of Central 
African States (beac) in Cameroon. While this arrangement provided cer-
tain stabilities, based on cross- border and postcolonial relationships that tie 
Equatorial Guinea to wider regional and transnational networks, other as-
pects of the daily life of money contrast with cfa convertibility. For instance, 
despite petro- inflation that made some aspects of daily life in Malabo out-
rageously expensive, in 2010 Equatorial Guinea remained an all- cash econ-
omy. It was not uncommon to see nattily dressed men and women walking 
out of the bank wheeling what any onlooker would know to be suitcases of 
cash. Credit or atm cards of any kind were useless within national borders, 
from the fanciest hotel to the supermarkets. While one had to carry cash at 
all times, petty crime and theft were rare. It was safe to walk the city’s streets 
day or night, despite the shared awareness that many people in the city car-
ried large amounts of cash at all times.1
But none of this was why Moussa was in Equatorial Guinea. Moussa 
was there for the future. On my block and far beyond in the greater Malabo 
area, stretching unevenly outside the city into Luba, Riaba, and Moka, and 
into the continental region in Bata, Niefang, Evinayong, and Mongomo, the 
Equatoguinean landscape was plastered with elaborate signs. These detailed 
and colorful billboards depicted the large buildings that would soon stand in 
this or that patch of forest: the new beac Regional Bank, the new headquar-
ters of the national gas company, a new refinery, or a new series of mansions 
and apartment buildings. In front of two matching luxury chalets newly built 
by the First Lady on the airport road, the sign read: For Rent to Businesses or 
Individuals. Equatorial Guinea, Growing Day by Day. Chinese construction 
workers lingered smoking by the unfinished elaborate fence going up around 
the mansions. Thousands of Chinese workers erected the new skyscrapers of 
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Malabo II seemingly overnight, and thousands more fanned out through the 
country paving roads and building dams. Arab Contractors — Egypt’s larg-
est parastatal construction firm — also had workers throughout the country, 
building a stadium here, a governmental palace or ministry there. Promi-
nent signs for the efforts of major oil companies also dotted the landscape 
touting community development projects: Building the Future of Equatorial 
Guinea Today.
In a country the size of Delaware with roughly 700,000 inhabitants, new 
infrastructure saturated daily life. It is difficult to overstate the pace, the 
feel, the proliferating sites of physical and infrastructural change in Equa-
torial Guinea, and in Malabo in particular, during my fieldwork. For Ma-
labo residents, the experience of these projects was visceral, sensory (Larkin 
2013; Mrázek 2002; Mba 2011). We watched skyscrapers grow overnight and 
new roads unspool beneath them; heard the endless thrum of jackhammers, 
bulldozers, and trucks too big for old colonial roads; smelled the air full of 
cement dust, felt it on our skin, and tasted it in our mouths. Where in 2006 
there was a huge billboard depicting a department store with a glass- front fa-
çade, with a Ferrari and its stylish white owner in the foreground (figure 5.1), 
by 2008 the blue and yellow Lebanese- owned Ventage store appeared, sell-
ing home appliances by Whirlpool, Black and Decker, and General Electric. 
On the Sipopo road, where massive Ceiba trees climbed through dense 
equatorial forest and whales migrated not twenty meters offshore, signs 
sprouted for a new hospital. Sipopo le Golf — a luxury hotel and golf com-
plex — grew there in 2011 to host the African Union Summit. Land was 
cleared as fast as you could blink, and signs declaring government ownership 
blossomed in the newly exposed red earth. Expropriation was rampant and 
all but incontestable, except for those most intimately connected with the re-
gime, and even for them the process was protracted, cumbersome, and most 
often futile. In an almost farcical move, the president went to great lengths 
on television to explain how even he had been expropriated by this unstoppa-
ble future, as thousands of acres of his private land became “state property,” 
rented to the large US oil companies for enormous sums of money. Huge 
tracts of new housing were springing up — small white homes with blue roofs 
as far as the eye could see. The homes were said to be subsidized by the state 
and intended for those who had been dispossessed, but were widely known 
to be for sale by members of government to the highest bidder. The develop-
ment was called La Buena Esperanza, or Good Hope (Mba 2011; Appel 2018a). 
The discovery of commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits brought in 
Figure 5.1. Signs of things to come.
Figure 5.2. La Buena Esperanza.
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its train not only innumerable infrastructure and construction companies, 
not only oil production companies large and small from the United States 
and Western Europe, Brazil, China, South Africa, Russia, and Malaysia, but 
also countless oil services companies (as chapter 4 describes) offering seis-
mic studies and exploratory drilling; plant construction and rig rental; well 
heads, casing, and completion services; transport and shipping, submarines, 
and fireboats; catering and accommodation; and the list goes on. With new 
companies coming in at a dizzying pace, and all of them wanting to know 
how to invest, and how to navigate de jure and de facto laws and procedures, 
state functionaries were well placed to serve as gatekeepers and socios (as-
sociates) for transnational business ventures. Equatoguinean government 
appointees and others who worked with or for the state would moonlight as 
business and investment consultants. The petro- boom also allowed Equato-
rial Guinea to all but pay off outstanding debt to international financial in-
stitutions, which held nothing of the power or influence they once wielded. 
While World Bank or International Monetary Fund (imf) delegations passed 
through Equatorial Guinea repeatedly during my time there, they were al-
ways on “technical support” missions and were rarely able to broker actual 
loan deals with any meaningful strings attached. Even usaid, attempting to 
operate a social fund in the country, was under an unprecedented arrange-
ment in which the Equatoguinean government paid for their services, essen-
tially using usaid as a development subcontractor (an agreement that had 
officially failed as of 2011).
In short, daily economic life in Equatorial Guinea was, on the one hand, 
quotidian — from blackouts to Moussa’s migration, from sidewalk vendors 
to overpriced shoes from Spain. On the other hand, daily economic life was 
extreme — from the felling of swaths of equatorial forest overnight, to the 
tragicomic act of the president dispossessing himself, to the marginaliza-
tion of international financial institutions. As anthropologists, we rightly 
approach these empirics through all their embodied frictions, refusing to 
flatten them into decontextualized analytics of growth or decline, statistics, 
demography, or other tools of social engineering. The economy is perhaps 
chief among the flattening analytics available to capture daily economic life 
as I’ve described it here (Mitchell 2002; Young 2014, 2017; Appel 2017). Rather 
than refuse this simplification, however, this chapter starts from the teem-
ing scene in Malabo to trace the making of this unified object called “the 
national economy” in all its authoritative and fetishized surfaces, and that 
apparent singularity’s role in the licit life of capitalism.
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Seriality, Inequality,  
and Economic Expertise
What is a national economy and who controls it? 
— Jean Comaroff, with David Kyuman Kim,  
“Anthropology, Theology, Critical Pedagogy”
In Equatorial Guinea as elsewhere, the economy is a privileged object, per-
haps the privileged object, in official discourse. State actors and multilateral 
institutions articulate futures in its terms — development, diversification, 
growth. In 1983, after his third trip to Equatorial Guinea, United Nations 
Special Rapporteur and Costa Rican law professor Fernando Volio Jimenez 
reported that “one official after another all the way up to Obiang himself” 
justified the limitations on the press (there was no press) and on political 
participation (political parties were banned) “as being necessary for the fo-
cusing of attention on economic issues” (Fegley 1989, 220). Over twenty years 
later, during my time in Equatorial Guinea, the persistent unreliability of 
electricity, education, potable water, and healthcare, not to mention the con-
tinued draconian limits on press and political organizing of any kind, were 
similarly justified by the need to focus first on economic development. Here, 
the economy is both the object of the future and the justification of the pres-
ent’s constant deferral.
Where the first four chapters of this book refused the timeworn oil- as- 
money approach, this chapter and the one that follows return to this ques-
tion. But, having now looked at the offshore, corporate and residential en-
claves, contracts and subcontracts, we can return to the question of oil as 
money with a much more capacious sense of the processes and projects that 
long precede oil’s specie transubstantiation. In the expanded understanding 
of oil’s conversion processes that I’ve explored thus far, transnational corpo-
rations come under direct ethnographic scrutiny. In contrast, in the oil- as- 
money literature (both its anthropological and resource curse variations), 
the industry recedes. As I argued in the introduction, in the oil- as- money 
literature, the industry itself is all but invisible, merely a revenue- producing 
machine, a black box with predictable effects (Appel 2012c). And, once the 
industry has disappeared from view, the well- documented pathologies of 
oil- exporting places then appear to reside only in state mismanagement of 
oil money — here, the pathological African state — rather than at many dif-
ferent points within the carbon network, from racialized labor and domes-
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tic intimacies to contracts and infrastructures. In resource curse theory 
in particular, state mismanagement of oil money is made visible in some-
thing called the national economy, which can then seem like something “out 
there,” somehow separate from local experiences of state violence and cor-
porate power. (Recall from the introduction my haunting experience with 
the hr manager who passed me an article on the resource curse, lamenting 
state graft but overlooking the agency of his firm entirely.) In this chapter, 
in my effort to understand the power of the national economy form, I follow 
the work of resource curse theory in the world via an ethnographic account 
of Equatorial Guinea’s “first” and “second” National Economic Conferences, 
held in 1997 and 2007, respectively. The chapter weaves in and out of confer-
ence proceedings to examine a constitutive tension in the idea of “national 
economy,” where national signifies a naively Westphalian framework within 
which “economies” are still conceived, and economy signifies an imagined 
space of private accumulation from which the state must recede. I explore 
each of these terms in turn. First, with regard to economy, I look at resource 
curse theory, economics “in the wild” (Callon 2007), and the embodied fan-
tasy of an idealized private sector. In the second half of the chapter, I turn 
to national as a signifier in this pair, focusing ethnographically on the after-
math of the Riggs transnational banking scandal and national budget docu-
ments, to think through the relationship between public office and private 
gain in the wake of oil.
Taking something called a national economy as self- evident — something 
“out there” that must be made to grow, and on which the future of any and 
every given place depends — asks that we overlook the translocal histories 
and political processes of its creation (Mitchell 2002, 246). As has been the 
case throughout this book, part of my project in this chapter is to narrate 
those histories and processes as they exist in Equatorial Guinea, showing 
them to be integral to the making of an object ostensibly a priori to them on-
tologically. But more pressingly, I want to show how this ability to refer to the 
national economy as an objective measuring tool or space of intervention, 
in fact, creates much of the object’s power. By insisting on “the economy’s” 
power at the same time as we attend to the processes of its making, we begin 
to see the national economy as part of the project in which Equatoguinean 
petro- capitalism is made licit. 
In its bluntest representation, a given economy is simply a statistical ag-
gregate, and one widely acknowledged as distressingly approximate and in-
complete at best. At the same time, the economy is arguably the most privi-
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leged epistemological and political object of our unevenly shared modernity. 
Part of this privilege comes from the seriality of national economies, their 
comparability from one place to another as if the same. This seriality and 
comparability efface histories of empire and the radical inequalities pro-
duced therein (Speich 2011; Young 2017; Mitchell 2002; Appel 2017). As Equa-
torial Guinea’s national economy was remade with the arrival of major US 
oil and gas firms, these histories of domination were the terrain on which its 
attendant fallacies of liberal equality and the spectacular accumulation of 
petro- capitalism were built.
Having returned to oil-as-money, we will see in these last two chap-
ters how the mundane bureaucracies of capitalism — accounting, statistics, 
metrics like gdp, national budget documentation — are constituted by post-
colonial, racial, and deeply fraught local politics which form the ground for 
economic expertise. While I go into an extensive historical and theoreti-
cal account of “the economy” elsewhere (Appel 2017), this chapter focuses 
on how the national economy form can render the radically unequal post-
colonial order licit and apparently subject to scientific management. Because 
the particular science in question is economics, this chapter returns to the 
spaces of “as if.” As I asked in the introduction, how do oil and gas emerge as 
if untouched by the messy frictions of cultural production that we see from 
enclaves to subcontracts? “The” economy — its reliability as a serial trans-
national form and apparent separability from corporate and state power — is 
one of the most powerful “as  ifs” routinely available to the project of global 
capitalism.
National Economic Conference
In 1997, Equatorial Guinea held its first National Economic Conference. 
There had been national- level conferences before, but the 1997 conference 
was distinguished by the fact that it was conceived, documented, and publi-
cized by its state organizers as Equatorial Guinea’s first National Economic 
Conference. Oil had been discovered three years earlier by an independent 
US oil company, and small amounts of money from exploratory contracts 
had just begun to circulate back into Equatorial Guinea. This was a dramatic 
turn of events for a microstate characterized by unprecedented economic 
collapse in the late 1970s, creeping into a crippling debt burden by the early 
1990s. In December 2007, two months into my fieldwork and ten years after 
the first National Economic Conference, Equatorial Guinea, now flush with 
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oil wealth, held its second National Economic Conference. Here again, de-
spite conferences on other themes in the interim decade, the “second” des-
ignation was an official part of the conference’s full title: National Economic 
Conference II. National Plan for Economic Development. Agenda for the 
Diversification of Sources of Growth. Equatorial Guinea toward Horizon 
2020. How might we understand the idea, implied in those “first” and “sec-
ond” descriptors, that a national economy, or at least a conference on it, was 
something new in the wake of oil? Seemingly ahistorical or amnesiac, the 
idea that a 1997 conference could be called the “first” regarding something 
called a “national economy” comes into sharper relief by going back briefly 
into Equatorial Guinea’s colonial and immediate postcolonial history, some 
of which I narrated in the book’s Introduction.
Recall, for instance, that as Macías progressively lost control in the first 
years of his rule, “after 1970 there was not one reliable economic figure, gov-
ernment statistic or census report to be found in the country” (Fegley 1989, 
72). After eight years of la triste memoria under Macías, in which being iden-
tified as an intellectual was reason enough to be put to death, and statistics 
were officially illegal, Obiang’s coup brought foreign observers back into the 
country for the first time. Dr. Alejandro Artucio, an Uruguayan lawyer in-
vited to Equatorial Guinea to witness Macías’s trial by the new regime, of-
fered a firsthand account of the economic situation he found in 1979:
It can fairly be said that the economic, social and cultural situation I found 
in Malabo was bordering on a national disaster. A few data will suffice to 
explain. The economy was to all intents and purposes paralyzed. The ba-
sic services — electric power, transport, the post, banking, communications, 
etc. — were virtually at a standstill. It was the practice for all citizens, includ-
ing salaried government officials, to go into the forest in search of fruit and 
other food for themselves and their families. Macías, as Head of State, took 
the national treasure to his palace of Nzeng Ayong, [and] . . . he administered 
the funds of the state from his house. He had not ventured into the capital 
for five years. . . . Commerce is practically at a standstill in Malabo. There 
are only a few small shops . . . still open but their shelves are empty. There is 
not a single restaurant in the whole town. There has been no electric power 
since 1978. For four years or so, there has been no written press in the coun-
try because, according to the government, there has been no paper. (Artucio 
1979, 14 – 15)
As Fegley summarizes, “Nowhere at any time had an economy collapsed in 
the sense that Equatorial Guinea’s had by 1978” (1989, 155). A separate sphere 
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called a national economy — recognizable and circulatable beyond national 
boundaries — is predicated first on the act of money changing hands, and 
second, on certain forms of representation of those acts in the aggregate: re-
cord keeping, accounting, statistic and demographic data — and paper.
Although foreign aid poured into Equatorial Guinea with the advent 
of Obiang’s rule, and the country joined the cemac region in 1988, those 
renewed ties had little effect on an already- fraught relationship to certain 
forms of knowledge production dating back to the colonial era. Even in 2009, 
the imf wrote of the country that “data on the national accounts, balance of 
payments, and inflation all have significant limitations and make it difficult 
to get an accurate representation of the performance of the non- oil sector 
and domestic price developments” (16). In addition to noting lacunae in the 
specific forms of knowledge production required to make a national econ-
omy in the normative sense, this report also draws our attention to an inter-
esting detail: the imf had the hardest time finding data for the non- oil sector. 
Although they don’t specify why, one can infer that oil industry accounting 
makes up for the data gap, and that Equatorial Guinea’s public administra-
tion is obliged to keep certain kinds of records in the oil and gas sector that 
are not obligatory outside those boundaries.
From erratic colonial administration, to the Franco regime’s complicity 
in official silences, to the national treasure in Macías’s Nzeng Ayong home, 
to the Ministry of Finance and Budget’s records soaked in the street, Equato-
rial Guinea has had a long, fraught relationship with the kinds of enumera-
tion and recording practices constitutive of the national economy form. And 
yet, with oil, that form was interpellated in new ways. Contracts with major 
multinational firms, required the making of a series of documents—budgets, 
reports, economic forecasts—and procedures for accounting, accountabil-
ity, and audit, among others. An acceptably documented national economy 
became both newly demanded and newly possible, hailed by the visibility 
of a single, and singularly profitable, global commodity. The economy, in 
other words, did not predate the commodity in any simple way, as a separate 
sphere ready to be populated. Rather, the commodity’s circulation made the 
economy both possible and necessary in new ways.2
216 chapter five
Utopia and Dystopia I:  
The Resource Curse and Salt into Gold
The future remains a stranger to most anthropological models 
of culture. . . . Economics has become the science of the future, 
and when human beings are seen as having a future, the key-
words such as wants, needs, expectations, calculations, have be-
come hardwired into the discourse of economics. In a word, the 
cultural actor is a person of and from the past, and the economic 
actor a person of the future. 
— Arjun Appadurai, The Future as Cultural Fact
In the year 2020, Equatoguinean society will be dominated by the 
middle class, with work and regular income available to all citi-
zens, who will own their homes, whose children will be educated, 
and who will be capable of meeting their health needs. 
— República de Guinea Ecuatorial, “Plan Nacional de Desarollo 
Econónomico y Social”
The 2007 Horizon 2020 Conference was held in Bata, Equatorial Guinea’s 
second city. Unlike claustrophobic Malabo, where you could barely tell that 
the ocean was just over there unless you peered over a wall, Bata felt expan-
sive, with wide roads, fewer people, and room to breathe. Although daily 
activities of governance took place in Malabo, the public administration 
moved, working periodically from a second set of ministerial and admin-
istrative buildings and palaces in Bata.3 Thus, for those living in Malabo, if 
one needed an official to sign a document or issue a permit, it was not un-
common to hear that “the government is in Bata,” suggesting that unless you 
wanted to fly or take an irregular boat to the continent, that need wouldn’t be 
filled any time soon. During preparations for the National Economic Con-
ference, radio announcers and empty streets reminded Malabeños daily that 
the government was, indeed, in Bata.
At the conference, the president and the prime ministers, ministers of 
government, oil company representatives and their local liaisons, national 
and international business owners hoping to invest, the World Bank, the imf, 
usaid, Washington lobbyists, United Nations Development Programme 
personnel, European Community and Spanish Cooperation delegates, dip-
lomats from throughout the region, local business men and women, and who 
knows who else were all brought together in the name of the future: Horizon 
The Economy 217
2020. After an initial day of registration, opening ceremonies, and closed- 
door meetings, Day 2 included four concurrent, day- long presentation ses-
sions by conference participants on infrastructure, social sector, public sec-
tor, and private sector. I followed the decidedly largest portion of the crowd 
into the private sector session, held in an opulent conference hall with seat-
ing for perhaps five hundred people. The hall’s front wall was painted floor 
to ceiling with a romantic mural of our host city. Leafy cacao and ceiba trees 
framed the foreground, inviting the eye in toward an idyllic rendering of the 
newly constructed port just behind. The harbor glinted clean at the edge of 
shimmering blue water, plied equally by oil tankers and cayucos — dugout 
canoes in common use throughout the country’s coastal regions for fishing, 
transport, and recreation. With Bioko Island and Malabo visible in the back-
ground, the entire painting glowed a warm pink- orange, lit by the flaring oil 
platforms painted pastorally at the mural’s bottom left. With the mural as a 
backdrop, men in suits began to fill a series of chairs at a long table behind 
large white computer monitors. Oversized plastic flowers and plants lined 
the floor in front of the table. This artificial hedge was interrupted only in 
front of the speaker’s podium, inexplicably embellished with a three- foot- 
tall plastic martini glass placed on the floor in front of it, with two shorter 
versions on either side. As we took our seats, there looked to be about two 
hundred or so people in the room, about 80 percent of whom seemed to be 
Equatoguinean, mostly men, talking with one another in Spanish or Fang. 
The first two rows of the auditorium were filled with white men, and young 
Equatoguinean women in conference uniforms scurried around the front 
of the auditorium distributing water bottles and seeing to the needs of the 
dignitaries in the audience.4
The printed materials we were given as conference attendees were star-
tling. As we entered, we were each handed a navy blue plastic carrying case, 
modeled after a briefcase, containing more aggregated information about 
Equatorial Guinea than had arguably ever been released into the public. 
Each plastic briefcase included three main booklets of about seventy- five 
pages each. Printed in vibrant color with extensive graphs and charts, the 
first booklet offered an economic and social diagnosis of the country; the 
second, strategies for improving that diagnosis over the next thirteen years; 
and the third, a poverty profile. Each briefcase also contained five smaller 
booklets of demographic and statistical analyses, including one document-
ing the results of the country’s third general census in 2002. Within the con-
text of Equatorial Guinea’s long and fraught history around these forms of 
knowledge production, and the judge’s quip — “it is easier to find petroleum 
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than information” — audience members marveled quietly at the material. 
Where did it come from? Who wrote it? Who produced the statistics? Is there 
any reason to think that any of it is accurate? The materials quickly became 
a hot commodity after the conference and were essentially impossible to get 
a hold of had one not been among the lucky few in attendance. Even at the 
conference itself, they ran out early.
What is it about oil, if anything, that produces such unprecedented dis-
plays? Certainly, there is a performance for the international community; 
and as Callon (1998) would have it, and Butler (1993) and Mol (2002) too, 
there is performation going on here. But what exactly is “in formation” or 
“being formed”? As I will suggest below, weaving through the themes of the 
resource curse, an idealized private sector, and the pairing of utopic futures 
with dystopic presents, there is something about this new, separated space 
of the national economy that seems “safe” for the ruling regime, for trans-
national corporations, and for civil society participants. When something 
called the “national economy” is laid out in colorful graphs and charts as an 
entity out there in the future to be diversified, it allows a space to open up be-
tween the world and its representation, between the people in that room and 
the reform agendas set out in those unprecedented booklets. “The idea of 
‘the economy’ provided a mode of seeing and a way of organizing the world 
that could diagnose a country’s fundamental condition, frame the terms of 
its public debate, picture its collective growth or decline, and propose reme-
dies for improvement, all in terms of what seemed a legible series of mea-
surements, goals, and comparisons” (Mitchell 2002, 272). Rather than the 
anthropological task being to collapse that distance, I want to acknowledge 
its power by exploring the conditions of its making and effects. How is the 
distance between absolute state/corporate power and complicity, on the one 
hand, and these colorful graphs and charts, on the other, made, and what 
does it, in turn, make in the world?
An interlocutor who had been involved in conference preparations, in-
cluding the drafting of these documents, explained that the Ministry of 
Planning, officially in charge of the event, had subcontracted the research 
and publication work to a Senegalese consulting company specializing in 
economic development. As a result of this subcontract, early meetings, re-
search, and drafting work were conducted in French. Although French is 
spoken widely in Equatorial Guinea, given both the country’s position in a 
francophone region and the number of people who lived in exile in Gabon, 
many Equatoguineans don’t speak French. My interlocutor recounted that 
those early meetings were far from participatory and full of grumbling by 
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Spanish speakers about their inability to participate meaningfully. Mean-
while, the leadership in the Ministry of Planning was desperately under-
prepared to assume their share of conference preparation. They didn’t have 
office space to hold meetings or accommodate workers; they didn’t have 
paper, photocopy machines, or ink. Hence, much of their contribution to 
the conference literature was eventually forged in the offices of an US de-
velopment subcontractor, in town for other purposes. The documents were 
then printed and duplicated in Spain before making their way back just in 
time for the conference. The transnational, subcontracted, and linguistically 
and processually messy process of making of these documents redoubles 
the theme of separation at issue here. From Senegalese and American de-
velopment experts came a series of unprecedented documents filled with 
predictions about the resource curse and statistics of unknown origin. Pro-
cesses of economic theory- making and the production and circulation of 
oft- repressed forms of information turned these documents into what my 
informant called “dream papers,” a widely shared sentiment at the confer-
ence and after that the materials’ contents were more daydreams spun atop 
economic theory than routes through petro- capitalist complicity between 
foreign companies and the Equatoguinean state.
The dream papers came to life through the long hours of the private sec-
tor session, as the Minister of Mines, representatives from the state oil and 
gas companies, and a German agro- businessman seemingly in the process 
of brokering a large deal with the government, one after another, narrated a 
future at once utopic and surreal:
In the energy sector, the government will build two conditioning plants, one 
in Bata and one in Malabo, to make gas available for local use and dimin-
ish ongoing reliance on foreign processing of their products. They will also 
construct a modular refinery in the country to bring down prices. By 2020, 
state- of- the- art gas processing facilities in Equatorial Guinea will monetize 
the gas that is currently burned off in the petroleum production process not 
only here, but also in Cameroon and Nigeria.
The potential for the fishing industry is colossal for industrial, artisanal, 
and farmed fish in the ocean and rivers, with an estimated local capacity of 
65,000 tons per year, the equivalent of $100,000,000 US. The government 
will build two industrial centers and ice factories in Malabo and Bata to ser-
vice this industry. They will educate oceanographers and boat engineers. By 
2020 there will be a fleet of industrial fishing ships, and an industry produc-
ing value- added products for export including salted, dried, and smoked fish, 
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canned and packaged products, and modern fish farms. By 2020 Equatorial 
Guinea will be the commercial center in the region for sea products. Anno-
bón will be the center of the industry, where women will be transformed into 
commercial fishers.
Equatorial Guinea has the richest soil in the world for tropical cultivants. 
By 2020 local agriculture will supply one hundred percent of local nutrition 
needs and there will be more for export. The forests of 2020 will be con-
served. There will be a restriction on timber exports, shifting to add- value 
products to preserve the ecosystem. Tourism too is an important world in-
dustry that generates employment and eradicates poverty. Equatorial Guinea 
will be a destination for luxury and business tourism, offering endemic- 
species safaris in the Bioko Caldera, sumptuous lodges on remote islands, 
and innumerable opportunities to invest while you recreate.
Small businesses and the entrepreneurial sector are the priority in this pro-
cess. The private sector must drive the economy. It should be the right of 
small and medium size businesses to avoid being in an uncompetitive econ-
omy. This will require microfinance, small business loans, export infrastruc-
ture, easy and transparent access to credit for small businesses.
But the “pure gold,” the German businessman suggested as the session 
concluded, is in salt. “Equatorial Guinea has excellent conditions to produce 
salt. The production of salt here, alongside caustic soda and chlorine, is the 
first step in modern industrialization, and then into the real chemical in-
dustry: plastic and other petroleum products that turn salt into pure gold.” 
As he hurried to get through his last improbable sentences, having been told 
repeatedly and loudly to end his presentation, the Minister of Mines finally 
stood to conclude the session: “By 2020, Equatorial Guinea will be a success-
ful African model of the transition from a petroleum economy to a diversi-
fied economy. Equatorial Guinea will be the first country in the global South 
to have avoided the resource curse.”
The salt- into- gold future presented to the audience of this conference 
was premised to a surprising degree on resource curse theory. Even more 
specifically, the erratic utopias of economic diversification were premised on 
an anticipation of “Dutch Disease” (Ebrahim- Zadeh 2003; Sachs and Warner 
2001), an economic theory that takes its name from the Netherlands, where, 
after oil and gas discoveries in the North Sea in the 1970s, revenue from the 
non- oil manufacturing sector started to plummet. The “disease” now refers 
to the pattern in resource- rich countries of exchange rate appreciation; a 
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decrease in domestic manufacturing, agriculture, and nonresource exports; 
and an increased reliance on imports. Economic diversification away from 
oil is widely prescribed as the “treatment” for this malady, thus the 2007 con-
ference title — “National Plan for Economic Development and Agenda for the 
Diversification of Sources of Growth.”5
That the Dutch Disease was presented as a looming fate for Equatorial 
Guinea by both conference presenters and the printed materials was incon-
gruous in multiple ways. In the first instance, the country had long been 
without a productive agricultural sector, let alone other industries for either 
domestic consumption or export. Far from a disease contracted in relation 
to oil, the rise and fall of a cocoa industry had everything to do with colo-
nial and postcolonial relationships (not only between Spain and Equatorial 
Guinea, but also with Nigerian and Liberian labor and Fernandino landown-
ers), contemporary political struggles over imports from Cameroon, and in-
ternal private property issues. Moreover, with once oil- rich Gabon just across 
Equatorial Guinea’s eastern border, and with the offshore platforms of Ni-
geria visible on clear nights from the shores of Malabo, Equatoguineans did 
not need a World Bank or International Monetary Fund expert to help them 
understand the perils of becoming an oil exporter, or to realize that these 
perils had everything to do with the toxic cocktail of local politics and our 
world’s most powerful corporations. And yet, a narrative that could lay these 
outcomes at the foot of a resource, and not at the feet of power, was welcome 
by many in attendance at the conference. The resource curse provided a safe, 
causal, and authoritative narrative that replaced translocal histories of power 
and ownership, offering a modular explanation for social and economic ills 
that moved responsibility, in both time and space, away from grounded his-
tories and toward futures already seen elsewhere, ostensibly inherent in qual-
ities of the resource. The conference became about avoiding a potentiality 
“out there” as opposed to reorganizing power distributions “in here.” The 
national economy becomes another offshore, another enclave, another stage 
for the performance of liberalism — market rationality and diversification — 
erected on the terrain of postcolonial inequality and capitalist violence. 
The work that resource curse theory in particular was doing at this con-
ference was astounding, specifically in relation to time: a future in which the 
resource curse “might” befall us; a deferred future in which we can be every-
thing that we are not now; a future framed by economic theory in which we 
don’t have to think about the historically and politically laden past or pres-
ent. And yet, each of the conference’s utopic visions was burdened by layers 
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of dystopic presents and pasts. These visions required tremendous public 
acts of forgetting and future- oriented confabulations — fabricating experi-
ences as compensation for loss of memory. Through what fictions and forget-
ting must the making of a serial thing called a “national economy” proceed?
The projected fishing industry would require a program of environmen-
tal controls for off- platform pollution, and yet as Eugenio intimated, and as 
others explained to me on multiple occasions, there had not been a single 
independent environmental review of Equatorial Guinea’s offshore oil in-
dustry. Equatoguinean officials tasked with environmental assessment and 
regulation had no relevant training and often took their days on- platform 
as a vacation. In one story recounted to me, the visiting “assessor” left his 
room on the rig only for meals. Industry environmental reviews seemed 
little better. They were consistently done in- house between subcontractors, 
and the results were always positive, despite documented evidence on one 
major platform of the intentional manipulation of water quality testing. On 
the education of oceanographers and engineers, the country has one uni-
versity — the National University of Equatorial Guinea — which, during my 
fieldwork, had sporadic electricity, a library of perhaps fifty books, and six 
computers belonging to an American study abroad program doing primate 
research (a group of white people known locally, in a delightful inversion of 
racist colonial stereotypes, as “los monkeys”). While President Obiang’s re-
gime is arguably more open to intellectual endeavor than that of Macías, the 
country was without a single bookstore during my fieldwork.6
A slightly deeper history of the fishing industry and Annobón’s prospec-
tive role therein takes us back to 1975, the year in which Macías officially 
outlawed doctors and medical care and half of the island’s inhabitants died, 
as recounted in the introduction. During my fieldwork, one could get to An-
nobón only by boat — a state- owned ferry service that was notoriously unre-
liable and often diverted to Bata. A new airport was under construction on 
Annobón, however, and although quoted airfares would be prohibitively ex-
pensive for the majority of those commuting to and from Annobón for their 
livelihoods, the airport was central to the imagined tourism industry, allow-
ing access to Annobón’s exquisitely beautiful, sparsely populated beaches. 
Annobón’s future as a tourist utopia of untouched beaches, depopulated by 
leprosy and various forms of political violence, is overlaid not only with the 
island’s history, but also with contemporary forms of surveillance and re-
pression throughout Equatorial Guinea. During my fieldwork, maps were 
illegal, as was photography in cities or anywhere in the country in view of a 
policeman or soldier. Roads were interrupted by official and unofficial check-
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points guarded by armed soldiers. While simple payments of beer or a few 
dollars were all that was required at most stops, circulation in the country 
was difficult for foreigners and locals alike. Websites and tourist brochures 
advertised the beautiful views to be had from atop El Pico, the mountain that 
rises along Malabo’s southwestern edge, yet the road up the mountain was 
guarded by soldiers, and during my fourteen months in Equatorial Guinea, 
I was never able to secure permission to go up.
The utopian agricultural future totters uncomfortably on dystopia as 
well. Recall from the introduction and chapter 4 that labor in Equatorial 
Guinea’s colonial cocoa industry was provided largely by Liberians and then 
Nigerians — the latter of which left en masse when Macías stopped paying 
them (Daly 2013, 2017; Martino 2017). This led to Macías decreeing a com-
pulsory labor act for Equatoguinean citizens in 1972, requiring unpaid labor 
from all men, sparking another mass exodus, this time of Equatoguineans. 
Since the precipitous decline of cocoa production that followed, Equatorial 
Guinea has had no industrialized agriculture. While much of the population 
outside the major cities is involved in subsistence farming, with some selling 
small surpluses to local markets, bulk agricultural products are imported 
from Cameroon. Less than a month after the conference’s proclamations 
on the future of agriculture, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (the 
president’s much- maligned son, Teodorín) was shown on television throw-
ing money and basic tools to elated farmers, arms outstretched.7 The 2007 
antilogging law — requiring all felled timber to be used in- country — did not 
seem to disrupt Teodorín’s large personal timber concession with Malaysia, 
later used by an American diplomat to explain how Teodorín came to have 
the money to fund his personal collection of mansions and luxury cars, de-
spite his small ministerial salary (Smith 2009). To imagine that the resource 
curse might account for how to strengthen or diversify economic activity in 
the wake of these histories would be laughable, if it weren’t so productive.
The surreal utopias presented at the conference were not the product of 
resource curse theory alone. The detached, idealized, private sector fantasies 
were also rooted in local experiences of a suffocating authoritarian regime 
and translocal imaginings of the endless riches to be had on the Equatogu-
inean frontier (Tsing 2005). Despite, or perhaps because of, the mirrored 
surrealities of a fishing sector with unimpeded offshore pollution; a tour-
ism industry without maps or cameras; forest conservation or a flourishing 
agricultural sector with a minister who personally maintains the country’s 
most lucrative illegal timber concession, I repeatedly found myself in the 
unexpected position of cheering for this imaginary object of desire called a 
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“private sector,” out of whose way the state claimed to want to get. As pre-
senters narrated future utopias of microfinance, small business loans, export 
infrastructure, and access to credit for small businesses, even my graduate 
training to sniff out neoliberalism in all its forms could not overpower my 
visceral support of something, anything, other than a totalitarian state appa-
ratus, strengthened beyond measure by the complicity of US oil companies. 
At the conference and elsewhere, I was not alone.
Utopia and Dystopia II: “Private” Sector 
and “Public” Administration
One of the first audience members to ask a question after the surreal nar-
ration of future utopias was the head of the Equatoguinean delegation for 
small and medium- sized businesses. Obliquely referencing the amnesias of 
the current conference, he reminded the audience of a 1982 national forum 
on the promotion of business, and of the 1997 conference, where it was also 
established that the private sector would be the motor of development. Af-
ter these reminders, he asked, “Where are we now? We need financing and 
access to credit, education, good labor conditions, access to technology, and 
a fiscal climate according to the law. I’m no xenophobe, but foreign compa-
nies are granted all the big contracts, and then we’re hired at dismal wages as 
subcontractors. I have the capacity but I lack the capital. If I had the money, I 
too could subcontract an architect or an engineer.” When he finished, much 
of the conference room erupted in boisterous applause and full- throated 
cheers, and he turned, smiled, and waved at the crowd. His question was a 
thinly veiled critique of the state and the repetitive conferences that came to 
the same conclusions, yet produced nothing — no credit, no education, no fis-
cal climate according to law, no disengagement of the state from its control 
of the private sector. Despite these serial failures, the boisterous response to 
his question revealed that the conference and its imagined private sector did 
offer the opportunity, otherwise unavailable, for people to gather in large 
numbers and cheer loudly at indirect critiques of the regime.
The desire for an idealized private sector was a visceral experience that 
caught me off guard more than once during my fieldwork. Indeed, during 
my time in Equatorial Guinea, this imagined private sector was the widely 
preferred realm of fantasies of freedom and opportunity for many. While 
these fantasies were certainly not evenly shared, neither were they the ex-
clusive daydreams of the wealthy or well- connected. These desires stretched 
from those of impoverished young musicians who had to go to Gabon to find 
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a recording studio free from government or Spanish sponsorship/censorship, 
to those of young Americans working in an “mbas without Borders” pro-
gram who were shocked at the extent to which, as they put it, “big brother is 
watching everything in Equatorial Guinea.” A private sector detached from 
this pervasive feeling of surveillance and control felt downright radical.8 In 
the pages that follow, I explore different moments of this desire for and ide-
alization of a future private sector, thinking through its ambivalent charac-
ter of subversion on the one hand and intimate subvention of state power on 
the other.
On weekends through June and July in 2008, Orange — the central brand 
of France Telecom, at that point trying to make inroads into the cell phone 
market in Equatorial Guinea — sponsored a free music and dance festival, 
setting up a stage and sound system in the public plaza around Malabo’s 
city hall. Replete with obnoxious recorded advertisements about Orange 
goods and services blaring between youthful acts, the festival allowed for 
something that rarely happened in Equatorial Guinea: free public art and an 
open- air public gathering, seemingly unrelated to the regime or the Span-
ish or French cultural centers, at least at first glance. I attended the festi-
val nearly every weekend, surrounded mostly by groups of teenagers with 
younger siblings in tow; but a variety of others lingered around the crowd’s 
edges, curious about this unusual public spectacle. The programming was 
heavily focused on hip hop culture and included numerous rap and break 
dancing groups. Where alabaciones (praise songs) flooded the official music 
industry, whose only source of income was the state, throughout the Orange 
summer stage, there was not a single song praising Obiang or the regime. 
Indeed, there were several songs that critiqued him, directly or indirectly.9 
There was even a song about marijuana.
With labor and event management subcontracted to a small Equatogu-
inean media company owned by a young Equatoguinean recently returned 
from France, the audience was clearly seduced by what Orange and its local 
collaborators were able to facilitate. In a place where the outlets for dissent 
of any kind were curtailed to hushed conversations around dinner tables, 
or framed by “international community” spaces like the Spanish Cultural 
Center, the spaces that private enterprise seemed to open up — like this Or-
ange stage — felt oddly radical and out of control. As with the head delegate 
for small and medium- sized businesses, who felt free to critique the state 
at a conference on the economy, on the Orange stage, too, capitalism in its 
own image became a felt space of possibility and unpredictability for the 
Equatoguinean youth performing, for those of us in the audience, and clearly 
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for the mayor herself, whom I watched leave in a huff during the marijuana 
song. Rather than dismiss everything that happened on the Orange stage 
that summer — or indeed fantasies of the private sector, in general — as es-
sentially and exclusively problematic, I follow Miyazaki (2013) and others in 
suggesting that to take the economy seriously is, in part, to take seriously 
people’s fantasies about it.
The seduction of the private sector was a common trope with which to 
narrate what was possible, and by extension what was not possible, in Equa-
torial Guinea. A US development worker who had spent his entire profes-
sional life working for ngos in Africa, and was now in Equatorial Guinea do-
ing corporate social responsibility work for an oil company, said of his new 
position, “Things happen a lot quicker in the private sector.” He continued:
In the ngo world, the pace of change [was slow]. The private sector doesn’t 
think that way. It’s “We’ve got the money, let’s do it.” . . . What I see here is 
very unlike any African country I’ve been in. This is virgin territory; there 
haven’t been ngos. Future opportunities are linked to the private sector more 
than other places I’ve been. They need ngos and they need more work in 
the development side of things, but what they have is that the private sector 
has parachuted in. There are few places in the world where investors or busi-
nesses looking to expand can come and it’s a clean slate. If you come with the 
right idea and the right partners, you can pretty much do what you want to 
do here. Everyone wants to talk business.
Feliciano, a recently returned Equatoguinean man, was working for a soft-
ware company with a contract to “modernize” the social security system 
by digitizing records. He noted with some pride that this work strained 
against ethnic and other local divisions, implying that those divisions were 
exacerbated by the hand- written, inconsistent record- keeping practices that 
his company sought to put in the past. He said his project would bring real 
change “if we don’t get kicked out first.” I smiled and said that I too was hop-
ing not to get kicked out, to which he replied, “Oh, but we’re not an ngo. 
We’re a business in it to make money.” The difference, he explained, was in 
the politics. ngos represent political interests and are thus more likely to be 
expelled from the country. Profit, on the other hand, is apolitical. While Fe-
liciano knew that I was a researcher affiliated with a foreign university, un-
attached to any ngo, my lack of a profit motive placed me on the “political” 
side of a line. It was only profit that offered safe haven in a place where get-
ting expelled was a distinct possibility.
From the Orange summer concert series, to the newly privatized devel-
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opment worker’s sense of “virgin territory,” to Feliciano’s conviction that the 
profit motive sheltered his company’s presence and potential to foment so-
cial change, the inhabited feeling that the private sector was variously unen-
cumbered and full of potential was pervasive. And yet, it is precisely because 
private profit is almost entirely of a piece with public power in Equatorial 
Guinea that it seems to operate so freely. In other words, capitalist expan-
sion and frontier- making — while it undeniably opened up contingent and 
newly unstable spaces of expression, dissent, or the opportunity for private 
gain — was fundamentally a state- sanctioned and state- building project. (We 
might think again about the power of the production sharing contract here, 
the signing of which not only directly supports Obiang’s regime, but also 
then proliferates a world of subcontracting arrangements.) As the develop-
ment worker put it, “if you come with the right partners,” you can pretty 
much do what you want to do, gesturing to the need to collaborate with a 
local socio in all business ventures. Orange undoubtedly lined the pockets of 
local power holders to bring goods and services into the country. And Feli-
ciano too went on to explain that, in order not to get expelled, his company 
had cultivated local power holders to ensure their work. Decree 137, which 
mandated that all businesses be 35 percent locally owned, made “socio” a 
common role for Equatoguinean state personnel or high- powered individu-
als, put on retainer to serve as government liaisons. Each company paid a 
high- level functionary to protect their interests, push their ideas and needs 
ahead, and get their paperwork through. While Feliciano was excited that his 
company pushed against localisms of various kinds, it also used those very 
localisms (referred to as enchufes, or plugs into the system) to ensure suc-
cess. Thus, this idealized, virgin, private sector Eden — one that shimmered 
in the mural of Bata, beckoned in the boundless future utopias of fishing and 
tourism, and lured those of us living in Malabo’s boom times out into sum-
mer evenings for corporate- sponsored concerts — was deeply entangled with 
Equatorial Guinea’s state apparatus, itself made by histories and presents of 
licit wealth creation at the intersection of public office and private gain.
Dystopia and Public Administration
In this final section of the chapter, I take up public sector finance (Elyachar 
2012; see also Collier in Ong and Collier 2005) as a constitutive piece of the 
national economy form. Misunderstanding “the economy” as coterminous 
with the private sector has been one of the less- remarked effects of neolib-
eralism when, in fact, across Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (oecd) countries we see that total government output accounts 
for nearly half of gdp (Stiglitz et al. 2011). In Equatorial Guinea, both the pri-
vate sector and the economy as a whole are exceptionally coterminous with 
“public sector finance,” to such an extent that it would be difficult to draw the 
boundary in practice. Oil production blurs those lines further and, because 
of that intensified blurring, hails state and corporate actors to draw those 
boundaries in new ways (Mitchell 1991). In order to think about Equatogu-
inean public sector finance in the age of oil, and to think creatively about 
the national economy as an ethnographic object and the way it articulates 
il/licit state and corporate power, development dreams, and spectacular ac-
cumulation, we must first think about “corruption,” as I started to do in 
chapter 3 on production sharing contracts. Here, I am interested in the in-
tersection of Equatoguinean norms around state officials and accumulation 
(themselves contested and multiple), and the equally heterogeneous norms 
of liberal, rule- of- law bureaucracy that come with oil companies and inten-
sified attention from the World Bank, imf, and groups like Transparency 
International.
Remember, again, that Equatorial Guinea is widely ranked among the 
most corrupt and kleptocratic dictatorships in the world by Transparency 
International, the World Bank, Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, and other global “anticorruption” organizations. After being deemed 
“too opaque to rank” by Transparency International in 2016, Equatorial 
Guinea was number 171 of 180 countries on their influential Corruption Per-
ceptions Index in 2017. In 2016, Freedom House put the country in its “worst 
of the worst” category, along with North Korea, Sudan, and Turkmenistan, 
earning an eight out of one hundred on their scale of “not free” (0) to “free” 
(100). Obiang himself consistently places among the richest leaders in the 
world. Scholarly accounts of Equatorial Guinea also often frame the coun-
try as exceptional. Even Bayart (2009), who argues that “we should not draw 
too hasty conclusions about the privileged relationship between power and 
wealth [given that] the positions of power never absorb all the channels of 
wealth,” goes on to say that “only the political gangsterism of a Touré fam-
ily in Guinea, or an Nguema family in Equatorial Guinea, approaches a de 
facto confiscation of the means of wealth” (91). And yet, the now approach-
ing four- decade rule of Obiang Nguema Mbasogo is, like all state projects, 
a “multilayered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of institutions, practices 
and people” (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 6). Not least, as this book has chroni-
cled, it owes its longevity to US oil companies, plain and simple. While Obi-
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ang, his family members, and their close associates have long benefited from 
absolute rule and access to positions of power, it is also important to stress 
the fractures and tensions at the very heart of the regime — fractures that the 
national budget lays bare, as I’ll go on to illustrate. But first, I will briefly nar-
rate the story of singularity. 
Obiang’s family is from Mongomo, a town in the continental province 
of Wele Nzas. He is ethnically Fang, as are the majority of Equatoguineans. 
Widely circulating ethnic stereotypes in Equatorial Guinea (emerging from 
colonial and postcolonial politics) portray Fang people as aggressive, power 
hungry, and fiercely loyal to family. But the “Nguema family,” or the “Fang 
people,” or “people from Mongomo,” or even “Obiang’s regime” are hardly 
the monoliths they are so often made out to be. It is widely known among 
Equatoguineans, for instance, that Obiang has jailed members of his own 
family for treachery or potential treachery; that some of his fiercest political 
opposition comes from Mongomo; and that Fang people are not only the 
demographic majority of power holders, but also the demographic majority 
of the poor and dispossessed in the country. Still, Bubi, Combe, and Anna-
bonés people, let alone immigrants, are routinely the victims of ethnically 
based structural violence. With narrower kinship networks and fewer di-
rect links to power, it is often harder for Bubi or Annabonés people to get 
jobs or to make other claims on the state often mobilized through kin- based 
networks. Thus, while I want to destabilize the homogenizing stories of 
Obiang and his family, I also want to underline the significance of kinship 
in politics more broadly. In such a small place, as one friend put it to me, “la 
politica toca la fibra familiar”: Politics touches (but more accurately, is made 
in) the fabric of families. Equatoguineans interested in oppositional politics 
or contemplating a public critique of the regime are generally disciplined 
with familial responsibility, even if family members agree with the critique. 
“Your aunt works at the port” or “your cousin is minister of such and such,” 
which is to say, keep critiques to yourself so as not to jeopardize shared in-
come streams or create family conflict.
Understanding how power and wealth creation are made licit in a given 
place takes aim at assumptions about legal liberalism — a separation of “public” 
and “private” spheres, and then naming their commingling as corruption — 
as unproblematic, or the only frame within which licit wealth might be cre-
ated. As I wrote earlier, Mbembe (2001) and others (Berry 1993; Guyer 2004) 
criticize this approach for undermining “the very possibility of understand-
ing African economic and political facts” (Mbembe 2001, 7), let alone the 
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realities of US politics, and instead producing a situation in which we know 
everything about what African states seem to lack, but nothing about what 
they actually are and how they work. While I agree with Mbembe and others, 
it has been a guiding intervention of this book that the danger in leaving the 
analysis there is the potential to overlook the effects in the world of all that 
lack talk. Misunderstandings of African economic and political facts — the 
absurd indices that rank freedom on 0 – 100 scales — are not simply wrong. 
They are incredibly productive processes in the world, not only because peo-
ple in powerful positions hold them and act on them, but also because they 
become institutionalized in “neutral,” “technical” and “liberal” instruments, 
such as national economies and contracts. It is one thing to understand the 
intimate relationship of the idealized private sector to political power on its 
own terms, and indeed I start here with a few “local” stories to animate cer-
tain contested Equatoguinean norms around accumulation. It is quite an-
other thing, however, to show the new terrain on which conflicts over public 
wealth take shape post- oil.
Public Power and Private Accumulation 
before and after Oil
Outside Equatorial Guinea’s two main cities, the small villages and towns of 
Bioko and Río Muni are dotted with large, cement homes that often stand 
out amid smaller homes made from more provisional materials. Asking 
about those homes would inevitably lead to a story of someone from the 
community who now worked in the administration and had built a house in 
his or her natal town postappointment. While there were always exceptions, 
it was incumbent upon those with higher positions in the administration, or 
who otherwise got rich, to construct a prestigious cement house — the bigger 
and more ostentatious the better — in the town of their birth. I would also 
hear, scathingly, that “so and so is now vice minister of such and such and 
he hasn’t built anything here yet.” In other words, if you didn’t build one of 
these structures, you could be seen as selfish, as a failure, and as ungener-
ous. These buildings were not “philanthropic” structures in the liberal way 
I had come to understand philanthropy; they were neither schools nor or-
phanages, clinics nor libraries. Rather, they were private residences whose 
interiors would be enjoyed only by the immediate and extended network of 
the powerful persons who owned them. For the wider population, however, 
these buildings were philanthropic: material signs of ethical action, monu-
ments to the correct moral relationship between powerful people and the 
The Economy 231
rest. They showed investment in and attention to the owners’ local commu-
nities, despite their wealth having been gained in the capital city.
I use a story of Luis, an Equatoguinean man in his late thirties who had 
lost his job at an airline office, to sketch another form of ethical obligation 
at stake in questions of public power and private accumulation. Beside him-
self and with no job prospects, Luis contacted our mutual friend Josefina — a 
well- connected woman from a powerful family — for help, advice, and per-
haps an enchufe for a job. I was there when Josefina took Luis’s call, and af-
ter the animated phone conversation to which I was half- privy, Josefina was 
irate, recounting the ethics of the situation in sharply ethnic terms: “Luis’s 
father is rich and powerful! He has a fleet of cars and houses everywhere! But 
he has given his son nothing! This is how the Bubis are! It is horrible! If his 
father was Fang, even if the son had no education, he would be given a job!” 
Josefina, from a Fang family, saw Luis’s plight as complete kinship negligence 
on the part of the father, explicable only in terms of his ethnicity. In other 
words, for Josefina, the only acceptable thing for a father of means to do in 
this situation would be to use his wealth and influence to get his son a job. In 
Equatorial Guinea, arguably among certain ethnic groups in particular, this 
behavior is expected, even morally demanded, and its absence may be seen 
as a grave moral transgression.
At the same time, nearly every Equatoguinean who I came to know, re-
gardless of their ethnicity or relationship to the regime, was disgusted by 
what they perceived to be the excesses of influence and private accumulation 
committed by the most powerful at the blatant expense of public goods and 
services. In other words, all forms of power and privilege have limits and 
thresholds. Equatoguineans could demand without hypocrisy that influen-
tial fathers must find positions for their children, often in government; that 
important public figures must build prestigious private homes in their natal 
towns; and that those in power must stop the excessive abuse of their posi-
tions for private gain. State and nonstate actors constantly, uneasily negoti-
ated these tensions (Sharma and Gupta 2006; Smith 2007).
While these stories of prestigious houses in rural towns and kin- based 
hiring practices give texture to the daily life of “public power and private 
gain,” the stakes of these negotiations and the scales at which they ram-
ify changed radically with the coming of oil. Recall the Riggs Bank scan-
dal I discussed in chapter 3, in which a US Senate subcommittee concluded 
that everyone from the Riggs Bank employee directly responsible for the 
Equatoguinean accounts, to his wife, to the examiner in charge from the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency (occ), to Federal Reserve regulators, 
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to US oil company management, to President Obiang himself were guilty of 
anti- money- laundering infractions (Coleman and Levin 2004). While there 
was brief protest in the streets of Malabo after Spanish television channels 
made this news quasi- public, the lasting legacy of the Riggs Bank scandal 
seems to have gone in several other directions, remaking the literal land-
scape in which public office and private accumulation might meet. First, as 
one of my friends managing a construction firm put it, “After Riggs, the 
government learned that they couldn’t just walk around with suitcases of 
cash; they had to find more nuanced ways of getting money.” Now, he went 
on to explain, the government pays radically inflated costs — on the order 
of 500 percent — to Chinese and Egyptian parastatal construction compa-
nies working on infrastructure projects. Subsequently, 80 percent of that 
inflated outlay goes to government officials as “kickbacks,” or indemnifica-
tion (indemnizaciones). After Riggs, in other words, infrastructure projects 
took on new importance both as a visible sign of the public investment of 
petro- profit, and as public/private contracts through which money could 
still change hands under increased scrutiny. This is no longer a question 
of locally powerful individuals building prestigious homes or offering jobs 
to family members. The post- oil landscape of public office and private gain 
now implicates the American Federal Reserve Bank, US Senate subcommit-
tee investigations, parastatal companies from around the world, millions of 
dollars, and massive infrastructure projects.
In the wake of the Riggs Bank scandal, the Government of Equatorial 
Guinea released a document in their own defense: “Statement of the People 
and Government of Equatorial Guinea in response to the report on Riggs 
Bank of the Permanent Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs of the Sen-
ate of the United States of America” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2005). 
This document offers another window into the effects of the subcommittee 
investigation. First, arguably buttressing my informant’s statement above 
about the role of infrastructure in post- Riggs forms of public/private accu-
mulation, the last sixty- six pages of the document include tables of infra-
structure projects, the companies responsible, and the costs, as well as “Some 
Investment Pictures,” as Annex IV is titled, with photos descriptively cap-
tioned: “View of Urbanization and Asphalting” or “Rehabilitation of Sendje 
Bridge.” These tables and photos are intended to document the licit forms of 
investment to which oil money has gone and to counter claims that govern-
ment appointees appropriate all of the wealth. The first thirty- seven pages of 
the document offer a different illustration of the struggle over the licit modes 
of power and accumulation.
Figure 5.3. Infrastructure budget details in defense of Riggs bank scandal.
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Reminiscent of Nigeria’s 1976 constitution, in which the authors drafted 
political power as “the opportunity to acquire riches and prestige, to be in a 
position to hand out benefits in the form of jobs, contracts, gifts of money, 
etc. to relations and political allies” (Bayart 2009, xvii; see also Simone 2004, 
186), the Riggs Response document (2005) also seeks to sanction the con-
flation of public office and private accumulation, albeit with recognizably 
contemporary rhetoric of free markets, competition, efficiency, and “entre-
preneurial flair”:
Article 29 of the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea establishes and defines 
the country’s economy as a free market economy, which guarantees eco-
nomic freedom, recognizes private initiative, and promotes competition and 
efficiency. . . . Every single citizen, including the President of the Republic, has 
the right to engage in commerce and trade, because the constitution and the 
laws therefrom derived permit them to do so. Foreign legislation, such as that 
of the United States of America, is not in force and does not apply to Equa-
torial Guinea, and as a result can in no way prohibit the President of the Re-
public, Ministers, Civil Servants, Citizens, or foreign residents in Equatorial 
Guinea from undertaking business initiatives. . . . Persons in positions of au-
thority are permitted to promote the creation of companies to be managed by 
third parties. . . . In the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, fellow family members 
of such Authorities are not prohibited from engagement in commerce (2). . . . 
The laws of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea do not prohibit any citizen, 
whether national or foreign, from developing their entrepreneurial flair in 
the country. (5; emphasis added)
At issue here are prevailing modes of wealth creation and distribution under 
new scrutiny, and the negotiation of those modes in the presence of both new, 
fabulous amounts of money, and new mechanisms and pressures through 
which that money must be distributed. The post- oil terrain on which these 
battles are fought is radically expanded beyond rural towns and family hir-
ing practices to include not only the occ, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the 
US Senate, but also Chinese and Egyptian construction parastatals and the 
disposition of private property required by their projects; US-based lobby-
ists newly active in drafting documents like the one quoted above; and the 
globally circulating claims of neoliberal capitalism itself — economic free-
dom, private initiative, competition and efficiency, and entrepreneurial flair.
Despite the boldness evinced in this document — an unapologetic vali-
dation of the wealth of the ruling elite and an aggressive assertion of sov-
ereignty — the daily life of Equatorial Guinea’s public administration, and 
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the administration of the national economy in particular, was far more am-
biguous. Citizens and state actors alike generally acknowledged the govern-
ment’s pervasive failures not only in service provision, but also in the basic 
rituals that facilitate the provision of public services in the first place. I refer 
here again to the equivocal role of administrative procedures, including bud-
gets and other forms of record- keeping, accounting, reporting, auditing, and 
monitoring—in general, to the ambivalent relationship of the state to proce-
dures of administration and bureaucracy.
State Failure, Proceduralism,  
and a Visit to Eduardo
After the futuristic confabulations of the main conference proceedings, all 
participants returned to the luxurious auditorium for a third day of con-
cluding summaries. The conference participants seemed noticeably tired on 
this closing day. People straggled into the conference hall late, and there 
seemed to be fewer animated discussions in the hallways. Having spent the 
evenings between conference days discussing the historic event over dinners 
with Equatoguinean friends, our conversations too had grown tired, moving 
from early laughter at the impracticable goals, toward the torpor of long days 
and wasted time. After participants slowly filled the large hall that morning, 
we sat and sat, waiting for the president to appear, slowly sinking down in 
our chairs, wrinkling our clothing, and trying to hush our growling stom-
achs. I wrote in my notebook, “The future is exhausting.” Finally, the voice 
of the president’s protocol roused all of us from our slumps: “Su Excelencia, 
Jefe Del Gobierno,” and the president’s Moroccan security guards strode in 
before him. The audience clapped in rhythm, and Obiang joined in as he 
walked to his seat in the center of dignitaries and government ministers at 
the head table. And then, it was as if for a moment the impossibly heavy fu-
ture gave way, and the present’s dystopia slipped in. In front of the president 
and others at the head table, government presenters elaborated on, with a 
bluntness that surprised me, the serious and obvious problems the country 
would have to overcome to achieve their future goals:
We are essentially without all basic social services. There is little to no run-
ning water, none of it potable. Electricity is sporadic in the cities, and not dis-
tributed throughout the territory. The health sector is essentially non existent 
for the majority of the country’s residents, and the education sector is little 
better. There is no transparent access to credit for small businesses, and no 
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regularized process according to which one might start a business. There is 
a total lack of legal instruments or regulation in any and all sectors. There 
are serious problems with private property and contract law. There is no state 
contract law or set of laws regarding the quality of work done.
There is no state contract law. There is a total lack of legal instruments. 
These statements do not solely, or even centrally, describe a corrupt state. 
This is a description of the depth of imperial debris through which US oil 
companies profitably traipse. This is a description of the spectacular profit to 
be made in the not- yets of liberalism. The depth and breadth of the problems 
described by government presenters that morning raise the question of the 
relationship between so- called corruption and the daily life of administra-
tive work. If the problems are this deep, can the conflation of public office 
and private gain fully account for them? What about the daily life of service 
provision, the making and implementation of legal instruments, or regula-
tion? National economies are built not only at the interface of forms of licit 
accumulation, but also by the mundane procedures of budget- making and 
record- keeping. Conference documents from both 1997 and 2007 dwell at 
length on bureaucratic chaos, complicating a picture of simple corruption:
More than corruption, Equatorial Guinea suffers from the absence of the 
procedures and tools of administration that facilitate the control of spending 
and limit the risk of the diversion of funds. It seems that Equatorial Guinea 
has not benefitted from an administrative tradition, allowing the country to 
construct a truly structured State. The modern Equatoguinean administra-
tion is still to be built (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2007a, 42). (Parece que 
Guinea Ecuatorial no se haya beneficiado de una tradición administrativa, 
permitiéndole construir un Estado verdaderamente estructurado. La admin-
istración Ecuatoguineana moderna queda por construir.)
As if to drive home the extent of what exactly remains to be built, another 
document narrates a bafflingly vast series of required reforms. Under the 
heading “Implement Quality Governance at the Service of Citizens,” the list 
includes, among other directives: (1) launch a planning state and a modern 
administration; (2) revise the legislative framework; (3) reform the judicial 
system; (4) encourage the participation and representation of citizens; and (5) 
secure the respect for human rights (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2007b, 
10 – 11). The documentation from the 1997 conference details a series of im-
plementations agreed to by the government that are equally shocking, given 
the absences they acknowledge. To paraphrase: The government will propose 
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legislation to ensure that accounting procedures and financial and regulatory 
laws are followed, backed by the threat of external audit. The government will 
introduce new rules and procedures to control the budget process and identify 
the functionaries responsible for discrete actions through the process. The bud-
gets of every agency will be identified, and the financial administration at de-
partmental levels will be improved (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 1997, 28; 
emphasis added). In other words, in 1997 there was no legislation requiring 
the monitoring of accounting or other financial procedures, nor were there 
codified processes that separated agencies by budgets, or budgets by respon-
sible party. Thinking back again to this “first” conference, these documents 
show, again, how newly circulating oil wealth demanded these procedures be 
put in place. To give one more example from the 1997 document, an adopted 
reform under the heading “The Function of the Treasury” reads: “The gov-
ernment will seek the necessary technical assistance to develop and design 
the systems, processes, and procedures of control for spending and [account-
ing]. This will allow the Treasury to maintain accounts for all agencies col-
lecting and spending public funds” (29). In a country where public funds are 
of a piece with private investment, what is a national economy in the absence 
of national budget accounting procedures or of national treasury accounts 
separated by agencies collecting and spending public funds? And what does 
it mean to try to make one, when suddenly billions of dollars are pouring 
in, and yet the treasury has long operated somewhere between Nzeng Ayong 
and Riggs Bank? It was in conversations with Eduardo that I began to think 
through these questions.
Without house numbers and with only a few main streets named, it 
was often a challenge to find unfamiliar destinations in Malabo. The ori-
enting landmark Eduardo had given to find his house was a well- known 
pepe soup restaurant. Friends and field interlocutors had long explained that 
Eduardo did not talk to just anyone, so I had waited until late in my field-
work to approach him, when I finally felt I had a list of informed questions 
that might be worthy of his time (and when I knew my way around the 
city!). A scholarly lawyer long active in opposition politics, Eduardo was un-
derstandably cagey about those to whom he granted an audience, and why. 
Despite all my careful preparation, approaching the pepe soup restaurant I 
was nervous that he would regret the invitation. When I finally found the 
corner store that marked his building and walked up a flight of stairs to the 
second- floor apartment, a young man greeted me, opening double doors to 
a shocking site: books. Books! Eduardo’s airy, high- ceilinged flat was lined 
floor- to- ceiling with bookshelves, and still more books covered the floor in 
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inclining piles. And papers! Stacks of papers and files leaned this way and 
that, covering and spilling off of available surfaces onto the tiled floor. That 
the sight of so many books — philosophy, history, political theory, law, and 
literature — caught me off guard has stayed with me for a long time. Beyond 
attention to knowledge production, as anthropologists we also must attend 
to the histories, uses, and relationships to specific kinds of knowledge in 
specific places — here, the kind to be found in books in a country with no 
bookstores. Indeed, in one sense, the idea of a “national economy” is but a 
representation of accumulated information; however, it’s not merely the con-
tent of that information that matters, but also what information as a cate-
gory means, and to whom, at the intersection of a country where being an 
intellectual was reason to be put to death for a time and an industry wherein 
agnotology is often the order of the day (Appel et al. 2015).
I sat amid the books to ask Eduardo questions about oil’s more intimate 
histories in local politics, and he began by telling me an origin story that I 
recount various times throughout this book. The late 1980s and early 1990s 
were a time of deep economic and political crisis in Equatorial Guinea. Ex-
ternal debt levels were among the highest on the continent, and Obiang’s 
regime, in power for ten years at that point, was under mounting pressure 
from a strong and newly unified opposition, emboldened by pressure from 
the international community. Chester Norris was the American ambassador 
to Equatorial Guinea during these years, between 1988 and 1991. During his 
tenure, Norris acted openly as the intermediary between local political fig-
ures and new American oil interests in the country. Walter International was 
the first American production company to produce oil in Equatorial Guinea, 
and Chester Norris served as their representative. In 2009, Avenida Ches-
ter Norris was one of the few named streets in the city, alongside Avenida 
Hassan II, after the Moroccan King whose kingdom has provided Obiang 
with his most trusted security guards. According to Eduardo, the money 
from those early contracts brokered by Norris went directly, personally, to 
Obiang (see chapter 3).
Many in Equatorial Guinea and within oil companies themselves will 
readily admit that the early days of oil contracts were full of personalized 
dealings and “irregularities,” and most will end these stories by explain-
ing that now all that has changed. Whether oil companies now face more 
public scrutiny or have undergone meaningful reforms in the post- Enron/
Sarbanes- Oxley moment is unclear, and whether local power holders have 
learned to deal differently with transnational corporations or were merely 
chastened by Riggs Bank is also unclear. Regardless, actors on both sides 
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generally admit to early transgressions in order to demonstrate contempo-
rary compliance, reminiscent of Baudrillard’s (2001) critique of capital stag-
ing its own death: “It is always a question of proving the real by the imagi-
nary; proving truth by scandal; proving the law by transgression. . . . Power 
can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legiti-
macy” (179).
Rather than explaining to me how things had changed since Obiang, and 
perhaps Norris himself, pocketed Walter International’s money, Eduardo 
took a different turn in our conversation. He walked across the room and 
reached into the middle of a paper mountain, returning to our seats by the 
window with a thick, dog- eared sheaf in hand. Shaking the stack as antici-
patory punctuation, Eduardo spoke in a whisper so intense that it seemed 
to emanate more from the desire to keep from yelling than to not be heard. 
“Money from petroleum exploitation didn’t appear in state budget docu-
ments until 2005! Look for the budgets from 2002, 2003, and 2004. Petro-
leum money does not appear!”
The stacks Eduardo held were national budget documents stretching 
from 2004 to 2007. As he flipped through them, he narrated his close read-
ings of these budgets faster than I could take notes. Roughly 50 percent of an-
nual budgets go into a category of “investments,” of which the largest portion 
is construction and infrastructure (recalling the post- Riggs moment of pub-
lic office and private gain, above). While the budget documents contained 
long lists of these projects and their projected costs, there was no proof or 
information indicating whether these projects had, in fact, been completed, 
nor were there numbers regarding their actual costs once completed. Edu-
ardo’s voice rose and he looked me in the eyes:
There are paragraphs that say, “We don’t know where this money goes.” 
There are sectors of the administration where the money does not enter the 
treasury. They are essentially saying here [while stabbing the document an-
grily with his pointer finger] that the money made by the government from 
the sale of national territory does not enter the treasury! These are reflections 
of inner- regime conflicts, but the document is still approved! There is no 
follow- through or monitoring. People in the regime with personal conflicts 
have suffered trying to develop accurate budget documents. [These docu-
ments] are a confession of the impotence of those who work in the Ministry 
of Finance.
As we sat and talked our way through the documents, the story that 
began to emerge most forcefully was of Equatorial Guinea’s parastatals — 
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legally separate entities created by the government to undertake commercial 
activities. These entities are largely funded by the government, but osten-
sibly operate with some degree of autonomy. (National oil companies are 
famous examples of parastatals, such as Saudi Arabia’s aramco or Brazil’s 
Petrobras. Within the US context, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are other, 
now notorious, examples.) Starting with the story of Bata Ports, a parastatal 
in charge of port administration in Bata, Eduardo explained that in 2006 
they received a government subsidy of 100 million cfa (about US$200,000), 
100 percent of which was unaccounted for. Did they deposit it in the trea-
sury? Where did it go? And, more pointedly, who might dare to follow up 
on these questions? He went on to explain that a host of institutions, includ-
ing the university, the social security administration, and the national gas 
company, were never asked to account for the money they received from the 
government. But with opposition pressure on this point starting in 2006, 
these institutions began to bring budgets to the table. “These are like feuds,” 
Eduardo explained. “When Obiang names someone [to lead an institution], 
they just use their appointment as an opportunity for private accumula-
tion.” “But surely,” I said, “there’s more than avarice at work here.” I talked 
about my experiences in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
process (documented in chapter 6), noting that there were radically differ-
ent levels of bureaucratic competence in the ministries. While a few people I 
worked with clearly had the training to produce complex budget documen-
tation (training that I do not have), others definitely did not; even among 
those who did, many felt that crunching numbers on Excel spreadsheets was 
menial work compared to their daily tasks of face- to- face meetings where 
agreements were brokered and work actually got done. “So, how much does 
procedural competence have to do with it,” I asked. “How much expertise is 
there in the formalities and procedures of budget- making?” Citing Chabal 
and Daloz’s Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (1999), Eduardo 
responded, “This disorder, this incompetence — when incompetent people 
are appointed to these posts it’s on purpose. It is using disorder as a political 
instrument.”
I left Eduardo’s house as the sun was setting and the harmattan sky was 
deepening to dusky orange. I was dizzy from the hurried flipping through 
documents full of numbers and charts, accompanied by Eduardo’s fervent 
narration. I was anxious about what an anthropological eye/ear might be 
able to bring to bear on documents so central to the national economy cos-
mos. Before leaving his house, I had asked if I might photocopy the docu-
ments we had gone over so that I could study them at greater length and then 
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come back to him with further questions. He agreed, on the condition that 
I come back the next day to pick them up, to give him the chance to orga-
nize the documents and take note of what he had lent me. When I returned 
to Eduardo’s house the next day, he was out, but the same young man who 
had so quietly ushered me into the book- filled room passed me five bursting 
manila envelopes of documents that I took to a small ciber — an establish-
ment that rented time on computers and happened to have a copy machine, 
as well. The Cameroonian clerk and I laughed and joked and talked about 
soccer as he took out the documents. But as soon as he saw the contents of 
what he was about to photocopy, he grew reticent and asked me if I worked 
for the government. I boldly said that I did not and that I was doing a re-
search project. Our conversation ended abruptly there, and I sat for a few 
hours watching the afternoon fade into night as he taciturnly copied and 
collated the materials.
Pouring over these documents, I indeed found the problems to which 
Eduardo drew my attention. The documents limn the cracks and internal 
tensions of an ostensibly monolithic and smoothly kleptocratic regime. Of 
the National University (unge), a 2006 document reads, “This institution 
lacks both accounting books and basic notions of accounting. This situation 
does not permit us to have reliable data” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 
2006a, 17). The same document three years later says of the university, “De-
spite the presentation of budgets that don’t even minimally respect the estab-
lished criteria, [La unge] has never justified the use of the funds put at their 
disposal by the government” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2009, 6). By 
2009, according to the Ministry of Finance responsible for these documents, 
the university had yet to produce a roster detailing how many professors 
it had on payroll and their salaries. Despite this lack of personnel records, 
the document notes that in unge’s anticipated budget for 2009, “there are 
122 professors who do not appear on the remitted payroll” (República de 
Guinea Ecuatorial 2009, 6).
Concerning the National Institute for Business Promotion and Develop-
ment (inpyde) — a particularly relevant institution given the general thrust 
of the Horizon 2020 plan — the budget document contemptuously reports: 
“This institution that advocates business promotion and development seems 
to be marginal to the realization of these activities. During the fiscal year 
that closed on December 31st, 2005, this institution had not accomplished 
a single activity of their own that advocated business promotion and/or de-
velopment. . . . Of the 195 million cfa subsidy inpyde received [roughly 
US$400,000], 62% went to pay personnel, 10.8% went to education even 
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though they did not hold a single seminar, and 8.7% went to travel costs” 
(República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2009, 18).
Concerning the Bioko Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture, and For-
estry’s final reported numbers, the 2005 budget document reads that “these 
results are fictitious and paradoxical when it is known that the Chamber is 
in debt to bgfi Bank for 335 million cfa” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 
2005, 19). And finally, in a document intended to review all submitted bud-
gets of all parastatals from 2005 to 2009, it indicates that GEProyectos  — the 
entity ostensibly responsible for all infrastructure projects nationwide — had 
submitted no budget data in four years. “This company has not remitted any 
information about the execution of its budgets” (República de Guinea Ecu-
atorial 2009, 10). Nevertheless, 2009’s anticipated national budget showed 
that GEProyectos was to receive a 200 percent increase in its government 
subsidy.
Despite Eduardo’s insistence on the intentional and strategic use of dis-
order, even this perfunctory glance at thousands of pages of budget docu-
ments reveals both an internally fractured regime and its ambivalence about 
the role of procedures and techniques of administration, accounting in par-
ticular. At the very least, we see the Ministry of Finance openly critiquing 
responsible parties at the National University and the National Institute for 
Business Promotion and Development, arguably trivial institutions in terms 
of both budget allocations and political clout. However, when that criticism 
extends to the information provided by the national gas company and GE-
Proyectos, the friction takes on increased political weight. Moreover, from 
both the National Economic Conference and the National Budget documen-
tation, I want to insist on the significance of statements about bureaucratic 
procedures. If the National University “lacks both accounting books and 
basic notions of accounting,” and if, by their own admission, in 2007 the 
government had not adopted “procedures and tools of administration that 
facilitate the control of spending and limit the risk of the diversion of funds,” 
then there is more to be said than simply that “new” or “Western” forms of 
accounting and accountability came in with oil that were in tension with lo-
cal forms that worked in the past. Rather, local political conflicts and their 
minimal room for maneuver are expressed through who may or may not be 
fluent in “basic notions of accounting.” 
Although, as Eduardo tells it, there is no one in the government who 
would dare to follow up on these arguably shocking “irregularities,” the 
Ministry of Finance still ends the document by daring the Parliament to 
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pass these budgets: “We present [the results] to this highest legislative body, 
to determine whether or not to validate the budgets presented by these Au-
tonomous State Entities, despite the preliminary conclusions reached by the 
Ministry of Finance and Budgets” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2006a, 
20). Looking at ethnographic data at this level alerts us to the relationship 
between broader political economic analysis — complicity among US bank-
ing and regulatory systems, transnational oil companies, and various dicta-
torial regimes — and the minutiae and infighting in the more localized daily 
practices of accounting and budget validation.
If Equatorial Guinea’s national economy is made at the intersection of 
political infighting, insufficiency in basic accounting techniques, and spec-
tacular accumulation, then what is this fetishized object? “Economic exper-
tise is forced largely to overlook . . . leakage, network, energy, control, vio-
lence, and irrationality,” as Mitchell (2002) writes.
It does not take them seriously, for that is not its task. The role of economics 
is to help make possible the economy by articulating the rules, understand-
ings, and equivalences out of which the economic is made. . . . This has been 
its impossible project. . . . This self- deception is essential, for otherwise it 
would have to follow these links, powers, and leakages, and admit that there 
could be no economy. (300)
In other words, despite all this leakage, violence, and transnational irratio-
nality, there is an “Equatoguinean” economy in the name of which the eter-
nal deferral of the future is justified; the government signs contracts worth 
billions of dollars; and carnivalesque conferences are convened and con-
vened again.
Conclusion
There is an enduring tension — epitomized in the national economy form, 
but stretching far beyond it — between the messy daily practices of national 
budget- making and the authoritative work those eventual forms do in the 
world; between the dystopian histories and presents of life in Equatorial 
Guinea and the utopian futures imagined in an idealized private sector, or 
a disembodied and diversified national economy. In negotiating this ten-
sion, I have tried to avoid the approach of simply demonstrating the ways 
in which concrete national economies differ from economists’ “abstract” 
national economies (Callon 1998; MacKenzie et al. 2007; Miyazaki 2013; 
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Holmes 2014; Appel 2017). Instead, I have proceeded on the understanding 
that “the economy is an artifactual body — a fabrication, yes, but as solid as 
other fabricated objects, and as incomplete” (Mitchell 2002, 301). Once we 
can hold both poles of the artifactual simultaneously, the solidity and the 
incompleteness, then we can shift analytic attention to the spaces opened 
up by these tensions in the world: productive spaces of misrepresentation, 
simplification, forgetting, and confabulation, in which powerful objects like 
“national economies” come to exercise much of their power. If, for instance, 
every country everywhere has a national economy, whose historical trajecto-
ries and potential futures can be compared, avoided, or emulated by employ-
ing authoritative economic and political tools like the resource curse, then 
we end up with dream spaces like the National Economic Conference I at-
tended and the reverberations of an idealized private sector far outside con-
ference walls. Involvement in a matchlessly lucrative sector of global trade 
like the oil industry compounds both the surrealism and the productivity 
of these spaces, as it requires intensified negotiation with new forms and ge-
ographies of legibility, licit accumulation, accounting, demography, record- 
keeping, the disposition of private property, and contract law, among others. 
These negotiations make Equatorial Guinea into a place from which hydro-
carbons can be extracted and exported licitly, even as they retrench translo-
cal forms of power, inequality, and rule. Central to these negotiations, then, 
is the alienability of hydrocarbon and its associated profits from Equatorial 
Guinea, epistemologically the same space of separation required between a 
national economy and the aggregate transactions and histories it can and 
cannot represent.
That it was the resource curse that enframed these temporal and spatial 
separations at 2007’s National Economic Conference is particularly demon-
strative, because at its core this body of theory is about the entanglement 
of oil money with local power structures. Because of the narrow focus on 
money, the suggestion is that this entanglement is somehow only “in” the 
national economy — the revenue from oil is misused; revenue streams aren’t 
diversified. The antidotes, similarly, become located “in” national economy 
fixes, for which the national government is solely responsible. But given the 
four preceding chapters, we can see the much more complicated daily life of 
the entanglements of the US oil industry with local power — entanglements 
in contracting and subcontracting regimes, infrastructure, labor, and en-
claved corporate and residential life, all of which are required long before oil 
and gas circulate back into national economies as money.
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The 2007 conference literature ends with two appendices that describe 
other national economies worth emulating. The first explains Dubai’s twenty- 
three- year transition away from an economy solely reliant on oil:
In 1990, Dubai’s government confronted their economic dependency on fos-
sil fuels, and decided to begin a conversion to new technologies, commerce, 
and luxury commercial ventures. In fifteen years, petroleum’s contribution 
to gnp fell from 80% to 10%. Dubai’s accelerated development was possi-
ble thanks to the voluntary recourse to foreign workers at all levels . . . to 
cover the country’s central necessities. This translated into extremely sim-
plified procedures for business contracts and the hiring of foreign workers. 
In 2003, 84% of Dubai’s population was immigrants, 71% of which were men. 
(República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2007a, 71)
The second narrates Singapore’s forty- year rise from “a third world island 
without resources” to “a true global economic dragon”:
The development of this island without resources was based essentially in 
the development of strong public infrastructure and the creation of an es-
pecially favorable business climate: Policies to attract foreign investment; A 
reliable judicial system that protects property rights; The most efficient and 
least expensive manual labor among developed countries; Prestigious busi-
ness schools administrated by Harvard; Perfect control of trade logistics; Lo-
gistical efficiency at air and sea ports. . . . Singapore surely owes its success to 
the great visionary Lee Kwan Yew, who knew to use his authoritarianism for 
the singular purpose of forging a common identity from a multiethnic society. 
In this way, he was able to inculcate concepts of Asian values including the 
primacy of the collective over the individual, the benefit of consensus, work, 
and savings into the population. (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2007a, 72; 
emphasis added)
These disembodied pasts, offered as Equatorial Guinea’s desired futures, 
perfectly illustrate the fantasy of something called a “national economy,” an 
object that enables the framing of “collective growth or decline, and reme-
dies for improvement, all in terms of what seemed a legible series of measure-
ments, goals, and comparisons” (Mitchell 2002, 272). Dubai offers a model 
in which local power holders would never have to respond to the small busi-
nessman’s popular plea for access to credit or capital, but could continue and 
even expand the “extremely simplified procedures for business contracts and 
the hiring of foreign workers” like body shopping and pay according to na-
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tion of origin (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2007a, 71). Singapore offers a 
model in which a combination of authoritarianism and orientalist essential-
ism pave the way for the Harvard- approved “perfect” control of trade logis-
tics, a judicial system that seems to protect only private property rights, and 
the most efficient port in the world.
These false equivalences and disavowals of historical connection enabled 
by the national economy form — the same in Singapore, Dubai, and Equato-
rial Guinea — are precisely the effects of macroeconomic tools like gdp or 
national growth rate when laid across postcolonial inequality. While these 
tools offer an expert language of comparability and potential equality, they 
also legitimize and dehistoricize radical inequality, rendering hierarchies of 
global supremacy licit in scientific language (Speich 2011; Appel 2017). The 
particular violence of the national economy form in the global South, and 
the enrolling of economic theories like the resource curse in that violence, 
entreat ethnographic attention. Independence- era Senegalese political lead-
ers Mamadou Dia and Léopold Senghor were prescient in their concerns 
that, even as they fought for political independence from France, relational 
inequality between colonizers and soon- to- be nation- states would not be 
undone by “nominal independence” in a world they insisted was increas-
ingly interdependent (Cooper 2015, 68; see also Pierre 2013; Ralph 2015). The 
sequelae of their concerns live on, here in National Economic Conferences 
in Equatorial Guinea, and thrumming in those moments when world and 
representation are not one; when development plans and economic theory 
occlude transnational corporate power; and when performativity is not so 
complete that the model becomes the world. These are the spaces of political 
possibility within the foreclosures of modern politics. To find them is to par-
ticipate in the classic ethnographic project of making the familiar strange: 
“Given the centrality of the economy to modernist social representations . . . 
it is necessary to defamiliarize the economy as feminists have denaturalized 
the body, as one step toward generating alternative social conceptions and 
allowing new political subjectivities to be born” (Gibson- Graham 2006, 97).
CHAPTER SIX
The Political
As I have shared the research on which this book is based in presentations 
and publications over the last five or six years, I’m often met with differing 
versions of these questions: What is the solution? What is the solution to 
the deep complicity between US oil companies and repressive regimes like 
Obiang’s? What is the solution to the incantation — waterschoolselectric-
ityhealthcare (water schools electricity healthcare) — that haunts too many 
resource- rich countries with the repeating specter of squandered oil reve-
nues? And of course, far beyond this book, the serial horrors of the transna-
tional oil industry in the global South, in particular, also provoke the ques-
tion: What is the solution? For people and organizations variously invested 
in and effected by extractive industries, transparency is often the answer. 
Forcing open the ledgers of infamously secretive transnational corporations 
and the governments with whom they collude, the idea goes, will reveal the 
flows of oil revenue — from whom and to whom — to the public, and thus bet-
ter enable that public to claim their fair share for running water, healthcare, 
infrastructure development, and education. This is the (mostly implicit) the-
ory of politics embedded in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive (eiti) documented in this chapter and epistemologies of transparency 
more broadly. 
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This theory of politics as transparency — liberal through and through — is 
also a theory of social change; that is, if you disclose information, perhaps if 
you can show that $28 billion is missing (as the eiti process revealed to much 
fanfare in Nigeria), then a cascade of political change will follow. Hether-
ington (2011) offers a useful summary of the political theory undergirding 
transparency:
If authoritarianism was built on the state’s control of information, then de-
mocracy is to be built by giving citizens access to, and indeed control over 
and responsibility for, all information. This ultimately is what a transparent 
society is supposed to look like: all state knowledge is public knowledge, and 
citizens can therefore “see” what goes on in government and in the economy, 
not directly, but by receiving information about it. Transparency is informa-
tion so complete that it seems unmediated; it is an access to the real through 
a medium so perfect as to disappear from the scene it is describing. This can 
never be realized, but remains always the ideal: a world of perfect informa-
tion in which citizens and entrepreneurs can make fully informed decisions 
about how to organize their society. Capable at last of choosing rationally 
among political and market options, governments will be held accountable, 
corruption will decrease accordingly, and markets will become more effi-
cient, leading to better growth, and hoisting developing countries out of pov-
erty. (6 – 7)
This theory of political change, in turn, has embedded within it a series of 
assumptions — an already- assembled public simply waiting for information, 
an already sorted- out national economy, or the very fact of a nationally or-
ganized order of things separate from transnational corporations. In other 
words, transparency is at once an enormous industry and a gravely false 
conclusion. It is how liberal politics is imagined but doesn’t work. After all 
that this book has recounted about the quotidian violence of liberal capi-
talism — from the segregated spaces on which it depends, to the gross in-
equalities of the contract form, to the chimeric yet serial “national econ-
omy” — there is a special irony to ending with, or to imagine that politics 
ends with, transparency.
This chapter, the last full ethnographic chapter in the book, uses the 
eiti process as it unfolded in Equatorial Guinea between 2006 and 2008 to 
return to the question of political possibility. Watching the eiti process un-
fold ethnographically allows a grounded critique of liberal theologies of so-
cial and political change, and shows that our epistemologies of capitalism — 
how we come to understand it and to see it — affect how we might seek to 
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change it. I begin by explaining how I came to be so intimately involved in 
Equatorial Guinea’s eiti process and offer a brief, emic overview of what 
the global eiti program aims to do. Thereafter, I move quickly through the 
literature on transparency before offering a detailed account of the first eiti 
meeting in Equatorial Guinea, eventually held in November 2007. The re-
mainder of this chapter weaves in and out of meetings among civil society 
groups, oil companies, the Equatoguinean government, and foreign consul-
tants that took place between November 2007 and June 2008, to think about 
politics and the political, before transitioning to the book’s conclusion on 
the quotidian violence of liberalism, and political possibilities within and 
against capitalism. 
Insofar as this book is an exploration of the more general forms and 
processes — the offshore, contracts, infrastructures, something called “the” 
economy — that facilitate diverse capitalist projects around the world, this 
chapter adds another such form. Transparency is often invoked as the anti-
dote not just to the ravages of extractive industries, but also to the excesses 
of capitalism more generally. Indeed, like the ngos that so often take trans-
parency as their rallying cry, transparency- as- solution is now in dialectical 
relation to capitalism itself — a permanent structural feature of it (Kirsch 
2014). Thus, the mandate this book attempts to fulfill — to know capitalism 
ethnographically — is also, today, a mandate to know transparency.
The Extractive 
IndustrIES Transparency Initiative
During my first week of long- term fieldwork in Malabo, I was discussing my 
project over lunch with Alfredo (the Equatoguinean economist with whom I 
recounted a conversation about audit, corporate governance, and the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act in chapter 1) and a group of five or six other Equatogu-
ineans, all of whom had recently returned from lives and educations abroad. 
Upon his return to Equatorial Guinea from postgraduate study and employ-
ment in London, Alfredo had worked first for the Major Corporation; by the 
time I arrived in Equatorial Guinea, he was working for Regal Energy. This 
was our first meeting (it would be months before our conversation on corpo-
rate governance), and it was basically a fieldwork networking lunch, in which 
we were getting to know one another and I was asking for other Equatogu-
inean contacts in and around the industry who might be willing to talk with 
me. As I rambled about my interest in the relationships among international 
capital, the state, and Equatoguinean citizens, Alfredo practically cried out 
250 chapter six
that I had to work with Isabel, who was also sitting among our large group 
at lunch. He introduced us.
Only a few years older than me, Isabel had recently returned to Equato-
rial Guinea from a life abroad. When we met that day, she was working as 
a director — essentially a high- level technocrat — in the Ministry of Finance 
and Budgets. In addition to her work at the ministry, Isabel ran a consulting 
business, helping potential international investors navigate Equatorial Guin-
ea’s murky investment waters. It was clear why Alfredo had steered me to her. 
Isabel was young, open, hyper- educated, and worldly. (Over lunch, it became 
clear that she was fluent in Spanish, English, French, German, and Bubi.) She 
and I agreed to meet formally to discuss possible collaborations, and a week 
or so later in her consultancy office, she offered me a participant observa-
tion position at her side. She would give me access to past and present state 
budget and finance documents, laws, decrees, and other documentation — 
notionally “public” information, but practically impossible to find. She 
would also bring me with her to the upcoming Second National Economic 
Conference and offered participation (as I found it interesting) in her consul-
tancy work, helping her design small, field- based research projects on vari-
ous subsectors. (X company wants to invest in the health sector. What are 
the needs there? How does the government solicit bids? Who wins and why? 
What companies are already working in that sector?) 
Isabel was also the government functionary recently appointed to lead 
Equatorial Guinea’s national Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 
which was scheduled to begin the following month. Tasked with the enor-
mous bureaucratic labor of this initiative, in addition to her functionary 
duties in the ministry and her consulting business responsibilities, Isabel 
was overwhelmed by her workload and offered me full access to the eiti 
process — meetings, correspondence, document drafting, and the World 
Bank consultancy relationship — in exchange for what turned out to be pe-
riodic full- time work from me, at least as meetings or external eiti dead-
lines approached. In response to Isabel’s generous offer, I let her know that 
I was most interested in working with and for her on the eiti process, al-
though I was willing to help out elsewhere as necessary. Ultimately, it was 
in part through my work for her on eiti that I gained access to oil company 
management, high- level Equatoguinean bureaucrats, much of the book’s 
document- based analysis, and more. But what is it that I had signed up for? 
What is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative?
Launched in 2002 by Tony Blair, then prime minister of the UK, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is an effort backed by the G8, 
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the International Monetary Fund (imf), and the World Bank, among other 
multilateral institutions, to promote what they see as good governance and 
fiscal transparency in resource- rich countries. The eiti process ostensibly 
differentiates itself from other G8, imf, and World Bank agreements and 
accords — structural adjustment comes to mind — by being a voluntary pro-
gram, nominally led by the national governments that choose to sign on 
to the process. Between eiti’s inception in 2002 and Equatorial Guinea’s 
entrance into the process in 2007, twenty- four countries had endorsed or 
were implementing eiti. Among these twenty- four, fifteen countries had 
met the four criteria for “candidate country” status, including Azerbaijan, 
Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, and Yemen. The nine remaining 
countries of the twenty- four, including Equatorial Guinea, as well as Chad, 
Congo, Congo DRC, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor L’este, and 
Trinidad and Tobago, were in the process of completing basic implementa-
tion criteria. Between its 2002 inception and 2007, no country had been fully 
validated as eiti “compliant.”
What does eiti do? Or more accurately for the moment, what does it 
intend to do? In short, the program proposes an accounting- based cure for 
the resource curse that the Second National Economic Conference set out 
to diagnose. The following description of the eiti program appeared in the 
sourcebook we received in Equatorial Guinea in 2007:
In many countries, money from oil, gas, and mining is associated with pov-
erty, conflict, and corruption. Commonly referred to as the “resource curse,” 
this is often driven by a lack of transparency and accountability around the 
payments that companies are making to governments, and the revenues that 
governments are receiving from those companies. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (eiti) seeks to create that missing transparency and 
accountability. It is a voluntary initiative, supported by a coalition of compa-
nies, governments, investors, and civil society organizations. Alongside other 
efforts to improve transparency in government budget practice, the eiti be-
gins a process whereby citizens can hold their governments to account for 
the use of those revenues. (eiti Sourcebook, March 2005)
In short, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is a protracted ex-
ercise in account balancing, designed to reconcile “the payments that com-
panies are making to governments, and the revenues that governments are 
receiving from those companies.” (Note again in this description the narrow 
oil- as- money approach and the same liberal myopia about national govern-
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ments as sources of pathology.) Companies and governments report those 
payments and revenues to a mutually agreed- upon auditor, referred to as an 
“aggregator” in eiti lingo. The aggregator is appointed to reconcile oil com-
panies’ accounts of how much money they have paid to a government with 
that government’s accounts of how much they have received from the com-
panies. (Proposed aggregator names floating around Equatorial Guinea as 
the process began included PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.) 
As of 2007, eiti defined a compliant country as one in which “(1) an ag-
gregator from an internationally recognized firm has been selected; (2) oil 
companies have disclosed their government payments to this individual; 
(3) governments have separately disclosed their revenue to this individual, at 
which point; (4) she or he will reconcile the figures, identify discrepancies, 
and recommend improvements. A public report of the auditor’s findings will 
be disseminated, and the country will then undergo another external valida-
tion process to be labeled ‘compliant’ ” (World Bank 2008). 
In any version of this modular eiti process, there are three “stakeholder 
groups”: the given national government (because it signs the hydrocarbon 
contracts, as detailed in chapter 3); the extractive industry companies (both 
foreign and national); and “civil society.” In its self- descriptions, the eiti 
process offers each group potential benefits from successful implementa-
tion. The promise to a given government is that the better management of 
resource revenue will lead to economic and political stability, which in turn 
will prevent the conflict found in so many resource- rich regions. A success-
fully completed eiti process also offers the government “an improved in-
vestment climate . . . providing a clear signal to investors and international 
financial institutions that the government is committed to greater trans-
parency” (eiti Sourcebook, March 2005, 5). Benefits to accrue to extraction 
companies include the mitigation of reputational risk, a clear and public 
demonstration of their contribution to a given country’s economy (as their 
payments to the government are made public), and the mitigation of con-
flict, hence the greater possibility of returns on the capital- intensive, long- 
term investments required by many natural resource projects. Finally, eiti 
promises civil society more information in the public domain about the rev-
enues that accrue to their government from extraction, which in turn may 
enable citizens to make more demands on those revenues and make govern-
ments more accountable to those they govern. While the eiti process does 
not technically encompass how mineral revenue is spent by the government 
(only that they do indeed receive it and in what amount), the wider scope of 
the program (then known as eiti ++) allows a platform for that discussion, 
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and some countries have used the eiti process to bring issues of revenue al-
location into public debate. 
While I offer an analysis of the eiti program and transparency more 
broadly throughout this chapter, I want to note for now Strathern’s (2000) in-
sight about accountability’s “dual credentials in moral reasoning and in the 
methods and precepts of financial accounting” (1). Mary Poovey (1998) has 
made similar observations about the moral histories of double- entry book-
keeping. In the eiti program, against the perception that both oil compa-
nies and the Equatoguinean state intentionally obfuscate revenue and in-
vestment information, eiti offers a platform for transparent accounts (in the 
dual sense) of how much money there is and where it is going. Accountabil-
ity, this program suggests, is to be found, or at least initiated, in accounting.
On Transparency
Critiques of transparency are widespread in anthropology and beyond, in-
cluding a few authors who have written about the eiti process specifically. 
Andrew Barry (2008) has called eiti’s intentionally delimited and depoliti-
cized accounting process “a form of political microscopy” which enables an 
assembly to examine a surface which has been prepared for it to inspect” (7). 
This critique of transparency as microscopy — looking at a radically delim-
ited and prepared surface in place of politics — has its roots in Power (1997), 
Strathern (2000), and others who urge us to look for what the visi bility al-
legedly provided by transparency processes conceals (Roberts 2009, 962). 
(See Ballestero 2012 for a helpful overview.) Not without humor, Barry (2013) 
points out that Azerbaijan was the first country to be validated in the eiti 
process in 2009, the same year in which the country was ranked 143rd on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In the midst of 
these apparent contradictions, Shore and Wright (2015) worry that transpar-
ency processes like eiti “recast political programs as mundane administra-
tive and technical matters to be dealt with by experts, thereby masking their 
ideological content and removing them from the realm of contestable poli-
tics” (421). (See also Burchell 1993; Shore and Wright 1997.)
One of the most interesting features of these critiques of transparency 
is how widely held they are, including by practitioners themselves. Despite 
transparency’s staying power as development dogma, even as other tenets 
of hardline neoliberal reform have been abandoned,1 Strathern notes that 
“what is odd about our embrace of transparency is that ‘everyone knows’ 
about its inadequacies: that transparency involves a simplistic abstraction 
254 chapter six
and decontextualization from the complexity of the world” (in Roberts 
2009, 968).2 Indeed, as has been the case for many of the forms and pro-
cesses of capitalism explored in this book, abstraction and decontextualiza-
tion are not accidents or shortcomings in the eiti process. Rather they are, 
in large part, intentional, even aspirational qualities. When it comes to reve-
nue from natural resources, the eiti process intentionally keeps “politics” — 
corruption, kleptocracy, violence, collusion — out of the audit frame, with 
the idea (often implicit) that this might create a safe space in which to talk 
politics by other means. 
In Equatorial Guinea, a place where politics cannot be spoken in pub-
lic, the delimiting that came with the eiti process — where the mandate was 
to talk only about revenue in and revenue out — was actually drawing new 
territory, new spaces for contestation and debate that were not there before. 
Nearly every ethnographic account of transparency processes has found sim-
ilar effects. As Ballestero (2012) writes: “There are plenty of circumstances . . . 
in which the utility of indicators lies in their capacity to create a new en-
tity, one that [was] unspeakable before the quantification exercise [was] per-
formed. This capacity to make entities speakable . . . requires a rethinking 
of transparency- creation arrangements in light of their multiple productivi-
ties” (164). Barry (2013) and Hetherington (2011) came to similar conclusions. 
Regarding the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline, Barry argues that the work of 
transparency, in fact, fosters new forms of dispute. Hetherington too notes 
that “the practices of representation that go into creating transparency are 
saturated at every turn with precisely that aspect of social life that they are 
meant to get rid of: politics. Indeed, far from stabilizing information, these 
larger technical networks create new spaces for disagreement and contesta-
tion” (7). The eiti process in Equatorial Guinea also illustrates this produc-
tivity, multivalence, and, indeed, unruliness of an ostensibly delimited and 
delimiting process.
While depoliticizing microscopy was certainly present in the eiti pro-
cess as it unfolded in Equatorial Guinea during 2007 and 2008, it was only 
as a haunted hope, a wished- for horizon. Over more than a year of Equato-
rial Guinea’s intensive participation in the eiti program, the process never 
got anywhere close to auditing or accounting. Rather, participants struggled 
through messy, embodied questions, including Who really is civil society 
in Equatorial Guinea, where it is technically illegal to meet in large groups 
without explicit government permission? How can we reconcile the advice 
and guidebooks of transnational experts with Equatoguinean daily life? Is 
an overtly depoliticized process the only method through which to openly 
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address political questions at the crossroads of the US oil industry and 
Obiang’s regime? In other words, eiti did not produce anything close to the 
outcome for which it was designed, nor did the mandate to focus on account-
ing successfully limit the parameters of the program to those envisioned in 
advance. Consider how the first meeting unfolded — literally came undone 
at every possible edge — as a case in point.
The First EITI Meeting
At my first official meeting with Isabel in late October 2007, she told me that 
the initial gathering of the eiti “civil society” stakeholder group would take 
place in less than two weeks. She asked if I would be willing to give a presen-
tation at that meeting on the concept of civil society — its history as a term, 
its evolution, its use within the context of the global South, and its current 
popularity in the international development world. This presentation was 
the first work Isabel requested of me, and while the thought of giving it re-
pelled me (I was, after all, a judgmental graduate student steeped in critical 
development studies and deeply skeptical about “civil society” as a political 
category), accepting this assignment felt like both a gesture of good faith and 
my ticket into the eiti process. I agreed to do the presentation and offered to 
help plan the seminar as well, given that ten days before the event, Isabel had 
no venue, no agenda, no speakers, and no invitations. In talking more about 
her expectations for my presentation, Isabel let me know that many of the 
people I would be speaking to (none of whom I had met at that point) didn’t 
have very “high qualifications” and would be a diverse group, including par-
liamentarians, members of voluntary associations, ngo representatives, and 
beyond. Isabel encouraged me to make liberal use of diagrams so that people 
would have visual representations of the material, and she reminded me re-
peatedly that this would be a “capacity- building” program.
The evening after Isabel talked about the incapacities of this civil society 
group, I worried over pages and pages of fieldnotes. I wrote that I struggled 
to even imagine who might show up to the meeting, in a country where 
people were not allowed to gather in groups, and where there was no press 
separate from government- controlled television or radio. I railed about the 
performative shortcomings of the civil society category, how it creates an-
other not yet (Chakrabarty 2000) for Africa: civil society must be located, 
developed, their capacity built and organized before they might emerge as 
some kind of political force. Indeed, this is Mehta’s (1997) argument about 
the teleological exclusions of liberalism itself, in which, far from a universal 
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rubric, liberalism proceeds via a specific set of cultural norms, “a constella-
tion of social practices riddled with a hierarchical and exclusionary density.” 
He goes on to explain:
[These norms] draw on and encourage conceptions of human beings that 
are far from abstract and universal and in which the anthropological mini-
mum is buried under a thick set of social inscriptions and signals. They chart 
a terrain full of social credentials. It is a terrain that the natural individual 
equipped with universal capacities must negotiate before these capacities can 
assume the form necessary for political inclusion. In this, they circumscribe 
and order the particular form that the universalistic foundations of Lockean 
liberalism assume. It is a form that can and historically has left an exclusion-
ary imprint in the concrete instantiation of liberal practices. (70)
The people to whom I would present, according to Isabel, who was of course 
addressing me and perhaps tailoring her descriptions accordingly, were not 
yet suitable as civil society, but had to achieve certain social credentials be-
fore their ostensibly universal capacities could “assume the form necessary 
for political inclusion.” Both Barry (2013) and Hetherington (2011) note this 
kind of interpellation or subject- making capacity of transparency processes, 
in which novel forms of civil society or publics are made by projects like eiti 
and do not predate them in any neat way. “It is common to assume,” Barry 
(2013) writes, “that the public has an immanent existence, waiting to be ad-
dressed and activated, only constrained by the absence of appropriate liberal 
democratic safeguards” (97). But transparency in practice shows that the as-
sembly of publics is itself a disputed process, and that was certainly the case 
in Equatorial Guinea.
At our next meeting, I asked Isabel for more detail on who was to make 
up this civil society group, and she passed me a set of World Bank guidelines 
on how to select civil society for the eiti process, noting that the Ministry of 
the Interior would make sure the World Bank guidelines were respected and 
could be reconciled with government definitions. The World Bank criteria 
stated that (1) civil society participants must be officially registered with the 
state; (2) they must be compliant with government regulations; and (3) no 
one should be excluded. Now, clearly, the first and second criteria are com-
pletely contradictory to the third, because certainly not everyone who might 
be considered civil society is officially registered with the state or compliant 
with government regulations, so all those people are automatically excluded. 
Moreover, in Equatorial Guinea, the process to become an officially recog-
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nized “civil society” group is arduous; and most applicants are rejected on 
the explicitly vague, but implicitly obvious, grounds that they are somehow 
threatening to the dictatorship. The process is “long and full of obstacles,” 
as Okenve (2017) summarizes:
It requires the organisation’s promoters to submit to the Ministry of the In-
terior an affidavit certifying that it will submit to its control on a quarterly 
basis, plus a favourable report from the Ministry of the area in which the or-
ganisation wishes to work, and another report from the governor or provin-
cial government delegate. It also requires [the organization] to formalise the 
constitution of the entity before a notary public, who in turn must obtain an 
authorisation from the Ministry of the Interior to validate this act. No legally 
constituted association is allowed to receive any donation, whether local or 
foreign, private or public, above US$100 without prior authorisation from 
the Interior Minister [and] no legally constituted organisation, that is, no 
organisation that has been allowed by the government to function, can deal 
directly with a beneficiary community without an additional authorisation 
or credential; this is not what the law says, but it is “customary.”
During my time in Equatorial Guinea, a friend was going through this pro-
cess to get permission to start an association that would show films (there 
was no movie theater in the country at that point), hold conferences, host 
speakers, and plan art exhibitions. Her application was rejected, implicitly 
because the idea was too subversive. So who, then, was to count as Equatogu-
inean civil society for the purposes of eiti? Who among the as- yet un-
defined, incapacitated, not- yet of Guinean civil society would be the right 
ones to participate in this effort? Isabel told me that she would sit down with 
people from the Ministry of the Interior and the World Bank technical ex-
pert, and together they would identify shared guidelines on which groups 
might participate.
This meeting to- be among the national eiti coordinator, the Minister of 
the Interior, the World Bank technical expert, and unknown others to define 
civil society for the purposes of eiti can easily seem like a conspiracy at the 
highest levels of power to ensure an innocuous “participatory” process. And 
yet, despite intentions to the contrary, this meeting and others like it never 
happened. The ingredients for the conspiracy were there, but the willful, or-
ganized, strategic, planned, and plotted execution was not. This is not to say 
that the same outcomes — exclusion, depoliticization, the general defanging 
of eiti — are not possible in the absence of tactical and deliberate conspiracy, 
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but the processes, methods, and intentions via which those outcomes are 
reached are not nearly as organized or intentional as it may be convenient 
(for analytical and critical purposes) to think, even in an internationally 
notorious dictatorship. In fact, over the year that I participated in nearly 
every detail of the eiti process, there was no enforcement of either the gov-
ernment’s or the World Bank’s rules of inclusion/exclusion in defining civil 
society for the purpose of eiti participation. At each meeting, there were 
new civil society participants who had not participated in previous meet-
ings, and no one checked if they were registered officially as civil society or 
not. It seemed enforcement would only come into effect if someone stepped 
dramatically out of line.
The larger planning process of the first civil society meeting had similar 
contours. When viewed from the outside, it had all the makings of a depoliti-
cizing conspiracy; from the inside, however, it was a bewildering tour through 
the daily life of a large bureaucracy. Originally to be held on November 9 and 
10, the meeting went through an almost farcical series of postponements 
and shape- shifts, which again, from the outside, could easily be attributed 
to an intentional, conspiratorial effort on the part of the government to con-
fuse, exclude, and nearly guarantee the failure of the meeting and hence civil 
society’s participation in the process. But, having witnessed the postpone-
ments and shape- shifts quite literally alongside the organizer herself, I know 
that they were, in fact — while admittedly staggering in their regularity — 
 a series of logistical conflicts and timing issues. Isabel made it clear to me 
that by the end of October (nine days ahead of the scheduled meeting), she 
still did not have the appropriate signatures from her superiors to approve 
the meeting, and technically we could not go ahead with publicity, invita-
tions (to take place over the radio), or planning without that permission. 
In the meantime, the Major Corporation had taken the lead in plan-
ning this meeting by arranging to host it on their compound and flying in 
an Azerbaijani expert on civil society participation in eiti, now working 
for them out of Houston. In the months leading up to the meeting, and be-
fore my involvement, Major representatives told Isabel that they had expe-
rience with civil society participation and with the eiti process, and that 
they were happy to host. Although, as noted above, eiti differentiates itself 
from other multilateral programs by being a government- led process, where 
possible, the Equatoguinean government deferred that responsibility to US- 
based companies. Isabel recounted a meeting to me between a minister and a 
company representative in which, having been given the files on the eiti ef-
fort, the minister turned to the company representative and asked, “So, what 
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do we have to do?” Again here, we see the implicit assumptions on which lib-
eralism and eiti are built — for instance, a clear line between state and com-
pany; already- assembled publics — as mere fictions, but productive fictions.
As the last days of October flew by, Isabel was still without official per-
mission to hold the meeting. Nevertheless, Major went ahead with their 
hosting plans, and Isabel and I began planning as well, although we couldn’t 
air anything on the radio or even tell anyone that this meeting would be 
held. I was somewhat incredulous and said repeatedly to Isabel that no one 
would come to the meeting if they didn’t know about it. She assured me that 
it’s always like this here, and people would listen to the radio the day before, 
if need be, and know that they were invited. Then she would call people on 
their cell phones and let them know again that they were invited. Over the 
next few days, the planned seminar changed from two days to one, and from 
a series of speakers to only me on civil society and an oil company represen-
tative on What Is eiti and Civil Society’s Role in eiti? Isabel was to present 
and go through the country work plan. Note, of course, the potential conflict 
of interest in an oil company not only hosting the seminar, but also deliv-
ering the instruction on what eiti is and how Equatoguinean civil society 
is meant to participate, let alone my own conflicted role in presenting this 
dreaded civil society talk.
At some point, it became clear to Isabel that she was not getting per-
mission for the meeting because all the ministers were too busy organizing 
for the upcoming Second National Economic Conference on the mainland, 
and no minister would be available to open the eiti meeting proceedings 
on the currently scheduled day because they would all have already left for 
Bata, where the economic conference was to take place. At that point, only 
three days before the meeting was scheduled to begin, Isabel postponed and 
relocated it — now to be held in Bata on the day before the economic confer-
ence was set to begin. Radio announcements in Malabo started five days 
ahead of the rescheduled event, now to be held on the continent, calling reg-
istered civil society members. Radio announcements started in Bata seven 
days ahead of the rescheduled event.
I flew into Bata the night before the rescheduled meeting (and two days 
before the Second National Economic Conference I chronicled in chapter 5), 
arriving at 10:30 p.m. I had been working for the previous four days on my 
civil society presentation — three days writing in English, and then one day 
translating into Spanish and editing with the help of the same friend whose 
film club was deemed too subversive to be approved as “civil society.” Isabel 
had not had time to look at the developing presentation earlier, so when I ar-
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rived in Bata late that night, she called me into a government office (where 
she was still working at 11:00 p.m.) to have a look. 
Isabel read the document in a speed- reading, out- loud voice and made a 
series of changes to take out any reference to the potential political (let alone 
revolutionary) dimensions of civil society. In a sentence on de Tocqueville, 
she crossed out “The independent associational life of civil society can act as 
protection against the domination of society by the state.” She revised a sen-
tence about the way in which dissident intellectuals fighting totalitarianism 
in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1970s and 1980s used the concept of 
civil society to read: “The concept of civil society has influenced civic partici-
pation in Eastern European populations and has played a primordial role in 
the changes in that region during the 1990s.” But by far the most excruciat-
ing change she made, in an already excruciating document, was an edit to a 
section in which I discussed the role of civil society in South Africa during 
the antiapartheid struggle. She deleted a sentence in which I had written that 
civil society “organized strikes and boycotts, and were not simple protesters 
but approached a revolutionary force against the apartheid regime.” I knew 
why she edited the previous examples above — Equatorial Guinea is a dicta-
torship, and those participating in eiti would not be allowed to “politicize” 
this process — so I said nothing when she made those changes. But in the case 
of the South African sentence, I asked her, “Why do I have to cut this?” Her 
response was that “the rich will never say anything bad against the rich.” It 
shocked me that what she viewed as the Equatoguinean government’s class 
position aligned them more closely with the former white South African 
regime than with those mostly Black South Africans who fought against it. 
I was awake until 3:30 the next morning making these changes in a dizzy-
ing exhaustion crowded with anxiety about complicity, depoliticization, and 
methodology.
I arrived early to the opulent conference hall where the meeting was to 
take place, eager to make sure my PowerPoint presentation worked and to 
calm my under- slept, over- caffeinated nerves. Major Corporation person-
nel were there as well, checking the technology they provided for the event, 
including a laptop for all presenters, a projector, and simultaneous transla-
tion technology. (Most of them did not speak Spanish.) Two hours after the 
indicated start time of 9:00 a.m., some members of civil society had trick-
led in, but the local coordinators and functionaries, with the exception of 
Isabel, were nowhere to be found. Isabel was in constant contact with the 
relevant government personnel via text, and she explained to me that if not 
enough people showed up for the meeting, they wouldn’t come (following 
The Political 261
a widely accepted practice among highly ranked government personnel to 
only attend functions deemed important enough for their presence). Finally, 
at 11:30 a.m., Isabel relayed a message from the prime minister, who would 
have been the functionary to officially open the conference. He felt, she said, 
that the meeting was so important that he wanted a quorum of civil society 
people present. Thus, in his name, Isabel postponed the meeting again, now 
to be held on November 15, the day following the national conference. The 
Major personnel immediately began muttering to themselves, and the Azer-
baijani expert was clearly upset, having already postponed her trip once and 
now not at all sure she’d be able to attend the meeting a week hence.
While announcing the postponement, Isabel explained eiti in very gen-
eral terms for those civil society members who were present, and she let them 
know what they could expect of the upcoming meeting. She then asked for 
questions. The first and only question came from his Excellency the Rep-
resentative of Muslims in Equatorial Guinea, who wanted all civil society 
members present to be formally introduced. In a paranoid dictatorship, es-
pecially around a de/politicized political process, participants always wanted 
to know who was present to avoid a situation analogous to my own disas-
trous evening with Elena and “the entrepreneur” who was also a security 
agent. After the group of roughly ten people introduced themselves, Isabel 
invited everyone to breakfast, and as we settled ourselves around the table in 
the restaurant, an animated discussion started among them about civil soci-
ety and Equatorial Guinea in general. “How big is our population?” someone 
asked, making the point that even basic statistics were impossible to come by. 
Another demanded basic statistics on oil revenue. Isabel replied that this in-
formation was available and that it was the obligation of civil society to find 
it. The man responded that he’s sick of obligations and that he wants rights; 
he has a right to information. Another added, elliptically, that “everyone has 
the right to dream in their country.” He had heard of someone who wanted 
to start a car factory, he explained. It wouldn’t work, “but let him dream.” 
Food came, and the conversation slowed but continued. A clearly outspoken 
member of the group, whom I would later come to know well, explained that 
people “are sick of the same shit, participating in something that they know 
will go nowhere, or they know exactly where it will go.” As the conversation 
about demands and rights continued, I was increasingly mortified about the 
civil society presentation I had narrowly escaped that day, but for which I 
was still on the hook in a week’s time. Far from a group of not- yet capacitated 
potential liberal subjects, the people I was sitting among were a diverse group 
of Equatoguineans who were generally suspicious of one another, and rightly 
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suspicious not only of the eiti process, but also of the US corporations who 
seemed to be behind it, as well as their own government, and yet I couldn’t 
address any of that openly in the presentation I still had to give.
One week later, after the National Economic Conference had passed, and 
after more statistical information (of questionable origin) about Equatorial 
Guinea had been released into the public than perhaps ever before, we all re-
assembled in the opulent conference hall. Three ministers strode in to open 
the meeting, and we stood as the prime minister called the meeting to order, 
flanked by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Planning. The prime 
minister’s opening speech that day was an almost verbatim enactment of 
Hetherington’s account of the politics of transparency (2011), in which “de-
mocracy [is] formally similar to capitalism — a rule- based playing field on 
which the rational choices of citizen- consumers equipped with transpar-
ent information were to discover and elect optimal governments” (4), while 
also optimizing markets. In the wake of the National Economic Conference 
(which most of us in the room had attended), the prime minister explained 
that the eiti process represented “the first time that civil society will in-
volve itself in important economic efforts at the national level,” and that this 
must be understood “in the context of calling the population to participate 
in the larger economic plan presented at the conference.” He said that eiti 
represented a restructuring of the relationship between state and society, 
with society now as the protagonist: “el pueblo en acción,” or the people in 
action. He explained the importance of administrative transparency to this 
restructuring, which would lead to authentic participation, effective infor-
mation, and access to administrative documentation “so that the world of 
petroleum won’t be secret.” The prime minister finished his speech by in-
voking the uneven geographies of globalization, noting that “competition is 
what Equatorial Guinea needs to occupy the center of globalization, not the 
periphery. For those on the periphery, globalization offers more threats than 
benefits. What we’re doing now is to move to the center from the periphery. 
Civil society is central in this move.” Meeting attendees — who represented 
an assorted crew of political parties, rural community initiatives, youth or-
ganizations, an organization of people with disabilities, and a representa-
tive from the National Association of Musicians of Equatorial Guinea — 
applauded politely, at which point the prime minister introduced Susan, the 
corporate social responsibility representative for the Major Corporation, by 
saying, “You all know Major, those that handle our petroleum, and some-
times give us something for it.”
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On the agenda, Susan (representing the Major Corporation more broadly) 
was slated to introduce eiti — what it is, why it is important, and what civil 
society’s role would be therein. She started her presentation with a descrip-
tion of the resource curse, which, she explained, emanated from a lack of 
transparency regarding the payment of oil revenues. Conveniently for Susan 
and her corporation, she specified that eiti was a process in which citizens 
hold their governments accountable for spending from oil and mining. The 
corporation disappeared from her description. After explaining what the 
eiti process was specifically designed to do — identify a third- party aggre-
gator familiar with oil finance and Equatoguinean contractual regimes who 
will collect revenue reporting from the government and payment informa-
tion from companies, and then reconcile them — Susan received an amazing 
series of questions from the civil society members in attendance. Below, I 
translate and transcribe several of them, interspersed with brief, parentheti-
cal clarifying commentary of my own. Each question was asked by a separate 
enquirer, and Susan answered all of them, unless I note otherwise.
Roughly half the questions to Susan addressed Major’s role in recent 
Equatoguinean history, notably, the company’s complicity with the govern-
ment and their role in corruption. (It is important to remember that among 
all the major US- based companies in Equatorial Guinea, Major had been 
there the longest.) Some of these questions also brought in the complicity of 
multilateral partners — the World Bank and the imf. Read together, I inter-
pret these questions less as a defense of the Equatoguinean state than as a 
polyvocal indictment of the companies in the wake of Susan’s presentation, 
which absolved them completely and pointed all the blame at the govern-
ment. Note that Susan’s answer to nearly every question was that the ques-
tion’s content was not relevant to the specific (political microscopy) of the 
eiti process.
Q About the curse (la maldición, referring to the role of the resource curse in her 
presentation): Your company has been here for many years, and 90 percent of 
local people don’t have access to work for you. If we want to work for you, we 
have to pay an agency. Most people can’t pay this. Guineanos should be able 
to have access to work for the companies. The people just see oil platforms and 
don’t know anything about the businesses. Maybe you can talk to the govern-
ment or the companies about these problems.
A I will answer this question at lunch. I want to keep these questions about the 
process of eiti. But to answer quickly, some people sit for an entrance exam, 
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and if they pass, Major hires them. There are no third parties in that process. 
We do hire people through subcontractors, and they comply with eg laws. 
(Note that the entrance exam process is just for higher levels of work. This 
isn’t true for maids or drivers, for example, who are hired through Voxa or 
other subcontracting agencies, as discussed in chapter 4.)
Q Your people live in beautiful estates and we have no access to them. Why is 
that?
A This too is not a part of eiti. But we do have outreach in communities. But 
the eiti process is intended to give you access. In other words, it’s a way in.
Q Can you give us a better definition of how we should define “corruption”? Only 
economic? Political as well? And good governance: to whom does this refer? To 
your companies and your leadership, or to our state?
A In eiti, “corruption” refers to misuse of government revenues. (Note that 
this is factually untrue in eiti’s own terms, which specify the relationship 
between company payments and government receipt of those payment. How 
the government chooses to use those revenues is beyond the primary scope 
of the auditing process, as explained above.)
Q The businesses have now been in our country for a while, and they don’t have 
trade unions. When will they have trade unions? (Everyone laughs.)
A This is not a question I can answer. It’s beyond the scope of eiti. (Isabel joins 
in to say that unionization is up to the workers. As far as she knows, “unions 
are legal here.” They are not, as discussed in chapter 4.)
Q If I buy a car for 20.000 cfa but the receipt says 15.000 (in other words, if the 
receipt is falsified), how can civil society moderate in this process where every-
one is taking their little bit and putting in false receipts? Where will we get our 
information from?
A The aggregator: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, someone who is 
completely objective. Everyone takes part in selecting the aggregator. It will 
be someone that everyone trusts and that everyone agrees is objective.
Q We have heard that the World Bank, the imf, and others are partners in this 
effort. In the economic chaos of 1995, the government followed imf suggestions 
to fire two thousand people from public administration. But now that we have 
money, can’t eiti help, give advice, tell them to hire these people back? We can’t 
get rid of poverty if people don’t have jobs. (Everyone applauds.)
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A This is not what eiti does. The World Bank and imf continue to give advice, 
but not eiti. 
Isabel speaks up again to say that the advice of the structural adjustment 
era is not relevant to this time. Now, she says, we’re looking at diversifying 
the economy; the imf and World Bank were at the conference, and this will 
make jobs.
There was another series of questions about civil society itself. Some par-
ticipants openly or tacitly agreed with the capacity- building framework, and 
they actively requested their own tutelage to “become” civil society members 
that might be capable of understanding the accounting complexities at is-
sue. Others noted the historic difficulties of civil society groups in Equato-
rial Guinea and wondered pointedly how this process would (or would not) 
change that history.
Q For civil society to commit to this process, we still need more training, more de-
tails. The concepts are new to most of us. I would like to request more seminars.
A Please speak up when you need more information. Again, remember that 
eiti is not an event, but the beginning of a process.
Q If we don’t know who we are as civil society, how will we know what to do with 
the information we are given? We don’t know what to do with the information.
A (Isabel responded directly to say that the civil society groups will be given 
more education on finance, payments, and other aspects of the program to 
enable them to follow the process.)
Q The European Union (in Equatorial Guinea) did a study on the difficulties of 
civil society in the country. That study concluded that civil society was not or-
ganized; that the actors who should participate don’t have training; and that 
there was a lack of economic resources to support civil society. These problems 
persist. The eu has tried to put together an overview organization of civil soci-
ety, but they couldn’t get it ratified. Now eiti is requesting our participation, 
but we haven’t resolved the original issue.
A Equatorial Guinea is in a difficult situation. But perhaps we can use this op-
portunity to build capacity, to solve some of the problems.
We can see in this question-and-answer session what Ballestero (2012), 
Hetherington (2011), and Barry (2013) found in their respective ethnographic 
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accounts of transparency processes. The eiti process was making entities 
speakable — labor unions, corporate and government collusion, the question 
of local employment, critiques of international financial institutions — that 
were not speakable before the process began, or certainly not in a more or 
less public forum like this one. We see evidence of both Barry’s “new forms 
of dispute” (2013, 5) and Hetherington’s argument that “the practices of rep-
resentation that go into creating transparency are saturated at every turn 
with precisely that aspect of social life that they are meant to get rid of: poli-
tics” (2011, 7). In other words, the ostensible delimitation of the eiti pro-
cess was, in fact, creating new kinds of space for political speech in front of 
high- level oil company and government functionaries, not to mention fel-
low Equatoguineans relatively unknown to one another. And the substantive 
content of this political speech was nowhere near accounting. Indeed, for the 
most part, the questions weren’t even near oil-as-money, but much closer to 
the material in this book’s preceding chapters on the conditions of possibil-
ity for oil-as-money in the first place — luxurious enclaves for foreign man-
agement, lack of local employment, contracting and subcontracting regimes, 
trade unions and their absence, and the difficulties of finding any kind of in-
formation in Equatorial Guinea. And this question content persisted despite 
Susan’s repeated protestations that these questions “weren’t relevant to eiti.” 
The one question that notionally addressed accounting — about how falsified 
receipts can possibly be accurately accounted for — was, of course, a jab at the 
companies and the Equatoguinean state alike, believed by most people to be 
equally complicit in falsifying financial information; thus, a process to look 
at already- falsified receipts (i.e., the eiti process) would go nowhere.
While the eiti process undeniably opened up new spaces for political 
speech, these spaces remained within a persistent subtext of paranoia, mu-
tual suspicion, and hesitation to participate, meaningfully shared by all 
but one civil society participant — already a well- known and often- arrested 
member of an opposition party — whom I will call Sonrisa. This mutual sus-
picion was evident at the first canceled meeting, when the representative for 
Muslim groups asked everyone to introduce themselves. It was even more 
evident when — after long hours that included my ultimately uneventful 
presentation, during which people just nodded politely at the weird white 
woman, and Isabel’s discussion of the action plan for civil society that they 
were all asked to sign — the eiti meeting concluded with a long a discussion 
of who would count as civil society for the purposes of eiti.
Isabel introduced the day’s final discussion topic by explaining that “all 
who are here now will be participants. Everyone who is here will be called 
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for every event. But when there are national committee meetings, only the 
selected committee will be able to participate.” With that, she posed a ques-
tion to the group: “Who do you think should make up that selected com-
mittee? Given the complicated level of discourse around eiti, who should do 
it?” The answer she was fishing for, and the answer she was given, was that 
the selected committee should have education and relevant work experience, 
which ruled out roughly four- fifths of the people present. Nevertheless, Isa-
bel asked those present to discuss the membership of the fifteen- member na-
tional committee and initiated that discussion by reading aloud Government 
Decree 42/2007, which regulated the participation of civil society in eiti. 
After reading the Decree, Isabel explained, “This law has a trap (or a trick) 
[la ley tiene trampa]. It says that five of the fifteen members should be from 
pdge [the ruling party]. Over time, we should work to improve this law.” 
Isabel’s statement — inviting the assembled members of civil society to 
discuss the content of a law, and not just any content, but content that speci-
fied a clear over- representation of the ruling party (which Isabel represented 
to many people present) — was, plainly, a radical one. Assembled members of 
civil society were incredulous. One representative asked, “Why did we have 
all that discussion before if there’s already a law!?” Others chimed in to the 
same effect, stating unequivocally that the law cannot be changed because 
it’s been published officially already. But Isabel insisted to everyone that we 
could interpret the document. She explained that the government legislated 
under time pressure from an external eiti deadline, but the law does not 
necessarily reflect the needs of the eiti process. She proposed that the as-
sembled group make a recommendation to the government of what would 
work best for eiti, and went on to suggest: “For instance, on the issue of po-
litical parties, perhaps one representative should be from pdge and another 
from the opposition.” She said that a recommendation of this kind wouldn’t 
mean that we were disrespecting the document (metonymically, the govern-
ment), but that we were involved in finding the best application of Equatogu-
inean law to the eiti process. Having known and worked intensively with 
Isabel for a month at this point, I believe her request for the assembled people 
to suggest a change in the law was genuine. It was not mere bait to sniff out 
dissent, as some people present clearly feared.
As Isabel insisted on the pliability of this law and the opportunity meet-
ing participants had to change it for the better, civil society members inter-
rupted her repeatedly to insist that they couldn’t change the decree, with a 
clear subtext of fear of government reprisal. And yet, Isabel herself was a 
government functionary telling them they could. To me, in that moment, 
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this debate seemed like such an important chance to potentially transcend 
the political microscopy of the eiti process through actually debating and 
improving an existing law. I found myself increasingly incensed and impas-
sioned with each interruption of Isabel’s insistence. I wanted to interject, 
and I drafted the following in Spanish in my notebook: “Let me see if I can 
explain myself. Ms. Isabel, as the national coordinator of eiti and as a mem-
ber of the public administration, is giving you, as civil society, an incredible 
opportunity to participate in the best implementation of this decree and to 
deepen your participation in the eiti process. But it seems no one is willing 
or interested. Shouldn’t we take this opportunity?” But I didn’t get a chance 
to say anything. It was 5:30 p.m., and we had been working since eight o’clock 
that morning without food, having taken only one thirty- minute break. Isa-
bel brought the meeting to a close, and afterward, I stood with Susan and 
her Equatoguinean translator, to whom I voiced my incredulity about what 
had just happened. Susan replied: “There’s no real debate. eiti is only to de-
cide the amount of money that the government gets. Civil society will have 
input into who is the aggregator, but the aggregator is chosen by a bid pro-
cess. So, it’s just for civil society to go and approve.” While Susan’s response 
was textbook transparency- as- depoliticization, having been in Equatorial 
Guinea on and off for a decade at that point, she continued: “That said, if 
you had told me ten years ago that people would be in a group debating a 
decree, saying it’s not valid, in a government building, I would never have be-
lieved you. I can’t believe how much things have changed.” In Susan’s brief 
recap, we see both the radically depoliticizing potential of transparency 
processes — “there’s no real debate” — and the out- of- bounds political poten-
tials these processes create, in which a group (hesitates to) debate a decree in 
a government building.
With both of these truths held in tension in my own experience of the 
meeting, I returned to my friend Josefina’s family home in Bata, where I’d 
been staying. I told her about the meeting: how the people had an amazing 
opportunity and they didn’t take it, and how I thought it was because they 
didn’t understand what was actually being offered to them, or maybe be-
cause they were scared. Isabel herself said it was because people still thought 
they were living under a dictatorship. But Josefina disagreed. She said they 
did understand, but that no one wanted to be perceived as being in the op-
position. “People always feel like people will talk [as in, inform], so even if in-
side they wanted to say something, they won’t because of others. That’s why 
security works so well in this country, because the masses talk just to fuck 
over others. Not even because they get paid or receive anything in return.”
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Transparency’s Mess,  
Ethnography’s Seduction
Over the next three months, there was a series of eiti meetings with various 
combinations of the stakeholder groups — civil society, foreign and national 
oil companies, and the Equatoguinean government. In this section, I offer 
a sequence of brief vignettes and descriptions of these meetings, in part to 
give a sense of the arc of the eiti process over the year I participated. I also 
offer these accounts to show how that process was perhaps not an arc at all, 
but tenuously connected fits and starts of processes, conversations, and pri-
orities that stretched not only between Houston- based companies and the 
Equatoguinean government with whom they had signed lucrative contracts, 
but also into the worlds of transnational development work and nonprofit 
organizations.
Shortly after the meeting chronicled above, Isabel traveled to Oslo, Nor-
way, where the eiti International Secretariat was holding its annual meet-
ing. She was greeted in Oslo with the news that Sonrisa — who, as an active 
member of an opposition party, had fairly extensive contacts in the interna-
tional ngo world — had submitted a complaint letter to Publish What You 
Pay (an ngo affiliated with eiti) about the November meeting chronicled 
above. In the letter, Sonrisa wrote that the notice civil society members were 
given before the meeting was too short; those who eventually showed up to 
the meeting were not sufficiently independent from the government; and he 
had signed the civil society action plan under pressure. Publish What You 
Pay representatives confronted Isabel when she arrived in Oslo, Sonrisa’s 
letter in hand, and requested a meeting with her, which she refused, after 
which she was asked to meet with “some other expert” who told her that the 
process in Equatorial Guinea “is not transparent enough.” Recounting this 
humiliating experience to me first over the phone from Oslo and later upon 
her return, Isabel said that she had tried to explain to the foreign “experts” 
and ngo representatives in Oslo that in Equatorial Guinea, the short notice 
was sufficient; none of the ngos were explicitly affiliated with the govern-
ment; and civil society members were in no way pressured to sign the action 
plan. She was then told that there needed to be another meeting and that 
Peter Eigen (at that time the head of eiti’s International Secretariat) should 
come. She questioned this assertion both in her Oslo interactions and again 
to me: “So it will be taken more seriously if he does it!? It always feels like 
people don’t trust the government here. But in the [eiti] Sourcebook it says 
this is a government- driven process! All I had was three days of fighting in 
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Oslo. They don’t want to listen to what the government says. They think that 
they are right and the government is wrong.”
In response to her experience in Oslo (in mid- December), Isabel called a 
civil society meeting after the winter holidays, in late January. She began that 
meeting by stating that when she got to Oslo, she was greeted with the accu-
sation that the government forces ngos to agree to things against their will. 
Everyone at the table shook their heads, and I found myself in the odd po-
sition of nearly agreeing with them. Having participated in every twist and 
turn of the November planning meeting, and of course the meeting itself, 
I knew full well that no one was forced to do anything. I wrote in my note-
book, “It’s good that Sonrisa hears this and understands the consequences of 
his actions, but then of course it may turn others [in the civil society group] 
against him.” Isabel told assembled civil society members that they needed to 
call their own meeting, ideally by February 4, so that they could participate 
meaningfully, and on their own terms, in the meeting with companies and 
the government scheduled for February 5. She said that they, as civil society, 
had to get the announcement on the radio, and that they would be respon-
sible for letting everyone know with sufficient lead time. “And there will be 
international people here as observers on the fifth, so maybe then they’ll 
believe our efforts.” Sonrisa, knowing that all of this was in response to his 
letter, said he wanted to help call the meeting on February 4, but couldn’t do 
it himself. He requested administrative support from Isabel who responded, 
not without sarcasm, that if the government (read: her) organizes and an-
nounces the meeting on the fourth, then maybe civil society will feel that 
they can’t speak openly. Sonrisa responded, “Don’t tell me a black pen is a 
blue pen! I can’t go to the Ministry of the Interior and ask for an ngo list! It’s 
just not that easy. We need your coordination office to facilitate this.” Isabel 
responded, “Go with a copy of the decrees, go with the acts to the Minister 
of the Interior. We can’t try to change the functioning of the whole admin-
istration; we are just working in eiti.” 
And this, of course, was a central problem with the eiti process in Equa-
torial Guinea, in general. How do you do it in a dictatorship with no inde-
pendent press? How do you do it where civil society is essentially illegal? 
How do you do it between the demands for liberalism from Publish What 
You Pay and the exigencies of what would actually happen if Sonrisa were 
to go to the Ministry of the Interior, or try by himself to get an announce-
ment put on the radio? How do you do it between histories of violence and 
repression that pester, even as recently returned government functionaries 
like Isabel promise (and seem to genuinely believe) that something else is 
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possible? Having become friends at that point, Sonrisa and I conferred after 
that meeting and agreed to work with whomever else was willing to organize 
an independent meeting. I would serve as the institutional go- between, using 
my relationship with Isabel to request needed information.
Also in late January, Isabel called a meeting for the corporate and govern-
ment eiti stakeholders. Held in the Major compound, this meeting brought 
together country managers of all the major US- based companies (Major, 
Smith, Endurance), along with Regal Energy, two Chinese- owned oil com-
panies, some smaller US- based exploration companies and representatives 
from both Sonagas and GEPetrol — the national gas and oil companies — 
as well as high- level government representatives from the Ministry of Fi-
nance and the Ministry of Mines. The preoccupations at this meeting were 
remarkably different from those expressed at the civil society meeting. Af-
ter presentations by Susan and Isabel on the eiti process, nearly the whole 
meeting was taken up with accounting; again, however, not accounting in 
a narrow, depoliticized sense, but in a tense, accounting- as- politics and as 
information- potentially- full- of- liability sense. After the initial bland presen-
tations on the eiti process, a representative from the Ministry of Finance 
asked, “Which are the different concepts of revenue that we want the aggre-
gator to look at? What will oil companies share? We will share the same.” 
The country manager for the Major Corporation responded: “We will re-
port lease bonus payments, lease rental payments, any sale of hydrocarbon 
that created revenue, any take in kind provided to government or another 
company. For example, GEPetrol is lifting half of our crude. GEPetrol would 
have to report that they received that and sold it. It’s that level of definition: 
product sales and takes in kind, plus other major fees paid to governments 
for our contracts: royalties, taxes. The government will have to take a view 
[then he interrupted himself], well, I would recommend that they take a view 
that we won’t take small registration fees: port fees, etc.” 
We can see from this exchange that what actually counted as revenue for 
the sake of the eiti process was not self- evident. Clearly, from the country 
manager’s description, “revenue” in the world of oil and gas contracts is a 
radically disaggregated and distributed category. We are not simply talking 
about double- entry bookkeeping here. Note, however, that at least at this 
point in the process, the government and the companies seem happy to work 
together on what will count as revenue, with the government representative 
effectively asking the oil companies, “What should count as revenue? What-
ever you decide, that’s what we’ll report as well.” In this question of what 
counts, or what will and will not be counted in an accounting process, the 
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various complicities between companies and the government grow starker, 
including the question of confidentiality. The Major country manager again: 
“Here’s what we should do, what I think we should do.” (He constantly cor-
rected himself from a command voice to a suggestion voice.) “We have to 
maintain the confidentiality of our production sharing contracts through 
this process. We should try to have a model confidentiality agreement where 
we could all sign the same thing. We need to bind the aggregator to this 
agreement also, bind him [sic] individually back to the companies and the 
government. Fully back and forth confidentiality provision.” This preoc-
cupation with confidentiality brings us back to the exploitative production 
sharing contract terms I discussed in chapter 3. Here, Major’s country man-
ager is worried that public disclosures of payments and revenue through the 
eiti process could inadvertently disclose the specificities of contract terms. 
Royalties, taxation rates, takes- in- kind, profit sharing percentages — all of 
these are not merely revenue categories but negotiated political relationships. 
And Major, as the company with the oldest standing contracts in Equatorial 
Guinea, undoubtedly had exceptionally lucrative (for the company) / exploit-
ative (for the government) contract terms that they did not want revealed 
either to other companies or to a more general public. Here again, a process 
focused narrowly on accounting aims at political microscopy but splatters 
over a wide swath of political relationships in practice. 
The final preoccupation at this more- than- accounting meeting was a 
question at the intersection of audit, aggregation, and temporality. Having 
made our way slowly through discussions of what would count as revenue 
and how confidentiality would be maintained, the question of revenue from 
when arose. How many years back does the eiti process need to go? How 
current does it need to be? Isabel suggested that at least for Equatorial Guin-
ea’s first foray into the process, they report perhaps one to two years of pay-
ments and revenue. But which one to two years was a surprisingly thorny 
problem. The country manager of the Regal Corporation explained the tem-
porality conundrum as follows: “The information we share as a company 
will come from audited financial reports. This means that we will be pub-
lishing with years of delay. Does that meet [the eiti] Secretariat require-
ments? If information can only be submitted following an audit process, 
then we won’t have the data until a year later — after our internal auditing 
process.” Major’s country manager picked up the thread: “We are subject to 
an internal audit as a company. I have audited books. When I report [to eiti], 
I report what we have. It’s just that as a business my books do get audited by 
an outside entity because I’m a public company and I have to do that. My 
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auditor doesn’t close out my books until early the following year. If we’re in 
’08, we could submit ’05 and ’06.” 
As these two country managers went back and forth with one another, 
there was a clear subtext about the Equatoguinean government’s bookkeep-
ing. After all, nearly everyone in that room had just been through the Na-
tional Economic Conference together and knew full well the admitted short-
comings of the government’s bookkeeping practices. Isabel finally addressed 
the palpable tension, now in her capacity as technician in the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Budgets: “The government doesn’t have formal auditing as such. 
We have a yearly imf mission [Article IV] that has a look in our accounts. 
So, the government will submit imf- reviewed data as our audited data.” In 
this meeting, we can see that even where political microscopy and ostensibly 
depoliticized accounting are the goals, and where participants are address-
ing eiti on its own terms, those terms are deeply politicized and controver-
sial. They are saturated with potential liability for companies and govern-
ments alike. Thus, Shore and Wright’s (2015, 421) anxiety that transparency 
programs “recast political programs as mundane administrative and tech-
nical matters to be dealt with by experts, thereby masking their ideologi-
cal content and removing them from the realm of contestable politics” may 
be misplaced, certainly in the case of Equatorial Guinea. Seemingly mun-
dane administrative questions — What counts as revenue? What can we keep 
confidential? — asked by and among experts who are both in competition 
and collusion with one another, do not mask ideological content, but beckon 
it. Force it to be spoken. Certainly, in the case of eiti in Equatorial Guinea, 
if the companies and the government would collude successfully, then this 
removal from the realm of contestable politics would be achieved; but this 
would happen only through great effort that included wading through im-
perial debris and confidentiality tensions in shareholder- owned companies, 
all of which shape the deep politics of accounting itself.
Less than a week later, on February 4, Sonrisa and I spent the entire day 
in an ngo office in Caracolas, drafting a proposal from civil society to the 
National Coordinator (Isabel) that outlined adequate civil society partici-
pation in the eiti process. Sonrisa had made cell phone calls to other civil 
society members (on a prepaid card provided by the government), and we 
were joined for a time by two of the more senior members of the civil society 
group, in addition to two foreign experts who had flown in for the next day’s 
meeting. One of these foreign experts was an Italian man I will call Piero, 
who was working in Cameroon as the regional director of Publish What You 
Pay, and one was a Venezuelan man — Luis — who was also an eiti board 
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member. I had picked them up from the airport the evening before, and Luis 
marveled at the good quality of the roads driving from the airport, illustra-
tive, in my experience, of people’s apocalyptic imaginations of Equatorial 
Guinea, so often contravened by lived experience. Piero had had visa prob-
lems because the government didn’t send him a letter of invitation in time, 
and he paid 30.000 cfa in the airport (roughly US$50) as an entry fee. After 
paying, Piero asked me loudly in the airport if this was corruption, and if so, 
stated that this was the first time in his ten years in Africa that he had paid 
a bribe. (I personally thought that 30.000 cfa was a reasonable, if unposted, 
fee for letting a foreign national in without a visa.) As I drove them from 
the airport to their hotel, they asked me what I did, and among other things 
I mentioned my research and relationships with the migrant wives of oil 
company managers. Piero made the analogy to Italian mafia wives — taking 
care of kids and having potlucks while their husbands decide whose leg to 
cut off. It was in this interesting company that Sonrisa and I drafted the pro-
posal that he would present at the first meeting among all three stakeholder 
groups, to be held the following day.
That meeting felt both momentous and uneventful. It was perhaps the 
first time that civil society — by which I mean, essentially, regular Equatogu-
ineans — high- level government personnel, and high- level oil company per-
sonnel were all in one small room together, with the idea that they should 
address one another. So that seemed momentous, as did the ten minutes dur-
ing which Sonrisa read aloud the proposal we had drafted the day before. But 
in other ways, the meeting was quotidian and felt purposeless. Oil company 
people don’t speak Spanish, and there wasn’t simultaneous translation, so 
many sat there with their arms folded across their chests as the Minister of 
Mines opened the meeting or as Sonrisa presented the proposal; so too when 
it was the companies’ turn to speak, and one of the Equatoguinean ministers 
was visibly asleep at the head of the table. But two short weeks later, with the 
blessing of the foreign visitors who came to witness the process, the Interna-
tional Committee of eiti met in Accra, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea was 
officially recognized as a candidate country. This recognition gave them two 
years (until February 2010) to complete all eiti requirements and to move 
from a candidate country to a compliant country.
After this flurry of meetings in early 2008, clearly scheduled to meet the 
Accra deadline, we didn’t have another eiti meeting until June, this time 
on the occasion of the one- month residency of a Peruvian World Bank/eiti 
consultant I will call Carlos. Carlos did not work for the World Bank, but 
was subcontracted by them given his central role in the eiti process in Peru. 
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A Cameroonian expert was also supposed to attend this meeting, but Isabel 
explained to me that he refused to come because he didn’t get his invitation 
letter from the Equatoguinean government in time. Subsequently, he didn’t 
trust Isabel’s advice to just go to Douala and that she would get him into the 
country. I heard her, exasperated on the phone with him, explaining, “You 
know how African governments work! If you want to participate in this con-
ference according to European norms, fine. But you are an African and we 
are an African government, and you have to trust me that this is how this 
will work.”
In June, at the final official meeting I attended, Carlos gave what was, for 
Equatorial Guinea, a wildly radical political speech. He began by repeating, 
indeed hammering, what I have called “the incantation” in this book — the 
contradiction between so much oil wealth and so much poverty. If the re-
source curse was the acceptable way to tell this story in Equatorial Guinea, 
Carlos’s speech offered no such niceties. Rather than relying on the comfort-
able distance of economic theory, he was directly critical of the Equatogu-
inean government. I wondered how government representatives in the au-
dience were taking it. Civil society people I had come to know well over the 
last many months were visibly uncomfortable and squirmed in their chairs. 
“All Equatoguineans are owners of these [hydrocarbon] resources” Carlos 
explained “and, organized as civil society, they can fulfill functions that the 
government should fulfill.” 
Again, in Equatorial Guinea, it was difficult if not impossible to say di-
rectly, in public, and still less in front of government ministers, that there 
were things that the government did not do. Most basically, this was be-
cause you could not criticize them, and more specifically because even the 
imagined state was not a service- providing state. It was a patronage state. 
Services, when provided, were provided through personal connections — 
enchufes into the system, or kin networks. But Carlos carried on about Sen-
dero Luminoso and the trial of Fujimori for corruption and human rights 
abuses. Carlos’s speech again highlights the ways in which the eiti pro-
cess did not stay within the lines of political microscopy, but rather spat up 
politics in the most unanticipated places. Who knew, for instance, that the 
World Bank subcontractor would be the most radical show in town?
When Carlos finished and opened the floor for questions, the first to 
speak was a lower level government functionary, who offered a rhetorical 
question that was in fact a warning to those considering asking actual ques-
tions. He said, in brief, that this eiti meeting was not an opportunity to issue 
personal political complaints. But rather than use the opportunity of Carlos’s 
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politicized speech to do that, members of civil society chose to illustrate the 
chasm between what Carlos narrated of his experience in Peru, and their 
experiences in Equatorial Guinea:
Q You talk about your experience in Peru, but I don’t have anywhere near the 
capacity that you talk about. You say in the Peru case they only invited ngos 
[to participate] whose institutional work already had to do with the themes 
of eiti. eiti was an extension of what they were already doing. If this were 
to be the case here, obviously there would be no eiti (pointing to the fact that 
there are no ngos monitoring government budgets or corruption in Equatorial 
Guinea).
Q I feel like you have given us a very interesting case, and one that is very dif-
ferent from ours. For example, if here only those members of civil society who 
already worked in transparency or fiscal vigilance were to participate, we 
wouldn’t have anyone. I want to say that here we find ourselves in a very dif-
ferent situation.
Rather than mustering a substantive response to these grounded and 
genuine questions, Carlos was basically empathetically dismissive of Equato-
guinean civil society in his exit report for the World Bank and the Equatogu-
inean government: 
It is not difficult to understand that a large number of representatives of civil 
society organizations have seen, in this initiative, an opportunity to obtain 
financial resources to carry out their particular projects. These can range 
from hospital care to artistic events but have nothing to do with issues of 
transparency and accountability. No wonder that some have felt themselves 
“misplaced” when confronted with the real definition of the eiti. . . . They 
are more concerned about what their participation in the eiti- eg can bring 
to them, rather than what they can bring to the country through their par-
ticipation in the Commission.
And indeed, many civil society participants were consistently concerned 
not only with potential revenue for their resource- starved organizations, but 
also with the potential of desplacamientos (small payments, similar to per 
diems) for their personal participation in the process. Just like the practice 
of a second salary for government ministers, who receive a desplacamiento 
for agreeing to speak here or participate there, it seemed perfectly reasonable 
for civil society participants to demand payments for participation, confi-
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dent that this was perhaps the only guaranteed good that could come from 
such a problematic process. Finally, Carlos also reported that although Isa-
bel seemed to be genuinely dedicated to her job and to the eiti process, she 
was radically overextended, and he suggested that the government name a 
full- time eiti director. My own role came up in Carlos’s final report as well:
This consultant finds that the person in charge of the National Coordinating 
Office should have a full- time dedication to her duties. The progress of the 
eiti process in Equatorial Guinea has been favored by the collaboration of 
an American anthropologist, Ms. Hannah Appel, who is in Malabo carrying 
out the field work for her Ph.D. program. Ms. Appel arrived six months ago 
and in six months she will return to her country; her departure will make 
clearer the limitations of the Coordination Office to fulfill its responsibilities.
Over my year of participation in the eiti process, during which I grew 
to be close friends with both Isabel and Sonrisa and gained access to more 
documents, ministries, and US oil company bureaucracies than I could ever 
have anticipated, what I saw more than anything was the messiness and un-
predictability of the eiti process. Certainly, there is government and cor-
porate collusion, and at the same time there are unanticipated spaces of po-
liticization and resistance. This messiness is precisely what ethnography, 
especially in recent decades, is accustomed to finding. But what is all this 
messiness doing? Is it creating interstitial political spaces for dissent and 
friction? Sure, to an extent. Is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive a simple stage for the reproduction of the power of transnational liberal 
political practice? I would say, given the above account, no, to an extent. Not 
only was the process itself messy and ever- far from eiti’s stated goals, but 
by February 2010 — the date set in the Accra meeting for Equatorial Guinea 
to demonstrate sufficient progress to move from a candidate to a compliant 
country — the country was officially delisted from the eiti process. It had 
failed.
Conclusion
Transparency — the ontology in the licit life of capitalism that was supposed 
to be about politics — failed, on its own terms. I want to note the contrast 
here with, for example, the offshore, the contract, or the national economy, 
which despite their own forms of messiness, did not fail, or at least did not 
in Equatorial Guinea. As I wrote of the offshore, it is not the capitalist utopia 
of placeless economic interaction. Rather, it is a teeming and situated social 
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space: men from twenty different countries and seventeen different compa-
nies, consequentially divided by nationality and race; Equatoguineans un-
derpaid and held indefinitely at the level of trainee; and a corporate form so 
multiple and attenuated that, paradoxically, it can seem to disintegrate alto-
gether. But nor is the power of the offshore, or its effects, undone by atten-
tion to this teeming and contentious sociality. So too with contracts, which, 
I contended, render licit blatant forms of neocolonialism; frame multiplici-
ties into legally recognized and politically consequential singularities; and 
change contested political regimes into petro- powerhouses. We can point to 
contracts’ reliance on and manipulation of postcolonial inequality and sov-
ereignty without imagining that these “social explanations” or “historical 
contexts” somehow undo their power. On the contrary, I argued that they 
are constitutive of it. But transparency, that which was meant to address or 
redress or hold accountable some of the excesses to be found in these earlier 
forms, did not work in this same way. As I will argue in the book’s brief af-
terword, liberalism (here in the form of transparency, civil society participa-
tion, and an improved investment climate), especially when mobilized as the 
moral architecture for resistance to transnational corporations, is too much 
in the service of capitalism to work as a trenchant form of politics.3
In 2017, a new General Secretary of eiti Equatorial Guinea was named, 
and the three stakeholder groups — the government, civil society, and the oil 
and gas companies — began to meet again. Indeed, as of June 2017, roughly a 
decade after the above year of work, the government’s website reported that 
“eiti members from Gabon and Equatorial Guinea will receive . . . a train-
ing seminar which will allow their Civil Society Organisations to learn the 
tools and mechanisms for internal handling, and how to carry out fully and 
effectively their missions within the extractive sector, and boost sustainable 
governance in this promising strategic sector.”4 
As the decades wear on, it seems that Equatoguineans remain candidates 
for liberalism. Equatorial Guinea is, in fact, a candidate country, in eiti’s 
language, hoping still to become compliant liberal subjects (again, eiti’s lan-
guage). And this iterative deferral itself reproduces fertile ground for the licit 
life of capitalism in Equatorial Guinea.
AFTERWORD
This book has engaged a specific capitalist project — US oil companies work-
ing off the shores of Equatorial Guinea — to make an argument about global 
capitalism more broadly. Refusing both totalizing theories that attribute to 
capitalism an intrinsic systematicity or logic, and arguments for an endlessly 
varied, specific, and fractured form, this book traces the work required to 
make Equatorial Guinea into an oil- exporting place. In so doing, it attempts 
to show the relationship between capitalism’s coherence and power and the 
radically heterogeneous sites through which those qualities are made — and 
made again. Methodologically, this approach asks us to take the “as  ifs” on 
which capitalism has so long relied — abstraction, decontextualization, and 
standardization — themselves as ethnographic objects, always- haunted as-
pirational processes and political projects that we can follow in the field. 
Rather than an attempt to recover the complexity and friction that those 
concepts famously elide, this is an ethnography of how things come to seem 
smooth, and of how the US oil and gas industry works to seem distanced 
from, and even outside of, Equatoguinean life. It is an ethnography of the 
effects of economic theory, or transparency rankings, or the contract form. 
It is an ethnography that traces the “real world effects of the phantoms” (Po-
vinelli 2006, 13).
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Each chapter — “The Offshore,” “The Enclave,” “The Contract,” “The 
Subcontract,” “The Economy,” “The Political” — chronicles a site where cap-
italism’s apparent smoothness is made, where systematicity is built, and 
where local complexity and heterogeneity are more or less successfully mus-
tered into legibly, and licitly, capitalist practices. Indeed, it is the licit life of 
capitalism — contracts and subcontracts, infrastructures, economic theory, 
corporate enclaves, “transparency” — and the forms of racialized and gen-
dered liberalism on which it relies that allow oil and gas to move from subsea 
deposit to futures price with both mundane reliability and spectacular accu-
mulation. A supple form of vernacular liberalism — most often in the mouths 
of migrant managers, although also present in the eiti process and national 
economy documentation — gives the licit life of capitalism its moral architec-
ture. Law, on the one hand, and densely historical forms of white supremacy 
and heteronormative conjugal intimacy, on the other, offered the US petro- 
project in Equatorial Guinea a performative stage on which to enact distance 
and tutelage, and to peddle standardization and market rationality.
First, a closing thought on law. Each site chronicled in this book — from 
the offshore to transparency — is meaningfully subtended by legal liberalism. 
The law of the sea, international tax law, contract law, labor law, regulatory 
takings, Sarbanes- Oxley, fcpa — each weaves in and out of the industry’s 
daily practice in Equatorial Guinea, not only in the straightforward sense 
as a law to be followed, but also much more circuitously as invocation (“tax 
planning,” “local law”), absence (the archive cemetery and imperial debris), 
and future (revise the legislative framework; reform the judicial system; se-
cure the respect for human rights). The relationship of capitalism to law, 
and to legal liberalism more broadly, is central to the licit. Plainly, many of 
capitalism’s most egregious excesses are lawful, or proceed dans le vrai of the 
law (Pistor 2019). This is precisely what Cheryl Harris (1993) means when she 
writes that “whiteness as property retains its core characteristic: the legal le-
gitimation of expectations of power and control that enshrine the status quo 
as a neutral baseline, while masking the maintenance of white privilege and 
domination” (1715; emphasis added). It is also de Tocqueville’s point, whom 
she quotes: “The United States has accomplished this twofold purpose of ex-
termination of Indians and deprivation of rights, legally, philanthropically, 
and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the 
world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws of human-
ity” (in Harris 1993, 1723; emphasis added).
Second, then, is the intertwined role of race — white supremacy, in partic-
ular — and gender in this supple vernacular liberalism. In Equatorial Guinea’s 
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oil industry, select postcolonial meanings attributed to whiteness, including 
expertise, technology, meritocracy, and philanthropy, worked together with 
the apparent standardization of rigs, subcontracts, economic theory, and 
globe- trotting transparency programs to produce a world in which racial 
discrimination and spatial segregation did not detract from, but added to, 
licit practice; white : nonwhite was semiotically mapped onto standard : cor-
rupt :: global : local. Here, we see the relationship between production shar-
ing contracts and heterosexual white marriage contracts, where the sanctity 
of the latter seems to validate the sovereign violations of the former. All three 
contract forms — pscs, subcontracts, and marriage contracts — disturb fan-
tasies of liberal equality, showing how “the liberal” is made in and by radi-
cal power imbalances always- already available to it. We see that law, gender, 
race, and capitalism are intimately knotted: “Contracts about property in 
the person constitute relations of subordination, even when entry into the 
contracts is voluntary . . . [and] the global racial contract underpins the stark 
disparities of the contemporary world” (Pateman and Mills 2007, 3).
The licit life of capitalism, then, is made at the intersection of technology, 
race, law, gender, materials, markets, and phantom philosophies of liberal-
ism. The global labor market for oil is made in the colonial relationship of 
the Philippines to US shipping and military industries, or Chavez’s firing of 
unionized workers in Venezuela. Supply and demand are made by the mobil-
ity of Jim Crow segregation, apparent in the ability to licitly categorize work-
ers as Third Country Nationals and in the fungibility of ten Filipinos for 
one American. Here, race, gender, empire, and capitalism are co- produced; 
one is not epiphenomenal to the other. Markets do not merely deepen post-
colonial inequality, they are made by that inequality. It is in this argument 
that this book is most clearly indebted both to feminist approaches to capi-
talism and to the Black radical tradition, which have long argued (in their 
own ways) that our bodies, histories, socialities, and conscriptions are not 
epiphenomenal, peripheral, or merely affected by something called capital-
ism. Rather, those histories and embodiments of inequality, exploitation, 
and difference are the grounds for arbitrage; the grounds for profit- seeking; 
the grounds for ownership, property, and dispossession; and the grounds, of 
course, for resistance.
Neither the Black radical tradition nor feminist political economy can be 
narrowly defined as bodies of scholarship. Both traditions emanate from “the 
modern project of emancipation” (Hudson 2016; see also Kelley 2003). I end, 
then, with a note on my own commitments to emancipation and the ques-
tion of this book’s contribution. If anthropological knowing has been a mode 
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of power, then we must know more about that which we need more power 
over. Consequently, as I wrote in the introduction, it was capitalism — its 
ideologies and institutions, people and dreams, ecologies and erasures — 
 that I took as my ethnos. Methodologically, the book’s chapters suggest eth-
nographic thresholds for the anthropological study of capitalism. In some, I 
tread well- worn ground — on transparency, for instance — but in others, like 
the contract or the national economy form, there is much work still to do. 
So there are hopeful programmatics here — that more richly ethnographic 
accounts of the daily life of capitalism will help us reimagine it. I am also 
aware, however, of my ambivalent belief in anthropological knowing — and 
scholarship more broadly — as a form of power. In the field, I saw again and 
again how the resource curse or social science on corrupt African states had 
powerful effects in the world, and powerful teeth in the mouths of trans-
national corporations, to invoke Simpson’s (2014) framework that I used in 
the introduction. But, to be frank, the types of anthropology and critical the-
ory that have long insisted on complexity, contingency, critiques of patriar-
chy, or racism did not seem to have the same liveliness in the field. They did 
not wield the same power. Thus, on the one hand, I insist that we trace the 
work of simplifications and systematization as themselves ethnographic ob-
jects. On the other hand, I want to harbor no illusions about the work theory 
does in the world, that is, the work it does and does not do when confronted 
with the world. Simply because capitalism is a project, for instance, does not 
mean that it can be undone simply. As I wrote in the introduction, bringing 
capitalism’s otherwises into being is a profound challenge that requires much 
more than simply calling it a project. 
I have committed myself increasingly to this particular challenge in the 
thirteen years since I began this research (see Appel 2012a, 2012b, 2015, 2019). 
With each passing year I am, on the one hand, more aware of the difficul-
ties of this work — that it can only be realized in immanent and incremental 
worldly action, that it both demands collectivity and exposes the excruciat-
ing fractures of solidarity. And thus, on the other hand, I am more thankful 
for the creative refuge of paid and insured intellectual life. But living and 
working in these worlds simultaneously, I often worry that anthropologi-
cal analysis, which often tacitly (and sometimes explicitly) presents itself 
as radical, seems to suggest that we know the answers — that we know how 
radical social change might proceed. My ongoing experiences as an activist 
have destabilized that conviction for me. Intellectual endeavor is one place 
where we can bask in the fullness of radical visions and radical critique but 
we must never forget the limits they meet beyond the page and, in my opin-
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ion, always commit ourselves to pushing those limits by putting ourselves 
beyond the page as well.
Beyond the page, we live in a world where the nexus of capitalism, ver-
nacular liberalism, and white supremacy explored in this book — market ra-
tionality, legal regimes, contracts and those they privilege — is hegemonic. 
This means that “no strategy credibly poses a direct threat to the system in 
the sense that there are good grounds for believing that adopting it will gen-
erate effects in the near future that would really threaten capitalism. This 
is what it means to live in a hegemonic capitalist system: capitalism is suffi-
ciently secure and flexible in its basic structures that there is no strategy pos-
sible that immediately threatens it” (Wright 2010, 332). Thus, when people 
ask me, wouldn’t a liberal Equatorial Guinea, with free and fair elections, an 
end to dictatorship and impunity, respect for human rights, be better than 
today’s illiberal (or antiliberal) Equatorial Guinea? Wouldn’t oil companies 
that follow environmental laws and desegregate workforces be better? The 
answer to these questions is, of course. Of course we succumb to the banal 
seduction of liberal projects. But for me, those commitments should be made 
warily and partially, not least because of the deep betrayals of justice that 
subtend the liberal orders within which these reforms make their demands. 
We might also commit ourselves warily to liberal reforms because liberal-
ism is felicitous in a liberal world. Liberal demands allow legible victories, 
like changing laws and changing regimes and voting for a better goddamn 
representative. And yet, at the same time, we can also commit ourselves to 
the fullness of radical projects: the scope of their vision, the depth of their 
analysis, their slow simmer and occasional explosion into public conscious-
ness. These projects are antiracist and antipatriarchal and, for me, anticapi-
talist and antiliberal, in the historical sense that liberalism as exclusion and 
dispossession presented itself to me, in Equatorial Guinea. The legible vic-
tories here are fewer and farther between, and when they are legible, it is of-
ten because they have been yoked to liberalism — a law changed, a candidate 
defeated. But the space they offer, which is to imagine otherwise, to articu-
late, enact, and embody it slowly and stutteringly, is as expansive as the open 
ocean, seen from above.
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Introduction
1. This sentence, like the rest of the book, rests on the work of many people. To 
start, I will simply point out three. First, I refer you to Karen Ho’s (2014) discussion 
of Andrew Orta’s 2014 article on business students abroad, in which she asserts that 
capitalism is not a context. Second, in Anna Tsing’s work on projects, she defines them 
as “organized packages of ideas and practices that assume an at least tentative stabil-
ity through their social enactment, whether as custom, convention, trend, clubbish 
or professional training, institutional mandate, or government policy. A project is an 
institutionalized discourse with social and material effects” (Tsing 2001, 4; see also 
Tsing 2000a, 2000b). Finally, Édouard Glissant (1989) refers to the West as a project, 
not a place. Insofar as capitalism has been central to the project of the West, the ma-
terial in this book demonstrates the same. 
2. This argument is in direct dialogue with Robinson (1983), who shows how race, 
in particular, is a form of difference that long predated capitalism in European soci-
ety and, thus, was widely available to it as a commonsense way to differentiate and 
(de)value — to the point of enslavement — labor, especially. As he writes: “The ten-
dency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but 
to differentiate — to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into 
‘racial’ ones. As the Slavs became the natural slaves, the racially inferior stock for 
domination and exploitation during the early middle ages, as the Tartars came to oc-
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cupy a similar position in the Italian cities of the late middle ages, so at the systemic 
interlocking of capitalism in the sixteenth century, the peoples of the Third World 
began to fill this expanding category of a civilization reproduced by capitalism” (26). 
Robinson uses the term “racial capitalism” (2) to capture this ongoing history and 
agency of racial differentiation as a material force. This book aims to contribute to 
the intellectual and political project of racial capitalism by showing how many of 
the general forms and processes on which capitalism relies — the offshore, contracts, 
infrastructures, something called “the” economy — are made by various forms of 
(de)valued difference including, but not limited to, race and gender.
3. Butler (1993) writes that performativity should focus on “the process of materi-
alization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface 
we call matter” (9). See also Callon 2007 on “performation.”
4. The people I refer to in this paragraph as “itinerant oil company management” 
are high- level managers for the overseas subsidiaries of the US- based companies on 
which this book focuses. As I will go on to detail, during my fieldwork in Equatorial 
Guinea, these were exclusively white men from the US or Western Europe. In earlier 
drafts of this manuscript I referred to them as expatriate managers, which is a term 
they use, and a term that I, in turn, had used uncritically. Now, however, I have cho-
sen to use the terms “itinerant” and “migrant” to describe them, only using “expat” 
or “expatriate” where it was someone’s actual usage (including my own) in Equatorial 
Guinea. I have made this shift because “expatriate” is a racialized term that essentially 
refers to the relative ease of white global mobility, based on the ongoing colonial ad-
vantage secured by European nations. Migrant, by contrast, is also a racialized term 
but refers to the relative difficulty of nonwhite mobility. Thus I refer to these managers 
as migrants as opposed to expatriates in order to denaturalize both terms and draw 
attention to their racialized constitution. In this choice, I draw on the work of Mon-
gia (1999); Neumayer (2006); Andrucki (2010); and Mau et al. (2015). I have also relied 
heavily on Achiume (2019), who writes: “First World citizens have far greater capa-
city for lawful international mobility relative to their Third World counterparts, even 
setting aside questions of personal financial means. One’s nationality determines the 
range of one’s freedom of movement in a way that completely belies frequent claims 
that assert or imply that all persons are equally without the right of freedom of inter-
national movement in our global order. This is because of the robust web of multi-
lateral and bilateral visa agreements that privilege First World passport holders and 
pre- authorize their movement across the globe. . . . Freedom of movement is, in effect, 
politically determined and racially differentiated. . . . And because of the persisting 
racial demographics that distinguish the First World from the Third — demograph-
ics that are a significant product of passports, national borders, and other successful 
institutions partially originated as technologies of racialized exclusion — most whites 
enjoy dramatically greater rights to freedom of international movement, by which I 
mean travel across borders, than most nonwhites.”
5. I use “Guinean” and “Equatoguinean” interchangeably to refer to people from 
Equatorial Guinea. “Guinean” is closer to local usage, where Guineano/a refers to an 
Equatoguinean national; however, because there is a separate country called Guinea 
Notes to Chapter One 287
(often referred to as Guinea- Conakry), this usage can be confusing outside national 
borders. Thus, I interchange it with Equatoguinean.
6. More recent histories characterize Río Muni as having a greater part in global 
trade and colonial connections, with active timber and rubber trade by German and 
British firms from the 1890s forward, and a vast labor- recruiting network with Li-
berian, Portuguese, and coastal Ndowe agents (Nerín 2010; Martino 2016a, 2018b). 
7. See Mamdani 1996 on the colonial and postcolonial history of forced labor on 
the continent. See Martino 2016a for more details on the Equatoguinean/Nigerian 
situation.
8. Dictadura is dictatorship in Spanish. Dura means hard, where blanda means 
soft. Thus, dictadura to dictablanda refers to the softening of the dictatorship.
9. Kirsch (2014) offers a powerful account of this moment in the transnational 
mining industry, arguing that, from this moment, “the dialectical relationship be-
tween corporations and their critics has become a permanent structural feature of 
neoliberal capitalism” (3).
10. See Kirsch (2014), who writes about “Not another OK Tedi,” and Bond’s (2013) 
work about change in the oil industry as an ongoing response to disasters of their 
own making.
11. For more recent and detailed accounts of the political situation in Equato-
rial Guinea, including the six- month detention of political cartoonist Ramón Esono 
Ebalé, or the internet blockage and oppositions arrests leading up to the November 
2017 elections, see resources on the EG Justice website: https://www.egjustice.org/.
12. In their “Feminist Manifesto for the Study of Capitalism,” Bear et al. (2015) call 
these assemblages formalizations or conversions through which “diverse social and 
economic projects come to appear coherent despite the heterogeneous, disaggregated 
practices from which they are constituted.” 
13. For resonant approaches see Appadurai 2003, and the Miller / Callon debate: Cal-
lon 1998, Miller 2002, Callon 2005, and Miller response 2005; see also Bear et al. 2015.
14. Quantitatively, flaring is measured in million cubic feet per day; for the largest 
producer in Equatorial Guinea, it averaged around 75 million cubic feet/day between 
January and April 2007 off of one platform (internal document).
15. On modularity as an ethnographic object, see Appel 2012c. 
16. Ansley (1989) defines white supremacy as “a political, economic, and cultural 
system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, con-
scious and unconscious ideas of white superiority are widespread, and relations of 
white dominance and non- white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad 
array of institutions and social settings” (1024). This is the definition I use through-
out the book.
1. The Offshore
1. All company and personal names are pseudonyms, here and throughout the book. 
2. In general, access to offshore infrastructure for any amount of time was quite 
difficult for me to arrange and required months of relationship building and anticipa-
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tory research with the company in question. Once I gained hard- won access for my 
twelve- hour visit to the fipco, I sought to organize return trips. Significant to the 
larger argument I develop in this book, by the time I did so, that rig had already been 
contracted by a different company and had changed locations at sea.
3. See Nixon 2011 on slow violence, and Hughes 2017 on the argument that the oil 
industry is most dangerous when it is working normally. 
4. Of course, government officials in Equatorial Guinea and elsewhere are often 
complicit in this vast transfer of funds. Ghana — the next major African offshore oil 
exporter — has chosen a different approach to this issue and has been working with 
Barclays Bank since 2005 to establish itself as a tax haven (Mathiason 2009).
5. Thanks to the dissertation writers’ seminar led by Sylvia Yanagisako in 2009 
for pushing me in this direction.
6. Transfer pricing refers to the practices by which legally related entities (a parent 
corporation and its subsidiaries, for example) negotiate cost and payment for goods 
and services among subsidiaries. Transfer pricing becomes a consequential practice 
because taxable income is determined based on net profit, giving companies an incen-
tive to inflate costs and pay exorbitant rates to their subsidiaries in order to minimize 
their tax burdens.
7. The incessant finger- pointing among bp, Halliburton, and TransOcean in the 
wake of the Deepwater Horizon conflagration demonstrates this insight in practice. 
8. mend is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (see Adunbi 
2015; Kashi and Watts 2008). As a northern neighbor of Equatorial Guinea, and ef-
fectively sharing productive offshore waters, every time there was a serious uptick of 
violence in Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea would go on high alert. The “intel” grapevine 
would start buzzing with rumors that an attack was also planned on EG, the strategy 
being that the Nigerian government had stopped paying attention to militant action 
within their borders, so fighters were going to carry out attacks outside of Nigeria to 
regrab the attention of their own nation.
9. Thanks to Ramah McKay (personal communication) for encouraging me to 
explore this line of thinking. I only wish that my data bore out the generosity her com-
ments suggested was part of these managers’ statements.
10. During eighteen months of fieldwork, I only encountered one female rig 
worker. The offshore oil industry is an exceptionally patriarchal space.
11. Although my rig visit in Equatorial Guinea predated the 2010 Deepwater Ho-
rizon conflagration, that disaster forcefully brought these potentialities into the con-
sciousness of a wider American, and arguably international, public. See Bond 2011, 
2013. 
2. The Enclave
1. “The wives” is an emic label that these women used to refer collectively to them-
selves. The great majority of the women who played cards were in Equatorial Guinea 
because they were married to migrant male managers in the oil and gas industry. 
Others who played were married to male diplomats or men in oil services companies. 
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Thus, “wives” made sense to them as a collective category. Among the regular group 
of women — a rotating cast of approximately fifty at any given time — there was only 
one whose presence in the country wasn’t primarily defined (by her or others around 
her) as an accompaniment to her husband. This was “Joyce,” a Chinese migrant who 
had come to Equatorial Guinea in the mid- 1990s to open a Chinese food restaurant. 
While her husband was indeed with her, as he was the cook, she was the social and 
commercial face of the business. When referring to this group of women in this chap-
ter, when appropriate, I use their term, “the wives,” although it is one of the purposes 
of this chapter to think through their modes of being — gendered, secondary, and 
otherwise — in Equatorial Guinea.
2. The three large enclaves I discuss here are by no means the only oil or oil- 
related compounds in the country. As the industry exploded in Equatorial Guinea 
and more companies came in every day, small walled complexes began springing up 
everywhere. But these companies are smaller, often related to Smith, Major, or En-
durance through subcontracting relationships discussed at length in chapter 4. With 
fewer in- country employees, their compounds were also noticeably different. They 
were generally located in affluent residential neighborhoods of Malabo, often recog-
nizable by high walls, razor wire, and uniformed security. These complexes housed 
between three and fifteen migrant employees at any given time, and were often more 
incorporated into the communities around them, both architecturally and in terms 
of the circulation of their personnel. The men and occasional woman in these com-
panies went into town more often and certainly fraternized outside their walls more, 
even if simply to go to another compound, usually the big ones that I deal with here, 
which became migrant management social centers. While these smaller develop-
ments are interesting and were an increasing presence in Malabo during my time 
there, I don’t discuss them explicitly in this chapter except to note here that they ex-
ist, and that the lifestyles of the people who work in them can be somewhat different 
than what I describe. In terms of business practices, because they are subcontractors 
or consortia investors for Endurance, Major, or Smith, their ring- fencing is largely 
taken care of by being under the wing of a larger operating company.
3. See Pierre 2013 for whiteness as a form of increased mobility through securi-
tized spaces in postcolonial Ghana. 
4. Given the centrality of state- sponsored violence to trade in this era, Beckert 
(2015) encourages us to replace “mercantilism” with War Capitalism, which “better 
expresses [the period’s] rawness and violence as well as its intimate connection to 
European imperial expansion.” His rereading of Marx’s original accumulation and 
rethinking of mercantilism relies on the scholarship of the black radical tradition, 
including Willams 1944. See Hudson 2017b for a critique. 
5. On the centrality of Africa and the African diaspora to capitalism (and critical 
rereadings of Marx on primitive accumulation), see James 1963; Robinson 1983; and 
Johnson and Kelley 2017. 
6. See Martino 2017 for resistance among nonunionized, colonial recruited labor 
in Equatorial Guinea.
7. After Obiang’s overthrow of Macías in 1979, the bienes abandonados decree 
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stipulated that during a specified time period, Spaniards who had abandoned “their” 
land under Macías could return to recuperate it, although they were no longer rec-
ognized as owners and were asked to buy the land back from the new regime. Some 
Spaniards returned, purchased land, and resumed work, mostly in agriculture. But 
in many (if not most) cases, the Spanish were not able to repossess their land, even 
if they were willing to pay for it, especially those with property in or near the city, or 
with particularly valuable holdings like Punta Europa. In general, those who returned 
slowly realized that there was no juridical guarantee of stability for their land tenure, 
even having successfully reclaimed ownership. Many began returning to Spain. The 
decree was widely understood as having multiple motives, including not only revenue 
for a new regime whose treasury had been raided by departing settlers, but also the 
official transfer of many of the most valuable holdings into the hands of Obiang and 
his new cohort of leaders. Punta Europa has belonged to Obiang as private property 
since this time.
8. Working for the Clinton White House, J. Paul Bremer served as the leader of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (cpa) in Iraq from May 2003 until June 2004, fol-
lowing the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States.
9. See Introduction note 4 for the meaningful distinction between migrant and 
expatriate and how I use these terms in the book. 
10. On white ambivalence in charity and development work, see Elisha 2008 and 
Kowal 2015. On the thinness of white ambivalence as a form of narcissism that only 
buttresses white privilege and supremacy, see Heron 2007 and Goudge 2003. On race, 
whiteness, and blackness in the development industry and Africa more broadly, see 
Pierre 2013.
11. Prohibitions on public transport were company policy for all migrant workers, 
though perhaps only enforced by and among managerial levels. These policies were 
not specific to women. Prohibitions on or permissions for driving private/company 
cars for men varied with their position in the company.
12. On histories of intra- European or white racialization, see Robinson 1983; 
Brodkin 1998; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 2018. 
3. The Contract
1. Zalik (2009) writes of subcontracted Mexican oil workers that they too “are of-
ten denied severance pay supposedly guaranteed under contract” (573).
2. On concessionary companies, see Bouteillier 1903; Coquery- Vidrovitch 1972; 
Cantournet 1991; and Hardin 2011. 
3. The opening four “Recitals” of the sample production sharing contract 
(República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2006b) specify this ownership regime, starting with 
the first: “whereas all Hydrocarbons existing within the territory of the Republic 
of Equatorial Guinea, as set forth in the Hydrocarbons Law, are national resources 
owned exclusively by the state” (1). The following three recitals go on to say that the 
state wants to develop hydrocarbon deposits within a specific contract area; the con-
tractor has the financial, technical, and professional ability to do so; thus, the state 
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and the contractor enter into this agreement. This ownership regime is also con-
secrated in Equatorial Guinea’s Hydrocarbon Law (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 
2006a), which begins: “The fundamental Law of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 
consecrates and designates as the property of the people of Equatorial Guinea all re-
sources found in our national territory, including the subsoil, continental shelf, is-
lands, and the Exclusive Economic Zone of our seas. It is by the mandate and delega-
tion of the people, to whom these resources legitimately belong, that the Government 
undertakes to manage them.”
4. For this reason, as Latour (2005) argues, we cannot offer a “social” explanation, 
but must instead offer an account of “reassembling the social” itself.
5. See Hale 1923 and Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979 for classic accounts of this 
argument. See Banaji 2003 for a historical materialist account.
6. The company- as- party listing in the sample psc reads: “[insert name], a 
company organized and existing under the laws of [insert jurisdiction], under 
a company registration number [insert number], and having its registered office 
at [insert address], (hereinafter referred to as [the Company]), represented for the 
purposes of this Contract by [insert name], in his capacity as [insert position]” 
(República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2006b, 1).
7. See Sawyer 2006 on this dual potential of corporate personhood. 
8. Until its merger with pnc Financial Services in 2005, Riggs Bank was a venera-
ble Washington, DC, financial firm. Its two major lines of business were Private Bank-
ing, “financial services provided exclusively to wealthy individuals,” and a specialized 
area known as Embassy Banking. Riggs opened and administered accounts to “more 
than 95% of the foreign missions and embassies located throughout the Washington 
metropolitan area” (Coleman and Levin 2004, 13).
9. In another egregious regional example of the contract as a vehicle for liability 
denial, in 2009, a group of Nigerian citizens took Chevron to court in an attempt to 
hold the company responsible for the murder of their relatives on an offshore plat-
form. “The Company” was easily able to claim that it was a nonsovereign entity op-
erating under legal and contractual conditions, which absolved them from security 
outcomes even on their own platforms (Michael Watts, personal communication).
10. See Harris 1993 for the ways in which transformative liberal legal precedent — 
Brown v. Board of Education — enshrined the white supremacist status quo as the neu-
tral baseline under the sign of newfound equality. 
11. “To include a country on the index, Transparency International analyzes at 
least three reliable data sources from credible organizations. This year, the anticor-
ruption organization was unable to find a third source of information for Equatorial 
Guinea. The absence of one single source such as the African Development Bank 
made it impossible to get the necessary three sources to be ranked compared to last 
year’s available sources. Compare this to neighboring Cameroon (ranked toward the 
bottom of the index at 136th), where Transparency International was able to identify 
eight reliable data sources” (http://www.egjustice.org/post/eg- too- opaque- rank- 0). 
12. “The antibribery provisions of the fcpa make it unlawful for a U.S. person, 
and certain foreign issuers of securities, to make a corrupt payment to a foreign offi-
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cial for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing busi-
ness to, any person. Since 1998, they also apply to foreign firms and persons who take 
any act in furtherance of such a corrupt payment while in the United States. The 
fcpa also requires companies whose securities are listed in the United States to meet 
its accounting provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m. These accounting provisions, which 
were designed to operate in tandem with the antibribery provisions of the fcpa, re-
quire corporations covered by the provisions to make and keep books and records 
that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions of the corporation and to devise and 
maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls” (http://www.justice 
.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay- persons- guide.pdf).
13. The brief legal history in this paragraph is based on conversations with this 
judge, a series of lawyers, and the scant legal history available, including Liniger- 
Goumaz 2000, and Campos Serrano and Micó Abogo 2006. On archives in Equato-
rial Guinea, see Martino 2014 and Enrique Martino’s incredible Open Archives Proj-
ect: opensourceguinea.org. 
4. The Subcontract
1. On contemporary body shopping practices, see Aneesh 2006; McKay 2007; 
2014; Biao 2006; and Parreñas 2008, 2015. 
2. On racial capitalism in particular, and a summary of the Black Radical Tradi-
tion, see Robinson 1983. For more recent work that explores the relationship between 
racialization and transnational capitalist processes, see Hoang 2015; Hudson 2017a 
and b; and Beckert 2015. 
3. Again, back to chapter 1, note here that the dispersed corporate geographies and 
liability- dissemination practices are definitive not only of the large operating compa-
nies, but of the oil services companies as well. Laurel’s finance manager described this 
setup as “the ‘legal’ way to do whatever they want with their money. They can declare 
some. They cannot declare some. It’s not double accounting, but handling things the 
way they want, creating their own fiscal paradises.”
4. Here “the party” refers to pdge — the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea, 
or Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial. This is the president’s political party, 
and membership therein was widely considered a requisite for any kind of gainful 
employment.
5. The Economy
1. As of 2018, credit and atm cards were far more useful and (with still- declining 
oil prices and production) petty theft more common.
2. See Mitchell 2002 on this phenomenon with Egyptian cotton.
3. In Equatorial Guinea, the issue of where the administration is — Malabo or 
Bata — is for many people tied up with the Fang/non- Fang (biloblob) question. While 
the colonial capitol is Malabo, many suggest that Obiang privileges administrative 
presence and infrastructural development in Bata, and on the continent more gener-
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ally, out of fealty to Fang people. While the Fang remain the demographic majority 
in Malabo as well, the island’s rural inhabitants are mostly Bubi.
4. On whiteness, racial meaning- making, and development, see Pierre 2013; Crewe 
and Fernando 2006; Leonard 2010; Kothari 2006; and Kowal 2015. 
5. The first paragraph of the 2007 conference’s printed material starts with a sum-
mary of these looming futures. After noting that Equatorial Guinea has experienced 
unprecedented growth over the last ten years, a caution: “This growth is fragile, and 
based entirely on petroleum, whose productive peak will be reached in less than five 
years, while agriculture, which flourished in the past, is in decline and new sectors are 
not emerging” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2007a, 9). Even in the first National 
Economic Conference in 1997, when oil was the unanticipated solution to Equatorial 
Guinea’s two decades of independent economic disaster, the resource curse cast its 
shadow: “Today a brilliant star has risen over Equatorial Guinea, that lights the way 
for all of our aspirations toward the progress and development of the nation. . . . The 
current economic moment invites us to examine the negative experiences of other 
countries whose goals have been frustrated in the use of their natural resources, and 
those who have been successful” (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 1997, 2).
6. The Spanish and French Cultural Centers sold a handful of books, and each 
had a small library accessible free to students. There were no private bookstores or 
public libraries. See also Williams 2011.
7. Throwing money, like “making it rain” in parts of US hip- hop culture or 
“shower money” at Nigerian weddings, is a recognized way to publicly display re-
lations of patronage and hierarchy in Equatorial Guinea and beyond. Despite this 
recognizable ritual character, however, the Equatoguinean friends with whom I was 
watching the news that day were enraged by Teodorín’s gesture and turned off the 
television in disgust.
8. Indeed, it had the mbas without Borders fantasizing about something so sepa-
rate from state control as to sound like the “informal economy”: “Here, it’s hard for 
a business to be legitimate, even if they want to be. It just means they get taxed and 
abused more. It’s almost better to be under the radar, almost better not to have those 
connections. Our idea now is just to build small companies which will specialize in 
something, and, from that, find a model that the other companies will follow. We’re 
trying to help build a market, generate some competition, good old capitalism.”
9. Koz2Rim song translated from French: “In our days, honor is dead / and only 
the cfa is left standing. / To sell a homeland to the highest bidder / banks defrauded 
as ministers and the state fill their pockets and leave us nothing. / They cruise around, 
all of them, in Porsches.”
6. The Political
1. “Even as the World Bank and others turned away from hardline neoliberalism 
in the wake of structural adjustment, information problems remained the key to guid-
ing the developing world out of poverty” (Hetherington 2011, 5).
2. The widespread dissatisfaction, even among economists, with gdp as a mea-
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sure of national economy is a compelling analogue here, and perhaps more than ana-
logue insofar as the abstractions in each case are substantively the same.
3. See James 1963; Sartori 2014; and Robinson 1983, chapter 9, for contrasting con-
clusions and discussions about the radical potentials of liberalism within capitalism.
4. “Inicio del seminario sobre Democracia y Buena Gobernabilidad de la eiti,” 
Equatorial Guinea government website, July 6, 2017, https://www.guineaecuatorial 
press.com/noticia.php?id=9856.
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